

# Measuring Relative Accuracy of Malware Detectors in the Absence of Ground Truth

John Charlton

 Depart. of Computer Science  
 UT San Antonio

Pang Du

 Depart. of Statistics  
 Virginia Tech

Jin-Hee Cho

 Depart. of Computer Science  
 Virginia Tech

Shouhuai Xu

 Depart. of Computer Science  
 UT San Antonio

**Abstract**—In this paper, we measure the *relative* accuracy of malware detectors in the *absence* of ground truth regarding the quality of malware detectors (i.e., the detection accuracy) or the class of sample files, (i.e., malicious or benign). In particular, we are interested in measuring the *ordinal* scale of malware detectors in the absence of the ground truth of their actual detection quality. To this end, we propose an algorithm to estimate the relative accuracy of the malware detectors. Based on synthetic data with known ground truth, we characterize when the proposed algorithm leads to accurately estimating the relative accuracy of the malware detectors. We show the measured relative accuracy of real-world malware detectors using our proposed algorithm based on a real dataset consisting of 10.7 million files and 62 malware detectors, obtained from VirusTotal.

**Index Terms**—Malware detection, security metrics, security measurement, ground truth, estimation, statistical estimators.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Measuring security metrics is a vital but challenging open research problem that has not been well addressed. The major problems in measuring security metrics are two-fold: (1) *what to measure*, which questions how to define new, useful security metrics; and (2) *how to measure*, which asks how to devise new methods to measure security metrics. In this work, we are interested in answering the latter question, *how to measure* a security metric where the ground truth does not exist for the detection accuracy of a malware detector as well as for the class (i.e., malicious or benign) of the files.

When measuring the quality of malware detectors, many methods have been used based on certain heuristics such as using the labels of a few malware detectors as ground truth [1, 2, 3]. These heuristic-based approaches are troublesome because of the well-known fact that each malware detector has a different quality of detection accuracy. Although some methods have been proposed to answer *how to measure* security metrics [4, 5], measuring the relative accuracy of malware detectors has not been addressed in existing works. In particular, this work is inspired by our prior work [4] which measured the quality of malware detectors assuming that a voting-based estimation of detection accuracy is true. Unlike [4], this work aims to estimate the *relative* accuracy of malware detectors, which are obtained without making the

assumptions that were made in [4]. Although the relative accuracy of malware detectors is weaker than the absolute accuracy, it is still useful in regards to comparing malware detectors. Therefore, this paper aims at answering the following research question: “How can we rank the accuracy of malware detectors in the absence of ground truth?”

This work has the following **key contributions**: (i) This study offers a method to formulate how to estimate the *relative accuracy* of malware detectors. This method can be used when one needs to choose one malware detector over others; and (ii) The proposed algorithm measuring the relative detection accuracy of a malware detector is validated based on a real world malware dataset consisting of 62 detectors, given synthetic data with known ground truth values.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the overview of the related state-of-the-art approaches. Section III presents a problem statement and our proposed methodology to solve the given problem. Section IV describes the experimental setup and results, with the discussion of key findings. Section V concludes the paper and suggests future research directions.

## II. RELATED WORK

In practice, obtaining ground truth is highly challenging and almost not feasible due to high noise, uncertain data, and/or the inherent nature of imperfect estimation. For example, when using machine learning techniques to train cyber defense models, we need to know the ground truth labels of training samples. For a small set of samples, we can use human experts to grade them and derive their ground truth. However, even in this case, the perfect evaluation is not guaranteed because humans are also error-prone and can make mistakes due to their inherent cognitive limitations. Accordingly, for a large set of samples, it is obviously not feasible for human experts to derive the ground truth. Therefore, it is true that many third-party datasets (e.g., blacklisted websites [6, 7, 8, 9]) are not necessarily trustworthy due to these inherent limitations.

Several studies have been conducted in order to investigate the accuracy of malware detectors when there exists no ground truth of their accuracy [4, 5, 10, 11]. These studies used different assumptions in order to estimate the accuracy of the malware detectors. Kantchelian et al. [5] used the naïve Bayesian method and treated the unknown ground truth labels as hidden variables, while the Expectation-Maximization (EM)

This work is done when Jin-Hee Cho was with US Army Research Laboratory.

method [10, 11] is used to estimate the accuracy of malware detectors using well-known metrics such as false-positive rate, false-negative rate, or accuracy. In [5], the authors assumed the homogeneity of false positives in all detectors, an independent decision of each detector, and low false positives but high false negatives assumed for all detectors, and so forth. However, these assumptions should be removed in order to reflect real world applications. Xu et al. [4] used a *frequentist* approach to design a statistical metric estimator to measure the quality metrics of malware detectors with only two of the four assumptions made in [5]. All the above works [4, 5, 10, 11] make certain assumptions. In contrast, the present paper investigates the relative accuracy of malware detectors without making those assumptions.

The paper falls into the study of security metrics, which is an integral part of the Cybersecurity Dynamics framework [12, 13] and indeed one of the most fundamental open problems that have yet to be adequately tackled [14]. Recent advancement in security metrics includes [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]. For example, the effectiveness of firewalls and DMZs is studied in [18] and the effectiveness of enforcing network-wide software diversity is investigated in [17]. Orthogonal to security metrics research are the first-principle modeling of cybersecurity from a holistic perspective [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and cybersecurity data analytics [31, 32, 33, 34, 35].

### III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND METHODOLOGY

#### A. Definitions of Relative Accuracy of Malware Detectors

Suppose that there are  $m$  files, denoted by  $F_1, \dots, F_j, \dots, F_m$  and  $n$  malware detectors, denoted by  $D_1, \dots, D_i, \dots, D_n$ . The input dataset is represented by a matrix  $V = (V_{ij})_{1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq j \leq m}$ , which is defined where

$$V_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } D_i \text{ detects } F_j \text{ as malicious,} \\ 0 & \text{if } D_i \text{ detects } F_j \text{ as benign,} \\ -1 & \text{if } D_i \text{ did not scan } F_j. \end{cases}$$

Vector  $V_i = (V_{i1}, \dots, V_{ij}, \dots, V_{im})$ , where  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , represents the outcome of using detector  $D_i$  to label  $m$  files.

With respect to a set of  $n$  detectors, the relative accuracy of detector  $i$ , denoted by  $T_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , is defined over interval  $[0, 1]$ , where 0 means the minimum degree (i.e., a zero degree) of *relative accuracy* while 1 indicates the maximum degree of *relative accuracy*.

**Definition 1: (Properties of relative accuracy)** For a given set of files and a fixed set of  $n$  detectors, the relative accuracy of detector  $i$ , denoted by  $T_i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , is defined based on the labels assigned by the  $n$  detectors (including detector  $i$  itself). For simplicity, we define  $T_i$  as a real number in the range  $[0, 1]$ .

We stress that the *relative accuracy* metric does not measure the true accuracy or trustworthiness of detectors. For example, consider three detectors  $D_1, D_2$ , and  $D_3$ , with respective true accuracy, 90%, 80%, or 70%. In this work, our goal is *not* to measure the accuracy of each detector. Instead, based on the labels of files assigned by these three detectors, we are

more interested in knowing which detector is more accurate than others, leading to generating the ranks of examined detectors. Based on our proposed methodology, we obtain their respective relative accuracy as  $T_1 = 100\%$ ,  $T_2 = 90\%$ , and  $T_3 = 70\%$ , which gives the performance of relative accuracy of the detectors:  $D_1 > D_2 > D_3$ . However, the relative accuracy does not approximate the true accuracy. Moreover, when we consider a set of files scanned by detectors,  $D_1, D_2, D_3$ , and  $D_4$ , letting the true accuracy of  $D_1$ - $D_3$  remain the same while the true accuracy of  $D_4$  is 95%, then the resulting relative accuracy may be  $T_1 = 80\%$ ,  $T_2 = 60\%$ ,  $T_3 = 50\%$ , and  $T_4 = 100\%$ . This leads to the relative accuracy of the detectors being  $D_4 > D_1 > D_2 > D_3$ . This is because the detector with the highest *relative accuracy* is always normalized to have a relative accuracy of 100% and the relative accuracy is always measured over a set of detectors.

#### B. Methodology

The basic underlying idea of estimating the relative accuracy of malware detectors is to measure the similarity between each pair of detectors. To do so, we iteratively create the relative accuracy of the malware detectors, given that the initial relative accuracy of each detector is set to 1, assuming that each detector is equally accurate.

1) *Similarity Matrix*: To measure the relative accuracy of detectors, the concept of a *similarity matrix* is introduced to collectively represent the similarity between malware detectors according to their decisions in labeling files as benign or malicious. In this matrix, denoted by  $\mathbf{S} = (S_{ik})$ , the  $i$ -th row corresponds to detector  $D_i$  and the  $k$ -th column corresponds to detector  $D_k$ , where  $1 \leq i, k \leq n$ . Element  $S_{ik}$  denotes the similarity between detectors  $D_i$  and  $D_k$  in terms of their capabilities in detecting malware. Naturally, we require (i)  $S_{ik} = S_{ki}$  because the similarity should be symmetric; and (ii)  $S_{ii} = 1$  for any  $1 \leq i \leq n$ . Intuitively, the similarity between  $D_i$  and  $D_k$ ,  $S_{ik}$ , is defined by the ratio of the number of decisions where  $D_i$  and  $D_k$  agree with each other over the total number of files scanned by both detectors,  $D_i$  and  $D_k$ .

To clearly define  $S_{ik}$  in a modular fashion, two auxiliary matrices are defined: the *agreement matrix*, denoted by  $\mathbf{A} = (A_{ik})_{1 \leq i, k \leq n}$ , and the *count matrix*, denoted by  $\mathbf{C} = (C_{ij})_{1 \leq i, k \leq n}$ . Intuitively,  $A_{ik}$  is the number of files upon which detectors  $D_i$  and  $D_k$  give the same labels, namely

$$A_{ik} = A_{ki} = \sum_{\ell=1}^m \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V_{i\ell} = V_{k\ell} \wedge V_{i\ell} \neq -1 \wedge V_{k\ell} \neq -1 \\ 0 & \text{if } V_{i\ell} \neq V_{k\ell} \vee V_{i\ell} = -1 \vee V_{k\ell} = -1. \end{cases}$$

and  $C_{ik}$  is the number of files scanned by both detectors,  $D_i$  and  $D_k$ , namely

$$C_{ik} = C_{ki} = \sum_{\ell=1}^m \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V_{i\ell} \neq -1 \wedge V_{k\ell} \neq -1, \\ 0 & \text{if } V_{i\ell} = -1 \vee V_{k\ell} = -1. \end{cases}$$

Note that both  $\mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{C}$  are symmetric. Given matrices  $\mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{C}$ , a similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S}$  is defined as:

**Definition 2: (Similarity matrix)** The similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S} = (S_{ik})_{1 \leq i, k \leq n}$  is defined as the ratio of labels that detectors  $D_i$  and  $D_k$  agree, namely  $S_{ik} = \frac{A_{ik}}{C_{ik}}$ , implying that  $S_{ik}$  is symmetric.

2) *Algorithm for Computing Relative Accuracy*: Definition 1 specifies the properties that a good relative accuracy definition should meet. Now we address a specific definition to measure the relative accuracy that satisfies those desired properties; the definition is shown in Algorithm 1.

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**Algorithm 1** Computing relative accuracy

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**Input:** Similarity matrix  $S_{n \times n}$ ; tolerable error threshold  $\epsilon$

**Output:** Relative accuracy vector  $\mathbf{T} = [T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n]^T$

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1:  $\delta \leftarrow 2\epsilon$ 
2:  $\mathbf{T} \leftarrow ([1, 1, \dots, 1]_{1 \times n})^T$ 
3:  $\text{NextT} \leftarrow ([0, 0, \dots, 0]_{1 \times n})^T$ 
4: while  $\delta > \epsilon$  do
5:    $\text{NextT} \leftarrow S \times T$ 
6:    $\text{NextT} \leftarrow \text{NextT} / \max(\text{NextT})$ 
7:    $\delta \leftarrow \sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} |T_i - \text{NextT}_i|$ 
8:    $\mathbf{T} \leftarrow \text{NextT}$ 
9: end while
10: Return  $T$ 
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The underlying idea of Algorithm 1 is as follows: The relative accuracy vector  $\mathbf{T}$  is recursively calculated from the similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S}$ . The algorithm halts when the error  $\delta$  is smaller than a threshold  $\epsilon$ .

The similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S}$  resembles a well-known correlation matrix consisting of correlation coefficients between a group of random variables. The major difference between these two kinds of matrices is that similarities are in the range of  $[0, 1]$  while correlations are in the range of  $[-1, 1]$ . The sample version of a correlation matrix is the base for a statistical technique called *principal component analysis* where the *eigendecomposition* of the sample correlation matrix is used to find the dominating directions of variation in the data. In a similar sense, we use the similarity matrix to rank the relative accuracies of detectors. On the other hand, the recursive computation of the relative accuracy vector  $\mathbf{T}$  may be reminiscent of a Markov Chain of  $n$  states. However, the similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S}$  is not a probability transition matrix because the entries do not reflect probability.

#### IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

In this section, we conduct experiments using a synthetic dataset with known ground truth to evaluate the approach and then use the approach to analyze a real dataset.

##### A. Experiments with Synthetic Data

**Generating synthetic data.** Three synthetic datasets of labels are generated for one million samples per dataset: **D1** contains 300,000 malicious files and 700,000 benign files; **D2** contains 500,000 malicious files and 500,000 benign files; and **D3** contains 700,000 malicious files and 300,000 benign files. Using these three datasets allows us to see the impact of the ratio between malicious and benign files.

**Experimental setup.** We consider 10 experiments where each experiment uses a number of detectors characterized by a true-positive rate ( $TP$ ) and a true-negative rate ( $TN$ ), while false-positive rates ( $FP$ ) and false-negative rates ( $FN$ ) are used to

derive  $TP$  and  $TN$ , such as  $TP = 1 - FN$  and  $TN = 1 - FP$  [14]. Moreover, accuracy is defined as  $\frac{TP+TN}{TP+FP+TN+FN}$  [14].

Experiments 1-5 aim to test a variety of situations with various distributions of accuracies of malware detectors.

- **Experiment 1** - Four sets of detectors of varying true accuracy rates are simulated:
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 95% to 85%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 85% to 75%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 80% to 70%;
  - 20 detectors with an accuracy range of 75% to 65%.
- **Experiment 2** - Four sets of detectors of varying true accuracy rates are simulated:
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 95% to 85%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 90% to 80%;
  - 20 detectors with an accuracy range of 85% to 75%.
- **Experiment 3** - The algorithm is tested with all 50 detectors that have a narrow range of accuracies (i.e., approximately the same detection capability):
  - 50 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%.
- **Experiment 4** - The algorithm is tested with *poor* detectors that have their accuracies below 50%:
  - 50 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 95% to 85%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 90% to 80%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 85% to 75%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.
- **Experiment 5** - The algorithm is tested with a higher ratio of *poor* detectors, as compared with Experiment 4:
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 95% to 85%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 90% to 80%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 85% to 75%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.

Experiments 6-10 are conducted to investigate the threshold where the algorithm is able to diagnose ‘good’ detectors over ‘poor’ detectors as the ratio of poor detectors increases. In all 5 experiments, the good detectors have accuracies that range from 100% to 90%, while the poor detectors have accuracies that range from 45% to 35%.

- **Experiment 6** - The algorithm is tested with 20% poor detectors:
  - 40 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.
- **Experiment 7** - The algorithm is tested with 40% poor detectors:
  - 30 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 20 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.
- **Experiment 8** - The algorithm is tested with 50% poor detectors:
  - 25 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 25 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.




Fig. 1. Experiment results with dataset **D1**: In each picture, the y-axis corresponds to the detectors in an experiment while the x-axis corresponds to the True Accuracy (left-hand half) and Relative Accuracy (right-hand half) of the detectors in color scale.




Fig. 2. Experiment results with dataset **D1**: In each picture, the y-axis corresponds to the true accuracy and relative accuracy of each detector. The x-axis counts the individual detectors.

- **Experiment 9** - The algorithm is tested with 60% poor detectors:
  - 20 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 30 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.
- **Experiment 10** - The algorithm is tested with 80% poor detectors:
  - 10 detectors with an accuracy range of 100% to 90%;
  - 40 detectors with an accuracy range of 45% to 35%.

Fig. 1 plots experimental results with **D1**. For each experiment, we look into the *true accuracy* and *relative accuracy* of each detector. We observe that except Exp. 10, the order of the accuracies (e.g., detector 2 is more accurate than detector 3) is preserved by the relative accuracy (i.e., detector 2 has a higher relative accuracy than detector 3). This does not hold for Exp. 10 because 40 (out of the 50) detectors are ‘poor.’

Fig. 2 maps both the *true accuracy* and the *relative accuracy* of each detector for the experiments in **D1**. Each experiment shows that there is one detector whose relative accuracy is 100%, which is implied by Algorithm 1. We also observe that the relative accuracy of a detector is *not* the same as the accuracy of the detector; in contrast, it can deviate signif-

icantly. However, note that the slope of the *relative accuracy* matches with the changes observed in the slope of the *true accuracy*, with minor differences in the degree of the change. This implies that recovering the true accuracy of each detector should be possible, if a proper method is provided. Experiment 10 is the exception again, showing that the rating system was overwhelmed by the ‘poor’ detectors which outranked the ‘good’ by a factor of 4 to 1. Furthermore, Experiments 6 through 9 show that with similar graphs for true accuracy, the difference in measurements between true accuracy and relative accuracy increases as the level of uncertainty increases.

For **D2** and **D3**, the results are almost identical to **D1**. The changes in the file distribution changed the initial ordering, but the results for comparing the true accuracy with the relative accuracy are trivial, so we didn’t include them here.

Algorithm 1 provides useful and significant results whether the (true) accuracy of detectors is continuously distributed across a wide range (as in Experiments 1 and 2), distributed across a narrow range (as in Experiment 3), or distributed across a wide range in a discontinuous fashion (as in Experiments 4 and 5). Experiments 6 through 10 show that through all three datasets, Algorithm 1 provides reliable results up to

the point where there are 4 poor detectors per good detector. At this threshold, the poor detectors begin to be rated above the good detectors due to the noise introduced by sheer numbers.

Summarizing the experiment results with synthetic datasets **D1-D3**, we obtain the following insight:

*Insight 1:* Algorithm 1 is useful because it can compute the relative accuracy, or relative ranking, of malware detectors as long as the number of ‘poor’ detectors is not overwhelming.

### B. Applying the approach to evaluate a real dataset

The dataset was collected from VirusTotal. It contains a corpus of  $m \approx 10.7$  million files, each of which was scanned by up to  $n = 62$  anti-malware detectors, but some files were not scanned by every detector. Each detector labels a file it scanned as malicious (“1”) or benign (“0”). The dataset is transformed to matrix  $\mathbf{V}_{ij_{n \times m}}$ , from which we derive a similarity matrix  $\mathbf{S}$  and a relative accuracy vector  $\mathbf{T}$  according to Algorithm 1.

TABLE I  
THE DETECTOR NAME AND TRUST VALUE FROM THE PROCESSED DATA FROM VIRUSTOTAL.

| Detector Name        | Trust  | Detector Name       | Trust  |
|----------------------|--------|---------------------|--------|
| BitDefender          | 100%   | Symantec            | 95.78% |
| Ad-Aware             | 99.85% | CAT-QuickHeal       | 95.46% |
| McAfee               | 99.63% | Panda               | 95.22% |
| GData                | 99.62% | Emsisoft            | 95.22% |
| Kaspersky            | 99.48% | Zillya              | 93.20% |
| AhnLab-V3            | 99.45% | TotalDefense        | 92.80% |
| VIPRE                | 99.39% | nProtect            | 92.64% |
| MicroWorld-eScan     | 99.38% | Kingsoft            | 91.74% |
| Avast                | 99.37% | Bkav                | 91.68% |
| AVG                  | 99.34% | Avira               | 89.93% |
| F-Pro                | 99.32% | Jiangmin            | 88.99% |
| K7AntiVirus          | 99.30% | TheHacker           | 88.33% |
| NANO-Antivirus       | 99.22% | Tencent             | 86.53% |
| F-Secure             | 99.05% | ViRobot             | 86.53% |
| McAfee-GW-Edition    | 99.04% | ALYac               | 85.91% |
| DrWeb                | 98.98% | Malwarebytes        | 79.80% |
| ESET-NOD32           | 98.78% | SUPERAntiSpyware    | 77.63% |
| Sophos               | 98.63% | ClamAV              | 77.47% |
| VBA32                | 98.45% | Baidu-International | 73.13% |
| Comodo               | 98.45% | Qihoo-360           | 71.68% |
| Ikarus               | 98.44% | CMC                 | 70.72% |
| AVware               | 98.31% | Zoner               | 70.17% |
| Fortinet             | 97.79% | Norman              | 65.44% |
| Cyren                | 97.53% | ByteHero            | 64.01% |
| TrendMicro           | 97.43% | AegisLab            | 60.10% |
| Microsoft            | 97.27% | Alibaba             | 47.14% |
| TrendMicro-HouseCall | 97.03% | Arcabit             | 32.09% |
| Antiy-AVL            | 96.87% | AntiVir             | 5E-04% |
| Agnitum              | 96.73% | CommTouch           | 5E-04% |
| K7GW                 | 96.50% | DrWebSE             | 3E-04% |
| Rising               | 95.81% | TotalDefense2       | 2E-06% |

Table I summarizes the relative accuracy of the 62 detectors. We observe that the relative accuracy of 35 detectors is in  $[1, 0.95]$ , 11 detectors in  $[0.85, 0.95]$ , 7 detectors in  $[0.7, 0.8]$ , 3 detectors in  $[0.6, 0.7]$ , 1 detector in the 0.4 range, 1 detector in the 0.3 range, and 4 detectors at the order of magnitude of  $10^{-6}$ . The extremely low relative accuracy of the last four detectors can be attributed to the following: (i) these detectors match poorly with the decisions of the other detectors; (ii) these detectors provide monotonous detection, meaning that they label all files either as 1 or 0; and (iii) these detectors scanned fewer than 1% of the files. Therefore, these detectors are correctly labeled as inaccurate.




Fig. 3. Relative accuracy vector  $T$  and associated similarity matrix  $S$ .

Fig. 3 (a) shows the similarity matrix while Fig. 3 (b) shows the *relative* accuracy of the detectors. The similarity matrix provides a good visual intuition as to why several detectors were rated low. The inherent symmetry is also observed. In order to reach the steady state, we ran 8 iterations of the algorithm to reach a resolution of  $\epsilon = 10^{-9}$ .




Fig. 4. Relative accuracy (y-axis) of the 62 detectors (x-axis) in the real-world dataset. Note that true accuracies of the detectors are not known and therefore not plotted.

Fig. 4 shows the relative accuracy of the 62 detectors in the real-world data. Summarizing the preceding discussion, we obtain the following insight:

*Insight 2:* A few detectors in the real-world dataset are not really useful. In traditional  $n$ -out-of- $K$  voting, these poor detectors would be given equal weight votes with the good detectors. With the ability to discern which detectors are more reliable, more appropriate voting weights can be applied to the appropriate detectors.

## V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We formulated the problem of estimating the *relative accuracy* of malware detectors in the absence of ground truth and presented an algorithm to derive the relative accuracy. We validated the proposed algorithm based on real-world datasets from VirusTotal, given synthetic data with ground truth. Through the extensive experimental study, we found that

the proposed algorithm of estimating the relative accuracy of malware detectors is capable of ranking the relative accuracies of the 62 real-world detectors which scanned millions of files. In particular, we identified 4 detectors that not only are useless, but also may do more harm than good.

We plan to conduct the following future research: (1) develop a theoretical evaluation framework that can be used to judge under what environments the proposed algorithm works or does not work; (2) characterize the co-variance and correlation between the accuracy of detectors; (3) develop an aggregation engine to incorporate detection labels of multiple malware detectors; and (4) identify the key characteristics of poor detectors in order to avoid them when aggregating the labels of multiple detectors.

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