
Instance-dependent Sample Complexity Bounds for Zero-sum Matrix Games

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Abstract

We study the sample complexity of identifying an approximate equilibrium for two-player zero-sum $n \times 2$ matrix games. That is, in a sequence of repeated game plays, how many rounds must the two players play before reaching an approximate equilibrium (e.g., Nash)? We derive instance-dependent bounds that define an ordering over game matrices that captures the intuition that the dynamics of some games converge faster than others. Specifically, we consider a stochastic observation model such that when the two players choose actions i and j , respectively, they both observe each other's played actions and a stochastic observation X_{ij} such that $\mathbb{E}[X_{ij}] = A_{ij}$. To our knowledge, our work is the first case of instance-dependent lower bounds on the number of rounds the players must play before reaching an approximate equilibrium in the sense that the number of rounds depends on the specific properties of the game matrix A as well as the desired accuracy. We also prove a converse statement: there exist player strategies that achieve this lower bound.

1 INTRODUCTION

In single player stochastic games like multi-armed bandits and reinforcement learning, instance dependent or “gap dependent” sample complexity bounds that characterize the number of interactions with the environment to identify a good policy are well-understood. In contrast to minimax or worst-case sample complexity guarantees, these bounds and the algorithms that obtain them adapt to the true difficulty of the problem and are provably better when the problem is easy. However, very little progress has been made on multiplayer settings. Even the simplest of such settings—i.e.

two-player normal form matrix games—have only been studied in a minimax, worst-case sense to our knowledge. Nonetheless many practical applications are such that the outcome for a decision-maker depends not just on their own action, but on the actions of other decision-makers in the environment. Indeed, finite normal form games represent a reasonable abstraction for a multitude of different important problems from economic decisions to voting systems to auctions to military abstractions (see, e.g., Başar and Olsder (1998); Nisan et al. (2007); Von Neumann and Morgenstern (2007) and references therein).

To concretize ideas, consider a setting in which two firms produce bids for a sequence of arriving customers. Each firm has one of two ways of preparing the bid (e.g., use a higher quality product versus lower quality product but include a warranty). Customers are drawn iid from a population, and select a firm meaning that the selected firm “wins” the bid, while the other firm “loses” the bid. This setting can be abstracted as a repeated two-player zero-sum game defined by a 2×2 stochastic matrix with independent entries in $\{-1, 0, 1\}$ and with expectation $A \in [-1, 1]^{2 \times 2}$. For instance, the entries of A may be $A_{11} = A_{22} = 0$, $A_{12} = 5/6$, and $A_{21} = -2/3$. Such abstractions arise in many applications including online platforms and other digital marketplaces where firms are competing for the same consumer demand.

With this motivation in mind, in this paper we consider two-player, zero-sum normal form matrix games possessing a unique Nash equilibrium which are defined by a stochastic matrix of dimension $n \times 2$ such that $2 \leq n < \infty$. For this class of games, we characterize the instance dependent sample complexity of identifying a joint mixed strategy that approximately achieves the value of the game, and a joint mixed strategy from which players have no incentive to deviate in an approximate sense. That is, in a sequence of repeated game plays, we address the following questions: how many rounds must the two players play before reaching a (i) ε -good solution, or (ii) ε -Nash equilibrium, respectively?

The repeated play proceeds as follows: for a fixed matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 2}$ with entries A_{ij} , at the start of each round t , the first and second player choose an $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ and $j \in \{1, 2\}$ simultaneously, respectively, observe each

others chosen actions, and then both simultaneously observe outcome X_{ij} where $\mathbb{E}[X_{ij}] = A_{ij}$ and is 1-sub-Gaussian (e.g., $X_{ij} \sim \text{Bernoulli}(A_{ij}) \in \{-1, 1\}$ representing firm 1 winning the bid or not). Hence, the first and second player receive expected rewards of A_{ij} and $-A_{ij}$, respectively. Throughout we refer to this zero-sum stochastic matrix game by simply referencing the matrix A that induces the game.

Letting Δ_m denote the m -dimensional simplex, we analyze the following two objectives: find a joint mixed strategy $(x, y) \in \Delta_n \times \Delta_2$ such that

$$(i) |V_A^* - \langle x, Ay \rangle| \leq \varepsilon \text{ where}$$

$$V_A^* := \max_{x \in \Delta_n} \min_{y \in \Delta_2} x^\top Ay$$

is the value of the game, and

$$(ii) \text{ both } \langle x, Ay \rangle \geq \langle x', Ay \rangle - \varepsilon \text{ and } \langle x, Ay' \rangle \geq \langle x, Ay \rangle - \varepsilon \text{ hold for all } (x', y') \in \Delta_n \times \Delta_2.$$

The former is precisely an ε -good solution, and the latter an ε -Nash equilibrium.

We characterize the instance-dependent sample complexity of identifying ε -approximate solutions for the above problems in the sense that they scale with not just ε and the number of actions, but the particular properties of the matrix A . Thus, our characterization defines an ordering over games capturing the intuition that the dynamics of some games converge must faster than others. Specifically, we prove lower bounds on the number of rounds necessary for any two players to converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we propose strategies for the two players that achieve this sample complexity. Our instance-dependent sample complexities introduce a number of quantities that characterize notions of the sub-optimality ‘‘gap,’’ and we discuss why it is non-trivial to extend these definitions and our analysis to the general $n \times m$ dimensional matrix games.

Before we state our main contributions, we state some easily proven facts to contextualize our results (see Appendix A for proof).

Proposition 1. *For any zero-sum matrix game A , an ε -Nash equilibrium is also an ε -good solution.*

This means any lower bound on identifying an ε -good solution is also a lower bound on identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium. Conversely, any algorithm that can identify an ε -Nash equilibrium can also identify an ε -good solution with the same sample complexity.

Lemma 1. *Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$, and matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$. Suppose that $\bar{A} \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times m}$ has entries $\bar{A}_{ij}$ that are the empirical mean of $\frac{8 \log(2mn/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ 1-sub-Gaussian observations resulting from players playing (i, j) , and such that $\bar{A}_{ij}$ has expectation A_{ij} . Let $(x, y) \in \Delta_n \times \Delta_m$ be the Nash equilibrium of the game defined by $\bar{A}$. With probability at least $1 - \delta$, the mixed strategy (x, y) is an ε -Nash equilibrium of A .*

The above strategy is minimax optimal: there exists a worst-case game matrix A such that identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium or ε -good solution with constant probability requires at least $1/\varepsilon^2$ samples. This worst-case result suggests that the sample complexity of identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium and ε -good solution are about the same, and that this sample complexity scales with ε . Remarkably, we will show that both these conclusions are false: there is a provable separation between these two problems, and that the sample complexities for natural problems can be as small as $1/\varepsilon$.

1.1 Contributions

Consider a game defined by a fixed 2×2 matrix A which has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In Theorems 1 and 2, we show under some mild assumptions that to find an ε -good solution for the matrix game A with probability at least $1 - \delta$, we require at least $\Omega\left(\min\left\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|}\right\}\right\} \log(1/\delta)\right)$ samples from the matrix A , where problem-dependent parameters D and $\Delta_{\min}$ are functions of A alone and defined in Section 2. Complementing this result, we present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that, with probability $1 - \delta$, identifies an ε -good solution using a number of samples matching this lower bound up to logarithmic factors.

In the same setting, we show (Theorem 5) that identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium for the game defined by A with probability at least $1 - \delta$ requires at least $\Omega\left(\frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2} \log(1/\delta)\right)$ samples where Δ_{m_2} , defined in Section 3, is function of A alone. Since a lower bound on ε -good solution identification immediately implies a lower bound on identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium, as noted above, we conclude that the sample complexity of identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium with probability at least $1 - \delta$ requires

$$\Omega\left(\min\left\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\right\}\right\} \log(1/\delta)\right)$$

samples. In general, it is the case that

$$\max\left\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\right\} \geq \max\left\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|}\right\}$$

which demonstrates a separation in sample complexity between identifying an ε -good solution and ε -Nash equilibrium. Again, we complement this lower bound result by designing an algorithm (Algorithm 2) that, with probability $1 - \delta$, identifies an ε -Nash equilibrium with a sample complexity matching this lower bound up to logarithmic factors.

On the other hand, if the game does have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium then we prove nearly optimal instance-dependent upper bounds for identifying an ε -good solution or ε -Nash that are similar to multi-armed bandits. In summary, our results completely characterize the instance-dependent

sample complexity of identifying an ε -good solution and ε -Nash in the 2×2 case.

Now consider a game defined by a fixed 3×2 matrix A that has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In Theorem 7, we show under some mild assumptions that to find an ε -good solution for the matrix game defined by A with probability at least $1 - \delta$, we require at least $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{\Delta_g^2} \log(1/\delta)\right)$ samples. In fact, this number of samples, characterized by the problem-dependent constant Δ_g , is required to just identify the support of the mixed strategy for player 1 in Δ_3 which we show is necessary for ε -good identification. Now consider a game defined by an $n \times 2$ matrix B for any $n \geq 3$ which has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) that is not a pure-strategy equilibrium. We complement our lower bound result by designing an algorithm (Algorithm 3) that, with probability at least $1 - \delta$, samples each element of B for $O\left(\min\left\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\Delta_g^2}\right\}\right\} \log(1/\delta)\right)$ times (ignoring some logarithmic factors) and either returns $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ or concludes that Δ_g is not sufficiently large compared to ε . If the support is successfully identified, the algorithms for the 2×2 cases can be applied. Otherwise, an ε -Nash equilibrium can be output after $O\left(\frac{n}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot \log(n/\delta)\right)$ using the procedure of Lemma 1. While these sample complexity results hint at necessary and sufficient conditions on the instance-dependent sample complexities of general $m \times n$ games, a full characterization of this setting is left for future work.

In their respective sections, we define these problem-dependent parameters and provide intuition for what they represent and how they arise, which itself provides some insight into the difficulty of the general $m \times n$ setting.

Above we have highlighted our results in the special case of a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a pure strategy. However, we address all other cases as well, they are simply more straightforward. For instance, if the Nash equilibrium is *not* unique, then $\Delta_{\min} = 0$ (and $\Delta_g = 0$ for $n \times 2$ games) and therefore our upper and lower bounds match and correspond to a $1/\varepsilon^2$ rate. Moreover, our algorithms do not assume that the equilibrium is a pure or mixed strategy, or if it is unique or not. All cases are covered (see Theorems 4, 6, 8 and Lemma 1). Note that our lower bound results hold only for the mixed strategy case, and we do omit a lower bound for the pure strategy case. This was done because the mixed strategy case is the novel and challenging case while the pure strategy case is very similar to multi-armed bandit lower bounds (c.f., Kaufmann et al. (2016)).

1.2 Related Work

Complexity of Matrix Games. Characterizing equilibrium behavior in normal form matrix games has been studied extensively in economics (Bohnenblust et al., 1950; Von Neu-

mann and Morgenstern, 1947), as has learning as an abstraction for how players reach an equilibrium (Fudenberg et al., 1998). The computational complexity of (exact) Nash equilibrium, especially in finite normal form games, is known to be PPAD-complete (Daskalakis et al., 2009a,b). Given such hardness results, it is natural to reason about the computational complexity of *approximate* equilibrium. For instance, it has been shown that ε -approximate Nash can be computed in polynomial time (Daskalakis et al., 2007, 2009c) where ε is an absolute constant. These results primarily focus on settings of full information, and are concerned with computational complexity.

Iteration complexity has been explored fairly extensively in partial information settings including settings with time-varying rewards and continuous action spaces; see, e.g., (Blum and Monsour, 2007; Bravo et al., 2018; Cardoso et al., 2019; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006; Daskalakis et al., 2011; Drusvyatskiy et al., 2021; Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2013; Syrgkanis et al., 2015) and references therein. Only recently has the focus shifted to characterizing statistical learnability—i.e., sample complexity—of equilibrium concepts, or other desiderata such as ε -good solutions, in the presence of bandit feedback. For example, in the bandit feedback setting where players also observe the actions of their opponents, O’Donoghue et al. (2021) show that players adopting an optimism in the face of uncertainty principle when selecting actions experience sublinear regret—i.e., the short-fall in cumulative rewards relative to the value of the game—and further show that alternative strategies such as Thompson sampling cannot do not have a guarantee of sublinear regret.

Instance Dependent Bounds for Games. To our knowledge, instance dependent sample complexity bounds remain under explored in games. That being said, there are very recent results on special classes of games. For instance, Dou et al. (2022) provide the first minimax bounds for the class of congestion games, which have the nice property of being equivalent to an optimization problem due to their potential game structure. Additionally, Dou et al. (2022) provide sample complexity results for the centralized and decentralized problem settings under both semi-bandit and bandit feedback. Similarly, Cui et al. (2022) study the regret of the Nash Q-learning algorithm for two-player turn based Markov games, and introduce the first gap dependent logarithmic upper bounds, which match theoretical lower bounds up to log factors, in the episodic tabular setting.

Instance Dependent Bounds in Stochastic Bandits. The sample complexity of stochastic bandits is well-understood: given n actions each yielding a stochastic reward, to identify an action with a mean within ε of the maximum with probability $1 - \delta$, it is necessary and sufficient to take $\sum_{i=1}^n \min\left\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{1}{\Delta_i^2}\right\} \log(1/\delta)$ total samples, where Δ_i is the difference between the i th mean and the highest mean (up to $\log \log(1/\Delta_i)$ factors) (Karnin et al., 2013; Kaufmann et al.,

2016; Mannor and Tsitsiklis, 2004). Stochastic bandits can be directly compared to our setting where A is an $n \times 1$ matrix with the means of the arms on the rows.

2 RESULTS FOR ε -GOOD SOLUTIONS OF 2×2 MATRIX GAMES

This section is devoted to instance-dependent sample complexity bounds for identifying an ε -good solution (x, y) for a zero-sum game matrix A . Recall that $|V_A^* - \langle x, Ay \rangle| \leq \varepsilon$. In what follows, we will frequently assume that the mixed strategies of the unique Nash equilibrium have full support: the mixed strategy $x \in \Delta_m$ is said to have a full support if $\text{Supp}(x) := \{i \in [m] : x_i > 0\}$ is equal to $[m] := \{1, \dots, m\}$. Here x_i is the i -th component of x . If $m = 2$ then the unique equilibrium is either a full support mixed strategy or is a pure strategy, but not both.

Definition 1 (Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium). *An element (i^*, j^*) is a Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) of the game induced by the matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ if $A_{i^*j^*} = \max_{i \in [m]} A_{ij^*}$ and $A_{i^*j^*} = \min_{j \in [n]} A_{i^*j}$. Moreover, a Nash equilibrium $(x, y) \in \Delta_m \times \Delta_n$ where $\text{Supp}(x) = \{i\}$ and $\text{Supp}(y) = \{j\}$ corresponds to a PSNE (i, j) .*

For a matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$ (elements of a row are separated by a comma and rows are separated by a semicolon) that has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, our bounds will be given in terms of instance-dependent quantities:

$$D = a - b - c + d, \\ \Delta_{\min} = \min\{|a - b|, |a - c|, |d - b|, |d - c|\}.$$

The matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE if and only if either of the following hold:

$$a < b, a < c, d < b, d < c, \quad \text{or} \\ a > b, a > c, d > b, d > c.$$

Hence $|D| \geq 2\Delta_{\min} > 0$. The material of this section show that the sample complexity of identifying an ε -good solution behaves as $\min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|}\}\} \log(1/\delta)$ up to log factors. To motivate this bound, for matrix $A = [1, 0; 0, 1]$ we have that $\min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|}\}\} \approx \frac{1}{\varepsilon}$ which is significantly better than the trivial bound of $\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$.

To provide some intuition about where these quantities come from, suppose we measured each entry of A exactly T times and compiled the empirical means into a matrix $\hat{A}$. If we let (x, y) and $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ be the Nash equilibria for A and $\hat{A}$, respectively, then $x^\top Ay = \frac{ad-bc}{D}$ and we show in Appendices B and C that we roughly have $|x^\top Ay - \hat{x}^\top A\hat{y}| \leq \min\{\frac{1}{\sqrt{T}}, \frac{1}{T|D|}\}$. Moreover, we require roughly $\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ samples to decide whether $a < b$ or $b > a$ (same for other pairs). Without this information, we cannot characterize whether the input matrix has a PSNE

or not, and this affects the value V_A^* (which in turn affects the performance of the algorithm). Hence, we observe it suffices to take $T \approx \min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|}\}\}$. In the remainder of this section we make this argument rigorous and show that no smarter algorithm can improve upon this simple strategy.

The following definition defines the set of algorithms under consideration.

Definition 2 ((ε, δ) -PAC-good). *We say an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good if for all matrices $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ the algorithm terminates at an almost-sure finite stopping time $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_m \times \Delta_n$ such that $|V_A^* - \langle x, Ay \rangle| \leq \varepsilon$ with probability at least $1 - \delta$.*

Our lower bounds will use this class of algorithms, and our proposed algorithm falls within this class.

2.1 Lower bound with respect to $|D|$

This subsection derives a lower bound for the case when A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE.

Theorem 1. *Fix any matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\Delta_{\min}^2}{3|D|})$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Any (ε, δ) -PAC-good algorithm that returns a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ at stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{3\varepsilon|D|}$.*

The lower bound considers a class of matrices $A_\square$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$ defined as follows:

$$A_\square = \begin{bmatrix} a + \square & b \\ c & d - \square \end{bmatrix}.$$

Clearly $A_\square = A$ when $\square = 0$. Observe that if $|\square| < \Delta_{\min}$, then the matrix game defined by $A_\square$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE. The proof of the theorem, found in Appendix D, follows from change of measure arguments applied to the instances defined in the following lemma.

Lemma 2. *Fix any $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\Delta_{\min}^2}{3|D|})$ and let $\Delta = \sqrt{3\varepsilon|D|}$. For any pair of mixed strategies $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ we have*

$$\max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\}} |V_B^* - \langle x', By' \rangle| \geq \frac{3\varepsilon}{2}.$$

Unlike many lower bounds for multi-armed bandits that rely on a number of binary hypothesis tests being decided correctly (c.f., (Kaufmann et al., 2016)), to prove the lower bound of this setting it is not possible to find a satisfying hypothesis test with fewer than three hypotheses due to the peculiar min-max behavior of the objective.

2.2 Lower bound with respect to $\Delta_{\min}$ and ε

Consider a matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE. Without loss of generality

assume that $D > 0$ and $\Delta_{\min} = a - b$. Let us also assume that $a - c \geq d - b$. This subsection derives a lower bound with respect to $\Delta_{\min}$ and ε .

Theorem 2. *Consider the matrix A and fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Any (ε, δ) -PAC-good algorithm that returns a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ at stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \min \left\{ \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\}$.*

The lower bound considers a class of matrices $A_{\square}$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$ defined as follows:

$$A_{\square} = \begin{bmatrix} a + \square & b - \square \\ c + \square & d - \square \end{bmatrix}.$$

Clearly $A_{\square} = A$ when $\square = 0$. The proof of the theorem, found in Appendix E, follows from change of measure arguments applied to the instances defined in the following lemma.

Lemma 3. *Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$. Let $\Delta = 6 \max\{\varepsilon, \Delta_{\min}\}$. For any pair of mixed strategies $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ we have $\max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_{\Delta}\}} |V_B^* - \langle x', By' \rangle| > \varepsilon$.*

We can now combine Theorems 1 and 2 to obtain the claimed result at the beginning of this section. Indeed, if $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\Delta_{\min}^2}{3|D|})$ then $\frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{3\varepsilon|D|} > \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ and so by Theorem 1 we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_A[\tau] &\geq \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{3\varepsilon|D|} \\ &= \max \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{3\varepsilon|D|}, \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\} \\ &\geq \min \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{36\varepsilon^2}, \max \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{3\varepsilon|D|}, \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, if $\varepsilon \geq \frac{\Delta_{\min}^2}{3|D|}$ then $\frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{3\varepsilon|D|} \leq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ and so by Theorem 2 we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_A[\tau] &\geq \min \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{36\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{36\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\} \\ &= \frac{1}{36} \min \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{\varepsilon^2}, \max \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{3\varepsilon|D|}, \frac{\log(\frac{1}{30\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, for all $\varepsilon > 0$ we have

$$\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max \left\{ \frac{1}{3\varepsilon|D|}, \frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\} \right\} \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36}.$$

2.3 Lower bound for games with multiple Nash Equilibria

Consider a matrix $A = [a, a; c, d]$ such that $a > c$, $a < d$. Let us also assume that $a - c \geq d - a$. Observe that the matrix game on A has multiple Nash Equilibria and this game is a degenerate version of a matrix game with unique Nash Equilibrium which is not a PSNE (as $\Delta_{\min} = 0$). This subsection derives a lower bound for the matrix game on A with respect to ε .

Theorem 3. *Consider the matrix A and fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Any (ε, δ) -PAC-good algorithm that returns a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ at stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\varepsilon^2}$.*

The lower bound considers a class of matrices $A_{\square}$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$ defined as follows:

$$A_{\square} = \begin{bmatrix} a + \square & a - \square \\ c + \square & d - \square \end{bmatrix}.$$

Clearly $A_{\square} = A$ when $\square = 0$. The proof of the theorem, found in Appendix F, follows from change of measure arguments applied to the instances defined in the following lemma.

Lemma 4. *Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$. Let $\Delta = 6\varepsilon$. For any pair of mixed strategies $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ we have $\max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_{\Delta}\}} |V_B^* - \langle x', By' \rangle| > \varepsilon$.*

2.4 Upper bound for ε -good solution

As discussed above, Lemma 1 describes a minimax optimal strategy. This subsection is dedicated to Algorithm 1 that achieves an instance-dependent sample complexity for the special case of $m = n = 2$. Algorithm 1 first samples the elements of A until we can conclude whether A has a PSNE or not. If A has a PSNE, then we return it. If A does not have a PSNE, we further sample each element of A for $\tilde{O}(\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{\varepsilon \tilde{D}})$ times and return the Nash equilibrium of the empirical matrix $\tilde{A}$. Here $\tilde{D}$ is an empirical estimate of $|D|$. If no prior condition is met, the algorithm terminates in the worst case at iteration $t = T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ and outputs an ε -good solution with high probability. The full sample complexity guarantees of the algorithm are described in the following theorem whose proof is in Appendix C.

Theorem 4. *Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. With probability at least $1 - \delta$, Algorithm 1 returns an ε -good solution after at most n_0 samples such that*

- $n_0 = c_1 \cdot \min \left\{ \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \max \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{\varepsilon|D|} \right\} \right\}$ if the matrix game induced by A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, and
- $n_0 = c_2 \cdot \min \left\{ \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(1/(\varepsilon\delta))}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\}$ if the matrix game induced by A has a PSNE,

where c_1, c_2 are absolute constants.

3 RESULTS FOR ε -NASH EQUILIBRIUM OF 2×2 MATRIX GAMES

This section is devoted to instance-dependent sample complexity bounds for identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium (x, y) . Recall that both $\langle x, Ay \rangle \geq \langle x', Ay \rangle - \varepsilon$ and $\langle x, Ay' \rangle \geq \langle x, Ay \rangle - \varepsilon$ hold for all $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$. For a matrix

Algorithm 1 Find an ε -good solution

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1:  $T \leftarrow \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ 
2: for time step  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$  do
3:   Sample each element  $(i, j)$  once and update the empirical means  $\bar{A}_{ij}$ .
4:    $\Delta \leftarrow \sqrt{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})/t}$ 
5:    $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} \leftarrow \min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12}|, |\bar{A}_{21} - \bar{A}_{22}|\} |\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{21}|, |\bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}$ 
6:    $\tilde{D} \leftarrow |\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}|$ 
7:   if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and the matrix game  $\bar{A}$  has a PSNE then
8:     Return the PSNE of  $\bar{A}$ .
9:   else if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and  $\tilde{D} < 10\varepsilon$  then
10:    Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $T - t$  times.
11:    Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
12:   else if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and  $\tilde{D} \geq 10\varepsilon$  then
13:      $N \leftarrow \frac{80 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\varepsilon \tilde{D}}$ 
14:     if  $N > T - t$  then
15:       Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $T - t$  times
16:       Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
17:     end if
18:     Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $N$  times.
19:     Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
20:   end if
21: end for
22: Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .

```

$A = [a, b; c, d]$, our bounds will be given in terms of the following instance-dependent quantities:

$$D = a - b - c + d,$$

$$\Delta_{m_2} = \max\{\min\{|a - b|, |d - c|\}, \min\{|a - c|, |d - b|\}\}.$$

The sample complexity of identifying an ε -Nash equilibrium is $\min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\}\} \log(1/\delta)$ up to log factors. To motivate this bound, consider the matrix $A = [1 + \varepsilon^{0.5}, 1; 0, 1 + \varepsilon^{0.5}]$ where $0 < \varepsilon < 1$. Then $\min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\}\} \approx \frac{1}{\varepsilon}$ which is significantly better than the trivial bound of $\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$. On the other hand, for the matrix $B = [1, 0; 0, 1]$ we have that $\min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\}\} \approx \frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}$ which is significantly worse than the bound of $\frac{1}{\varepsilon}$ that we achieved for identifying an ε -good solution before. This shows that finding an ε -Nash equilibrium can require many more samples than finding an ε -good solution. This is not unexpected as every ε -Nash equilibrium is also an ε -good solution.

To provide some intuition about where these quantities come from, suppose we measured each entry of A exactly T times and compiled the empirical means into a matrix $\hat{A}$. If we let $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ be the Nash equilibrium for $\hat{A}$, respectively, then we

show (cf. Appendix G) that we roughly have

$$\max_{x' \in \Delta_2} x'^\top \hat{A} \hat{y} - \hat{x}^\top \hat{A} \hat{y} \leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{\sqrt{T|D|}},$$

$$\hat{x}^\top \hat{A} \hat{y} - \min_{y' \in \Delta_2} \hat{x}^\top \hat{A} y' \leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{\sqrt{T|D|}}.$$

Moreover, in the previous section we showed that roughly $1/\Delta_{\min}^2$ samples are required to distinguish between various alternatives. Hence, we observe it suffices to take $T \approx \min\{\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\{\frac{1}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\}\}$. In the remainder of this section we make this argument rigorous and show that no smarter algorithm can improve upon this simple strategy.

The following is the definition of the set of algorithms under consideration.

Definition 3 ((ε, δ) -PAC-Nash). *We say an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-Nash if for all induced by matrices $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, the algorithm terminates at an almost-sure finite stopping time $\tau \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_m \times \Delta_n$ such that $\langle x, Ay \rangle \geq \langle x', Ay \rangle - \varepsilon$ and $\langle x, Ay' \rangle \geq \langle x, Ay \rangle - \varepsilon$ hold for all $(x', y') \in \Delta_m \times \Delta_n$ with probability at least $1 - \delta$.*

Our lower bounds will use this class of algorithms, and the proposed algorithm falls within this class.

3.1 Lower bound for finding ε -Nash equilibrium

This subsection derives a lower bound for the case when A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE.

Theorem 5. *Fix any matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Any (ε, δ) -PAC-Nash algorithm that returns a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$ at stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(1/30\delta)}{9\varepsilon^2 D^2}$.*

Without loss of generality assume that $D > 0$ and $\Delta_{m_2} = a - b$. The lower bound considers a class of matrices $A_\square$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$ defined as follows:

$$A_\square = \begin{bmatrix} a + \square & b + \square \\ c - \square & d - \square \end{bmatrix}.$$

Clearly $A_\square = A$ when $\square = 0$. The proof of the theorem, found in Appendix H, follows from change of measure arguments applied to the instances defined in the following lemma.

Lemma 5. *Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$. For any pair of mixed strategies $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that (x', y') is not an ε -Nash equilibrium of B where $\Delta := \frac{3\varepsilon D}{\Delta_{m_2}}$.*

Recall that any lower bound for an ε -good solution also holds for ε -Nash equilibrium. Hence, combining Theorems 2 and 5 we obtain the claimed result at the beginning of this section. Note that the lower bound of Theorem 1 is redundant as $\frac{1}{\varepsilon|D|} \leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2}{\varepsilon^2|D|^2}$ when $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{3|D|})$.

3.2 Upper bound for ε -Nash equilibrium

Algorithm 2 Find an ε -Nash equilibrium

```

1:  $T \leftarrow \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ 
2: for round  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$  do
3:   Sample each element  $(i, j)$  once and update the empirical means  $\bar{A}_{ij}$ .
4:    $\Delta \leftarrow \sqrt{2 \log(16T/\delta)/(t)}$ .
5:    $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} \leftarrow \min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12}|, |\bar{A}_{21} - \bar{A}_{22}|\} |\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{21}|, |\bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}$ 
6:    $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} \leftarrow \max\{\min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12}|, |\bar{A}_{21} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}, \min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{21}|, |\bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}\}$ 
7:    $\tilde{D} \leftarrow |\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}|$ 
8:   if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and the game induced by  $\bar{A}$  has a pure strategy Nash then
9:     Return the Nash equilibrium associated with the PSNE of  $\bar{A}$ .
10:  else if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and  $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} \geq \tilde{D}/8$  then
11:    Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $T - t$  times.
12:    Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
13:  else if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and  $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} < \tilde{D}/8$  then
14:     $N \leftarrow \frac{200 \tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}^2 \log(16T/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2 \tilde{D}^2}$ 
15:    if  $N > T - t$  then
16:      Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $T - t$  times.
17:      Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
18:    end if
19:     $\Delta_1 \leftarrow \sqrt{2 \log(16T/\delta)/(N + t)}$ 
20:    Sample each element  $(i, j)$  for  $N$  times.
21:     $i_1 \leftarrow \arg \min_i |\bar{A}_{i1} - \bar{A}_{i2}|$  and  $i_2 \leftarrow \{1, 2\} \setminus \{i_1\}$ 
22:     $j_1 \leftarrow \arg \min_j |\bar{A}_{1j} - \bar{A}_{2j}|$  and  $j_2 \leftarrow \{1, 2\} \setminus \{j_1\}$ 
23:     $B_{i_1 j_1} \leftarrow \bar{A}_{i_1 j_1}, B_{i_2 j_2} \leftarrow \bar{A}_{i_2 j_2}, B_{i_1 j_2} \leftarrow \bar{A}_{i_1 j_2} - 2\Delta_1, B_{i_2 j_1} \leftarrow \bar{A}_{i_2 j_1} + 2\Delta_1$ 
24:    Return the Nash equilibrium of  $B$ .
25:  end if
26: end for
27: Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .

```

Next, we characterize the instance-dependent sample complexity of Algorithm 2 for the special case of 2×2 matrix. Algorithm 2 first samples the elements of A until we can conclude whether the game induced by A has a PSNE or not. If the game does, then we return it. If the matrix game induced by A does not have a PSNE, we further sample each element of A for $\tilde{O}(\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} \log(\frac{1}{\delta})}{\varepsilon^2 \tilde{D}^2})$ times and return the Nash equilibrium of a matrix $\tilde{B}$ that we get by slightly modifying the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$. Here $\tilde{D}$ and $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}$ are the empirical estimates of $|D|$ and Δ_{m_2} , respectively. If no prior condition is met, the algorithm terminates in the worst case at iteration $t = T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ and outputs an ε -Nash equilibrium with high probability by Lemma 1. The full sample complexity guarantees of the algorithm are described in the following theorem the proof of which is in Appendix G.

Theorem 6. Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. With probability at least $1 - \delta$ Algorithm 2 returns an ε -Nash equilibrium after at most n_0 samples where

- $n_0 = c_1 \cdot \min\left\{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon\delta})}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{\log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(\frac{1}{\varepsilon\delta})}{\varepsilon^2 \tilde{D}^2}\right\}\right\}$ if the matrix game induced by A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, and
- $n_0 = c_2 \cdot \min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(1/\varepsilon\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}\right\}$ otherwise,

where c_1, c_2 are absolute constants.

4 RESULTS FOR $n \times 2$ MATRIX GAMES

This section is devoted to instance-dependent sample complexity bounds for identifying an ε -good solution and an ε -Nash equilibrium in a $n \times 2$ matrix game that has a unique Nash equilibrium. For a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 2}$, the bounds will be given in terms of instance-dependent quantities $\Delta_{\min}$ and Δ_g . For $\Delta_{\min}$, the natural extension from the 2×2 to the $n \times 2$ case is

$$\Delta_{\min} = \min\left\{\min_i \{|A_{i1} - A_{i2}|\}, \min_{j,k:j \neq k} \{|A_{j1} - A_{k1}|\}, \min_{j,k:j \neq k} \{|A_{j2} - A_{k2}|\}\right\}.$$

To define Δ_g , observe that if the matrix game induced by A has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) , then $|\text{Supp}(x^*)| = |\text{Supp}(y^*)|$ (Bohnenblust et al., 1950). Suppose that A has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) such that $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{i_1, i_2\}$. Let $A_{i_1 1} > A_{i_2 1}$ and $A_{i_2 1} < A_{i_2 2}$ and define

$$\Delta_g := \min_{i \in [n] \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}} r_i \cdot (V_A^* - \langle y^*, (A_{i1}, A_{i2}) \rangle),$$

where $r_i = \frac{|A_{i1 1} - A_{i1 2}| + |A_{i2 1} - A_{i2 2}|}{|A_{i1 1} - A_{i1 2}| + |A_{i2 1} - A_{i2 2}| + |A_{i1 1} - A_{i2 1}|}$. It is not hard to see that $\min_{i \in [n] \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}} V_A^* - \langle y^*, (A_{i1}, A_{i2}) \rangle > 0$ which implies $\Delta_g > 0$.

To provide some intuition for the origin of Δ_g , consider a class of matrices $A_{\square} = [a, b; c - \square, d - \square; e + \square, f + \square]$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$. In Appendix J.2, we show that for $\Delta = c_0 \cdot \Delta_g$ where c_0 is an absolute constant, the matrices A_0, A_{Δ} and $A_{2\Delta}$ have different supports for their respective Nash equilibrium. This implies that we require roughly $1/\Delta_g^2$ samples to determine the support of the Nash equilibrium of A . Without this information, we cannot determine an ε -good solution with high probability as the support of the Nash equilibrium affects the value V_A^* . The same holds true for finding an ε -Nash equilibrium as every ε -Nash equilibrium is also an ε -good solution. Moreover, to obtain any meaningful upper bound, we require an empirical estimate of Δ_g to be close to Δ_g and this is possible when we re-scale the gaps $V_A^* - \langle y^*, (A_{i1}, A_{i2}) \rangle$ by a factor of r_i . In the remainder of this section we make this argument rigorous and further show that roughly $1/\Delta_g^2$ samples suffices to find the support of the Nash equilibrium of A . Once the support is identified, we can use the algorithms derived for the 2×2 case in the previous two sections.

4.1 Lower bound with respect to Δ_g

Consider any matrix game $A = [a, b; c, d; e, f]$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) which is not a PSNE. Without loss of generality assume that $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \text{Supp}(y^*) = \{1, 2\}$. Let us also assume that $a > b, a > c, a > e, d > b, d > c, f > e, f > b$. Observe that in this case we have the following:

$$\Delta_g = \frac{(|a - b| + |c - d|)(V_A^* - \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle)}{|a - b| + |c - d| + |e - f|}$$

Let $D_1 := a - b - c + d$ and $D_2 := a - b - e + f$. Let $\Delta := \frac{(d-b)D_2 - (f-b)D_1}{D_1 + D_2}$ and $\lambda := \min\{\frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_1}, \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_2}\}$. This subsection derives a lower bound for ε -good solution for the matrix game A .

Theorem 7. Consider the matrix A and fix any $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\lambda}{4})$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Any (ε, δ) -PAC-good algorithm that returns a pair of mixed strategies $(x, y) \in \Delta_3 \times \Delta_2$ at stopping time τ satisfies $\mathbb{E}_A[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{4\Delta_g^2}$.

The lower bound considers a class of matrices $A_\square$ parameterized by $\square \in \mathbb{R}$ defined as follows:

$$A_\square = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c - \square & d - \square \\ e + \square & f + \square \end{bmatrix}.$$

Clearly $A_\square = A$ when $\square = 0$. The proof of the theorem, found in Appendix J, follows from change of measure arguments applied to the instances defined in the following lemma.

Lemma 6. Fix any $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{\lambda}{4})$. For any pair of mixed strategies $(x', y') \in \Delta_3 \times \Delta_2$, we have

$$\max_{B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{2\Delta}\}} |V_B^* - \langle x', By' \rangle| > \varepsilon.$$

4.2 Finding the support in $n \times 2$ matrix games

Next, we characterize the instance-dependent sample complexity of Algorithm 3 which finds the support of the unique Nash equilibrium, having cardinality at most two, for the matrix game $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 2}$. Algorithm 3 first samples the elements of A until we can conclude whether the game induced by A has a PSNE or not. If the game has a PSNE, then we return it. If the game induced by A does not have a PSNE, we further sample the elements of A until $\tilde{\Delta}_g$ is sufficiently large and return the support of the Nash equilibrium of the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$. Here $\tilde{\Delta}_g$ is an empirical estimate of Δ_g . If no prior condition is met, the algorithm terminates in the worst case at iteration $t = T = \frac{8 \log(8n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ and outputs an ε -Nash equilibrium with high probability by Lemma 1. The full sample complexity guarantees of the algorithm are described in the following theorem the proof of which is in Appendix I.

Algorithm 3 Find the equilibrium support for a $n \times 2$ matrix

```

1:  $T \leftarrow \frac{8 \log(8n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ 
2: for round  $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$  do
3:   Sample each element  $(i, j)$  once and update the empirical means  $\bar{A}_{ij}$ .
4:    $\Delta \leftarrow \sqrt{2 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})/(t)}$ .
5:    $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} \leftarrow \min \{ \min_i \{ |\bar{A}_{i1} - \bar{A}_{i2}| \}, \min_{j,k:j \neq k} \{ |\bar{A}_{j1} - \bar{A}_{k1}| \}, \min_{j,k:j \neq k} \{ |\bar{A}_{j2} - \bar{A}_{k2}| \} \}$ 
6:   if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and the matrix game  $\bar{A}$  has a PSNE then
7:     Return the PSNE of  $\bar{A}$ .
8:   else if  $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$  and  $\bar{A}$  does not have a pure strategy Nash then
9:      $\forall i \in [n]$ , remove the row  $i$  of  $\bar{A}$  if there is a row  $j$  such that  $\bar{A}_{j1} > \bar{A}_{i1}$  and  $\bar{A}_{j2} > \bar{A}_{i2}$ .
10:    for round  $t' = t + 1, t + 2, \dots, T$  do
11:      Sample each element  $(i, j)$  once and update the empirical means  $\bar{A}_{ij}$ .
12:       $\Delta' \leftarrow \sqrt{2 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})/(t')}$ 
13:       $(x', y') \leftarrow$  Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ 
14:      If  $t' = T$ , return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
15:      if  $|\text{Supp}(x')| = 2$  then
16:         $\{i_1, i_2\} \leftarrow \text{Supp}(x')$ 
17:        For all rows  $i$ ,
18:           $\tilde{r}_i \leftarrow \frac{|\bar{A}_{i1} - \bar{A}_{i2}| + |\bar{A}_{i21} - \bar{A}_{i22}|}{|\bar{A}_{i11} - \bar{A}_{i12}| + |\bar{A}_{i21} - \bar{A}_{i22}| + |\bar{A}_{i11} - \bar{A}_{i12}|}$ 
19:           $\tilde{\Delta}_g \leftarrow \min_{i:i \notin \{i_1, i_2\}} \tilde{r}_i \cdot (V_A^* - \langle y', (\bar{A}_{i1}, \bar{A}_{i2}) \rangle)$ 
20:          If  $\tilde{\Delta}_g \geq 4\Delta'$ , then Return  $\{\{i_1, i_2\}, \{1, 2\}\}$  as the support of the Nash equilibrium.
21:        end if
22:      end for
23:    end if
24:  Return the Nash equilibrium of  $\bar{A}$ .
```

Theorem 8. Fix any $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\delta \in (0, 1)$. Let $T = \frac{8 \log(8n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$. Consider a game defined by the matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 2}$ with a unique Nash equilibrium $(x^*, y^*) \in \Delta_n \times \Delta_2$. The following hold, where c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4 are absolute constants.

- If A has a PSNE and $\frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} \leq T$, then with probability at least $1 - \delta$, Algorithm 3 samples each element of A for n_0 times and returns a PSNE where $n_0 = c_1 \cdot \frac{\log(\frac{n}{\varepsilon\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$.
- If A has a PSNE and $\frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} > T$, then with probability at least $1 - \delta$, Algorithm 3 samples each element of A for n_0 times and either returns a PSNE or an ε -Nash equilibrium where $n_0 = c_2 \cdot \frac{\log(n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$.

- If A does not have a PSNE and $\max \left\{ \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2} \right\} < T$, then with probability at least $1 - \delta$, Algorithm 3 samples each element of A for n_0 times and returns $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ where $n_0 = c_3 \cdot \max \left\{ \frac{\log(\frac{n}{\varepsilon\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\log(\frac{nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2} \right\}$.
- If A does not have a PSNE and $\max \left\{ \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2} \right\} \geq T$, then with probability at least $1 - \delta$, Algorithm 3 samples each element of A for n_0 times and either returns $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ or an ε -Nash equilibrium where $n_0 = c_4 \cdot \frac{\log(n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$.

If Algorithm 3 returns $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ such that $|\text{Supp}(x^*)| = |\text{Supp}(y^*)| = 2$, then Algorithms 1 and 2 can be run on the 2×2 sub-matrix formed by $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ and return, with high probability, an ε -good solution and ε -Nash equilibrium, respectively.

5 CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS

To the best of our knowledge, this work provides the first instance-dependent sample complexity results for zero-sum normal form games. We have completely characterized the instance dependent sample complexity of finding Nash Equilibrium in 2×2 matrix games. In addition, we have shed some light on the case of $n \times 2$ matrix games. These results shed light on the properties of a game that make its dynamics converge quickly or slowly. The implications of this line of results could be new algorithms designed to take advantage of easy games, where previous minimax optimal algorithms may not. This more nuanced understanding of instance-dependent sample complexity may also influence mechanism design since our results describe specifically how one could speed up convergence of players to a Nash equilibrium.

However, our work leaves many questions unresolved as well as revealing new ones. The most obvious direction—extending our results to general $(n \times m) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ —is also one of the most challenging. First, unlike our $n \times 2$ case in which the size of the support is trivially at most $k = 2$, it is unclear how to identify the true size k of the support of the Nash equilibrium in general, and then how to identify the $k \times k$ sub-matrix within the game matrix. Second, there does not exist a closed-form expression for the Nash equilibrium of general $(n \times m) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{N}$ matrix games. We exploit the existence of the closed-form solution in our 2×2 analysis in many ways, including deriving alternative instances for lower bounds, and also understanding the right notions of gap by considering a perturbation of the optimal solution. Due to Cramer’s rule there exists a closed-form expression for the Nash equilibrium of general $(n \times n)$ matrix game, however, we would have to analyze how determinants of a matrix behave under minor perturbations in order to

establish meaningful upper bounds.

Besides larger game matrices, there are other very natural questions to pursue. Given the instance-dependent quantities we introduced in this work, how do these generalize to general-sum games and can our lower bound strategies be extended? What is the sample complexity of identifying other kinds of equilibria, such as an ε (coarse) correlated equilibrium? Finally, can we derive instance-dependent regret bounds for computationally efficient strategies?

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A Properties of Matrix games

Let e_j^k denote a k -dimensional vector such that its j -th component is 1 and the rest of the components are 0. We now state some well known properties of Nash Equilibrium (in short NE) of Matrix games.

1. (Karlin and Peres (2017)) If (x^*, y^*) is a Nash equilibrium of a matrix game $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, then $\langle x^*, Ay^* \rangle = V_A^*$.
2. (Karlin and Peres (2017)) Let (x^*, y^*) be a Nash equilibrium of a matrix game $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$. Then the following holds true:
 - For any $i \in \text{Supp}(x^*)$, $\langle e_i^m, Ay^* \rangle = V_A^*$. Similarly, for any $j \in \text{Supp}(y^*)$, $\langle x^*, Ae_j^n \rangle = V_A^*$.
 - For any $i \notin \text{Supp}(x^*)$, $\langle e_i^m, Ay^* \rangle \leq V_A^*$. Similarly, for any $j \notin \text{Supp}(y^*)$, $\langle x^*, Ae_j^n \rangle \geq V_A^*$.
3. (Bohnenblust et al. (1950)) Consider a matrix game on $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) . Then the following holds true:
 - $|\text{Supp}(x^*)| = |\text{Supp}(y^*)|$
 - For any $i \in \text{Supp}(x^*)$, $\langle e_i^m, Ay^* \rangle = V_A^*$. Similarly, for any $j \in \text{Supp}(y^*)$, $\langle x^*, Ae_j^n \rangle = V_A^*$.
 - For any $i \notin \text{Supp}(x^*)$, $\langle e_i^m, Ay^* \rangle < V_A^*$. Similarly, for any $j \notin \text{Supp}(y^*)$, $\langle x^*, Ae_j^n \rangle > V_A^*$.

Next we present some useful properties of Matrix games.

Proposition 2. *If $\Delta_{\min} = 0$, then the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a PSNE.*

Proof. W.l.o.g let us assume that $a = b$. If $a \geq c$, then $(1, 1)$ is a PSNE of A . If $a \geq d$, then $(1, 2)$ is a PSNE of A . If $a \leq c \leq d$, then $(2, 1)$ is a PSNE of A . If $a \leq d \leq c$, then $(2, 2)$ is a PSNE of A . $\square$

Proposition 3. *If the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) such that $\min\{|\text{Supp}(x^*)|, |\text{Supp}(y^*)|\} = 1$, then the matrix game on A has a PSNE.*

Proof. If $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{i\}$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*) = \{j\}$, then (i, j) is a PSNE of A . Now w.l.o.g let us assume that $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{1\}$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*) = \{1, 2\}$. This implies that $a = b$. Hence due to Proposition 2, matrix game on A has a PSNE. $\square$

Proposition 4. *If the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ does not have a PSNE, then either $a < b, a < c, d < b$ and $d < c$ or $a > b, a > c, d > b$ and $d > c$.*

Proof. Due to Proposition 2, we have $\Delta_{\min} > 0$. Let us first assume that $a > b$. Then $d > c$ otherwise A has a PSNE. Similarly we have $a > c$ otherwise $(2, 1)$ would be a PSNE of A . Also we have $b < d$ otherwise $(1, 2)$ would be a PSNE of A . Similarly we can show that if $a < b$, then $a < c, d < b$ and $d < c$. $\square$

Proposition 5. *1. The matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE if and only if one of the following condition holds true:*

- $a < b, a < c, d < b$ and $d < c$
- $a > b, a > c, d > b$ and $d > c$

2. *Consider a matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) which is not a PSNE. Then $x^* = (\frac{d-c}{D}, \frac{a-b}{D})$, $y^* = (\frac{d-b}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D})$ and $V_A^* = \frac{ad-bc}{D}$ where $D = a - b - c + d$.*

Proof. Let us assume that $a < b, a < c, d < b$ and $d < c$. Then the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ does not have a PSNE. Hence due to Proposition 3, any Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) of the matrix game on A has $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \text{Supp}(y^*) = \{1, 2\}$. Let $((x, 1-x), (y, 1-y))$ be a Nash equilibrium of matrix game on A . Then it must satisfy the following equations:

$$\begin{aligned} ax + (1-x)c &= bx + (1-x)d \\ ay + (1-y)b &= cy + (1-y)d \end{aligned}$$

The above equations have a unique solution which is $x = \frac{d-c}{a-b-c+d}$ and $y = \frac{d-b}{a-b-c+d}$. In a similar way we can show that if $a > b, a > c, d > b$ and $d > c$, then the matrix game on A has unique Nash equilibrium $((x, 1-x), (y, 1-y))$ where $x = \frac{d-c}{a-b-c+d}$ and $y = \frac{d-b}{a-b-c+d}$. We also have $V_A^* = \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot a + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot c = \frac{ad-bc}{D}$ where $D = a - b - c + d$.

Next let us assume that the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE. Then it does not have a PSNE. Due to Proposition 4, either $a < b, a < c, d < b$ and $d < c$ or $a > b, a > c, d > b$ and $d > c$. $\square$

Proposition 6. Consider a matrix $A = [a, b; c, d]$. If $\Delta_{\min} > 0$, then the input matrix A has a unique Nash Equilibrium.

Proof. If A does not have a PSNE, then due to Propositions 4 and 5, we get that the matrix A has a unique Nash Equilibrium which is not a PSNE.

Let $\Delta_{\min} > 0$. Let us assume that A has a PSNE. W.l.o.g. let the element $(1, 1)$ be a PSNE. Due to the definition of PSNE, we have $a < b$ and $a > c$. If $d < b$, then $(1, 1)$ is the unique Nash Equilibrium of A as $a < b$ and strategy 1 strictly dominates strategy 2 for the row player. Similarly if $d > c$, then $(1, 1)$ is the unique Nash Equilibrium of A as $a > c$ and strategy 1 strictly dominates strategy 2 for the column player. The final case $d < c$ and $d > b$ is not possible otherwise we would have $d > b > a > c$ which is contradictory. Hence A has a unique Nash Equilibrium. $\square$

Proposition 7. The matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE if and only if the matrix game on A does not have a PSNE.

Proof. If the matrix game on $A = [a, b; c, d]$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE, then due to Proposition 5 either $a < b$, $a < c$, $d < b$ and $d < c$ or $a > b$, $a > c$, $d > b$ and $d > c$. This implies that A does not have a PSNE.

If A does not have a PSNE, then due to Proposition 4 either $a < b$, $a < c$, $d < b$ and $d < c$ or $a > b$, $a > c$, $d > b$ and $d > c$. This along with Proposition 5 implies that the matrix game on A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE. $\square$

Proposition 8. Any ε -Nash equilibrium of a matrix game A is also an ε -good solution of the matrix game A .

Proof. Let (x^*, y^*) be a Nash equilibrium of A and (x, y) be an ε -Nash equilibrium of A . Recall that $V_A^* = \langle x^*, Ay^* \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x^*, Ay^* \rangle &\geq \langle x, Ay^* \rangle && \text{(as } (x^*, y^*) \text{ is a Nash equilibrium)} \\ &\geq \langle x, Ay \rangle - \varepsilon && \text{(as } (x, y) \text{ is an } \varepsilon\text{-Nash equilibrium)} \end{aligned}$$

Similarly we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x^*, Ay^* \rangle &\leq \langle x^*, Ay \rangle && \text{(as } (x^*, y^*) \text{ is a Nash equilibrium)} \\ &\leq \langle x, Ay \rangle + \varepsilon && \text{(as } (x, y) \text{ is an } \varepsilon\text{-Nash equilibrium)} \end{aligned}$$

Hence (x, y) is also an ε -good solution. $\square$

B Minimax sample complexity, Proof of Lemma 1

Proof. First note that

$$\mathbb{P} \left(\bigcup_{i=1}^m \bigcup_{j=1}^n \{ |\bar{A}_{ij} - A_{ij}| \geq \varepsilon/2 \} \right) \leq \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \mathbb{P}(|\bar{A}_{ij} - A_{ij}| \geq \varepsilon/2) \leq \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\delta}{mn} = \delta$$

where the last inequality follows from a sub-Gaussian tail bound on our 1-sub-Gaussian observations. The sub-Gaussian tail bound, also known as Hoeffding bound, is as follows.

Lemma 7 (sub-Gaussian tail bound). Let $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$ be i.i.d samples from a 1-sub-Gaussian distribution with mean μ . Then we have the following:

$$\mathbb{P} \left[\left| \frac{1}{n} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n X_i - \mu \right| \geq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(2/\delta)}{n}} \right] \leq \delta$$

Thus, in what follows assume $|\bar{A}_{ij} - A_{ij}| \leq \varepsilon/2$ for all $(i, j) \in [m] \times [n]$. For any $x' \in \Delta_m$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x, Ay \rangle &= \langle x, \bar{A}y \rangle + \sum_{i,j} (A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{i,j}) x_i y_j \\ &\geq \langle x, \bar{A}y \rangle - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ &\geq \langle x', \bar{A}y \rangle - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} && \text{(as } (x, y) \text{ is a NE of } \bar{A}) \\ &\geq \langle x', Ay \rangle - \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for any $y' \in \Delta_n$ we have

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x, Ay \rangle &\leq \langle x, \bar{A}y \rangle + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ &\leq \langle x, \bar{A}y' \rangle + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ &\leq \langle x, Ay' \rangle + \varepsilon \end{aligned} \quad (\text{as } (x, y) \text{ is a NE of } \bar{A})$$

which completes the proof. $\square$

C Proof of ε -good solution Upper Bound

We establish the sample complexity and the correctness of the Algorithm 1 by proving the Theorem 4.

Proof of Theorem 4. Let $\bar{A}_{ij,t}$ denote the empirical mean of A_{ij} at time step t . Let us begin by defining two events:

$$\begin{aligned} G &:= \bigcap_{t=1}^T \bigcap_{i=1}^2 \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,t}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(16T/\delta)}{t}} \} \\ E &:= \bigcap_{i=1}^2 \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,T}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(16/\delta)}{T}} \} \end{aligned}$$

A union bound and sub-Gaussian-tail bound demonstrates that $\mathbb{P}(G^c \cup E^c) \leq \mathbb{P}(G^c) + \mathbb{P}(E^c) \leq \delta$. Consequently, events E and G hold simultaneously with probability at least $1 - \delta$, so in what follows, assume they hold.

If A has a PSNE and if the condition of line 7 of Algorithm 1 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -good solution in $\frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 9 and Corollary 1. On the other hand, if A has a PSNE but the for loop completes after $t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 9. Hence, if A has a PSNE, we identify an ε -good solution in $O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}\right\}\right)$ time steps.

Let us now assume for the rest of the proof that A has a unique NE which is not a PSNE. If the condition of line 9 of Algorithm 1 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Now observe that in this case $T = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon|D|}\right\}\right)$ due to Lemma 13. On the other hand, if the for loop completes after $t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 9.

Now let us assume for the rest of the proof that the condition in the line 12 is satisfied. Then due to Lemma 12, we have $\frac{64 \log(\frac{16}{\delta})}{\varepsilon|D|} \leq N \leq \frac{96 \log(\frac{16}{\delta})}{\varepsilon|D|}$. If the condition in the line 14 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Now observe that in this case $T = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon|D|}\right\}\right\}\right)$ as $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} + N$. If the condition in the line 14 is not satisfied, then we identify an ε -good solution due to Lemma 15. In this case, let the number of times we are required to sample each element be n_0 . Then $n_0 \leq T$ and $n_0 \leq \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} + \frac{96 \log(\frac{16}{\delta})}{\varepsilon|D|}$. Hence, $n_0 = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon|D|}\right\}\right\}\right)$. $\square$

C.1 Consequential lemmas of Algorithm 1's conditional statements

Recall the definitions of events E and G . We first present a few lemmas that deal with empirical estimates and instance dependent parameters like $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{D}$, $\Delta_{\min}$ and $|D|$. Whenever we fix a time step $t \leq T$ and discuss the parameters like $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{D}$ and Δ , we consider those values that have been assigned to these parameters during the time step t . We begin with upper bounding $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}|$ in the following lemma.

Lemma 8. Fix a time step $t \leq T$. If the event G holds, then we have the following:

$$|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$$

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. Then we have $||A_{ij} - A_{i'j'}| - |\bar{A}_{ij} - \bar{A}_{i'j'}|| \leq 2\Delta$ for any i, j, i', j' . By repeatedly applying the Lemma 18, we get $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$. $\square$

The following lemma upper bounds the number of time steps required to satisfy the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$.

Lemma 9. *Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $t \leq \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$.*

Proof. Consider the time step $t = \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta = \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{t}} = \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{20}$. Now observe that $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta \leq \Delta_{\min} + 4\Delta = \frac{6\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Similarly, we have $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta \geq \Delta_{\min} - 4\Delta \geq \frac{4\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Hence, we have $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$. $\square$

The following lemma bounds the ratio $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}}$.

Lemma 10. *Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .*

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{4\Delta_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min} + 2\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{6\Delta_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. $\square$

The following lemma and the subsequent corollary relates the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$ to the input matrix A .

Lemma 11. *Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:*

- If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, then $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$
- If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, then $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$
- If $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$, then $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$
- If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, then $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$

Proof. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Due to Lemma 10, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$. As event G holds, for any element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{t_0}} \leq \Delta$.

If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{ij_1} &\geq A_{ij_1} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{ij_2} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } A_{ij_1} - A_{ij_2} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{ij_2} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{ij_2} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{i_1j} &\geq A_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } A_{i_1j} - A_{i_2j} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{i_{j1}} > \bar{A}_{i_{j2}}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{i_{j1}} &\geq \bar{A}_{i_{j1}} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{i_{j1}} - \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{i_{j2}} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{i_1j} &\geq \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \bar{A}_{i_2j} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Corollary 1. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:

- (i, j) is PSNE of A if and only if (i, j) is a PSNE of $\bar{A}$.
- A does not have a PSNE if and only if $\bar{A}$ does not have a PSNE.

The following lemma bounds the ratio $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|}$.

Lemma 12. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds and A has a unique Equilibrium which is not a PSNE, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ and $2\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} \leq \tilde{D}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{20}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{\tilde{D} - 4\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{4\tilde{D}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \geq \frac{\tilde{D}}{\tilde{D} + 4\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{D}}{6\tilde{D}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. □

The following two lemmas bound $|D|$ when certain conditions in the algorithm 1 hold true.

Lemma 13. If the condition in the line 9 of the algorithm 1 holds true and event G holds, then $|D| < 12\varepsilon$

Proof. Due to Lemma 12, we have $|D| \leq \frac{6\tilde{D}}{5} < 12\varepsilon$. □

Lemma 14. If the condition in the line 12 of the algorithm 1 holds true and event G holds, then $|D| \geq 8\varepsilon$

Proof. Due to Lemma 12, we have $|D| \geq \frac{4\tilde{D}}{5} \geq 8\varepsilon$. □

For any $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, let $A(\Delta) := \{B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} : \max_{i,j} |(B - A)_{ij}| \leq \Delta\}$. We now present the main lemma that establishes the correctness of the algorithm 1 when the input matrix A does not have a PSNE.

Lemma 15. *If the condition in the line 12 of the algorithm 1 holds true and event G holds, then Nash equilibrium of the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$ is also an ε -good solution of the input matrix A .*

Proof. $\bar{A} \in A\left(\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon \tilde{D}}{40}}\right)$ as event G holds true. Due to Lemma 12, we have $\tilde{D} \leq \frac{5|D|}{4}$. Hence, $\bar{A} \in A\left(\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon |D|}{32}}\right)$ which in turn implies that $A \in \bar{A}\left(\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon |D|}{32}}\right)$. Now we show that $\frac{\sqrt{\varepsilon |D|}}{4\sqrt{2}} < \frac{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}|}{12}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}|}{12} &\geq \frac{|A_{11} - A_{12} - A_{21} + A_{22}| - 4 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon |D|}{32}}}{12} && (\text{as } \bar{A} \in A\left(\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon |D|}{32}}\right)) \\ &= \frac{|D| - \sqrt{\varepsilon |D|}/2}{12} \\ &\geq \frac{\sqrt{8\varepsilon |D|} - \sqrt{\varepsilon |D|}/2}{12} && (\text{as } |D| \geq 8\varepsilon) \\ &> \frac{\sqrt{\varepsilon |D|}}{4\sqrt{2}} \end{aligned}$$

Let (x, y) be the Nash equilibrium of $\bar{A}$. Now by applying Lemma 17 we have that $|V_A^* - \langle x, Ay \rangle| \leq \varepsilon$. We can apply lemma 17 as $A \in \bar{A}\left(\sqrt{\frac{\varepsilon |D|}{32}}\right)$, $\frac{\sqrt{\varepsilon |D|}}{4\sqrt{2}} < \frac{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}|}{12}$ and $\bar{A}$ has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE (due to Corollary 1). $\square$

C.2 Technical Lemmas for Upper Bound

In this section, we present few technical lemmas that are used to establish the upper bound on the sample complexity of finding ε -good solution.

Let $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$. Recall that $A(\Delta) := \{B \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n} : \max_{i,j} |(B - A)_{ij}| \leq \Delta\}$ and for any n -dimensional vector v , $v(i)$ denotes its i -th component. Now we present the following lemma, where we relate V_A^* , the Nash equilibrium of A , to V_B^* where $B \in A(\Delta)$.

Lemma 16. *Consider a matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}$ with unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) which is not a PSNE. Then for any $B \in A(\Delta)$ that has a unique Nash equilibrium (x, y) which is not a PSNE, we have the following:*

$$V_B^* = \langle x^*, By^* \rangle + \sum_{j=1}^n y^*(j) \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij}$$

where $\Delta_{ij} := B_{ij} - A_{ij}$ and $\theta_i = x(i) - x^*(i)$.

Proof. For all $i \in [n]$, let $x_i = x(i)$, $y_i = y(i)$, $x_i^* = x^*(i)$ and $y_i^* = y^*(i)$.

First observe that $\langle x^*, By^* \rangle = V_A^* + \sum_{i,j} x_i^* y_j^* \Delta_{ij}$. Also observe that $\sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i = 0$. Let B_j denote the j -th column of B . Let $V_j := \langle x, B_j \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x, B_j \rangle &= \sum_{i=1}^n [x_i^* A_{ij} + x_i^* \Delta_{ij} + \theta_i A_{ij} + \theta_i \Delta_{ij}] \\ &= V_A^* + \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^* \Delta_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i A_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij} && (\text{as } \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^* A_{ij} = V_A^*) \end{aligned}$$

Let $V = (V_1, \dots, V_n)$. Since $\text{Supp}(x) = \text{Supp}(y) = [n]$, therefore we have for all $j \in [n]$, $V_j = V_B^*$. Now we have the

following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 V_B^* &= \langle V, y^* \rangle \\
 &= \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* V_A^* + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^* \Delta_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i A_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij} \\
 &= V_A^* + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n x_i^* y_j^* \Delta_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* A_{ij} + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij} \\
 &= \langle x^*, B y^* \rangle + V_A^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij} \quad (\text{as } \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* A_{ij} = V_A^*) \\
 &= \langle x^*, B y^* \rangle + \sum_{j=1}^n y_j^* \sum_{i=1}^n \theta_i \Delta_{ij}
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Let us define two matrices A_1 and A_2 as follows:

$$A_1 = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix}$$

$$A_2 = \begin{bmatrix} a + \Delta_{11} & b + \Delta_{12} \\ c + \Delta_{21} & d + \Delta_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

Let $\Delta = \max_{i,j} |\Delta_{ij}|$. Now we present the following lemma, where we upper bound $|V_{A_2}^* - \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle|$ where (x^*, y^*) is the Nash equilibrium of A_1 .

Lemma 17. *Let A_1 and A_2 have a unique NE which is not a PSNE. Let (x^*, y^*) be the NE of the matrix game A_1 . Let $\Delta \leq |a - b - c + d|/12$. Then we have the following:*

$$|V_{A_2}^* - \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle| \leq \frac{16\Delta^2}{|D|} \leq \frac{32\Delta^2}{|D'|}$$

where $D := a - b - c + d$, $D' := a - b - c + d + \Delta_{11} - \Delta_{12} + \Delta_{22} - \Delta_{21}$.

Proof. Let $(x^*, y^*) = ((x, 1 - x), (y, 1 - y))$ be the NE of the matrix game A_1 where $x = \frac{d-c}{a-b-c+d}$ and $y = \frac{d-b}{a-b-c+d}$. Let $((x', 1 - x'), (y', 1 - y'))$ be the NE of the matrix game A_2 where $x' = \frac{d-c+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{21}}{a-b-c+d+\Delta_{11}-\Delta_{12}+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{21}}$ and $y' = \frac{d-b+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{12}}{a-b-c+d+\Delta_{11}-\Delta_{12}+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{21}}$. For convenience, let $N := d - c$ and $D := a - b - c + d$. Hence, we have $x = \frac{|N|}{|D|}$ and $x' = \frac{N+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{21}}{D+\Delta_{11}-\Delta_{12}+\Delta_{22}-\Delta_{21}}$. Now we will upper bound x' as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 x' &\leq \frac{|N| + 2\Delta}{|D| - 4\Delta} \\
 &= \left(\frac{|N|}{|D|} + \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} \right) \left(1 - \frac{4\Delta}{|D|} \right)^{-1} \\
 &\leq \left(\frac{|N|}{|D|} + \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} \right) \left(1 + \frac{6\Delta}{|D|} \right) \quad (\text{as } \frac{1}{1-z} \leq 1 + \frac{3z}{2} \text{ when } 0 \leq z \leq \frac{1}{3}) \\
 &= \frac{|N|}{|D|} + \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} + \frac{|N|}{|D|} \cdot \frac{6\Delta}{|D|} + \frac{12\Delta^2}{|D|^2} \\
 &\leq \frac{|N|}{|D|} + \frac{9\Delta}{D} \quad (\text{as } \frac{|N|}{|D|} \leq 1 \text{ and } \frac{\Delta}{|D|} \leq \frac{1}{12})
 \end{aligned}$$

Next we will lower x' as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 x' &\geq \frac{|N| - 2\Delta}{|D| + 4\Delta} \\
 &= \left(\frac{|N|}{|D|} - \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} \right) \left(1 + \frac{4\Delta}{|D|} \right)^{-1} \\
 &\geq \left(\frac{|N|}{|D|} - \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} \right) \left(1 - \frac{4\Delta}{|D|} \right) && (\text{as } \frac{1}{1+z} > 1 - z \text{ when } z > 0) \\
 &= \frac{|N|}{|D|} - \frac{2\Delta}{|D|} - \frac{|N|}{|D|} \cdot \frac{4\Delta}{|D|} + \frac{8\Delta^2}{|D|^2} \\
 &\geq \frac{|N|}{|D|} - \frac{6\Delta}{|D|} && (\text{as } \frac{|N|}{|D|} \leq 1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence we have $|x' - x| \leq \frac{8\Delta}{D}$. Due to Lemma 16, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 |V_B^* - \langle x^*, By^* \rangle| &\leq \sum_{j=1}^2 y^*(j) \sum_{i=1}^2 |\theta_i \Delta_{ij}| \\
 &\leq \sum_{j=1}^2 y^*(j) \sum_{i=1}^2 \frac{8\Delta^2}{|D|} \\
 &= \frac{18\Delta^2}{|D|} \sum_{j=1}^2 y^*(j) \\
 &= \frac{18\Delta^2}{|D|} \\
 &\leq \frac{32\Delta^2}{|D'|} && (\text{as } |D'| \geq |D| - 4\Delta \geq 2|D|/3)
 \end{aligned}$$

□

The next lemma states some basic inequalities that will be used frequently in the analysis that follows.

Lemma 18. *Let $a, \bar{a}, b, \bar{b}, \Delta'$ be positive real numbers. Let $|a - \bar{a}| \leq \Delta'$ and $|b - \bar{b}| \leq \Delta'$. Then we have the following:*

- $|a + b - (\bar{a} + \bar{b})| \leq 2\Delta'$
- $|\min\{a, b\} - \min\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| \leq \Delta'$
- $|\max\{a, b\} - \max\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| \leq \Delta'$

Proof. First observe that $|a - \bar{a} + b - \bar{b}| \leq |a - \bar{a}| + |b - \bar{b}| \leq 2\Delta'$.

Next w.l.o.g let us assume that $\min\{a, b\} = a$. If $\min\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\} = \bar{a}$, then we have $|\min\{a, b\} - \min\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| = |a - \bar{a}| \leq \Delta'$. If $\min\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\} = \bar{b}$, then $\bar{b} \leq \bar{a} \leq a + \Delta'$ and $\bar{b} \geq b - \Delta' \geq a - \Delta'$. Hence, in this case also we have $|\min\{a, b\} - \min\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| = |a - \bar{b}| \leq \Delta'$.

Finally w.l.o.g let us assume that $\max\{a, b\} = b$. If $\max\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\} = \bar{b}$, then we have $|\max\{a, b\} - \max\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| = |b - \bar{b}| \leq \Delta'$. If $\max\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\} = \bar{a}$, then $\bar{a} \geq \bar{b} \geq b - \Delta'$ and $\bar{a} \leq a + \Delta' \leq b + \Delta'$. Hence, in this case also we have $|\max\{a, b\} - \max\{\bar{a}, \bar{b}\}| = |b - \bar{a}| \leq \Delta'$. □

D Proof of ε -good solution lower bound with respect to D

Before finishing the proof of the theorem 1, we begin with the proof of Lemma 2

Proof. W.l.o.g let us assume that $D > 0$. For $\square \in \{-\Delta, 0, \Delta\}$ it can be shown that

$$\begin{aligned} V_{A_\square}^* &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square - \frac{\square^2}{D} \\ \langle x', A_\square y' \rangle &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square + \frac{\alpha\beta + (\alpha+\beta)\square}{D} \end{aligned}$$

where $x' = (\frac{d-c+\alpha}{D}, \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D}) \in \Delta_2$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b+\beta}{D}, \frac{a-c-\beta}{D}) \in \Delta_2$ for any $\alpha \in [c-d, a-b]$ and $\beta \in [b-d, a-c]$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . We refer the reader to the Appendix D.2 for the detailed calculations.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices has error of at least $3\varepsilon/2$. If $|\alpha\beta| \geq \Delta^2/2$, then $|V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle| = \frac{|\alpha\beta|}{D} \geq \frac{\Delta^2}{2D}$. If $|\alpha\beta| < \Delta^2/2$ and $\alpha + \beta \geq 0$, then $\langle x', A_\Delta y' \rangle - V_{A_\Delta}^* = \frac{\Delta^2 + \alpha\beta + (\alpha+\beta)\Delta}{D} \geq \frac{\Delta^2}{2D}$. Similarly, if $|\alpha\beta| < \Delta^2/2$ and if $\alpha + \beta < 0$, then $\langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle - V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* = \frac{\Delta^2 + \alpha\beta - (\alpha+\beta)\Delta}{D} \geq \frac{\Delta^2}{2D}$. Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\}$ such that

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| \geq \frac{\Delta^2}{2D} = \frac{3\varepsilon}{2}$$

□

D.1 Proof of Theorem 1

Let $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$ be the distribution of an observation when playing pair (i, j) with matrix A . Let $\mathbb{P}_A$ denote the probability law of the internal randomness of the algorithm and random observations. If an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good and outputs a solution $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ then $\min_A \mathbb{P}_A(|V_A^* - \langle \hat{x}, A \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. We will show that if an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good then it can also accomplish a particular hypothesis. We will conclude by noting that any procedure that can accomplish the hypothesis test must take the claimed sample complexity.

For any pair of mixed strategies $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ output by the procedure at the stopping time τ , define

$$\phi = \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\} \setminus \arg \max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\}} |V_B^* - \langle \hat{x}, B \hat{y} \rangle|,$$

breaking ties arbitrarily in the maximum so that $\phi \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0\} \cup \{A_{-\Delta}, A_\Delta\} \cup \{A_0, A_\Delta\}$. Note that

$$\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi, |V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) = \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(|V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta \quad (1)$$

where the equality follows from the Lemma 2: at least one of the three matrices must have a loss of at least $3\varepsilon/2$, but A_0 has a loss of at most ε , thus $A_0 \in \phi$. Now because

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \max\{\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\})\} &\geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) + \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq 1 - \delta \end{aligned}$$

we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$ or $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$. Let's assume the former (the latter case is handled identically). By the same argument as (1) we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \leq \delta$.

For a stopping time τ , let $N_{i,j}(\tau)$ denote the number of times (i, j) is sampled. Recalling that $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$, we have by Lemma 1 of Kaufmann et al. (2016) that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{1,1}(\tau)]KL(\nu_{1,1}^{A_0}, \nu_{1,1}^{A_\Delta}) + \mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{2,2}(\tau)]KL(\nu_{2,2}^{A_0}, \nu_{2,2}^{A_\Delta}) \geq d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}))$$

where $KL(\nu_{1,1}^{A_0}, \nu_{1,1}^{A_\Delta}) = KL(\nu_{2,2}^{A_0}, \nu_{2,2}^{A_\Delta}) = \Delta^2/2$ and $d(p, q) = p \log(\frac{p}{q}) + (1-p) \log(\frac{1-p}{1-q})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\})) &\geq d(\frac{1-\delta}{2}, \delta) \\ &= \frac{1-\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1-\delta}{2\delta}) + \frac{1+\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{2(1-\delta)}) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - \frac{\delta}{2} \log(\frac{(1-\delta)^2}{\delta(1+\delta)}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - 1/8 > \frac{1}{2} \log(1/30\delta) \end{aligned}$$

and $\tau = N_{1,1}(\tau) + N_{1,2}(\tau) + N_{2,1}(\tau) + N_{2,2}(\tau)$ we conclude that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta^2} = \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{3\varepsilon|D|}$$

as claimed.

D.2 Calculations for Lemma 2

Proposition 9. For $\square \in \{-\Delta, 0, \Delta\}$, $V_{A_\square}^* = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square - \frac{\square^2}{D}$

Proof. $V_{A_\square}^* = \frac{(a+\square)(d-\square)-bc}{a+\square-b-c+d-\square} = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square - \frac{\square^2}{D}$ □

Recall that $x' = (\frac{d-c+\alpha}{D}, \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D})$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b+\beta}{D}, \frac{a-c-\beta}{D})$. Now we present the following proposition.

Proposition 10. For $\square \in \{-\Delta, 0, \Delta\}$, $\langle x', A_\square y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square + \frac{\alpha\beta+(\alpha+\beta)\square}{D}$

Proof. Let $V_1 = \langle x', (a + \square, c) \rangle$ and $V_2 = \langle x', (b, d - \square) \rangle$. First we have the following.

$$\begin{aligned} V_1 &= \frac{d-c+\alpha}{D} \cdot (a + \square) + \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D} \cdot c \\ &= \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot a + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot c + \frac{d-c+\alpha}{D}\square + \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot \alpha \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-c+\alpha}{D}\square + \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot \alpha \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, we have the following.

$$\begin{aligned} V_2 &= \frac{d-c+\alpha}{D} \cdot b + \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D} \cdot (d - \square) \\ &= \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot b + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot d - \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D}\square + \frac{b-d}{D} \cdot \alpha \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} - \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D}\square + \frac{b-d}{D} \cdot \alpha \end{aligned}$$

Now observe that $\langle x', A_\square y' \rangle = \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle &= \left\langle y', \left(\frac{ad-bc}{D}, \frac{ad-bc}{D} \right) \right\rangle + \frac{d-b+\beta}{D} \cdot \frac{d-c+\alpha}{D} \cdot \square - \frac{a-c-\beta}{D} \cdot \frac{a-b-\alpha}{D} \cdot \square \\ &\quad + \frac{d-b+\beta}{D} \cdot \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot \alpha + \frac{a-c-\beta}{D} \cdot \frac{b-d}{D} \cdot \alpha \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)(d-c) - (a-c)(a-b)}{D^2} \square + \frac{(d-c+\alpha)\beta + (a-b-\alpha)\beta}{D^2} \cdot \square \\ &\quad + \frac{(d-b)\alpha + (a-c)\alpha}{D^2} \cdot \square + \frac{(d-b)(a-c)\alpha - (a-c)(d-b)\alpha}{D^2} + \frac{a-b-c+d}{D^2} \cdot \alpha\beta \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{d-a}{D}\square + \frac{(\alpha+\beta)\square + \alpha\beta}{D} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

We get (2) as $D = a - b - c + d$ and $(d-b)(d-c) - (a-c)(a-b) = (d-a)(a-b-c+d)$. □

E Proof of ε -good lower bound with respect to $\varepsilon, \Delta_{\min}$

Before finishing the proof of the Theorem 2, we begin with the proof of Lemma 3

Proof. Let us first consider the case when $d - c > 2\Delta$. Observe that $V_{A_0}^* = \frac{ad-bc}{D}$, $V_{A_\Delta}^* = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \cdot \Delta$ and $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* = a - \Delta$. For any $\alpha \in [\frac{c-d}{D}, \frac{a-b}{D}]$ and $\beta \in [\frac{b-d}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D}]$, let $x' = (\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha, \frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$.

Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . It can be shown that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$. We refer the reader to the Appendix E.2 for the detailed calculations.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices has error of more than ε . If $|D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$, then $|V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle| = |D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$. Let $f(\Delta) = \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \Delta + 2\Delta\beta$. If $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) \geq \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $\langle x', A_{\Delta} y' \rangle - V_{A_{\Delta}}^* = D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) - \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \cdot \Delta \geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} > \varepsilon$. Similarly, if $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) < \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* - \langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle = \frac{(a-b)(a-c)}{D} - \Delta - D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) < \Delta_{\min} - \Delta + \varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} \leq -\varepsilon$. Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_{\Delta}, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that the following holds:

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| > \varepsilon$$

Next we consider the case when $d - c \leq 2\Delta$. Observe that $V_{A_0}^* = \frac{ad-bc}{D}$, $V_{A_{\Delta}}^* = d - \Delta$ and $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* = a - \Delta$. For any $\alpha \in [\frac{c-d}{D}, \frac{a-b}{D}]$ and $\beta \in [\frac{b-d}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D}]$, let $x' = (\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha, \frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . Recall that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices has error of more than ε . If $|D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$, then $|V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle| = |D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$. Let $f(\Delta) = \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \Delta + 2\Delta\beta$. If $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) \geq \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x', A_{\Delta} y' \rangle - V_{A_{\Delta}}^* &= D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) - \frac{(d-b)(d-c)}{D} + \Delta \\ &\geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{d-c}{2} + \Delta && \text{(as } d-b \leq D/2) \\ &\geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} && \text{(as } d-c \leq 2\Delta) \\ &> \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, if $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) < \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* - \langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle = \frac{(a-b)(a-c)}{D} - \Delta - D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) < \Delta_{\min} - \Delta + \varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} \leq -\varepsilon$. Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_{\Delta}, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that the following holds:

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| > \varepsilon$$

□

E.1 Proof of Theorem 2

Let $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$ be the distribution of an observation when playing pair (i, j) with matrix A . Let $\mathbb{P}_A$ denote the probability law of the internal randomness of the algorithm and random observations. If an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good and outputs a solution $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ then $\min_A \mathbb{P}_A(|V_A^* - \langle \hat{x}, A \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. We will show that if an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good then it can also accomplish a particular hypothesis. We will conclude by noting that any procedure that can accomplish the hypothesis test must take the claimed sample complexity.

For any pair of mixed strategies $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ output by the procedure at the stopping time τ , define

$$\phi = \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_{\Delta}\} \setminus \arg \max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_{\Delta}\}} |V_B^* - \langle \hat{x}, B \hat{y} \rangle|,$$

breaking ties arbitrarily in the maximum so that $\phi \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0\} \cup \{A_{-\Delta}, A_{\Delta}\} \cup \{A_0, A_{\Delta}\}$. Note that

$$\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi, |V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) = \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(|V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta \quad (3)$$

where the equality follows from the Lemma 3: at least one of the three matrices must have a loss of more than ε , but A_0 has a loss of at most ε , thus $A_0 \in \phi$. Now because

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \max\{\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{\Delta}\})\} &\geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) + \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{\Delta}\}) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq 1 - \delta \end{aligned}$$

we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$ or $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$. Let's assume the former (the latter case is handled identically). By the same argument as (3) we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \leq \delta$.

For a stopping time τ , let $N_{i,j}(\tau)$ denote the number of times (i, j) is sampled. Recalling that $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$, we have by Lemma 1 of Kaufmann et al. (2016) that

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{i,j}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{\Delta}}) \geq d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}))$$

where for any $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{\Delta}}) = \Delta^2/2$ and $d(p, q) = p \log(\frac{p}{q}) + (1-p) \log(\frac{1-p}{1-q})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\})) &\geq d(\frac{1-\delta}{2}, \delta) \\ &= \frac{1-\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1-\delta}{2\delta}) + \frac{1+\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{2(1-\delta)}) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - \frac{\delta}{2} \log(\frac{(1-\delta)^2}{\delta(1+\delta)}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - 1/8 > \frac{1}{2} \log(1/30\delta) \end{aligned}$$

and $\tau = N_{1,1}(\tau) + N_{1,2}(\tau) + N_{2,1}(\tau) + N_{2,2}(\tau)$ we conclude that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta^2} = \min \left\{ \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\Delta_{\min}^2} \right\}$$

as claimed.

E.2 Calculations for Lemma 3

Recall that $x' = (\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha, \frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Let $(A_{\square})_i^r$ denote the i -th row of $A_{\square}$ and $(A_{\square})_j^c$ denote the j -th column of $A_{\square}$.

First, observe that $\langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle = \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot a + \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot \square + a\alpha + \square\alpha + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot c + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot \square - c\alpha - \square\alpha = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \square + (a-c)\alpha$. Similarly, we have $\langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle = \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot b - \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot \square + b\alpha - \square\alpha + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot d - \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot \square - d\alpha + \square\alpha = \frac{ad-bc}{D} - \square + (b-d)\alpha$.

Now we present the following proposition.

Proposition 11. $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$

Proof. Let $V_1 = \langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle$ and $V_2 = \langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle$. Now observe that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle &= \left\langle y', \left(\frac{ad-bc}{D}, \frac{ad-bc}{D} \right) \right\rangle + \left(\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta \right) \cdot \square - \left(\frac{a-c}{D} - \beta \right) \cdot \square \\ &\quad + \left(\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta \right) \cdot (a-c)\alpha - \left(\frac{a-c}{D} - \beta \right) \cdot (d-b)\alpha \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta \\ &\quad + \frac{(d-b)(a-c) - (a-c)(d-b)}{D} \cdot \alpha + (a-b-c+d)\alpha\beta \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-b)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta \quad (\text{as } D = a-b-c+d) \end{aligned}$$

□

F Proof of ε -good lower bound for games with multiple Nash Equilibria

Before finishing the proof of the Theorem 3, we begin with the proof of Lemma 4

Proof. Let us first consider the case when $D = d - c > 2\Delta$. Observe that $V_{A_0}^* = a$, $V_{A_\Delta}^* = a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \cdot \Delta$ and $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* = a - \Delta$. For any $\alpha \in [-1, 0]$ and $\beta \in [\frac{a-d}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D}]$, let $x' = (1 + \alpha, -\alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-a}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . It can be shown that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$. We refer the reader to the Appendix F.2 for the detailed calculations.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices has error of more than ε . If $|D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$, then $|V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle| = |D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$. Let $f(\Delta) = \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \Delta + 2\Delta\beta$. If $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) \geq \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $\langle x', A_\Delta y' \rangle - V_{A_\Delta}^* = D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) - \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \cdot \Delta \geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} > \varepsilon$. Similarly, if $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) < \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* - \langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle = -\Delta - D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) < -\Delta + \varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} \leq -\varepsilon$. Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that the following holds:

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| > \varepsilon$$

Next we consider the case when $d - c \leq 2\Delta$. Observe that $V_{A_0}^* = a$, $V_{A_\Delta}^* = d - \Delta$ and $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* = a - \Delta$. For any $\alpha \in [-1, 0]$ and $\beta \in [\frac{a-d}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D}]$, let $x' = (1 + \alpha, -\alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-a}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . Recall that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices has error of more than ε . If $|D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$, then $|V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle| = |D\alpha\beta| > \varepsilon$. Let $f(\Delta) = \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \Delta + 2\Delta\beta$. If $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) \geq \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x', A_\Delta y' \rangle - V_{A_\Delta}^* &= D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) - \frac{(d-a)(d-c)}{D} + \Delta \\ &\geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} - \frac{d-c}{2} + \Delta && \text{(as } d-a \leq D/2) \\ &\geq -\varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} && \text{(as } d-c \leq 2\Delta) \\ &> \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, if $|D\alpha\beta| \leq \varepsilon$ and $f(\Delta) < \frac{\Delta}{2}$, then $V_{A_{-\Delta}}^* - \langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle = -\Delta - D\alpha\beta + f(\Delta) < -\Delta + \varepsilon + \frac{\Delta}{2} \leq -\varepsilon$. Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that the following holds:

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| > \varepsilon$$

□

F.1 Proof of Theorem 2

Let $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$ be the distribution of an observation when playing pair (i, j) with matrix A . Let $\mathbb{P}_A$ denote the probability law of the internal randomness of the algorithm and random observations. If an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good and outputs a solution $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ then $\min_A \mathbb{P}_A(|V_A^* - \langle \hat{x}, A \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. We will show that if an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good then it can also accomplish a particular hypothesis. We will conclude by noting that any procedure that can accomplish the hypothesis test must take the claimed sample complexity.

For any pair of mixed strategies $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ output by the procedure at the stopping time τ , define

$$\phi = \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\} \setminus \arg \max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\}} |V_B^* - \langle \hat{x}, B \hat{y} \rangle|,$$

breaking ties arbitrarily in the maximum so that $\phi \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0\} \cup \{A_{-\Delta}, A_\Delta\} \cup \{A_0, A_\Delta\}$. Note that

$$\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi, |V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) = \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(|V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0 \hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta \quad (4)$$

where the equality follows from the Lemma 4: at least one of the three matrices must have a loss of more than ε , but A_0 has a loss of at most ε , thus $A_0 \in \phi$. Now because

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \max\{\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\})\} &\geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) + \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq 1 - \delta \end{aligned}$$

we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$ or $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$. Let's assume the former (the latter case is handled identically). By the same argument as (4) we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \leq \delta$.

For a stopping time τ , let $N_{i,j}(\tau)$ denote the number of times (i, j) is sampled. Recalling that $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$, we have by Lemma 1 of Kaufmann et al. (2016) that

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{i,j}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{\Delta}}) \geq d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}))$$

where for any $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{\Delta}}) = \Delta^2/2$ and $d(p, q) = p \log(\frac{p}{q}) + (1-p) \log(\frac{1-p}{1-q})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\})) &\geq d(\frac{1-\delta}{2}, \delta) \\ &= \frac{1-\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1-\delta}{2\delta}) + \frac{1+\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{2(1-\delta)}) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - \frac{\delta}{2} \log(\frac{(1-\delta)^2}{\delta(1+\delta)}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - 1/8 > \frac{1}{2} \log(1/30\delta) \end{aligned}$$

and $\tau = N_{1,1}(\tau) + N_{1,2}(\tau) + N_{2,1}(\tau) + N_{2,2}(\tau)$ we conclude that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta^2} = \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{36\varepsilon^2}$$

as claimed.

F.2 Calculations for Lemma 4

Recall that $x' = (1 + \alpha, -\alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-a}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Let $(A_{\square})_i^r$ denote the i -th row of $A_{\square}$ and $(A_{\square})_j^c$ denote the j -th column of $A_{\square}$.

First, observe that $\langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle = 1 \cdot a + 1 \cdot \square + a\alpha + \square\alpha - c\alpha - \square\alpha = a + \square + (a-c)\alpha$. Similarly, we have $\langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle = 1 \cdot a - 1 \cdot \square + a\alpha - \square\alpha - d\alpha + \square\alpha = a - \square + (a-d)\alpha$.

Now we present the following proposition.

Proposition 12. $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta$

Proof. Let $V_1 = \langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle$ and $V_2 = \langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle$. Now observe that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle y', (V_1, V_2) \rangle &= \langle y', (a, a) \rangle + \left(\frac{d-a}{D} + \beta \right) \cdot \square - \left(\frac{a-c}{D} - \beta \right) \cdot \square \\ &\quad + \left(\frac{d-a}{D} + \beta \right) \cdot (a-c)\alpha - \left(\frac{a-c}{D} - \beta \right) \cdot (d-a)\alpha \\ &= a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta \\ &\quad + \frac{(d-a)(a-c)-(a-c)(d-a)}{D} \cdot \alpha + (a-c+d-a)\alpha\beta \\ &= a + \frac{(d-a)-(a-c)}{D} \square + 2\square\beta + D\alpha\beta \end{aligned} \quad (\text{as } D = d-c)$$

□

G Proof of ε -Nash equilibrium Upper Bound

We establish the sample complexity and the correctness of the Algorithm 2 by proving the Theorem 6.

Proof of Theorem 6. Let $\bar{A}_{ij,t}$ denote the empirical mean of A_{ij} at time step t . Let us begin by defining two events:

$$G := \bigcap_{t=1}^T \bigcap_{i=1}^2 \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,t}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(16T/\delta)}{t}} \}$$

$$E := \bigcap_{i=1}^2 \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,T}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(16/\delta)}{T}} \}$$

A union bound and sub-Gaussian-tail bound demonstrates that $\mathbb{P}(G^c \cup E^c) \leq \mathbb{P}(G^c) + \mathbb{P}(E^c) \leq \delta$. Consequently, events E and G hold simultaneously with probability at least $1 - \delta$, so in what follows, assume they hold.

If A has a PSNE and if the condition in the line 8 of the algorithm 2 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium in $\frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 20 and Corollary 2. On the other hand, if A has a PSNE but the for loop completes after $t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 20. Hence, if A has a PSNE, we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium in $O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}\right\}\right)$ time steps.

Let us assume for the rest of the proof that A has a unique Nash equilibrium which is not a PSNE. If the condition in the line 10 of the algorithm 2 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Now observe that in this case $T = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\right\}\right)$ due to Lemma 25. On the other hand, if the for loop completes after $t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 20.

Now let us assume for the rest of the proof that the condition in the line 13 is satisfied. Then due to Lemma 26, we have $\frac{800 \Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{9 \varepsilon^2 |D|^2} \leq N \leq \frac{450 \Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\varepsilon^2 |D|^2}$. If the condition in the line 15 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium in $T = \frac{8 \log(16/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Now observe that in this case $T = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\right\}\right\}\right)$ as $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} + N$. If the condition in the line 15 is not satisfied, then we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium due to Lemma 27. In this case, let the number of times we are required to sample each element be n_0 . Then $n_0 \leq T$ and $n_0 \leq \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2} + \frac{450 \Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\varepsilon^2 |D|^2}$. Hence, $n_0 = O\left(\min\left\{\frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}, \max\left\{\frac{\log(T/\delta)}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(T/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2 D^2}\right\}\right\}\right)$. $\square$

G.1 Consequential lemmas of Algorithm 2's conditional statements

Recall the definitions of events E and G . We first present a few lemmas that deal with empirical estimates and instance dependent parameters like $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{D}$, $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}$, Δ_{m_2} , $\Delta_{\min}$ and $|D|$. Whenever we fix a time step $t \leq T$ and discuss the parameters like $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{D}$, $\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}$ and Δ , we consider those values that have been assigned to these parameters during the time step t .

We begin with upper bounding $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}|$ and $|\Delta_{m_2} - \tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}|$ in the following lemma.

Lemma 19. Fix a time step $t \leq T$. If the event G holds, then we have the following:

- $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$
- $|\Delta_{m_2} - \tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}| \leq 2\Delta$

Proof. As the event G holds true, we have $||A_{ij} - A_{i'j'}| - |\bar{A}_{ij} - \bar{A}_{i'j'}|| \leq 2\Delta$ for any i, j, i', j' . By repeatedly apply Lemma 18, we get $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$ and $|\Delta_{m_2} - \tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}| \leq 2\Delta$. $\square$

The following lemma upper bounds the number of time steps required to satisfy the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$.

Lemma 20. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $t \leq \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$.

Proof. Consider the time step $t = \frac{800 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta = \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{t}} = \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{20}$. Now observe that $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta \leq \Delta_{\min} + 4\Delta = \frac{6\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Similarly, we have $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta \geq \Delta_{\min} - 4\Delta \geq \frac{4\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Hence, we have $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$. $\square$

The following two lemmas bound the ratios $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}}$ and $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\Delta_{m_2}}$.

Lemma 21. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{4\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{6\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. $\square$

Lemma 22. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\Delta_{m_2}} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds true. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{10}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\Delta_{m_2}} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{4\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\Delta_{m_2}} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} + 2\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{6\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. $\square$

The following lemma and the subsequent corollary relates the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$ to the input matrix A .

Lemma 23. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:

- If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, then $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$
- If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, then $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$
- If $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$, then $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$
- If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, then $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$

Proof. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Due to Lemma 21, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$. As event G holds, for any element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{t_0}} \leq \Delta$.

If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{ij_1} &\geq A_{ij_1} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{ij_2} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && \text{(as } A_{ij_1} - A_{ij_2} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{ij_2} + \Delta && \text{(as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{ij_2} && \text{(as event } G \text{ holds)}
 \end{aligned}$$

If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{i_1j} &\geq A_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } A_{i_1j} - A_{i_2j} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{i_{j1}} > \bar{A}_{i_{j2}}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{i_{j1}} &\geq \bar{A}_{i_{j1}} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{i_{j1}} - \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{i_{j2}} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{i_{j2}} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{i_1j} &\geq \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \bar{A}_{i_2j} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Corollary 2. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:

- (i, j) is PSNE of A if and only if (i, j) is a PSNE of $\bar{A}$.
- A does not have a PSNE if and only if $\bar{A}$ does not have a PSNE.

The following lemma bounds the ratio $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|}$.

Lemma 24. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds and A has a unique Equilibrium which is not a PSNE, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ and $2\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} \leq \tilde{D}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{20}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{\tilde{D} - 4\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{D}}{4\tilde{D}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{D}}{|D|} \geq \frac{\tilde{D}}{\tilde{D} + 4\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{D}}{6\tilde{D}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. □

The following two lemmas bound the ratio $\frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|}$ when certain conditions in the algorithm 2 hold true.

Lemma 25. If the condition in the line 10 of the algorithm 2 holds true and event G holds, then $\frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} \geq \frac{1}{12}$

Proof. Due to Lemma 22, we have $\Delta_{m_2} \geq \frac{4\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{5}$. Due to Lemma 24, we have $|D| \leq \frac{6\tilde{D}}{5}$. Hence, we have $\frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{D} \geq \frac{2\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{3\tilde{D}} \geq \frac{1}{12}$. We get the latter inequality as the condition in the line 10 holds true. □

Lemma 26. If the condition in the line 13 of the algorithm 2 holds true and event G holds, then $\frac{2\Delta_{m_2}}{3|D|} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\tilde{D}} \leq \frac{3\Delta_{m_2}}{2|D|}$.

Proof. Due to Lemma 22, we have $\frac{5\Delta_{m_2}}{6} \leq \tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} \leq \frac{5\Delta_{m_2}}{4}$. Due to Lemma 24, we have $\frac{5|D|}{6} \leq \tilde{D} \leq \frac{5|D|}{4}$. Hence, we have $\frac{2\Delta_{m_2}}{3|D|} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{\tilde{D}} \leq \frac{3\Delta_{m_2}}{2|D|}$. $\square$

We now present the main lemma that establishes the correctness of the algorithm 2 when the input matrix A does not have a PSNE.

Lemma 27. *If the condition in the line 13 of the algorithm 2 holds true and event G holds, then Nash equilibrium of the matrix B is also an ε -Nash equilibrium of A*

Proof. First observe that $\Delta_1 \leq \sqrt{2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta}) / (\frac{200\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}^2 \log(\frac{16T}{\delta})}{\varepsilon^2 \tilde{D}^2})} = \frac{\varepsilon \tilde{D}}{10\Delta_{m_2}}$. Due to Lemma 26, we then have $\Delta_1 \leq \frac{3\varepsilon|D|}{20\Delta_{m_2}}$. Let $\Delta_{ij} := A_{ij} - B_{ij}$ for all i, j . As event G holds true and due to the construction of the matrix B , we have $|\Delta_{ij}| \leq 3\Delta_1 < \frac{\varepsilon|D|}{2\Delta_{m_2}}$.

As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ and $\Delta_1 \leq \Delta$, we have $\Delta_1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Due to Lemma 21, we then have $\Delta_1 \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$. As the condition in the line 13 holds true and due to Lemma 26, we have $\frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} \leq \frac{3\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2}}{2\tilde{D}} < \frac{3}{16}$.

Now we show that B does not have PSNE. Recall that $B_{i_1 j_1} = \bar{A}_{i_1 j_1}$, $B_{i_2 j_2} = \bar{A}_{i_2 j_2}$, $B_{i_1 j_2} = \bar{A}_{i_1 j_2} - 2\Delta_1$ and $B_{i_2 j_1} = \bar{A}_{i_2 j_1} + 2\Delta_1$. Due to Corollary 2, $\bar{A}$ does not have a PSNE. Hence, it suffices to show that $2\Delta_1 < \min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12}|, |\bar{A}_{21} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{21}|, |\bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}$. As event G holds and due to Lemma 19, we have $\min\{|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12}|, |\bar{A}_{21} - \bar{A}_{22}|\}|\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{21}|, |\bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{22}|\} \geq \Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta_1$. As $\Delta_1 \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$, we have $\Delta_{\min} - 2\Delta_1 > 2\Delta_1$. Hence, B does not have a PSNE.

Let $(x^*, y^*) := ((x_1^*, x_2^*), (y_1^*, y_2^*))$ be the Nash equilibrium of B . Let $D_B = |B_{11} - B_{12} - B_{21} + B_{22}|$. Observe that $D_B = |\bar{A}_{11} - \bar{A}_{12} - \bar{A}_{21} + \bar{A}_{22}| \geq |D| - 4\Delta_1$ as event G holds true. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 x_{i_2}^* &= \frac{|B_{i_1 1} - B_{i_1 2}|}{D_B} \\
 &\leq \frac{|\bar{A}_{i_1 1} - \bar{A}_{i_1 2}| + 2\Delta_1}{D_B} && \text{(Due to the construction of } B) \\
 &\leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} + 2\Delta_1}{D_B} && \text{(Due to the choice of } i_1 \text{ in Algorithm 2)} \\
 &\leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2} + 4\Delta_1}{|D| - 4\Delta_1} && \text{(as event } G \text{ holds)} \\
 &\leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2} + \Delta_{m_2}/2}{|D| - |D|/4} && \text{(as } \Delta_1 \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8} \leq |D|/4) \\
 &= \frac{2\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} \\
 &< \frac{3}{8} && \text{(as } \frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} < \frac{3}{16})
 \end{aligned}$$

Similarly we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_{j_2}^* &= \frac{|B_{1j_1} - B_{2j_1}|}{D_B} \\
 &\leq \frac{|\bar{A}_{1j_1} - \bar{A}_{2j_1}| + 2\Delta_1}{D_B} && \text{(Due to the construction of } B) \\
 &\leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{m_2} + 2\Delta_1}{D_B} && \text{(Due to the choice of } i_1 \text{ in Algorithm 2)} \\
 &\leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2} + 4\Delta_1}{|D| - 4\Delta_1} && \text{(as event } G \text{ holds)} \\
 &\leq \frac{\Delta_{m_2} + \Delta_{m_2}/2}{|D| - |D|/4} && \text{(as } \Delta_1 \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8} \leq |D|/4) \\
 &= \frac{2\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} \\
 &< \frac{3}{8} && \text{(as } \frac{\Delta_{m_2}}{|D|} < \frac{3}{16})
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, we have shown that $i_1 = \operatorname{argmax}_i x_i^*$ and $j_1 = \operatorname{argmax}_i y_i^*$.

Now we have $B_{i_1j_1} = \bar{A}_{i_1j_1} \leq A_{i_1j_1} + \Delta_1 = B_{i_1j_1} + \Delta_{i_1j_1} + \Delta_1$. We also have $B_{i_2j_1} = \bar{A}_{i_2j_1} + 2\Delta_1 \geq A_{i_2j_1} + \Delta_1 = B_{i_2j_1} + \Delta_{i_2j_1} + \Delta_1$. Hence we have $\Delta_{i_1j_1} \geq -\Delta_1 \geq \Delta_{i_2j_1}$.

Similarly, we have $B_{i_1j_1} = \bar{A}_{i_1j_1} \geq A_{i_1j_1} - \Delta_1 = B_{i_1j_1} + \Delta_{i_1j_1} - \Delta_1$. We also have $B_{i_1j_2} = \bar{A}_{i_1j_2} - 2\Delta_1 \leq A_{i_1j_2} - \Delta_1 = B_{i_1j_2} + \Delta_{i_1j_2} - \Delta_1$. Hence we have $\Delta_{i_1j_1} \leq \Delta_1 \leq \Delta_{i_1j_2}$.

Hence, all the conditions of the Lemma 28 is satisfied by the matrices A and B . Hence, we can apply Lemma 28 and conclude that (x^*, y^*) is an ε -Nash equilibrium of A . $\square$

G.2 Technical Lemma for Upper Bound

In this section, we present an important technical lemma that is used to establish the upper bound on the sample complexity of finding ε -Nash equilibrium.

Let us first define two matrices A_1 and A_2 as follows:

$$A_1 = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix} A_2 = \begin{bmatrix} a + \Delta_{11} & b + \Delta_{12} \\ c + \Delta_{21} & d + \Delta_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

Let $(x^*, y^*) := ((x_1^*, x_2^*), (y_1^*, y_2^*))$ be the unique Nash equilibrium of A_1 . Let $\operatorname{Supp}(x^*) = \operatorname{Supp}(y^*) = \{1, 2\}$. Let $i^* := \operatorname{argmax}_i x_i^*$ and $j^* := \operatorname{argmax}_j y_j^*$. Recall that $\Delta_{m_2} := \max\{\min\{|a - b|, |d - c|\}, \min\{|a - c|, |d - b|\}\}$ and $D := a - b - c + d$. Now we present the technical lemma.

Lemma 28. *Let $|\Delta_{ij}| \leq \frac{\varepsilon|D|}{2\Delta_{m_2}}$ for all i, j . If $\Delta_{i^*j^*} \geq \Delta_{ij^*}$ for all i and $\Delta_{i^*j^*} \leq \Delta_{i^*j}$ for all j , then (x^*, y^*) is an ε -Nash equilibrium of matrix A_2 .*

Proof. First, observe that $\langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \sum_{i,j} x_i^* y_j^* \Delta_{ij}$. Let $(A_2)_i^r$ denote the i -th row of A_2 and $(A_2)_j^c$ denote the j -th column of A_2 . Now observe that $\langle (A_2)_1^r, y^* \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + y_1^* \Delta_{11} + y_2^* \Delta_{12}$ and $\langle (A_2)_2^r, y^* \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + y_1^* \Delta_{21} + y_2^* \Delta_{22}$. Finally, observe that $\langle (A_2)_1^c, x^* \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + x_1^* \Delta_{11} + x_2^* \Delta_{21}$ and $\langle (A_2)_2^c, x^* \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + x_1^* \Delta_{12} + x_2^* \Delta_{22}$.

W.l.o.g let us assume that $i^* = 1$ and $j^* = 1$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle (A_2)_1^r, y^* \rangle - \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle &= x_2^* y_1^* (\Delta_{11} - \Delta_{21}) + x_2^* y_2^* (\Delta_{12} - \Delta_{22}) \\
 &\leq x_2^* y_1^* (|\Delta_{11}| + |\Delta_{21}|) + x_2^* y_2^* (|\Delta_{12}| + |\Delta_{22}|) \\
 &\leq \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} (x_2^* y_1^* + x_2^* y_2^*) \\
 &= x_2^* \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \\
 &= \frac{|a-b|}{|D|} \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \\
 &\leq \varepsilon \quad (\text{as } |a-b| \leq \Delta_{m_2})
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle (A_2)_2^r, y^* \rangle - \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle &= x_1^* y_1^* (\Delta_{21} - \Delta_{11}) + x_1^* y_2^* (\Delta_{22} - \Delta_{12}) \\
 &\leq x_1^* y_2^* (\Delta_{22} - \Delta_{12}) \quad (\text{as } \Delta_{11} \geq \Delta_{21}) \\
 &\leq x_1^* y_2^* (|\Delta_{22}| + |\Delta_{12}|) \\
 &\leq \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} x_1^* y_2^* \\
 &\leq \frac{|a-c|}{|D|} \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \quad (\text{as } x_1^* \leq 1 \text{ and } y_2^* = \frac{|a-c|}{|D|}) \\
 &\leq \varepsilon \quad (\text{as } |a-c| \leq \Delta_{m_2})
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle - \langle (A_2)_1^c, x^* \rangle &= x_1^* y_2^* (\Delta_{12} - \Delta_{11}) + x_2^* y_2^* (\Delta_{22} - \Delta_{21}) \\
 &\leq x_1^* y_2^* (|\Delta_{12}| + |\Delta_{11}|) + x_2^* y_2^* (|\Delta_{22}| + |\Delta_{21}|) \\
 &\leq \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} (x_1^* y_2^* + x_2^* y_2^*) \\
 &= y_2^* \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \\
 &= \frac{|a-c|}{|D|} \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \\
 &\leq \varepsilon \quad (\text{as } |a-c| \leq \Delta_{m_2})
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle x^*, A_2 y^* \rangle - \langle (A_2)_2^c, x^* \rangle &= x_1^* y_1^* (\Delta_{11} - \Delta_{12}) + x_2^* y_1^* (\Delta_{21} - \Delta_{22}) \\
 &\leq x_2^* y_1^* (\Delta_{21} - \Delta_{22}) \quad (\text{as } \Delta_{11} \leq \Delta_{12}) \\
 &\leq x_2^* y_1^* (|\Delta_{21}| + |\Delta_{22}|) \\
 &\leq \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} x_2^* y_1^* \\
 &\leq \frac{|a-b|}{|D|} \frac{\varepsilon |D|}{\Delta_{m_2}} \quad (\text{as } y_1^* \leq 1 \text{ and } x_2^* = \frac{|a-b|}{|D|}) \\
 &\leq \varepsilon \quad (\text{as } |a-b| \leq \Delta_{m_2})
 \end{aligned}$$

□

H Proof of ε -Nash equilibrium Lower Bound

Before finishing the proof of the theorem 5, we begin with the proof of Lemma 5

Proof. For any $\alpha \in [\frac{c-d}{D}, \frac{a-b}{D}]$ and $\beta \in [\frac{b-d}{D}, \frac{a-c}{D}]$, let $x' = (\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha, \frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x', y' is equal to Δ_2 . It can be shown that $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha + D\alpha\beta$. Let $(A_{\square})_i^r$ denote the i -th row of $A_{\square}$ and $(A_{\square})_j^c$ denote the j -th column of $A_{\square}$. It can be shown that $\langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha + (a-c)\alpha$ and $\langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha + (b-d)\alpha$. Similarly, it can be shown that $\langle y', (A_{\square})_1^r \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \square + (a-b)\beta$ and $\langle y', (A_{\square})_2^r \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} - \square - (d-c)\beta$. We refer the reader to the Appendix H.2 for the detailed calculations.

Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle y', (A_{\square})_1^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle &= \frac{2(a-b)}{D} \square + (a-b)\beta - 2\square\alpha - D\alpha\beta \\ \langle y', (A_{\square})_2^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle &= -\frac{2(d-c)}{D} \square - (d-c)\beta - 2\square\alpha - D\alpha\beta \\ \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle - \langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle &= D\alpha\beta - (a-c)\alpha \\ \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle - \langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle &= D\alpha\beta + (d-b)\alpha \end{aligned}$$

Observe that if (x', y') is an ε -Nash equilibrium of $A_{\square}$, then $\langle y', (A_{\square})_1^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle \leq \varepsilon$, $\langle y', (A_{\square})_2^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle \leq \varepsilon$, $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle - \langle x', (A_{\square})_1^c \rangle \leq \varepsilon$ and $\langle x', A_{\square} y' \rangle - \langle x', (A_{\square})_2^c \rangle \leq \varepsilon$.

We will now show that regardless of what values (α, β) take (equivalently, regardless of what values (x', y') take), there is at least one of the three alternative matrices for which (x', y') is not an ε -Nash equilibrium. Let us assume that (x', y') is an ε -Nash equilibrium of A , otherwise A_0 is the matrix for which (x', y') is not an ε -Nash equilibrium. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} (a-b)\beta - D\alpha\beta &\leq \varepsilon \\ -(d-c)\beta - D\alpha\beta &\leq \varepsilon \\ -(a-c)\alpha + D\alpha\beta &\leq \varepsilon \\ (d-b)\alpha + D\alpha\beta &\leq \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Using the above equations, we get the following:

$$\begin{aligned} -\varepsilon &\leq D\alpha\beta \leq \varepsilon \\ \beta &\geq -\frac{2\varepsilon}{d-c} \\ \beta &\leq \frac{2\varepsilon}{a-b} \end{aligned}$$

If $\Delta\alpha < \varepsilon$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle y', (A_{\Delta})_1^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{\Delta} y' \rangle &= \frac{2(a-b)}{D} \Delta + (a-b)\beta - 2\Delta\alpha - D\alpha\beta \\ &\geq \frac{2(a-b)}{D} \Delta + (a-b)\beta - 2\Delta\alpha - \varepsilon && (\text{as } -D\alpha\beta \geq -\varepsilon) \\ &\geq \frac{2(a-b)}{D} \Delta - 2\Delta\alpha - 3\varepsilon && (\text{as } \beta \geq -\frac{2\varepsilon}{d-c}) \\ &> \frac{2(a-b)}{D} \Delta - 5\varepsilon && (\text{as } -\Delta\alpha > -\varepsilon) \\ &= \varepsilon && (\text{as } \Delta = \frac{3\varepsilon D}{a-b}) \end{aligned}$$

If $\Delta\alpha \geq \varepsilon$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \langle y', (A_{-\Delta})_2^r \rangle - \langle x', A_{-\Delta} y' \rangle &= \frac{2(d-c)}{D} \Delta - (d-c)\beta + 2\Delta\alpha - D\alpha\beta \\
 &\geq \frac{2(d-c)}{D} \Delta - (d-c)\beta + 2\Delta\alpha - \varepsilon && (\text{as } -D\alpha\beta \geq -\varepsilon) \\
 &\geq \frac{2(d-c)}{D} \Delta - (d-c)\beta + \varepsilon && (\text{as } \Delta\alpha \geq \varepsilon) \\
 &\geq \frac{2(d-c)}{D} \Delta - \frac{2(d-c)}{a-b} \varepsilon + \varepsilon && (\text{as } -\beta \geq -\frac{2\varepsilon}{a-b}) \\
 &= \frac{6(d-c)}{a-b} \varepsilon - \frac{2(d-c)}{a-b} \varepsilon + \varepsilon && (\text{as } \Delta = \frac{3\varepsilon D}{a-b}) \\
 &> \varepsilon
 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, we proved that for any $(x', y') \in \Delta_2 \times \Delta_2$, there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{-\Delta}\}$ such that (x', y') is not an ε -Nash equilibrium of B . $\square$

H.1 Proof of Theorem 5

Let $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$ be the distribution of an observation when playing pair (i, j) with matrix A . Let $\mathbb{P}_A$ denote the probability law of the internal randomness of the algorithm and random observations. Let $f_A(x, y) = \max\{\max_{x' \in \Delta_2} \langle x', Ay \rangle - \langle x, Ay \rangle, \langle x, Ay \rangle - \min_{y' \in \Delta_2} \langle x, Ay' \rangle\}$. If an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-Nash and outputs a solution $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ then $\min_A \mathbb{P}_A(f_A(\hat{x}, \hat{y}) \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. We will show that if an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-Nash then it can also accomplish a particular hypothesis. We will conclude by noting that any procedure that can accomplish the hypothesis test must take the claimed sample complexity.

For any pair of mixed strategies $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ output by the procedure at the stopping time τ , define

$$\phi = \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\} \setminus \arg \max_{B \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0, A_\Delta\}} f_B(\hat{x}, \hat{y}),$$

breaking ties arbitrarily in the maximum so that $\phi \in \{A_{-\Delta}, A_0\} \cup \{A_{-\Delta}, A_\Delta\} \cup \{A_0, A_\Delta\}$. Note that

$$\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi, f_{A_0}(\hat{x}, \hat{y}) \leq \varepsilon) = \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(f_{A_0}(\hat{x}, \hat{y}) \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta \quad (5)$$

where the equality follows from the Lemma 5: at least one of the three matrices must have a loss of more than ε , but A_0 has a loss of at most ε , thus $A_0 \in \phi$. Now because

$$\begin{aligned}
 2 \max\{\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\})\} &\geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) + \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \\
 &= \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq 1 - \delta
 \end{aligned}$$

we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$ or $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$. Let's assume the former (the latter case is handled identically). By the same argument as (5) we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}) \leq \delta$.

For a stopping time τ , let $N_{i,j}(\tau)$ denote the number of times (i, j) is sampled. Recalling that $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$, we have by Lemma 1 of Kaufmann et al. (2016) that

$$\sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{i,j}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{2\Delta}}) \geq d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}))$$

where for any $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$, $KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_\Delta}) = \Delta^2/2$ and $d(p, q) = p \log(\frac{p}{q}) + (1-p) \log(\frac{1-p}{1-q})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned}
 d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_\Delta}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{-\Delta}\})) &\geq d(\frac{1-\delta}{2}, \delta) \\
 &= \frac{1-\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1-\delta}{2\delta}) + \frac{1+\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{2(1-\delta)}) \\
 &= \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - \frac{\delta}{2} \log(\frac{(1-\delta)^2}{\delta(1+\delta)}) \\
 &\geq \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - 1/8 > \frac{1}{2} \log(1/30\delta)
 \end{aligned}$$

and $\tau = N_{1,1}(\tau) + N_{1,2}(\tau) + N_{2,1}(\tau) + N_{2,2}(\tau)$ we conclude that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{\Delta^2} = \frac{\Delta_{m_2}^2 \log(1/30\delta)}{9\varepsilon^2 D^2}$$

as claimed.

H.2 Calculations for Lemma 5

Recall that $x' = (\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha, \frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha)$ and $y' = (\frac{d-b}{D} + \beta, \frac{a-c}{D} - \beta)$. Let $(A_\square)_i^r$ denote the i -th row of $A_\square$ and $(A_\square)_j^c$ denote the j -th column of $A_\square$.

First, observe that $\langle y', (A_\square)_1^r \rangle = \frac{d-b}{D} \cdot a + \frac{d-b}{D} \cdot \square + a\beta + \square\beta + \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot b + \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot \square - b\beta - \square\beta = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \square + (a-b)\beta$. Similarly, we have $\langle y', (A_\square)_2^r \rangle = \frac{d-b}{D} \cdot c - \frac{d-b}{D} \cdot \square + c\beta - \square\beta + \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot d - \frac{a-c}{D} \cdot \square - d\beta + \square\beta = \frac{ad-bc}{D} - \square + (c-d)\beta$.

Next, observe that $\langle x', (A_\square)_1^c \rangle = \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot a + \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot \square + a\alpha + \square\alpha + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot c - \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot \square - c\alpha + \square\alpha = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + (a-c)\alpha + 2\square\alpha$. Similarly, we have $\langle x', (A_\square)_2^c \rangle = \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot b + \frac{d-c}{D} \cdot \square + b\alpha + \square\alpha + \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot d - \frac{a-b}{D} \cdot \square - d\alpha + \square\alpha = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + (b-d)\alpha + 2\square\alpha$.

Now we present the following proposition.

Proposition 13. $\langle x', A_\square y' \rangle = \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha + D\alpha\beta$

Proof. Let $V_1 = \langle y', (A_\square)_1^r \rangle$ and $V_2 = \langle y', (A_\square)_2^r \rangle$. Now observe that $\langle x', A_\square y' \rangle = \langle x', (V_1, V_2) \rangle$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle x', (V_1, V_2) \rangle &= \left\langle x', \left(\frac{ad-bc}{D}, \frac{ad-bc}{D} \right) \right\rangle + \left(\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha \right) \cdot \square - \left(\frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha \right) \cdot \square \\ &\quad + \left(\frac{d-c}{D} + \alpha \right) \cdot (a-b)\beta - \left(\frac{a-b}{D} - \alpha \right) \cdot (d-c)\beta \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha \\ &\quad + \frac{(d-b)(a-b) - (a-b)(d-c)}{D} \cdot \beta + (a-b-c+d)\alpha\beta \\ &= \frac{ad-bc}{D} + \frac{(d-c)-(a-b)}{D} \square + 2\square\alpha + D\alpha\beta \quad (\text{as } D = a-b-c+d) \end{aligned}$$

□

I Proof of $n \times 2$ Matrix Upper Bound

We now establish the sample complexity and the correctness of the Algorithm 3 by proving the Theorem 8.

Proof of Theorem 8. Let $\bar{A}_{ij,t}$ denote the empirical mean of A_{ij} at time step t . Let us begin by defining two events:

$$\begin{aligned} G &:= \bigcap_{t=1}^T \bigcap_{i=1}^n \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,t}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(8nT/\delta)}{t}} \} \\ E &:= \bigcap_{i=1}^n \bigcap_{j=1}^2 \{ |A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij,T}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(8n/\delta)}{T}} \} \end{aligned}$$

A union bound and sub-Gaussian-tail bound demonstrates that $\mathbb{P}(G^c \cup E^c) \leq \mathbb{P}(G^c) + \mathbb{P}(E^c) \leq \delta$. Consequently, events E and G hold simultaneously with probability at least $1 - \delta$, so in what follows, assume they hold.

If A has a PSNE and if the condition in the line 6 of the algorithm 3 is satisfied, then we identify a PSNE in $\frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 30 and Corollary 3. On the other hand, if A has a PSNE but the outer for loop completes after

$t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(8n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 30.

Let us assume for the rest of the proof that A does not have a PSNE. If the outer for loop completes after $t = T$ iterations, then we identify an ε -good solution in $T = \frac{8 \log(8n/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Note that in this case, $T < \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$ due to Lemma 30.

Now let us assume for the rest of the proof that the condition in the line 8 is satisfied. If the condition in the line 14 is satisfied, then we identify an ε -Nash equilibrium in $T = \frac{8 \log(8nT/\delta)}{\varepsilon^2}$ time steps due to Lemma 1. Now observe that in this case $T \leq \max \left\{ \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2} \right\}$ due to Lemma 30 and Lemma 34. If the condition in the line 19 is satisfied, then we identify $\text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\text{Supp}(y^*)$ due to Lemma 33. In this case, let the number of times we are required to sample each element be n_0 . Then $n_0 \leq \max \left\{ \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}, \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2} \right\} + 1$ due to Lemma 30 and Lemma 34. $\square$

I.1 Consequential lemmas of Algorithm 3's conditional statements

Recall the definitions of events E and G . We first present few lemmas which deal with empirical estimates and instance dependent parameters like $\hat{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{\Delta}_g$, $\Delta_{\min}$ and Δ_g . Whenever we fix a time step $t \leq T$ and discuss the parameters like $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}$, $\tilde{\Delta}_g$, Δ' and Δ , we consider those values that have been assigned to these parameters during the time step t . We begin with upper bounding $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}|$ in the following lemma.

Lemma 29. Fix a time step $t \leq T$. If the event G holds, then we have the following:

$$|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$$

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. Then we have $||A_{ij} - A_{i'j'}| - |\bar{A}_{ij} - \bar{A}_{i'j'}|| \leq 2\Delta$ for any i, j, i', j' . By repeatedly applying the Lemma 18, we get $|\Delta_{\min} - \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}| \leq 2\Delta$. $\square$

The following lemma upper bounds the number of time steps required to satisfy the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$.

Lemma 30. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $t \leq \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$.

Proof. Consider the time step $t = \frac{800 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_{\min}^2}$. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta = \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{t}} = \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{20}$. Now observe that $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta \leq \Delta_{\min} + 4\Delta = \frac{6\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Similarly, we have $\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta \geq \Delta_{\min} - 4\Delta \geq \frac{4\Delta_{\min}}{5}$. Hence, we have $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$. $\square$

The following lemma bounds the ratio $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}}$.

Lemma 31. Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then $\frac{5}{6} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{5}{4}$ at the time step t .

Proof. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then for every element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \Delta$. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Now observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{4\Delta_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{4}$. Next observe that $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\Delta_{\min}} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta} \geq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{6\Delta_{\min}/5} = \frac{5}{6}$. $\square$

Now let us define the notion of strong dominance.

Definition 4 (Strongly dominate). We say that a row i of a matrix A strongly dominates a row j of A if $A_{i1} > A_{j1}$ and $A_{i2} > A_{j2}$

The following lemma and the subsequent corollary relates the empirical matrix $\bar{A}$ to the input matrix A .

Lemma 32. *Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:*

- If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, then $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$
- If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, then $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$
- If $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$, then $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$
- If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, then $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$

Proof. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Due to Lemma 31, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$. As event G holds, for any element (i, j) , we have $|A_{ij} - \bar{A}_{ij}| \leq \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{t_0}} \leq \Delta$.

If $A_{ij_1} > A_{ij_2}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{ij_1} &\geq A_{ij_1} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{ij_2} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } A_{ij_1} - A_{ij_2} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{ij_2} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{ij_2} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $A_{i_1j} > A_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{A}_{i_1j} &\geq A_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} + \Delta_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } A_{i_1j} - A_{i_2j} \geq \Delta_{\min}) \\
 &> A_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}) \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{ij_1} > \bar{A}_{ij_2}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{ij_1} &\geq \bar{A}_{ij_1} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{ij_2} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{ij_1} - \bar{A}_{ij_2} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{ij_2} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{ij_2} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\bar{A}_{i_1j} > \bar{A}_{i_2j}$, we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_{i_1j} &\geq \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \Delta \\
 &\geq \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - \Delta && (\text{as } \bar{A}_{i_1j} - \bar{A}_{i_2j} \geq \tilde{\Delta}_{\min}) \\
 &> \bar{A}_{i_2j} + \Delta && (\text{as } \Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}) \\
 &\geq A_{i_2j} && (\text{as event } G \text{ holds})
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Corollary 3. *Let t be the time step when the condition $1 \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$ holds true for the first time. If the event G holds, then at any time step t_0 such that $t \leq t_0 \leq T$, we have the following:*

- (i, j) is PSNE of A if and only if (i, j) is a PSNE of $\bar{A}$.

- A does not have a PSNE if and only if $\bar{A}$ does not have a PSNE.
- The row i of A strongly dominates the row j of A if and only if the row i of A strongly dominates the row j of $\bar{A}$.

We now present the main lemma that establishes the correctness of the algorithm 1 when the input matrix A does not have a PSNE.

Lemma 33. *Let (x^*, y^*) be the Nash equilibrium of A . If the condition in the line 19 of the algorithm 3 holds true and event G holds, then $\{i_1, i_2\} = \text{Supp}(x^*)$ and $\{1, 2\} = \text{Supp}(y^*)$.*

Proof. As condition in the line 19 of the algorithm 3 holds true and event G holds, $\bar{A}$ does not have a PSNE. Due to Corollary 3, A does not have a PSNE. Hence $\{1, 2\} = \text{Supp}(y^*)$. Moreover, $|\text{Supp}(x^*)| = 2$ as A has a unique Nash equilibrium.

As $\bar{A}$ has no row that strongly dominates any other row, A does not have a row that strongly dominates any other row due to Corollary 3. As $\frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} + 2\Delta}{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min} - 2\Delta} \leq \frac{3}{2}$, we have $\Delta \leq \frac{\tilde{\Delta}_{\min}}{10}$. Due to Lemma 31, we have $\Delta' \leq \Delta \leq \frac{\Delta_{\min}}{8}$. Therefore, for any $i, j, k \in [n]$, $\frac{6\Delta'}{|A_{i1} - A_{i2}| + |A_{j1} - A_{j2}| + |A_{k1} - A_{k2}|} \leq \frac{6\Delta'}{3\Delta_{\min}} \leq \frac{1}{4}$. Hence, we can apply the lemmas in the Section I.2.

Now let us assume that $\{i_1, i_2\} \neq \text{Supp}(x^*)$. Let $B = [A_{i_1 1}, A_{i_1 2}; A_{i_2 1}, A_{i_2 2}]$ and (x_B, y_B) is the Nash equilibrium of B . Then due to Lemma 37, $\exists i \in \text{Supp}(x^*) \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}$ such that $V_B^* - \langle y_B, (A_{i1}, A_{i2}) \rangle < 0$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\Delta}_g &\leq \frac{(|\bar{A}_{i_1 1} - \bar{A}_{i_1 2}| + |\bar{A}_{i_2 1} - \bar{A}_{i_2 2}|)(V_{\bar{A}}^* - \langle y', (\bar{A}_{i_1}, \bar{A}_{i_2}) \rangle)}{|\bar{A}_{i_1 1} - \bar{A}_{i_1 2}| + |\bar{A}_{i_2 1} - \bar{A}_{i_2 2}| + |\bar{A}_{i_1} - \bar{A}_{i_2}|} \\ &\leq \frac{(|A_{i_1 1} - A_{i_1 2}| + |A_{i_2 1} - A_{i_2 2}|)(V_B^* - \langle y_B, (A_{i_1}, A_{i_2}) \rangle)}{|A_{i_1 1} - A_{i_1 2}| + |A_{i_2 1} - A_{i_2 2}| + |A_{i_1} - A_{i_2}|} + 4\Delta' \quad (\text{due to Lemma 36}) \\ &< 4\Delta' \quad (\text{as } V_B^* - \langle y_B, (A_{i_1}, A_{i_2}) \rangle < 0) \end{aligned}$$

This contradicts the fact that the condition in the line 19 of the algorithm 3 holds true. Hence $\{i_1, i_2\} = \text{Supp}(x^*)$. $\square$

The following lemma upper bounds the number of time steps required to return the support of the Nash equilibrium when the input matrix A does not have a PSNE.

Lemma 34. *Let the condition in the line 8 of the algorithm 3 hold true. Let t' be the time step when both the conditions $|\text{Supp}(x')| = 2$ and $\tilde{\Delta}_g \geq 4\Delta'$ hold true simultaneously for the first time. If the event G holds, then $t' \leq \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2}$.*

Proof. Consider the time step $t' = \frac{722 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta})}{\Delta_g^2}$. Let us assume that the event G holds. Then $\Delta' = \sqrt{2 \log(\frac{8nT}{\delta}) / (t')} = \frac{\Delta_g}{19}$. Let (x^*, y^*) be the Nash equilibrium of A . Let $\text{Supp}(x^*) = (i^*, j^*)$. Let $A_* = [A_{i^* 1}, A_{i^* 2}; A_{j^* 1}, A_{j^* 2}]$ and $\bar{A}_* = [\bar{A}_{i^* 1}, \bar{A}_{i^* 2}; \bar{A}_{j^* 1}, \bar{A}_{j^* 2}]$. Let (x'', y'') be the Nash equilibrium of $\bar{A}_*$. Then for any $i \notin \text{Supp}(x^*)$, we have the following due to Lemma 36.

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{(|\bar{A}_{i^* 1} - \bar{A}_{i^* 2}| + |\bar{A}_{j^* 1} - \bar{A}_{j^* 2}|)(V_{\bar{A}_*}^* - \langle y'', (\bar{A}_{i^* 1}, \bar{A}_{i^* 2}) \rangle)}{|\bar{A}_{i^* 1} - \bar{A}_{i^* 2}| + |\bar{A}_{j^* 1} - \bar{A}_{j^* 2}| + |\bar{A}_{i^* 1} - \bar{A}_{i^* 2}|} \\ &\geq \frac{(|A_{i^* 1} - A_{i^* 2}| + |A_{j^* 1} - A_{j^* 2}|)(V_{A_*}^* - \langle y^*, (A_{i^* 1}, A_{i^* 2}) \rangle)}{|A_{i^* 1} - A_{i^* 2}| + |A_{j^* 1} - A_{j^* 2}| + |A_{i^* 1} - A_{i^* 2}|} - 15\Delta' \\ &\geq \Delta_g - 15\Delta' \\ &= 19\Delta' - 15\Delta' \\ &= 4\Delta' > 0 \end{aligned}$$

Hence, due to Lemma 38, (x', y') is the unique Nash equilibrium of $\bar{A}$ and $\text{Supp}(x') = \{i^*, j^*\}$. This implies that $\tilde{\Delta}_g \geq \Delta_g - 15\Delta' = 19\Delta' - 15\Delta' = 4\Delta'$. $\square$

I.2 Technical Lemmas for upper bound

In this section, we present few technical lemmas that are used to establish the upper bound on the sample complexity of finding the support of the Nash equilibrium in $n \times 2$ matrix games.

We first define matrices A_1, A_2, A_3 and A_4 as follows:

$$A_1 = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \\ e & f \end{bmatrix} A_2 = \begin{bmatrix} a + \Delta_{11} & b + \Delta_{12} \\ c + \Delta_{21} & d + \Delta_{22} \\ e + \Delta_{31} & f + \Delta_{32} \end{bmatrix} A_3 = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{bmatrix} A_4 = \begin{bmatrix} a + \Delta_{11} & b + \Delta_{12} \\ c + \Delta_{21} & d + \Delta_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

Let us assume that $|\Delta_{ij}| \leq \Delta$ for all i, j . Let us assume that $a > b, a > c, d > b, d > c$. Let us also assume that $e \neq f, e \neq a, e \neq c, f \neq b, f \neq d$. Let us also assume that $a + \Delta_{11} > b + \Delta_{12}, a + \Delta_{11} > c + \Delta_{21}, d + \Delta_{22} > b + \Delta_{12}, d + \Delta_{22} > c + \Delta_{21}$. Let us also assume that no row of A_1 strongly dominates any other row. Now we present the following lemma that would be useful to compute the parameter Δ_g .

Lemma 35. *Let (x^*, y^*) be the Nash equilibrium of A_3 . Then we have the following:*

$$V_{A_3}^* - \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle = \frac{(ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de)}{a - b - c + d}$$

Proof. First observe that $V_{A_3}^* = \frac{ad-bc}{a-b-c+d}$ and $y^* = (\frac{d-b}{a-b-c+d}, \frac{a-c}{a-b-c+d})$. Next we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned} V_{A_3}^* - \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle &= \frac{ad - bc}{a - b - c + d} - e \cdot \frac{d - b}{a - b - c + d} - f \cdot \frac{a - c}{a - b - c + d} \\ &= \frac{(ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de)}{a - b - c + d} \end{aligned}$$

□

Next we present the following two propositions that would be useful to prove other technical lemmas in this section.

Proposition 14. $\frac{|d-f|+|c-e|+|b-f|+|a-e|+|b-d|+|c-a|}{|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|} \leq 3$

Proof. W.l.o.g let us assume that $e < f$. As no row of A_1 strongly dominates any other row, we have $a > e$ and $b < f$. Now observe that $|a-c|+|b-d| = a-b-c+d = |a-b|+|c-d|$ and $|a-e|+|b-f| = a-b-e+f = |a-b|+|e-f|$. If $c > e$ and $d < f$, then $a > c > e$ and $b < d < f$. Hence, we have $|c-e|+|d-f| < |a-e|+|b-f| = |a-b|+|e-f|$. Similarly, if $e > c$ and $f < d$, then $a > e > c$ and $b < f < d$. Hence, we have $|c-e|+|d-f| < |a-c|+|b-d| = |a-b|+|c-d|$. Therefore, we have $\frac{|d-f|+|c-e|+|b-f|+|a-e|+|b-d|+|c-a|}{|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|} \leq 3$. □

Proposition 15. $\frac{|(ad-bc)-(af-be)+(cf-de)|}{(|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|)^2} \leq 2$

Proof. W.l.o.g let us assume that $e < f$. As no row of A_1 strongly dominates any other row, we have $a > e$ and $b < f$. We have $(ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de) = (d - b)(a - b - e - f) - (f - b)(a - b - c + d)$. Now observe that $|a-c|+|b-d| = |a-b|+|c-d|$ and $|a-e|+|b-f| = |a-b|+|e-f|$. This implies that $|d-b| \leq |a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|$, $|f-b| \leq |a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|$, $|a-b-c+d| \leq |a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|$ and $|a-b-e+f| \leq |a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|$. Hence, we have $\frac{|(ad-bc)-(af-be)+(cf-de)|}{(|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|)^2} \leq \frac{|d-b||a-b-e-f|+|f-b||a-b-c+d|}{(|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|)^2} \leq 2$. □

We present the following lemma that serves as a concentration inequality for the empirical estimate of Δ_g .

Lemma 36. *Let (x^*, y^*) be the Nash equilibrium of A_3 and (x', y') be the Nash equilibrium of A_4 . Let $\Delta_{A_1} = \frac{(a-b-c+d)(V_{A_3}^* - \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle)}{|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|}$ and $\Delta_{A_2} = \frac{(a'-b'-c'+d')(V_{A_4}^* - \langle y', (e', f') \rangle)}{|a'-b'|+|c'-d'|+|e'-f'|}$ where $a' = a + \Delta_{11}, b' = b + \Delta_{12}, c' = c + \Delta_{21}, d' = d + \Delta_{22}, e' = e + \Delta_{31}$ and $f' = f + \Delta_{32}$. Then we have the following:*

$$\Delta_{A_2} \geq \Delta_{A_1} - 15\Delta$$

Moreover, if $\frac{6\Delta}{|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|} \leq \frac{1}{4}$ and $\Delta_{A_1} \leq 0$, then we have the following:

$$\Delta_{A_2} \leq \Delta_{A_1} + 4\Delta$$

Proof. Due to Lemma 35, we have $\Delta_{A_1} = \frac{(ad-bc)-(af-be)+(cf-de)}{|a-b|+|c-d|+|e-f|}$ and $\Delta_{A_2} = \frac{(a'd'-b'c')-(a'f'-b'e')+(c'f'-d'e')}{|a'-b'|+|c'-d'|+|e'-f'|}$ where $a' = a + \Delta_{11}, b' = b + \Delta_{12}, c' = c + \Delta_{21}, d' = d + \Delta_{22}, e' = e + \Delta_{31}$ and $f' = f + \Delta_{32}$. Let $N = (ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de)$ and $M = |a - b| + |c - d| + |e - f|$. Let $N' = (a'd' - b'c') - (a'f' - b'e') + (c'f' - d'e')$ and $M' = |a' - b'| + |c' - d'| + |e' - f'|$. Observe that $N' = N + (d - f)\Delta_{11} + (e - c)\Delta_{12} + (f - b)\Delta_{21} + (a - e)\Delta_{22} + (b - d)\Delta_{31} + (c - a)\Delta_{32}$. Now we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{N'}{M'} &\geq \frac{N - (|d - f| + |e - c| + |f - b| + |a - e| + |b - d| + |c - a|)\Delta}{M(1 + \frac{6\Delta}{M})} \\
 &\geq \left(\frac{N}{M} - 3\Delta\right) \left(1 + \frac{6\Delta}{M}\right)^{-1} && \text{(due to Proposition 14)} \\
 &= \left(\frac{N}{M} - 3\Delta\right) \left(1 - \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 + \frac{6\Delta}{M}}\right) && \text{(as } (1+x)^{-1} = 1 - \frac{x}{1+x}\text{)} \\
 &= \frac{N}{M} - 3\Delta - \frac{N}{M} \cdot \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 + \frac{6\Delta}{M}} + 3\Delta \cdot \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 + \frac{6\Delta}{M}} \\
 &\geq \frac{N}{M} - 3\Delta - \frac{|N|}{M^2} \cdot 6\Delta && \text{(as } \frac{6\Delta}{M} \geq 0\text{)} \\
 &\geq \frac{N}{M} - 3\Delta - 2 \cdot 6\Delta && \text{(due to Proposition 15)} \\
 &= \frac{N}{M} - 15\Delta
 \end{aligned}$$

If $\frac{N}{M} \leq 0$, then we have the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{N'}{M'} &\leq \frac{N + (|d - f| + |e - c| + |f - b| + |a - e| + |b - d| + |c - a|)\Delta}{M(1 - \frac{6\Delta}{M})} \\
 &\leq \left(\frac{N}{M} + 3\Delta\right) \left(1 - \frac{6\Delta}{M}\right)^{-1} && \text{(due to Proposition 14)} \\
 &= \left(\frac{N}{M} + 3\Delta\right) \left(1 + \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 - \frac{6\Delta}{M}}\right) && \text{(as } (1-x)^{-1} = 1 + \frac{x}{1-x}\text{)} \\
 &= \frac{N}{M} + 3\Delta + \frac{N}{M} \cdot \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 - \frac{6\Delta}{M}} + 3\Delta \cdot \frac{\frac{6\Delta}{M}}{1 - \frac{6\Delta}{M}} \\
 &\leq \frac{N}{M} + 3\Delta + 3\Delta \cdot \frac{1}{3} && \text{(as } \frac{6\Delta}{M} \leq \frac{1}{4} \text{ and } \frac{N}{M} \leq 0\text{)} \\
 &= \frac{N}{M} + 4\Delta
 \end{aligned}$$

□

Next we define matrix B as follows:

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \\ e & f \\ g & h \end{bmatrix}$$

Let us assume that $a > b, d > c, e > f, h > g$. Let us also assume that $a > c$ and $d > c$. Now we present the following lemma where we establish important properties of the optimal rows (rows that are in the support of the Nash equilibrium).

Lemma 37. *Let (x_1, y_1) be the Nash equilibrium of $B_1 = [a, b; g, h]$, (x_2, y_2) be the Nash equilibrium of $B_2 = [e, f; c, d]$ and (x_3, y_3) be the Nash equilibrium of $B_3 = [e, f; g, h]$. Let us assume that B_1, B_2 and B_3 have unique Nash Equilibria which are not PSNE. If B has a unique Nash equilibrium (x^*, y^*) such that $|\text{Supp}(x^*)| = |\text{Supp}(y^*)| = \{1, 2\}$, then we have the following:*

- $V_{B_1}^* - \langle y_1, (c, d) \rangle < 0$
- $V_{B_2}^* - \langle y_2, (a, b) \rangle < 0$

$$\bullet V_{B_3}^* - \max\{\langle y_3, (a, b) \rangle, \langle y_3, (c, d) \rangle\} < 0$$

Proof. Due to Lemma 35, we have $V_{B_1}^* - \langle y_1, (c, d) \rangle = \frac{(ah-bg)-(ad-bc)+(gd-hc)}{a-b-g+h}$. Due to Lemma 35 and the fact that $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{1, 2\}$, we have $V_B^* - \langle y^*, (g, h) \rangle = \frac{(ad-bc)-(ah-bg)+(ch-dg)}{a-b-c+d} > 0$. Hence, we have $V_{B_1}^* - \langle y_1, (c, d) \rangle < 0$.

Due to Lemma 35, we have $V_{B_2}^* - \langle y_2, (a, b) \rangle = \frac{(ed-fc)-(eb-fa)+(cb-da)}{e-f-c+d}$. Due to Lemma 35 and the fact that $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{1, 2\}$, we have $V_B^* - \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle = \frac{(ad-bc)-(af-be)+(cf-de)}{a-b-c+d} > 0$. Hence, we have $V_{B_2}^* - \langle y_2, (a, b) \rangle < 0$.

Let $y^* = (y_1^*, y_2^*)$ and $y_3 = (y_{3,1}, y_{3,2})$. As $\text{Supp}(x^*) = \{1, 2\}$, we have $\langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle < V_B^*$ and $\langle y^*, (g, h) \rangle < V_B^*$. If $y_{3,1} \leq y_1^*$, we have $V_{B_3}^* = \langle y_{3,1}, (e, f) \rangle \leq \langle y^*, (e, f) \rangle < V_B^* \leq \langle y_{3,1}, (c, d) \rangle$. Similarly, if $y_{3,1} > y_1^*$, we have $V_{B_3}^* = \langle y_{3,1}, (g, h) \rangle < \langle y^*, (g, h) \rangle < V_B^* < \langle y_{3,1}, (a, b) \rangle$. Hence, $V_{B_3}^* - \max\{\langle y_3, (a, b) \rangle, \langle y_3, (c, d) \rangle\} < 0$. $\square$

Let A be a $n \times 2$ matrix with no PSNE. Let us assume that $\forall i \in [n], A_{i1} \neq A_{i2}$. Now we present the following lemma that relates the nash equilibrium of a submatrix of A to the nash equilibrium of A .

Lemma 38. *Consider two distinct row indices i_1, i_2 such that $A_{i_11} > A_{i_12}, A_{i_21} < A_{i_22}$. Let (x^*, y^*) be the Nash equilibrium of $C = [A_{i_11}, A_{i_12}; A_{i_21}, A_{i_22}]$. If $A_{i_11} > A_{i_21}$, $A_{i_12} < A_{i_22}$ and $V_C^* - \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle > 0$ for all $j \in [n] \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}$, then A has a unique Nash equilibrium (x', y') such that $\text{Supp}(x') = \{i_1, i_2\}$.*

Proof. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium of A . Let $x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)$, $y = (y_1, y_2)$ and $y^* = (y_1^*, y_2^*)$.

If $y_1 < y_1^*$, then $\langle y, (A_{i_21}, A_{i_22}) \rangle > V_C^*$. Consider $j \in \text{Supp}(x)$ such that $A_{j1} > A_{j2}$. In this case, we have $\langle y, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle < \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle \leq V_C^* < \langle y, (A_{i_21}, A_{i_22}) \rangle$. This contradicts the fact that $j \in \text{Supp}(x)$. Hence $y_1 \geq y_1^*$.

If $y_1 > y_1^*$, then $\langle y, (A_{i_11}, A_{i_12}) \rangle > V_C^*$. Consider $j \in \text{Supp}(x)$ such that $A_{j1} < A_{j2}$. In this case, we have $\langle y, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle < \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle \leq V_C^* < \langle y, (A_{i_11}, A_{i_12}) \rangle$. This contradicts the fact that $j \in \text{Supp}(x)$. Hence $y_1 \leq y_1^*$.

As $y_1 \geq y_1^*$ and $y_1 \leq y_1^*$, we have $y_1 = y_1^*$. This implies that $V_A^* = \max_{j \in [n]} \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle = V_C^*$.

As $V_A^* - \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle > 0$ for all $j \in [n] \setminus \{i_1, i_2\}$ and $V_A^* = \langle y^*, (A_{j1}, A_{j2}) \rangle$ for all $j \in \{i_1, i_2\}$, we have $\text{Supp}(x) = \{i_1, i_2\}$. Now observe that C has a unique Nash Equilibrium which is not a PSNE and $((x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}), y)$ is also a Nash Equilibrium of C . This implies that (x, y) is the unique Nash equilibrium of A such that $\text{Supp}(x) = \{i_1, i_2\}$ and $((x_{i_1}, x_{i_2}), y) = (x^*, y^*)$. $\square$

J Proof of Lower Bound with respect to Δ_g

Before finishing the proof of the theorem 7, we begin with the proof of Lemma 6

Proof. Let $c' = c - \Delta$, $d' = d - \Delta$, $e' = e + \Delta$ and $f' = f + \Delta$. Let $V^* = \frac{ad'-bc'}{D_1}$. It can be shown that $V_{A_0}^* = V^* + \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_1}$, $V_{A_\Delta}^* = V^*$ and $V_{A_{2\Delta}}^* \geq V^* + \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_2}$. For any $\alpha, \beta \in [0, 1]$ such that $\alpha + \beta \leq 1$ and $\gamma \in [\frac{b-d'}{D_1}, \frac{a-c'}{D_1}]$, let $x' = (1 - \alpha - \beta, \alpha, \beta)$ and $y' = (\frac{d'-b}{D_1} + \gamma, \frac{a-c'}{D_1} - \gamma)$. Note that this parameterization ensures the range of x' is equal to Δ_3 and the range of y' is equal to Δ_2 . Let $k = (1 - \alpha - \beta)(a - b)\gamma + \alpha(c' - d')\gamma + \beta(e' - f')\gamma$. It can be shown that $\langle x', A_\Delta y' \rangle = V^* + k$. It can also be shown that $\langle x', A_0 y' \rangle = V^* + k + (\alpha - \beta)\Delta$ and $\langle x', A_{2\Delta} y' \rangle = V^* + k - (\alpha - \beta)\Delta$. We refer the reader to the Appendix J.2 for the detailed calculations.

If $|k| > \lambda/4$, then $|V_{A_\Delta}^* - \langle x', A_\Delta y' \rangle| = |k| > \lambda/4$. If $|k| \leq \lambda/4$ and $(\alpha - \beta)\Delta \geq 0$, then $V_{A_{2\Delta}}^* - \langle x', A_{2\Delta} y' \rangle \geq \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_2} - k + (\alpha - \beta)\Delta \geq \frac{3\lambda}{4}$. Similarly, If $|k| \leq \lambda/4$ and $(\alpha - \beta)\Delta < 0$, then $V_{A_0}^* - \langle x', A_0 y' \rangle = \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_1} - k - (\alpha - \beta)\Delta \geq \frac{3\lambda}{4}$. Hence, we proved that there exists a matrix $B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{2\Delta}\}$ such that the following holds:

$$|V_B^* - \langle x', B y' \rangle| > \frac{\lambda}{4} > \varepsilon$$

$\square$

J.1 Proof of Theorem 7

Let $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$ be the distribution of an observation when playing pair (i, j) with matrix A . Let $\mathbb{P}_A$ denote the probability law of the internal randomness of the algorithm and random observations. If an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good and outputs a solution $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ then $\min_A \mathbb{P}_A(|V_A^* - \langle \hat{x}, A\hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta$. We will show that if an algorithm is (ε, δ) -PAC-good then it can also accomplish a particular hypothesis. We will conclude by noting that any procedure that can accomplish the hypothesis test must take the claimed sample complexity.

For any pair of mixed strategies $(\hat{x}, \hat{y})$ output by the procedure at the stopping time τ , define

$$\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{2\Delta}\} \setminus \arg \max_{B \in \{A_0, A_\Delta, A_{2\Delta}\}} |V_B^* - \langle \hat{x}, B\hat{y} \rangle|,$$

breaking ties arbitrarily in the maximum so that $\phi \in \{A_{2\Delta}, A_0\} \cup \{A_{2\Delta}, A_\Delta\} \cup \{A_0, A_\Delta\}$. Note that

$$\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi, |V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0\hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) = \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(|V_{A_0}^* - \langle \hat{x}, A_0\hat{y} \rangle| \leq \varepsilon) \geq 1 - \delta \quad (6)$$

where the equality follows from the Lemma 6: at least one of the three matrices must have a loss of more than ε , but A_0 has a loss of at most ε , thus $A_0 \in \phi$. Now because

$$\begin{aligned} 2 \max\{\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{2\Delta}\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\})\} &\geq \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{2\Delta}\}) + \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \\ &= \mathbb{P}_{A_0}(A_0 \in \phi) \geq 1 - \delta \end{aligned}$$

we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$ or $\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_{2\Delta}\}) \geq \frac{1-\delta}{2}$. Let's assume the former (the latter case is handled identically). By the same argument as (6) we have that $\mathbb{P}_{A_{2\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}) \leq \delta$.

For a stopping time τ , let $N_{i,j}(\tau)$ denote the number of times (i, j) is sampled. Recalling that $\nu_{i,j}^A = \mathcal{N}(A_{ij}, 1)$, we have by Lemma 1 of Kaufmann et al. (2016) that

$$\sum_{i=2}^3 \sum_{j=1}^2 \mathbb{E}_{A_0}[N_{i,j}(\tau)] KL(\nu_{i,j}^{A_0}, \nu_{i,j}^{A_{2\Delta}}) \geq d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{2\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}))$$

where $KL(\nu_{2,1}^{A_0}, \nu_{1,1}^{A_{2\Delta}}) = KL(\nu_{2,2}^{A_0}, \nu_{2,2}^{A_{2\Delta}}) = KL(\nu_{3,1}^{A_0}, \nu_{3,1}^{A_{2\Delta}}) = KL(\nu_{3,2}^{A_0}, \nu_{3,2}^{A_{2\Delta}}) = 2\Delta^2$ and $d(p, q) = p \log(\frac{p}{q}) + (1-p) \log(\frac{1-p}{1-q})$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} d(\mathbb{P}_{A_0}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\}), \mathbb{P}_{A_{2\Delta}}(\phi = \{A_0, A_\Delta\})) &\geq d(\frac{1-\delta}{2}, \delta) \\ &= \frac{1-\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1-\delta}{2\delta}) + \frac{1+\delta}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{2(1-\delta)}) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - \frac{\delta}{2} \log(\frac{(1-\delta)^2}{\delta(1+\delta)}) \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \log(\frac{1+\delta}{4\delta}) - 1/8 > \frac{1}{2} \log(1/30\delta) \end{aligned}$$

and $\tau = \sum_{i=1}^3 \sum_{j=1}^2 N_{i,j}(\tau)$ we conclude that

$$\mathbb{E}_{A_0}[\tau] \geq \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{4\Delta^2} > \frac{\log(1/30\delta)}{4\Delta_g^2}$$

as claimed. We get the last inequality as $0 < \Delta < \Delta_g$ (see Appendix J.2 for more details).

J.2 Calculations for Lemma 6

Recall that $\Delta := \frac{(d-b)D_2 - (f-b)D_1}{D_1 + D_2}$. Let $c' = c - \Delta$, $d' = d - \Delta$, $e' = e + \Delta$ and $f' = f + \Delta$. Observe that $D_1 = a - b - c + d = a - b - c' + d'$ and $D_2 = a - b - e + f = a - b - e' + f'$. Let $V^* = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1}$.

First, observe that $\square = \frac{(d-b)D_2 - (f-b)D_1}{D_1 + D_2}$ satisfies the equality $\frac{d-b-\square}{D_1} = \frac{f-b+\square}{D_2}$. Next, observe that $0 < \frac{d-b-\Delta}{D_1} < 1$ as $\frac{d-b-\Delta}{D_1} = \frac{(d-b) + (f-b)}{D_1 + D_2}$.

Hence, we have $(\frac{d'-b}{D_1}, \frac{a-c'}{D_1}) = (\frac{f'-b}{D_2}, \frac{a-e'}{D_2})$ and $(\frac{d'-b}{D_1}, \frac{a-c'}{D_1}) \in \mathbb{D}_2$. Therefore, we have $V_{A_\Delta}^* = \frac{d'-b}{D_1} \cdot a + \frac{a-c'}{D_1} \cdot b = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} = V^*$. Next, observe that $V_{A_0}^* = \frac{d'-b+\Delta}{D_1} \cdot a + \frac{a-c'-\Delta}{D_1} \cdot b = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} + \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_1} = V^* + \frac{(a-b)\Delta}{D_1}$.

If $a - e' > \Delta$, then $V_{A_{2\Delta}}^* = \frac{f' - b + \Delta}{D_2} \cdot a + \frac{a - e' - \Delta}{D_2} \cdot b = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} + \frac{(a - b)\Delta}{D_2} = V^* + \frac{(a - b)\Delta}{D_2}$. We get $\frac{f' - b}{D_2} \cdot a + \frac{a - e'}{D_2} \cdot b = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1}$ as $(\frac{d' - b}{D_1}, \frac{a - e'}{D_1}) = (\frac{f' - b}{D_2}, \frac{a - e'}{D_2})$. Note that the second row is sub-optimal for $A_{2\Delta}$ as $\frac{f' - b + \Delta}{D_2} \cdot (c' - \Delta) + \frac{a - e' - \Delta}{D_2} \cdot (d' - \Delta) < V^*$.

If $a - e' \leq \Delta$, then the element in the third row and the first column of $A_{2\Delta}$ is a PSNE. Hence, $V_{A_{2\Delta}}^* = e' + \Delta$. Let $g = e' + \Delta - a$. Observe that $a - b < D_2$. Now we have $V^* + \frac{(a - b)\Delta}{D_2} = \frac{f' - b + \Delta}{D_2} \cdot a + \frac{a - e' - \Delta}{D_2} \cdot b = (1 + \frac{g}{D_2})a - \frac{gb}{D_2} = a + \frac{(a - b)g}{D_2} \leq a + g = e' + \Delta$. Hence $V_{A_{2\Delta}}^* \geq V^* + \frac{(a - b)\Delta}{D_2}$.

Now we define a class of matrices $B_{\square}$ as follows:

$$B_{\square} = \begin{bmatrix} a & b \\ c' + \square & d' + \square \\ e' - \square & f' - \square \end{bmatrix}$$

Now observe that $B_{\Delta} = A_0$, $B_0 = A_{\Delta}$ and $B_{-\Delta} = A_{2\Delta}$.

Recall that $x' = (1 - \alpha - \beta, \alpha, \beta)$ and $y' = (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma, \frac{a - c'}{D_1} + \gamma)$. Let $V_1 = \langle y', (a, b) \rangle$, $V_2 = \langle y', (c' + \square, d' + \square) \rangle$ and $V_3 = \langle y', (e' - \square, f' - \square) \rangle$. First, we have $V_1 = (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma) \cdot a + (\frac{a - c'}{D_1} - \gamma) \cdot b = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} + (a - b)\gamma = V^* + (a - b)\gamma$. Next, we have $V_2 = (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma) \cdot (c' + \square) + (\frac{a - c'}{D_1} - \gamma) \cdot (d' + \square) = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} + (c' - d')\gamma + (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma + \frac{a - c'}{D_1} - \gamma)\square = V^* + \square + (c' - d')\gamma$. Similarly, we have $V_3 = (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma) \cdot (e' - \square) + (\frac{a - c'}{D_1} - \gamma) \cdot (f' - \square) = \frac{ad' - bc'}{D_1} + (e' - f')\gamma - (\frac{d' - b}{D_1} + \gamma + \frac{a - c'}{D_1} - \gamma)\square = V^* - \square + (e' - f')\gamma$.

Let $k = (1 - \alpha - \beta)(a - b)\gamma + \alpha(c' - d')\gamma + \beta(e' - f')\gamma$. Now observe that $\langle x', B_{\square} y' \rangle = \langle x', (V_1, V_2, V_3) \rangle = V^* + k + (\alpha - \beta)\square$.

Now we present the following proposition.

Proposition 16. $\Delta < \Delta_g$

Proof. Observe that $\Delta = \frac{(d - b)D_2 - (f - b)D_1}{D_1 + D_2} = \frac{(ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de)}{D_1 + D_2}$. Due to Lemma 35, we have $\Delta_g = \frac{(ad - bc) - (af - be) + (cf - de)}{|a - b| + |c - d| + |e - f|} > 0$. Hence, $0 < \Delta < \Delta_g$. Note that $\Delta_g > 0$ as the third row of A is sub-optimal. $\square$