Towards Inclusive Political Representation

by

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My research asks the following questions: What are the ramifications of male dominance in positions of power? Do they adequately address the concerns of women constituents? How do electoral quotas influence the trajectory of political careers for underrepresented groups? Which subgroups derive the greatest benefits from quota implementation? How do voters respond to the introduction of quotas, and what factors shape their reactions? I theorize and offer causal evidence on the consequences of inequitable political representation and the role of quotas in remedying disparities in political inequality. Through a combination of observational and experimental data spanning various levels ranging from legislatures to voters, my research examines quotas (or lack thereof) from multiple perspectives using a range of methodological approaches. My research demonstrates that while there is a risk of neglecting policy issues faced by underrepresented groups in legislative spaces, indicating the need for institutionalizing quotas, quotas can have asymmetric effects on citizens' political behavior. Quotas can bridge gaps in political participation by demobilizing dominant groups while simultaneously mobilizing underrepresented groups. However, their repercussions extend beyond the realm of politics and have implications for intergroup relations. Thus, my research highlights the nuances of political representation and examines the effects of quotas on governance structures and political behavior. My dissertation comprises three distinct yet interconnected empirical chapters, all situated within the context of India. Overall, this dissertation offers lessons not only for those interested in Indian politics but also for everyone seeking to understand the role of quotas in addressing political inequality.

Dedication

To mom and dad, for inspiring the love of reading and learning!

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Introduction

Political inequality remains a significant contributor to the persistence of socioeconomic disparities among marginalized communities (Sen 1993). Global trends reveal significant progress in diminishing political inequality. For instance, the United States extended voting rights to Black men in the 1870s, followed by women gaining the right to vote in 1920. Subsequent legislative efforts, such as the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, further dismantled discriminatory practices like literacy tests and poll taxes (Lesley Kennedy 2023). Internationally, progress has been made, albeit gradually. By 1945, only 25 out of the initial 51 United Nations Member States allowed women equal voting rights (UN Women 2019). By the turn of the 20th century, 94% of countries worldwide had established universal suffrage for both men and women (in Data 2023). Concurrently, there has been a notable reduction in political inequality regarding representation. In 1945, the global average of women's political representation in national parliaments stood at a mere three percent (Hughes and Paxton 2018). Fast forward to January 2024, and women's political representation has surged to 26.9%, marking the highest level in history (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2024). Considering other identity dimensions, diversity in political representation remains low in proportion to the demographic diversity of populations, and the representation in positions of power is becoming more and more diverse (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2024; Uberoi and Lees 2020; Schaeffer 2023).

While shifts in suffrage laws, voting rules and technology, and electoral systems have contributed to narrowing gaps in political participation (Corder and Wolbrecht 2016; Skorge 2023; Kim 2019; Fujiwara 2015), electoral quotas— measures implemented to ensure the representation

of underrepresented groups in elected bodies— have been instrumental in diversifying political representation in recent decades. With gender quotas implemented in over 130 countries (Hughes et al. 2019) and ethnic quotas in more than 40 countries (Tan 2014), these measures represent some of the most extensive political reforms to date (Hughes 2011**a**; Hughes et al. 2019). Without quotas, achieving such diversity in political representation would have been a very slow phenomenon. India serves as a compelling example: while some provisions for gender and ethnic quotas existed in British India, gender quotas were abolished post-independence while ethnic quotas were retained. It was not until 2023 that India passed legislation mandating gender quotas, reserving 33% of seats in national and state assemblies. In the first post-independence parliament, less than five percent of seats were held by women; as of 2024, that figure stands at 15%. Contrast that with women's political representation in municipal and rural councils, where initially 33 percent reservations were mandated since 1993 and later increased to gender parity levels since 2006 in some states. As a result, 44.4% of all elected local representatives are now women (Kumar and Ghosh 2024; Women 2021). Quotas have acted as an exogenous shock, enabling women to enter politics. Therefore, it would not be an overstatement to assert that without quotas, women's representation in local governments would have followed similar trends as observed at the state and national levels.[1]

Quotas serve as a disruptive force within a system that systematically excludes underrepresented groups. Women and other marginalized communities face formidable obstacles, ranging from household constraints, and limited resources and networks, to biases and stereotypes perpetuated by elites and voters alike (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2009; Chhibber 2002). Advocates contend that quotas bring democracy closer to its ideal form by enhancing justice and equality in political representation. The resulting diversity in political representation ensures plurality of perspectives and ideas, promoting not only fair consideration of policy debates but also influencing redistributive outcomes (Bardhan, Mookherjee and Torrado 2010; Parthasarathy, Rao and Palaniswamy 2019). Further, as Mansbridge (1999**a**) emphasizes, representation through quotas establishes new social

[1] While some suggest that women may find local politics more accessible in comparison to higher levels of office (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Anzia and Bernhard 2022), it is challenging to envision that women would have secured 44.4% of seats without the enabling institutional framework that quotas offer.

meanings. For marginalized groups, simply witnessing a representative of their own can instill a sense of confidence and efficacy (Govinda 2006). Hence, there are compelling arguments, grounded in both justice and utility perspectives, supporting quotas in shaping political expression (Hughes and Paxton 2018).

However, when quotas make underrepresented groups politically relevant and serve to disrupt their systematic oppression and political inequality, these have implications for inter-group relations (Chauchard 2014; Brulé and Toth 2022). Such progressive policies are also believed to catalyze backlash from dominant, elite groups (Nanivadekar 2006; Suryanarayan and White 2021). Considering these factors, quotas' effects on political behavior and intergroup relations remain unspecified. As a result, we are yet to fully understand what it means to have (or not have) quotas in hierarchical societies. Our understanding of representation and participation in politics is incomplete without knowing how and why quota-receiving groups stand out to gain or lose with and without quotas.

My research addresses these gaps in the literature by asking the following questions: What are the ramifications of male dominance in positions of power? Do they adequately address the concerns of women constituents? How do quotas influence the trajectory of political careers for underrepresented groups? Which subgroups derive the greatest benefits from quota implementation? How do voters respond to the introduction of quotas, and what factors shape their reactions? I theorize and offer causal evidence on the consequences of inequitable political representation and the role of quotas in remedying disparities in political inequality. Through a combination of observational and experimental data spanning various levels ranging from legislatures to voters, my research examines quotas (or lack thereof) from multiple perspectives using a range of methodological approaches. My research demonstrates that while there is a risk of neglecting policy issues faced by underrepresented groups in legislative spaces, indicating the need for institutionalizing quotas, quotas can have asymmetric effects on citizens' political behavior. Quotas can bridge gaps in political participation by demobilizing dominant groups while simultaneously mobilizing underrepresented groups. However, their repercussions extend beyond the realm of politics and have

implications for intergroup relations. Thus, my research highlights the nuances of political representation and examines the effects of quotas on governance structures and political behavior. My dissertation comprises three distinct yet interconnected empirical chapters, all situated within the context of India.

1.1 Indian Context of Caste, Gender, and Affirmative Action

India is a ripe test case for examining my research questions as deeply embedded gendered and caste-based discrimination persists alongside progressive policy instruments and institutional reforms aimed at equal rights across castes and sexes.

Caste

Caste stratification is a defining feature of prevalent social norms in South Asia. Those at the top of the caste hierarchy, mainly *Brahmins* (priests), *Kshatriya* (warriors), and *Vaishya* (traders) have afforded better socioeconomic conditions for centuries. Shudras (farmers, artisans, workers) have been at the lowest in the caste hierarchy. These groups have become politically assertive since the 1970s (Dasgupta 2018; Jaffrelot 2000). Outside of this hierarchical system are the *Dalits* and (previously called 'untouchables' or 'outcastes') *Advasis* (indigenous, tribal communities). The notion of 'purity and pollution' and the belief that the mere presence of Dalits is contaminating has dictated the oppressive treatment of Dalits by dominant groups (Mosse 2004). Caste, assigned at birth, is characterized by endogamy and rigid assignment of occupations. So, an individual's societal position is predetermined by birth and there is little room to escape that. Dalits have historically been relegated to menial jobs such as cleaning, sanitation, scavenging, cremation, handling dead bodies and animal carcasses, tanning leather, and cobbling, among others. Adivasis, another outcaste group, that historically resided in forested areas, continues to face oppression, deliberate marginalization, and alienation (Guha 1990).

During the British colonial era, censuses identified many groups experiencing untouchability as Depressed Classes. Subsequently, the Government of India Act of 1935 categorized them as

Scheduled Castes, denoting the list of castes eligible for affirmative action and government assistance. Article 341 of the Indian Constitution enumerates over a thousand castes, races, and tribes designated as Scheduled Castes. Throughout this dissertation, I refer to these groups as Scheduled Castes or SCs. Following independence, various constitutional safeguards, including quotas for Scheduled Tribes (STs), were instituted. The comprehensive list of over 700 tribal communities outlined in Article 342 of the Indian Constitution designates these groups as Scheduled Tribes. Throughout this dissertation, I use the term Scheduled Tribes or STs to refer to these communities.

Since gaining independence, India has implemented affirmative action measures for both SCs and STs as steps towards social justice and inclusion. In politics, affirmative action was implemented in the form of reserved seats whereby seats in the national and state assemblies were reserved based on their population proportion. According to the 2011 Indian census, SCs constitute 16.6% of the population, while STs comprise 8.6%. In India's electoral system, members of state and national assemblies are elected from single-member districts, known as constituencies. In reserved constituencies, only SCs and STs are permitted to contest elections. Regardless of the reservation status, all individuals aged 18 and above are eligible to vote. Given the demographic patterns of India, SCs often constitute minorities within their constituencies, whereas STs tend to have a higher concentration in ST-reserved constituencies.

Affirmative action in local governments came into effect with the passage of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments in 1992 and 1993 respectively to promote decentralization in rural and urban areas. These amendments established provisions for the election of local governing bodies every five years, consisting of ward members and a council head. Broadly, these local bodies bear significant responsibility for implementing both state and central-level schemes and programs, particularly in areas such as infrastructure development and social welfare. Moreover, the elected representatives in local governments wield considerable influence over the selection of beneficiaries for programs funded by both the central and state governments.

Notably, these constitutional amendments also introduced quotas for women, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the form of reserved seats. Specifically, 33% of

seats were reserved for women, while seats for SCs and STs were reserved in proportion to their population shares. Implementation of these quotas varied across states, with some states taking longer than others to enact the necessary policies and conduct local-level elections. For instance, while the first rural elections in West Bengal were held in 1993, Bihar delayed its elections until 2001. Since 2006, another trend emerged. Several state governments began to increase the proportion of seats reserved for women from 33% to 50%. Interestingly, Bihar, despite its initial delay in implementing decentralization and conducting elections, was among the first states to adopt parity for women in local elected bodies.

As a result of decentralization policies, more than three million elected representatives are part of local governments. Drawing on the conceptual framework of nested quotas proposed by Hughes (2018), the design of these quotas allows for nested representation, ensuring that seats reserved for SCs and STs include proportion reservations for women. For example, if a state has the policy of 50% seats reserved for women, this means that 50% of SC and ST reserved seats are reserved for SC and ST women. This approach aims to facilitate equitable representation of various sub-groups of women within the reserved seats.

Despite constitutional provisions aimed at empowering SCs and STs, including political quotas that have catalyzed their pathways to power, these communities persistently face significant barriers to equal opportunities. They continue to face social stigma and lag on various socio-economic indicators (Deshpande and Ramachandran 2019). Caste-based segregation remains pervasive not only in rural areas but also in urban settings (Adukia et al. 2022; Bharathi, Malghan and Rahman 2019). SCs and STs are deliberately excluded from social life and endure discrimination at the hands of dominant groups. For instance, in 2016, a Dalit family was prohibited from performing the last rites of their family member at the cremation ground (Huffpost.com 2016). In 2024, an SC village council head encountered a similar ordeal (News 2024). The rigidity of caste-based stratification is also evident from the fact that intercaste marriages accounted for only five percent of marriages in 2006 (National Family Health Survey, 2005-06). Furthermore, the 2011 India Human Development Survey revealed that 21% of the respondents admitted to practicing untouchability,

despite its abolition and classification as a cognizable offense under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, of 1955. Notably, untouchability is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas and is reported at higher rates by landowners compared to non-landowners (Lee 2020, p.157). Many tribal communities continue to face the stigma of being 'criminal' as a result of acts such as the Criminal Tribes Act of 1911, which allowed the colonial governments to brand tribal communities criminal by birth. Overall, given these prevalent discriminatory attitudes, the implementation of institutional reforms, such as quotas allowing for sharing political power with SCs and STs, carries significant implications for social and political dynamics (Chauchard 2014; Jensenius 2017).

Gender

While SCs and STs still confront barriers across various facets of life, at least their numerical representation in politics has been addressed. However, the story is different for women, who have historically occupied subordinate roles in politics, both in terms of representation and participation. Unlike SCs and STs, there were no gender quotas in India's national and state assemblies post-independence. Despite women's political representation in parliament aligning with the global average in the 1950s, women in India lagged behind their counterparts in other countries, largely due to the absence of gender quotas. It was only in the 1970s that women's groups in India began advocating for gender quotas in politics. Consequently, the Women's Reservation Bill was introduced in parliament in 1996. However, it faced numerous delays and was only passed in 2023. The implementation timeline for the bill remains uncertain, casting doubt on when it will come into effect.

Relatedly, the gender turnout gap in national elections has significantly decreased over the years, from 16.7 percent in the 1962 elections to a mere 0.4 percent in 2019 (Kumar 2021, p.20). Particularly, women residing in rural areas, belonging to dominant groups, and those employed exhibit greater engagement in electoral politics (Kumar 2021). Scholars attribute the rising voter turnout among women to the increased descriptive representation of women in politics and the strengthening of women's civic networks (Goyal 2020; Prillaman 2017). However, despite improve-

ments in voter turnout, the gender gap in other forms of political participation, such as attending rallies, public meetings, and contacting government officials, has not narrowed significantly (Iyer and Mani 2019).

Women's involvement in politics needs to be put in perspective with the broader gendered dynamics of society. India ranks among the least safe countries globally (Foundation 2018). The gender gap in labor force participation is significant, standing at 41.5 percentage points (Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation 2023), compared to the global average of 30% (World Bank 2022). Moreover, the role of caste profoundly influences gender norms and women's status and opportunities in society. The notions of purity and pollution also dictate gendered relations in society. Non-SCST women face more barriers than SCST women in mobility so as to limit non-SCST women's contact with SCST men. Consequently, SC and ST women are more likely to be employed than non-SCST women despite their lower levels of education (Joshi et al. 2020; Eswaran, Ramaswami and Wadhwa 2013).[2]

This brief backdrop highlights the gender and caste dynamics in Indian society, where electoral quotas for these historically oppressed groups have been institutionalized. Quotas strive to make these marginalized groups politically salient and undercut the prevalent systems of institutionalized domination by elite men. However, there is a risk of backlash and resistance from dominant groups who stand to lose from electoral quotas, prompting the question: how do electoral quotas disrupt hierarchies, and are they even necessary? My dissertation addresses these questions. I demonstrate that quotas play a crucial role in rectifying the historical underrepresentation of marginalized groups. Without quotas, there is a risk of perpetuating the neglect of policy issues faced by these underrepresented groups. Thus, quotas not only enhance numerical representation but also increase the likelihood of previously overlooked issues receiving consideration by policymakers. Furthermore, my research examines the equitable impact of quotas on facilitating women's upward mobility in politics, assessing whether certain groups benefit more than others, thereby en-

[2] Empirical literature shows that with the rise in family incomes, married women withdraw from labor force (Goldin 1995). The trends of *Sanskritization* also postulate that when SC, ST households gain economically, they tend to adopt similar rituals of dominant groups (Srinivas 1956).

suring fair and inclusive political representation in the upward mobility of women. But there is a catch. When quotas are powerful enough to disrupt hierarchies, they are bound to receive backlash from dominant groups. I quantify the backlash and resistance that quotas can provoke from these groups. Moreover, my research shows that this backlash can lead to the electoral demobilization of dominant groups and can accentuate discriminatory attitudes of dominant groups towards women and SCs. Overall, my dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of the wide-ranging effects of electoral quotas, ranging from their ability to promote representational equity while also exploring the potential backlash and unintended consequences that arise from disrupting entrenched power structures.

1.2 Outline of the Dissertation

In Chapter 2, I explore the implications of poor levels of women's representation in legislative bodies. Specifically, I ask whether the over-representation of men in political leadership is damaging to furthering women's policy issues. Leveraging two decades of data on questions posed in the Indian parliament, I compare the contents of questions posed by men and women Members of Parliament (MPs). Employing advanced text-as-data methodologies, I analyze 279,493 questions asked during parliamentary question time from 1999 to 2019. The analysis yields compelling and consistent evidence indicating that women's issues receive scant attention in parliamentary discourse. Furthermore, I find that women legislators, particularly those from historically marginalized groups such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, are more inclined to raise questions regarding women's concerns compared to their male counterparts. Additionally, women MPs prioritize topics related to welfare, including access to essential services like gas connections and rural child centers, as well as issues such as minority women's rights and law enforcement. In contrast, male MPs tend to focus more on areas such as children's health, self-help groups, and economic matters like insurance and labor force participation. These findings underscore the detrimental impact of male over-representation in legislative chambers on the representation of women's issues. From a theoretical perspective, I study a relatively understudied aspect in examining the linkage between the

gender of the legislator and the policy issues they raise.

Chapter 3 extends the recent literature on the upward mobility of women politicians following their entry into politics through quotas. I theorize and explore whether the carry-over effects of gender quotas vary among different subgroups of women. Analyzing India's 40 years of state-level election data, I find no significant differences in the impact of village-level gender quotas on the career progression of different groups of women at the state level. A closer look at the overall institutional context shows that women from traditionally disadvantaged groups SCs and STs benefit in higher-level elections when caste quotas are available. I contend that had there been no electoral quotas for underrepresented groups at the state level, SC and ST women's political representation would not have improved and only women from privileged groups have been taken off taking the benefit of local-level gender quotas. This research contributes to our understanding of sustainable representation through an intersectional lens and emphasizes the importance of carefully designing institutional reforms to address political inclusion concerns.

In Chapter 4, I explore the role of electoral quotas in electoral mobilization. Recognizing that support for quotas varies depending on which groups stand out to gain and which groups will lose, I adopt a comparative and intersectional approach to assess the impact of gender and ethnic quotas on political behavior across different sub-groups. Through a field-based survey experiment involving 1,989 individuals in rural India, I examine how quotas implemented at the local government level influence political participation and efficacy among dominant and non-dominant men and women. I find that quotas mobilize groups receiving the benefit of quotas but simultaneously demobilize dominant groups. Additionally, dominant groups exhibit higher levels of discriminatory attitudes towards women and ethnic minorities with exposure to quotas. These results shed light on the unintended consequences of quotas and prompt further reflection on their broader societal implications.

1.3 Contribution

This dissertation offers lessons not only for those interested in Indian politics but also for everyone seeking to understand the role of quotas in addressing political inequality. My work makes the following contributions to multiple fields of literature, providing insights that extend beyond the specific context of Indian politics to inform the discussions on political inequality, and social justice worldwide:

Relevance of Question Time to Study Gendered Elite Behavior

Question time is nearly ubiquitous in parliamentary democracies. Question time serves as a crucial mechanism for legislative oversight and accountability in democracies, offering MPs a platform to obtain vital information from the government and represent the interests of their constituents. Question time is a strategic instrument for MPs to strengthen their political image and influence, set agendas, and hold the government accountable. As I argue in Chapter 2 question time can unravel gendered elite behavior while avoiding other intervening factors such as legislative dynamics, and party-level factors that can muddle the relationship between the gender of the MPs with the kinds of questions they pose. However, despite its importance in political communication and representation, question time remains underexplored from a gendered perspective. Using a large dataset, my research offers new empirical insights into studying legislative behavior. I also highlight the role of innovative methodological tools that can be applied to study big datasets from a gendered perspective.

Asymmetric Effects of Quotas

My research offers a holistic examination of attitudes towards affirmative action in politics, thereby contributing to broader debates surrounding quotas, as elucidated in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. The existing literature suggests that progressive policy instruments face resistance and lack of support from citizens. For example, measures aimed at strengthening democracy, such as safeguarding

minority rights, have been linked to reduced support for democracy (Claassen 2020). In the Belgian context, men have questioned the legitimacy of gender quotas, perceiving them as anti-democratic (Meier 2008). Moreover, support for quotas varies depending on the targeted beneficiary group. Studies conducted in the USA reveal disparities in the predictors of support for gender-based versus race-based affirmative action (Baunach 2002; Strolovitch 1998). An online survey conducted in India found that while a similar percentage of respondents acknowledge the existence of caste-based and gender-based discrimination in society, support for caste-based quotas is considerably lower (49.8%) than support for gender-based quotas (89%) (Kaur and Philips n.d.). Additionally, women themselves may exhibit reluctance towards receiving preferential treatment through gender quotas, potentially diminishing their political engagement (Clayton 2015). Historically, women's advocacy groups in India have even opposed reservations until the 1970s (John 2000). Moreover, informing young men about women's progress has been associated with heightened levels of anxiety (Spoor and Schmitt 2011; Kim and Kweon 2022). Similarly, women and ethnic minorities may face increased hostility and backlash as they make progress on economic indicators (Mosse 2018; Luke and Munshi 2011; Leibbrandt, Wang and Foo 2018; Paryavi, Bohnet and van Geen 2019). Although much of this research has centered on affirmative action in education and employment, its implications for political affirmative action remain underexplored.[3] Consequently, the legitimacy of progressive institutions may be called into question if citizens harbor negative attitudes toward quotas and their beneficiaries, and thus, warrants detailed examination.

Intersectionality

In this dissertation, I contribute to the literature on intersectionality by bringing evidence from a developing country context. Intersecting identities leads to distinct lived experiences in terms of opportunities and oppression as well as privilege and prejudice. There are contrasting viewpoints regarding whether intersecting marginalized identities offers advantages or disadvantages. The double-jeopardy hypothesis suggests that minority women in politics face the greatest challenges

[3] Refer to a systematic review by (Schotte, Gisselquist and Leone 2023).

in progressing (Beal 2008). Conversely, the intersectional invisibility theory suggests the opposite, positing that minority women do not conform to stereotypical representations and thus may have a better chance of acceptance than both majority women and minority men (Kang and Bodenhausen 2015). Moreover, much of the literature on intersectionality is situated within the context of Western democracies (Gershon et al. 2019; Mansbridge 1999**a**; Medenica and Fowler 2020; Celis and Erzeel 2017; Hughes 2016), leaving intersectionality in the Indian context relatively understudied (but see, Brulé and Toth (2022)). By studying both gender and minority quotas from a comparative as well as intersectional perspective, this dissertation advances our understanding of how intersecting identities influence political representation and participation.

Local Politics

My dissertation contributes to the literature on local politics by shedding light on the dynamics of political representation and participation at the grassroots level. While much scholarly work has concentrated on the underrepresentation of women and minorities in national leadership positions, recent developments, such as the expansion of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) monitoring framework, have underscored the importance of women's representation in local government (Women 2021). With increasing decentralization efforts, the role of local governments has expanded, making them a fertile ground for studying the implications of quotas in the local government. From a governance perspective, local politics play a pivotal role in policymaking, implementation, welfare, and social services. Additionally, the sheer size of local bodies worldwide is significant, with millions of elected officials worldwide, of which approximately 36% are estimated to be women (Women 2021). The pipeline theory suggests that local governments serve as a launching pad for political aspirants to advance in their careers (Buckley et al. 2015). Consequently, local politics can supply qualified candidates to bridge the numerical representational gaps in political leadership (Buckley et al. 2015). Furthermore, quotas are designed not only to address numerical representation but also to mobilize broader electoral support for underrepresented groups. In the US context, women have demonstrated a competitive advantage in local elections compared to na-

tional ones (Anzia and Bernhard 2022). Additionally, local governments often wield authority over decisions that directly impact citizens' everyday lives. Given these reasons, it is crucial to examine entry-level formal and informal institutions, which often serve as gateways for political aspirants to advance.

Examining Voters' Stereotypes in a Relatively High-Information Context

Existing research demonstrates that citizens often rely on identity-based stereotypes when making political choices (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Sigelman et al. 1995). These stereotypes tend to be especially influential in low-information contexts (Berinsky et al. 2020). In contrast to the United States, where voters often have limited information about candidates in local and off-cycle elections (Anzia and Bernhard 2022; Oliver, Ha and Callen 2012), the Indian context presents a unique analytical case. Indian citizens tend to possess more information about the characteristics of local candidates compared to those at the state or national level. This increased awareness primarily stems from the requirement that local candidates reside in the same ward from which they submit their nominations. Consequently, India serves as a rigorous analytical test case for examining the role of individuals' identity-based perceptions and attitudes in shaping political decisions, even in contexts where voters are well-informed about candidates and their policy priorities.

Policy Contributions

The research presented in this dissertation offers several policy insights on the topic of quotas and political representation. One, my findings underscore the significant barriers faced by women and underrepresented groups in attaining political office, necessitating quotas, at least in the short to medium term, to facilitate their political empowerment. Without such measures, there is a risk of certain policy ideas being unfairly overlooked, potentially leading to inequitable redistributive outcomes. Moreover, policymakers can make a note of the nested design of quotas, wherein different sub-groups of women are provided opportunities to advance in the political arena that has proven effective in bringing equitable sustainable representation. My research also highlights the side ef-

fects of quotas as quotas implemented in the form of reserved seats can exacerbate discriminatory attitudes toward quota-receiving groups and can have adverse implications for electoral mobilization for dominant groups. Thus, I find that underrepresented groups' electoral gains have asymmetric effects on empowering minority groups but disempowering dominant groups. These results open up questions on carefully evaluating the impacts of different types of quota designs so as to pick the ones that can have a minimal negative effect. Moreover, my research emphasizes the importance of accounting for public opinion when implementing contentious policy instruments such as quotas. Understanding who participates in elections and who is politically active can significantly influence the distribution of political power. If quotas lead to decreased political participation among dominant groups, it suggests a relative lack of support for such policies. Hence, policymakers must recognize that their job extends beyond the creation of progressive policies; effective communication and framing of such policies are essential to mitigate potential backlash and garner broader societal acceptance.

Chapter 2

Deliberating Women's Issues: Evidence from Indian Legislature, 1999-2019

2.1 Introduction

The[1] research on women's representation in politics has demonstrated the profound impacts of women in politics on elite and mass behavior, policy directions, and political discourse (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004**a**; Beaman et al. 2009; Clayton, Josefsson and Wang 2017; Brulé 2020; Funk and Philips 2019; Goyal 2023). Nonetheless, the link between women's descriptive representation—having representatives who have similar traits and experiences—and substantive representation—measuring the alignment between representatives' actions and policy outputs, and constituents' policy interests, needs, and demands—remains multifaceted and not yet fully comprehended (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005; Pitkin 1967**a**).

Much of the empirical work on this topic has focused on representational processes such as parliamentary debates, plenary speeches, and voting on legislation to explore this relationship (Celis 2006; Piscopo 2011; Franceschet 2008; Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Catalano 2009). While these investigations have enriched our understanding of gendered legislative behavior, this body of work has yielded mixed findings. The dynamics of legislative activities and representation processes are inherently gendered. Legislative activities such as proposing, cosponsoring, or voting on a bill demand substantial resources, commitment, and expertise. Crucially, legislators often undertake these actions to advance their party agenda, which inherently constrains them within the parameters

[1] This chapter is joint with Elizabeth Cupp who worked with me as an undergraduate research assistant during 2022-23.

of their party's positions (Andeweg and Thomassen 2005). Further, getting a bill passed often hinges on legislators' capacity to foster cross-party collaborations and strategic alliances. All these intervening factors are gendered. For instance, an average typical male politician has higher political experience and is more networked, both within and outside the party, than an average typical female politician (O'Neill, Pruysers and Stewart 2021; Verge and Claveria 2018). Women politicians are deliberately marginalized as they face more interruptions during discussions and deliberations and are relegated to less influential committees (Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Kathlene 1994). Taken together, these disparities hold implications for the accumulation of legislative capital and consequently, the efficacy of women in advancing their legislative agenda (Kathlene 1994), complicating our ability to disentangle the relationship between the gender of legislators and their performance.

In response, we posit that it is crucial to push the analysis to study the gendered dimensions of parliamentary behavior beyond the legislative processes and outputs. An additional promising avenue lies in examining their non-legislative parliamentary behavior. One such non-legislative activity is question time in a parliamentary democracy. Question time stands as a non-legislative activity that holds significant importance in fostering representative and deliberative democracy. Legislators wield the power to hold the government accountable, obtain crucial information, and steer policy directions, all without the constraints imposed by party whip directives or the need to rely on fellow legislators (Salmond 2004; Proksch and Slapin 2011; Bird 2005; Russo and Wiberg 2020; Martin 2011**a**). Consequently, question time serves as a relatively cost-effective avenue through which legislators can vocalize their concerns and priorities. Thus, the systematic exploration of question time emerges as a promising avenue for uncovering parliamentarians' gendered policy orientations.

We study the gendered dimensions of question time discourse in the Indian parliament and provide insights into how and by whom the issues relevant to women are brought to the fore within the parliamentary arena. We conducted an automated content analysis of 279,493 questions asked during question time in India's Lower House *Lok Sabha* from 1999 to 2019. Using two

separate methods, topic models and supervised classification methods, we find that (1) women's issues constituted only a fraction of the total questions asked during this period, indicating an underrepresentation of women's concerns during the question time, (2) women MPs ask more questions than men MPs on issues concerning women and children's health, safety, education, and professions dominated by women such as nursing and school teaching, and (3) within questions on these topics, key themes raised by men and women parliamentarians differ.

This research contributes to the growing literature on political representation and elite behavior in several ways. Our theoretical contribution is to distill the relation between descriptive and substantive representation by examining question time, a representational site that has remained underexplored within the women and politics literature. Empirically, our analysis spotlights an understudied case of a gender-imbalanced legislature as women's representation in the Indian parliament has consistently remained below 15%. From a policy perspective, our findings reinforce the concerns that male-dominated legislatures are damaging to advancing policy agenda on gender equality (Murray 2014), underscoring the importance of creating an inclusive and equitable political environment where women's concerns can be well represented.

We proceed by first discussing the usefulness of studying question time from a gendered perspective. Then we review the literature on women's substantive representation to present an overview of contested concepts, such as women's policy preferences, alongside the existing divergent findings linking numerical representation with substantive representation. Building upon the insights from the literature review, we develop our theoretical expectations. We then describe our dataset and our methodological approach. In the following section, we present our results. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on policy as well as the political implications of our results.

2.2 Question Time: A Fruitful Avenue to Understand Legislators' Behavior

Among various checks and balances built into democracies, question time is an important non-legislative activity that serves to foster both representative and deliberative democracy. Operating as a mechanism for legislative oversight in representative democracies, question time offers legisla-

tors a platform to elicit vital information from the government on a spectrum of issues that hold significance for both themselves and their constituents. They are important forums for holding the government accountable (Höhmann and Sieberer 2020). Notably, question times provide a sphere where Members of Parliament (MPs) can exercise influence independently, unaffected by the directives of the party whip. Thus, analyzing the question content gives insight into elite behavior by minimizing the influence of intervening factors such as party-level factors and gendered nature of legislative activities (Martin 2011**b**).

Question time is a strategic instrument for both individual legislators and political parties (Bailer 2011; Otjes and Louwerse 2018). MPs may pose questions out of a genuine desire to comprehend a specific policy issue, reflective of constituents' interests or their abilities to their party leadership. Asking questions, as opposed to giving a speech or introducing a bill, is a low-investment activity for representatives to make their presence felt in the parliament and receive information on issues that matter to them. Thus, legislators can use question time to strengthen their political image (Bailer 2014). Opposition parties deploy questions directed at the government to advance their electoral objectives, often focusing on issues aligned with their agendas to elicit government responses. As a result, opposition parties leverage question time as an agenda-setting tool (Green-Pedersen 2010; Otjes and Louwerse 2018). Governments also use question time to defend their policy actions and decisions. In particular, televised question hour sessions incentivize parties to strategically articulate their viewpoints (Datta 2008), leading to spirited debates marked by wit, occasional confrontation, and impassioned rhetoric. These dynamics, in turn, bear implications for political trust and interest (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Salmond 2014).

Irrespective of the underlying motives for posing questions in parliament, the act of identifying who asks what questions and on which themes presents a significant analytical vantage point. As Vliegenthart and Walgrave (2011) point out, the choice of questions posed by legislators reflects the policy priorities of MPs, bearing broader societal and policy implications.[2] Therefore, the

[2] This is particularly relevant in the Indian context, where women's issues are expansive. As an example, India has been ranked as the most dangerous country for women in a poll carried out by Thomson Reuters Foundation (Sanghera 2018). Additionally, women's labor force participation rate in India is alarmingly low (Mehrotra and

manner in which women's concerns are addressed by the elite holds significant consequences for society at large. However, despite its utility as a lens for examining representation, question time remains surprisingly underexplored from a gendered standpoint (although exceptions exist, e.g., Höhmann (2020); Bird (2005); Tam (2017)).[3] We contend that this aspect of parliamentary functioning necessitates scholarly attention within the realm of gender and politics and can enrich our understanding of elite behavior.

2.3 All Issues are Women's Issues; But Some Hit Closer Home than Others

Women's Policy Priorities

A substantial body of literature within the realm of women and politics underscores an ongoing debate regarding whether women, as a collective, have distinctive policy preferences and interests vis-à-vis their male counterparts. Earlier influential scholarly work asserts that women's position of subordination within societal hierarchies engenders life experiences that diverge markedly from those of men (Pitkin 1967**a**). These differential experiences, steeped in gender-based discrimination and marginalization, shape women's distinct perspectives on policy issues (Young 2000). Phillips (1995) argues in her influential book, *The Politics of Presence*, that child-rearing, gender pay gap, sexual harassment, and violence are the key areas where women have distinct preferences. Empirical research supports these theoretical claims. Within the United States context, for instance, research indicates that women tend to prioritize subjects such as healthcare, caregiving, and social reform, while men exhibit a greater proclivity towards economic matters, the Supreme Court, and foreign affairs (Kraft 2023). Similar trends have also emerged in the Swedish context (Wängnerud 2000).

These divergences in policy preferences extend beyond mass behavior. For instance, Childs

Parida 2017; Deshpande and Singh 2021).

[3] Beyond the scope of women and politics, some research has been conducted on question time from the perspectives of political representation. For instance, Kolpinskaya (2017) investigates the correlation between the religious affiliations of MPs in the UK's House of Commons and the nature of parliamentary questions they raise. Similarly, Geese and Schwemmer (2019) delve into the immigrant backgrounds of MPs and their influence on substantively representing immigrant groups through questions in the German parliament. Question time has also been employed to scrutinize issues of representation in semi-democratic and authoritarian contexts (Malesky and Schuler 2010; Tam 2017).

and Withey (2004) examines the functioning of Labor Party MPs in the British Parliament and informs that women MPs exhibit distinctive preferences in domains such as reproductive health, safety, violence against women, women's rights, and opportunities. Likewise, some find that female legislators pay more attention to domains like education, health, and social welfare than their male counterparts (Wängnerud 2000), and that their viewpoints resonate more closely with feminist and leftist values (Norris and Lovenduski 1995). Schwindt-Bayer (2006) shows from the Latin American context that women legislators accord precedence to issues related to women, children, and family matters, although there is no attitudinal gender gap on topics of education, health, or the economy. In sum, this body of work demonstrates that gendered policy preferences are manifested both in mass behavior and elite behavior.

Nonetheless, the contention that women inherently share distinct policy perspectives remains controversial. Scholars of intersectionality emphasize that women are not a monolithic group (Crenshaw 2013). Instead, their identities are multifaceted, molded by intersecting factors, such as ethnicity, socioeconomic class, religion, and race that contribute to diverse lived experiences of subgroups of women, interwoven with cultural and historical influences. These divergent influences can account for varying political perspectives among women (Weldon 2002), posing the question of whether women's interests diverge from those of men (Weldon 2002; Harder 2023). Moreover, some scholars view the categorization of policy domains ascribed to men and women as a hierarchy that unwittingly reinforces the subordination of women's interests and issues—mirroring the societal position they inhabit (Schwindt-Bayer 2006). While these arguments highlight the need for a nuanced comprehension of the aspects encompassing substantive representation, broadly, empirical work shows that women have distinct policy priorities in the interest of improving their lives (Celis et al. 2008).

Conceptualizing Women's Policy Preferences

Because women's policy concerns are context-dependent, scholars have devised and operationalized various conceptualizations to measure women's policy priorities. Moreover, scholars have used dif-

ferent terminologies such as “feminine issues” and “soft policy domains”. These variations present not only methodological and analytical challenges, but can also explain inconsistent research outcomes.

Some scholars have taken a narrow construction of women’s issues. For example, Bird (2005) focuses on parliamentary questions that specifically refer to women or gender. Another group of scholars supports a more expansive interpretation of women’s issues. Wängnerud (2000) considers three dimensions in explaining women’s interests: recognition of women as a social entity, gender equality policy, and social welfare policy. Chaney (2012) examines 100 randomly selected plenary debates in the Scottish parliament to study how women’s numerical presence shapes the representation of women’s interests on topics including domestic abuse, childcare, equal pay, gender and criminal justice, equality in the labor market, women’s health, and women’s rights/equal representation. Focusing on health as a women’s interest area, Catalano (2009) examines gendered differences in debates on health in comparison to the masculine policy area of finance. Tam (2017), in the Hong Kong context, codes questions on women’s rights, children and families, health care, education, social welfare, and the environment as women’s concerns. Bäck, Debus and Müller (2014) take a somewhat different approach and study gendered disparities in speeches on ”soft” and ”hard” policy matters in the Swedish parliament, encompassing issues like health, labor, employment, immigration, education, and social welfare as ”soft.” Funk and Philips (2019) classify feminine issues as education, health care, social assistance, culture, housing, environment, and citizenship rights. In the Argentinian context, Htun, Lacalle and Micozzi (2013) employ an extensive keyword list of 145 terms to analyze bills on women’s rights covering terms on reproductive health, childcare, women’s economic rights, family issues, transsexuality, violence, and harassment against women. These examples reflect how the conceptualization of women’s interests, issues, and preferences has been markedly different in scholarly work.

Indeed, arriving at a universally applicable definition is challenging, as women’s policy priorities vary across different geographies. For instance, women in the Middle East might prioritize issues such as genital mutilation and veiling, whereas women in India might be more concerned with

dowry, acid attacks, or safety, both in public and private domains. Moreover, historical, cultural, and contextual factors shape how women's policy areas are understood. In many cases, conflicting arguments can be presented as to whether an issue pertains to women's interests and concerns. Consider a question asked by a male MP P.C. Thomas in the Indian Parliament on August 23, 2004: "(a) Whether the Government of Kerala has given a memorandum in July 2004 regarding suicide by farmers and the hardships faced by them (b) If so, the details thereof; and (c) The action taken by the Government in this regard?" Various arguments can be made to categorize whether this question reflects women's policy issues. Firstly, considering India's context of poverty and small-scale agriculture, farming can be viewed as a social policy issue, potentially coded as 'feminine'. However, it is worth noting that the majority of farmers who die by suicide in the Indian context are men. In this light, the issue might be deemed neutral or non-feminine. To further complicate the matter, here is another argument: given that farming-related suicides potentially result in the loss of the primary earner of the family, thereby disproportionately affecting women and children as the surviving members, it could also be interpreted as a feminine issue.

Let us explore another example: Indian MP Adsul Anandrao Vithoba had a question on August 9, 2005: "(a) whether the IITs incurred huge losses due to inefficiency as revealed by Comptroller and Auditor-General of India (CAG) in their Report; (b) if so, the details and facts thereof." This question delves into the financial management of various campuses of a government-funded educational institute, the Indian Institute of Technology. On one hand, this question might be considered an educational issue and can thus, be under the purview of women's policy concerns. On the other hand, it pertains to financial matters, often categorized as men's policy areas, making it either non-feminine or neutral. The complexity of such categorizations underscores the nuanced nature of understanding women's policy issues in diverse contexts. Taken together, defining and operationalizing women's policy issues are heavily influenced by cultural and historical factors (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).

Who Acts for Women?

A substantial portion of empirical research has concentrated on studying women legislators and their representation of women's interests and issues within their legislative activities. For instance, qualitative insights from interviews conducted by Franceschet (2008) with Argentinian women senators underscore their focus on themes such as contraception, pregnancy, sexual education, abortion, sexual assault, maternity leave as well as the concerns of children and adolescents. Similarly, Celis (2006) discerns vigorous discussions on women's interests among Belgian women parliamentarians. Comparable trends are also apparent in cross-national investigations. Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005) scrutinize data from 31 countries, revealing higher policy responsiveness to women's interests —gender equality in this case—when the proportion of women in the legislature is greater. In a study spanning 19 OECD countries, Kittilson (2008) observes that the adoption of women-friendly policies —maternity and childcare leave in this case—is more pronounced in legislatures with elevated women's representation.

To explain these empirical findings, some argue that shared characteristics and lived experiences render women legislators more engaged and responsive to women's policy perspectives (Allen 2022; Burden 2007). Contrarily, others posit that male legislators often restrict women to handling exclusively gender-focused issues, inadvertently establishing a gendered division of labor (Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Franceschet 2008). Institutional norms, such as gender quotas, can also exert influence. A mandate effect related to gender quotas suggests that women elected through such mechanisms may feel compelled to center their legislative activities around gender-related matters (Franceschet 2008). Moreover, women's civil society groups and alliances may find women legislators more responsive towards their concerns and thus, forge stronger connections with them, thereby amplifying efforts to advance women's policy agendas (Franceschet 2008; Karen and Sarah 2008).

However, there are contrasting findings too (Matfess and Berry 2023; Childs and Krook 2006; Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Women's descriptive representation does not always result in im-

proving women's lives. For instance, Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) find that women legislators' initiatives on women-related bills are not as fruitful in transforming policy outcomes, which can be attributed to a range of factors. For one, women legislators may not wish to be pigeonholed as solely advocating for women's interests — a position that can undermine their broader policy goals and credibility within their constituencies, as well as may hurt their career progression (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Carlson 2001). Second, party-level dynamics such as party ideology, and executive dominance can shape the extent to which women's policy priorities are addressed (Poggione 2004; Fokum 2020; Htun and Power 2006). Third, legislators might prioritize party loyalty over personal advocacy for women's issues (Skjeie 1991). Fourth, the deliberate marginalization of women within both political parties and the legislative arena can constrain their efficacy in advancing women's policy priorities (Franceschet 2008; Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Htun, Lacalle and Micozzi 2013). The backlash from male colleagues may also hinder women legislators' capacity to effectively champion substantive representation (Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Yildirim, Kocapınar and Ecevit 2021; Berry, Bouka and Kamuru 2021). These complexities highlight that women's descriptive representation alone does not guarantee automatic alignment with the substantive representation of women's interests.

Beyond these complexities, this literature is closely tied to critical mass theory, as well as critical actor literature. Critical mass theory suggests that achieving a certain threshold of women's representation in a legislature is essential for women to have a meaningful impact on legislative outcomes and policy discussions (Funk, Paul and Philips 2022). For example, Saint-Germain (1989) finds that when the proportion of women is higher in a legislature, they can introduce and pass more bills on women's issues. Conversely, an alternative perspective shifts the focus to the individuals who champion and advocate for policy proposals aligned with women's interests (Childs and Krook 2009). This approach emphasizes the significance of critical actors, irrespective of their gender or numbers, in shaping substantive representation (Celis 2006; Rosenthal 2002; Childs and Withey 2006; Tamerius, Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 2010).

Building off this review, the bulk of empirical evidence suggests that women legislators display

a higher degree of interest in pursuing policy measures that aim to improve women's lives. However, given the context of question time, there are reasons to expect that men may be engaging with policy concerns that align with women's interests. We outline these reasons as follows.

As explored in the preceding sections, the engagement required during question time in parliament is comparatively less demanding than other legislative activities, suggesting that male legislators may not face significant barriers to raising women's issues. Additionally, Down's median voter model implies that legislators, regardless of gender, address the priorities of the median voter, potentially leading to policy congruence even in gender-imbalanced legislatures (Downs 1957; Dingler, Kroeber and Fortin-Rittberger 2019). Hence, we might anticipate minimal gender disparities in the propensity to raise women's concerns during question time. However, if women MPs predominantly address concerns relevant to women's lives either for social or biological reasons, it underscores the importance of descriptive representation based on sex for advancing women-friendly policies. Conversely, if men are more active in raising women's issues, it suggests that a gender-imbalanced legislature does not hinder progress on women's policies, highlighting the pivotal role men can play in shaping policy directions.

2.4 Data and Institutional Context

India's political system operates under a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy with a bicameral structure. The Lower House, known as the Lok Sabha, comprises 543 Members of Parliament (MPs), 541 of whom are elected by Indian citizens aged 18 and above from single-member electoral constituencies.[4] Some seats are designated for historically disadvantaged groups as a part of affirmative action, proportional to their population size. Specifically, 81 seats are reserved for members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs), and 43 seats are reserved for members of the Scheduled Tribes (STs). Members of these groups are also eligible to contest MP elections from unreserved seats.

[4] Till 2020, two members from the Anglo-Indian community were nominated by the President of India on the recommendation of the Government of India.

The question-hour session in the Indian parliament follows a structured process. MPs are required to submit their questions 15 days before the intended date of response. Each MP can submit a maximum of 10 questions per session. Question Hour typically commences at 11 a.m. and continues until noon when the Parliament is in session, with some exceptions such as the beginning of a new Lok Sabha term, the first day of a new parliamentary year, and the day when the Finance Minister presents the Budget.

Daily, a maximum of 250 questions are selected for the government's response, out of which 20 questions can be chosen for oral responses, referred to as the starred questions. The remaining 230 questions receive written answers and are referred to as unstarred questions. The selection of questions to be answered on a given day is determined randomly. During the session, MPs have the opportunity to ask a maximum of two follow-up questions for the response received orally in the parliament. This random selection of questions is ideal for our research design as it removes the concerns about selection bias and gendered aspects of legislative activities discussed in the earlier sections.

We utilized the PQ Data Portal, a comprehensive dataset managed by the Trivedi Centre for Political Data at Ashoka University, to conduct our analysis (Bhogale 2019). This dataset encompasses questions posed in the Indian Lower House for 1999 to 2019. Throughout this time frame, the country underwent four changes in government, corresponding to the 13th term (1999-2004), 14th term (2004-2009), 15th term (2009-2014), and 16th term (2014-2019). The PQ Data Portal dataset includes details about the MP's name, party affiliation, constituency type (reserved or unreserved constituency), and the type of question (starred or unstarred).

It is noteworthy that when similar questions are received from different MPs, the speaker can group them. We refer to these sets of questions as 'joint questions'. In our dataset, 208,282 questions have been posed by individual MPs, while 89,699 questions have been posed by a pair or a group of MPs. By descriptively examining the total number of questions asked by women and men MPs, we find that a majority of questions are asked by men (Figure 2.1). Barring the 2014-19 Lok Sabha term, the average number of questions asked by men MPs is higher than that of women

MPs (Table 6.3). Further, within 89,699 joint questions, 18455 questions, 6.6% of the sample, have been asked by mixed-gender teams of MPs. As our primary focus is examining the link between the gender of the MP and the question content, we omit the questions asked by a mixed-gender group of MPs from the analysis.



(a) By individual MPs

(b) By MPs jointly

Figure 2.1: Gender-wise starred and unstarred questions posed by MPs over time

2.5 Analysis and Results

Method 1: Topic Models

There has been a growing interest in utilizing quantitative text analytical approaches in political science. These methods offer valuable tools for effectively handling large volumes of textual data through machine learning models. A widely employed method is probabilistic topic modeling, such as Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) and Structural Topic Model (STM), which uncover latent topics within extensive textual data. Topic models have been used to examine policy or ideological differences among political parties by analyzing manifestos, political speeches, and parliamentary debates (Slapin and Proksch 2008; Lauderdale and Herzog 2016; Schwarz, Traber and Benoit 2017). These models are particularly useful when researchers lack predefined expectations about topics in their data. Researchers fit the model to receive various topics, which they then label using sub-

stantive knowledge. However, sometimes these models can inadvertently create multiple topics on similar issues which can affect researchers' ability to interpret the results for substantive purposes. To address these challenges, Eshima, Imai and Sasaki (2020) introduced the keyword-assisted topic model (keyATM), a Bayesian semi-supervised approach that allows researchers to pre-define topics of interest before model fitting (Wiedemann 2022).

The keyATM method offers several advantages over other topic models. Firstly, it needs only a limited number of keywords to guide topic extraction (Eshima, Imai and Sasaki 2020). Secondly, it enhances substantive interpretability by minimizing post-hoc interpretation efforts. Thirdly, keyATM facilitates the incorporation of covariates to achieve more robust inferences. We implement this approach using the keyATM package in R. This approach is well-suited to our research question as we can directly specify keywords related to women's issues in the Indian context. We selected 48 keywords pertinent to women's issues.[5] The proportion of these predefined keywords in the question texts are shown in Figures 6.1 and **??**.

Before fitting the model, data must be preprocessed. Therefore, we first carried out standard preprocessing steps on the question text to create a document feature matrix (DFM). The details are given in the Appendix section. We then use the gender of the MP as the question-level covariate to fit the model, as we want to know document-topic distributions for women and men MPs. The document-topic distribution (θ) for each covariate is then used to estimate the predicted topic proportion (θ) for the given topic—women's issues in our case—along with the corresponding 90% credible intervals.[6] We also account for the question type and constituency type of the MP as other covariates in our analyses.

We first explore the proportion of all 48 predefined keywords on women's issues in the question texts. As shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 in the Appendix section, the observed frequencies of these

[5] As reviewed in the preceding sections, arriving at a definition of what constitutes a women's issue presents analytical challenges, particularly given the absence of a universally accepted understanding of women's concerns among Indian citizens and women MPs. In light of this complexity, we adopt a focused approach by considering keywords associated with women and children. To construct the keyword list, we draw from terms employed in existing literature on gender and politics, complemented by our contextual familiarity with India. Additionally, we read over 5,000 question texts at random to refine our list of keywords (refer to the Appendix for further details).

[6] 90% credible intervals are considered more stable than 95% in the context of Bayesian inferences (Goodrich et al. 2020).

keywords within our dataset are notably limited. This observation underscores that the overall proportion of questions pertaining to women's issues is quite modest. To further assess whether the gender of MPs plays a role in predicting their propensity to address women's issues, we employ three analytical approaches.

Our first approach involves selecting keywords that appear at least 0.1% of the time, as recommended by Eshima, Imai and Sasaki (2020). In our dataset, merely three keywords ("child," "school," and "woman") fulfill this criterion. Using these, we calculate the marginal posterior means of the document-topic distributions along with respective 90% credible intervals for women and men MPs. We present these means separately for questions posed individually (left panel) and jointly (right panel) in Figure 2.2. These results show that the mean topic prevalence is 0.51 for questions posed by women MPs individually, implying that, on average, the model predicts a proportion of 51.2% for questions posed by women MPs related to women's issues. In contrast, the corresponding figure for questions posed by men MPs stands at 0.49. Similarly, in the context of joint questions, the estimated mean proportion of questions concerning women's issues is 0.42 for men MPs and 0.48 for women MPs. These results suggest that women MPs place a heavier emphasis than male MPs on asking questions on women's issues.



(a) By individual MPs

(b) By MPs jointly

Figure 2.2: Marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on three keywords that appeared more than 0.1% of the corpus.

Additionally, we adopt two alternative strategies for selecting keywords for our analysis. First, we identify words that feature in over 0.01% of the corpus. This criterion yields six terms: "child," "school," "woman," "girl," "teach," and "female". Second, we use all 48 predefined keywords. In both cases, we find consistent results on point estimates that women MPs are more likely to ask more questions on women's issues than men MPs (Figures 2.1a and **??**).

Method 2: Supervised Classification

We employ an alternative method involving text classification to address our research question. Here, we initially develop a codebook to guide the manual labeling process for distinguishing questions related to women's issues from those that are not. Subsequently, we manually label a random subset of questions according to this codebook. Using this hand-labeled set of questions as training data, we select an appropriate model for subsequent classification. Employing the chosen model, we classify all questions to ascertain whether they pertain to women's issues or not. We then employ a logistic regression model to determine the likelihood of a question on women's issues being posed by either a female MP or a male MP.

We adopt the same focused approach for preparing the codebook and hand-labeling the questions as we do in the case of the keyword section for topic modeling. In line with the criteria of Celis et al. (2008), a question is considered to be women-specific if it holds implications for women due to social or biological reasons. This includes questions that directly reference women, children, and their primary or secondary education, aligning with previous research (Crowder-Meyer 2007; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2009; Htun and Power 2006). Following Höhmann (2020), we also encompass questions concerning professions predominantly occupied by women, such as nursing or the management of rural childcare centers (known as *anganwadi*). We assign the "women-specific" label to questions covering topics like education, health, poverty, and social welfare only when they explicitly relate to women or children.

For training purposes, we randomly select 5,519 questions (1.85% of the dataset) and manually categorize them based on whether they address women's issues. Following the manual labeling,

we proceed to select a model for predictions using the hand-coded dataset. We compare the performance of three models: Random Forest (RF), Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost), and Support Vector Machine (SVM). As the F1-score is the highest for XGBoost (Figure 6.9), we select this model for classification (see Appendix for details). This process yields a total of 14,380 questions categorized as women's issues.



Figure 2.3: Likelihood of a question on women's issue asked by male and female MPs along with 95% confidence intervals.

We plot these by taking into account the constituency type of MPs (General, SC, ST constituencies) and the type of questions (starred and unstarred). These results are also given in Model 1 in Table 6.6.

We then apply logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of a parliamentary question addressing women's issues. As done in the case of using keyATM method, we also account for the constituency type as well as the question type as control variables. Additionally, we separately

analyze the questions posed individually and jointly, as we do in the topic modeling approach.



Figure 2.4: Likelihood of a question on women's issue asked by male and female MPs jointly along with 95% confidence intervals.

Logistic regression results are given in the Model 2 in Table 6.6.

We present the outcomes of logistic regression using predicted probabilities. As depicted in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, our analysis reveals that both women and men MPs display an increasing likelihood of addressing questions on women's issues in each successive government term. However, gender disparities persist across time, with women MPs consistently demonstrating a higher propensity to raise questions on women's issues throughout all four Lok Sabha terms. Importantly, this relationship holds statistical significance and remains consistent for both starred (oral) and unstarred (written) questions. Furthermore, when scrutinizing the MPs' constituency types, a notable pattern emerges: women MPs from ST-reserved seats exhibit a greater tendency to raise questions on women's issues compared to their counterparts representing General or Scheduled Castes (SC)

constituencies.[7] Importantly, these patterns observed for both gender and constituency type align with the results obtained from utilizing the keyATM method, thus adding robustness to our findings.[8]

2.5.0.1 Topics in Women's Issues

We extend our analysis to unravel the underlying topics in the 14,380 questions predicted as questions on women's issues using supervised classification method. As we do not have a priori expectations, we use the Structural Topic Models (STM) technique for exploratory purposes (Roberts et al. 2014).[9] In order to determine the optimal number of topics, we first consider a range of diagnostic values between 10 and 20 topics, evaluating the performance of the models (See Appendix for further details). This process results in the identification of 18 topics, which we subsequently explore in terms of their distribution across questions posed by women and men MPs. The generated topics along with their distribution in the corpus of questions on women's issues are shown in Figure 2.5.

Further, we examine whether some of these topics are more likely to be discussed by women or men MPs. The outcomes of this analysis reveal notable variations in the topics that women and men MPs tend to emphasize when addressing women's issues. Women MPs more frequently focus on welfare-related subjects, encompassing themes such as gas connections, rural child centers, tourism, the portrayal of women in the entertainment industry, minority women, and law and order (topics 1, 2, 8, 14, and 15 in Figure 2.5). Conversely, men MPs tend to concentrate on topics such as children's health and women's economic concerns, including labor force participation, insurance, and women's involvement in self-help groups (topics 4, 7, 11, 12, and 17 in Figure 2.5). However, both women and men MPs share common interests in topics on education, safety, and women's health.

[7] Constituency type's impact is relatively complicated in the context of joint questions compared to the gender composition of MPs. Hence, we prioritize the simplicity of our measures and do not consider the constituency type of MPs concerning joint questions.

[8] Results concerning constituency type using the keyATM method are detailed in Figures 6.6b, 6.7, and 6.8.

[9] While acknowledging that, as highlighted by Parthasarathy, Rao and Palaniswamy (2019), topic modeling can sometimes yield challenging-to-interpret topics, it remains a valuable tool for uncovering topics in the absence of predetermined expectations.



Figure 2.5: Topic distribution in the corpus of questions on women's issues

2.6 Discussion and Conclusion

Prior research on question time dynamics has been limited either by examining a small number of questions or by studying a short period through manual hand-coding and/or the analysis of a random set of questions (Bailer 2011; Nyhuis, Zittel and Henneke 2016; Borghetto, Santana-Pereira and Freire 2020; Zittel, Nyhuis and Baumann 2019; Russo 2021; Jensen, Proksch and Slapin 2013). In contrast, we use text-as-data approaches to handle large volumes of data and move beyond the small-scale empirical analysis. This methodological advancement allows us to comprehensively investigate question dynamics from a gendered vantage point and provides a more nuanced understanding of elite behavior.

Our study highlights a stark reality: questions addressing women's issues constitute a mere fraction of the total questions raised during question time in the Indian parliament. Our analysis



Figure 2.6: Topic prevalence in the corpus of questions on women's issues by gender of the MP.

Coefficients less than zero indicate topics that are more frequently raised by women MPs. Coefficients greater than zero indicate topics that are more frequently raised by men MPs.

predicts that questions related to women's concerns accounted for less than five percent of the entire spectrum of queries posed over the two-decade period. We also find that although both men and women MPs have been asking a higher number of questions as time progresses, a striking gender gap remains apparent. Women MPs have raised women's concerns in their questions more than men MPs in each parliamentary term since 1999 to 2019. Further, we took a closer look at whether there are gendered differences in themes emerging from questions on women's issues. In our exploratory analysis, we observe that women MPs tend to focus more on topics like gas connections, rural child centers, tourism, and minority women. In contrast, men MPs appear to prioritize children's health, women's labor force participation, self-help groups, and insurance.

Although our primary focus is not on constituency type as to whether MPs represent seats reserved for historically marginalized groups of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, our analysis

highlights intriguing trends. MPs from constituencies reserved for historically marginalized ethnic groups consistently raise more questions related to women's issues compared to those from General or nonreserved constituencies (Figures 6.6b, 6.7, and 6.8). Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that women MPs representing ST constituencies exhibit the highest predicted probability of addressing women's concerns (Figures 2.3 and 2.4). These findings are in line with Clots-Figueras (2011**a**)'s work at the Indian state legislature level that women legislators from reserved constituencies are more likely to address "women-friendly policies". These findings underscore the importance of adopting an intersectional perspective when investigating gendered elite behaviors and offer a fertile ground for future research in elucidating the underlying drivers behind these trends.

It is also crucial to contextualize our findings in relation to the gender gap in voter turnout in India. The gender gap in voter turnout during Indian national elections stood at 8% in both 1999 and 2004, narrowing to 4.42% and 1.46% in 2009 and 2014 respectively (Kumar and Gupta 2015). Legislators, in a representative democracy, are expected to address concerns relevant to their constituents irrespective of gender (Downs 1957; Dingler, Kroeber and Fortin-Rittberger 2019). Moreover, increasing women's voter turnout has presented an opportunity for parties to attract women's voter base. Many parties have attempted to seek women's support by proposing women-centric policy agendas (Spary 2020; Kumar 2013). However, based on our results, it appears that there is a marked disconnect between party promises and MPs' performance on women's concerns. We leave this question to be further explored by future scholars.

Our findings are also noteworthy considering unsuccessful attempts to implement gender quotas both at the national and state-level legislatures to improve the political representation of women. In the Indian case, women occupied 15% of the seats in the current parliamentary term of 2019-2024, the highest ever in the history of India. Our findings, thus, reaffirm Phillips (1995)'s theory of politics of presence and Murray (2014)'s concerns that gender-imbalanced electoral bodies may be insufficiently paying attention to women's policy priorities *even when* raising their concerns require minimal legislative efforts (Phillips 1995). Our research must be taken into account in this

ongoing debate on the need for gender quotas, as our findings underscore the persistent gender gap in addressing women's issues even in low-investment activities such as asking questions from the government during the question time. Thus, the imperative for enhancing women's numerical representation becomes even more pronounced so that women's concerns and policy preferences are able to gain the requisite attention within the parliamentary discourse and in policy determination.

This project opens up intriguing avenues for future exploration. Although women's numerical representation in the Indian parliament has remained stagnant, their activeness has increased, as demonstrated by the average number of questions asked by women parliamentarians over the years (Table 6.3), and we do not yet know drivers of these trends. Relatedly, it remains to be investigated whether the gendered trends observed during question time hold across other legislative activities such as proposing or passing bills on women's issues in the Indian context. Additionally, extending this inquiry to India's state-level legislatures could offer valuable insights from a comparative perspective to discern whether these gendered differences persist across all states. Future work can also investigate MPs' motivations behind their choice of topics for questions and other legislative priorities. Are these choices driven by personal interest or by their constituents' concerns? How do other identity markers or social positions of legislators intersect with gender in explaining their topic choice? Our study prompts these questions, inviting further examination into these nuanced gender dynamics. Finally, much of the research in this line of work has been from European or Latin American contexts. As we add a fresh research case of India, we hope our research sparks broader investigations into gender and intersectionality as well as helps refine theories on legislative behavior.

Chapter 3

Equal Measures, Uneven Paths: Evaluating Intersectional Effects of Gender Quotas

Sushumlata Kushwaha, a first-time head of a village council in Bhojpur, Bihar, India, emerged as one of the final candidates nominated for the state-level assembly elections in 2020. Out of 21 competitors vying for the Jagdishpur assembly seat, she was the sole female candidate. Ultimately, the incumbent male candidate secured the victory, leaving Kushwaha as the first runner-up in the contest. In the context of India, where women's representation in state and national politics is alarmingly low[1] , where criminal and corrupt politicians often ascend to higher political positions (Vaishnav 2017), and where dynastic politics is prevalent (Chandra 2014), the journey of an individual like Kushwaha, progressing from a local-level political position to being nominated for state-level elections, is a remarkable achievement for a woman. The implementation of gender quotas in local governments has facilitated the entry of millions of women, including those from Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) groups, into village-level politics.[2] Existing literature suggests that women not only participate in local governance due to quota implementation but also secure nominations and occasionally win higher-level elections (O'Connell 2020; Goyal 2020; Karekurve-Ramachandra 2020; Kaur and Philips 2022). Nevertheless, the question remains: which women are more likely to advance further in politics, and what factors contribute to their success?

[1] Less than 10 % of seats in state assemblies and the national parliament are occupied by women. Refer to the news report published by Business Standard.

[2] The 1993 73rd constitutional amendment made it mandatory to reserve at least 33% of seats for women.

The presence of quotas at one level of government does not guarantee an equitable distribution of their spillover effects among various sub-populations of women. This situation can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, in societies characterized by stratification, women hailing from majority, privileged, and historically dominant communities may possess greater access to resources, which could shape their political trajectories differently compared to women belonging to historically oppressed, disadvantaged, minority, or underprivileged communities.[3] Secondly, the dynamics of political competition and the overall institutional context can exert varying influences on women from different subgroups. By drawing upon existing literature on gender, ethnicity, politics, and intersectionality, this study puts forth a hypothesis and tests how policy instruments like entry-level gender quotas facilitate the progression of different groups of women in their political careers at higher levels.

Electoral quotas implemented at the local government level in India create a convergence between reserved seats for women and those allocated for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). This intersection ensures that women from diverse ethnic groups have equal access to political opportunities. However, it is essential to investigate whether the pipeline for women's advancement to higher positions of power comprises a varied and inclusive group of candidates and winners. In this chapter, I examine whether gender quotas function as an equalizer by facilitating the upward progression of diverse groups of women in their political careers. The implementation of gender quotas entails the reservation of a certain percentage of seats, initially set at 33% for women. Subsequently, several states have raised the reservation percentage to 50%.

The available observational data on MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) candidates' affidavit information only permits an assessment of the impact of 50% reservations at the village level on women's representation in state-level elections.[4] These results do not reveal any discernible effects across women from all groups. Nonetheless, the available data provide an opportunity to separately examine the effects of 33% and 50% reservations on caste-based reserved and unreserved

[3] Throughout this chapter, I use these terms interchangeably.

[4] Since 2004, all candidates have been required to disclose their caste, educational, criminal, and financial information.

seats at the constituency level. Upon closer examination, it is evident that women's representation on both SC-reserved and unreserved seats has improved with local-level women's reservations. As the constituency-level institutional context allows minority women to contest elections from both caste-based reserved and unreserved seats, I delve further into whether minority women's representation improves on unreserved seats. However, the analysis does not reveal any evidence supporting this notion. These results suggest that while entry-level gender quotas have helped both majority and minority women secure higher-level political positions, the gains made by minority women are not substantial enough for them to contest and win elections without relying on caste-based quotas.

This work contributes to the existing literature on the impacts of quotas in several significant ways. Firstly, it integrates the literature on intersectionality by shedding light on the upstream effects of quotas on different groups of women. Scholars of intersectionality argue that considering women as a unified group mutes group differences resulting from underlying power dynamics (Crenshaw 1990; Hughes 2011**b**). Rather, experiences and opportunities are also a function of other identities women carry. While studies exploring the intersectional identities of gender with race, class, religion, and ethnicity have started addressing gaps in the existing literature (Ramirez et al. 2006; Evans 2016; Hughes 2016), the role of caste has received limited attention. Despite the significant interest in the Indian case of gender quota implementation, only a few studies have examined the intersections of gender and caste (See Brulé and Toth (2022) for exceptions). Therefore, this chapter aims to contribute to understanding how progressive institutions such as quota policies can either facilitate or restrict the political representation of different groups. Addressing this question is important not only from a numerical representation standpoint but also because women legislatures from majority and minority ethnicities address substantial representation differently. Women from underprivileged groups are more likely to favor 'women-friendly' and redistributive policies as compared to the majority women (Clots-Figueras 2011**b**). In any case, the goal of diversifying political leadership is worth pursuing to break the dominance of a few groups on policy decisions and expose voters to new information about the competence of other groups. Without carefully

designed quotas, there is a risk of overlooking and co-opting the agenda by majority women or minority men who may not genuinely represent the interests and policy preferences of minority women (Htun 2014; Smooth 2011). Thus, addressing this question has both policy and political relevance.

Secondly, while an extensive body of literature informs our understanding of quotas' impacts on the descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation, we still lack a comprehensive understanding of how quotas create lasting and durable effects on women's political careers, termed as the sustainable representation (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013). Although recent studies on the spillover effects of quotas have started to emerge (Karekurve-Ramachandra 2020; Kaur and Philips 2022; O'Brien 2015), demonstrating that women can overcome backlash faced due to their gender or being quota beneficiaries, it is not immediately evident if these results mask subgroup effects. In hierarchical societies where some identities hold political salience, women from different subgroups may experience varying levels of success in advancing further in politics.

The remaining sections of the chapter are structured as follows. The next section provides a review of the relevant literature on gender quotas and women's representation, specifically examining the intersectional perspectives. Building on this literature, I outline the key hypotheses derived from the existing body of work. I then introduce the policy background in the Indian context, data sources, and the empirical strategy employed in the study. Then, I present the findings followed by a discussion and conclusion that summarizes the results and situates them within the broader literature.

3.1 Gender Quotas' Representational Effects

Quotas have emerged as an important policy tool to address the underrepresentation of marginalized groups in politics. Gender quotas, in particular, have been widely implemented across more than 130 countries, leading to significant improvements in the gender composition of political offices (Hughes et al. 2019). These quotas have played a crucial role in promoting gender equality and political inclusion. In addition to gender quotas, some countries have also implemented quo-

tas to address the underrepresentation of minority communities based on race, age, ethnicity, and caste (Hughes 2011**b**; Bird 2016; Belschner and Garcia de Paredes 2021). Existing scholarship has extensively examined the empirical consequences of quota policies. This work shows that strengthening political inclusion by bringing underrepresented groups has meaningful gains for governance (Deininger et al. 2015), political competition (Huang 2016), policy preferences (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004**b**; Funk and Philips 2019), distributional outcomes (Pande 2003), political participation (Merolla, Sellers and Fowler 2013; De Paola, Scoppa and De Benedetto 2014), and trust in political institutions (Marschall and Shah 2007; Atkeson and Carrillo 2007).

When gender quotas are implemented at the grassroots or local levels of government, they provide not only immediate political representation but also serve as a platform for women to gain experience, build political agency, and establish networks with constituents and party recruiters. The presence of gender quotas creates a demonstration effect, showcasing women's competitiveness as candidates, and expanding the pool of potential women candidates for party leaders to consider (Mariani 2008). Women politicians get opportunities to demonstrate their abilities and present themselves as competitive candidates even for higher political office. This multifaceted impact of gender quotas contributes to women's upward mobility and their increased likelihood of attaining higher political office.

Gender quotas have not only led to tangible changes in political representation but have also had a significant impact on perceptions of women's leadership abilities. Traditionally, the idea of a "women leader" has often been considered an oxymoron, with limited imagination of women in leadership positions, particularly in politics (Lawless and Fox 2013). However, the implementation of gender quotas has exposed constituents to women leaders, challenging and updating their preconceived notions. As a result, perceptions towards women politicians have been found to change positively (Beaman et al. 2009). Moreover, women leaders can serve as role models and inspirational figures, inspiring other women to pursue political careers (Ladam, Harden and Windett 2018; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). These psychological effects shed light on why quotas can help in strengthening sustainable representation, which refers to "a durable, substantial numerical political

representation of women, freed of the risk of immediate major backlash" (Darhour and Dahlerup 2013, p. 133).

Studies examining the long-term effects of gender quotas have demonstrated their persistent impacts over time and space. Entry-level gender quotas have facilitated women in gaining influential positions within political parties (O'brien and Rickne 2016). Furthermore, the presence of gender quotas in previous elections has led to a greater number of women candidates in subsequent elections, even when quotas are not in effect (Bhavnani 2009; Bhalotra, Clots-Figueras and Iyer 2013). The positive effects of gender quotas can also extend beyond the directly affected constituencies, as neighboring constituencies demonstrate a higher propensity to support women candidates (Gilardi 2015). These findings suggest that gender quotas not only increase women's representation at lower levels of political office but also contribute to their progression to higher positions of power (Goyal 2020; Karekurve-Ramachandra 2020; Kaur and Philips 2022).

Despite knowing that quotas have positive effects on women's entry and career progression in politics, we do not yet know *which* subgroups of women are more likely to break through. Are women from underprivileged groups equally likely to find these quotas beneficial for advancing their political careers as women from privileged groups? To shed light on these dynamics, I incorporate the concept of intersectionality into the analysis.

3.2 Intersectionality and Political Representation

How do different groups of women achieve political power? Broadly, the literature on intersectionality and political representation generates competing hypotheses that in some cases, intersecting marginalized traits, such as being a woman as well as an ethnic minority, can either be a double disadvantage or a double advantage. Below, I discuss this literature as an attempt to inform my theoretical expectations.

First, *double-jeopardy hypothesis* posits that intersecting disadvantaged identities create additional barriers for marginalized groups compared to those with only one disadvantaged identity. For example, in her influential work, Crenshaw (1990) argues that Black women face acute forms

of discrimination for being a *Black* as well as for being a *woman*. Some take objection to the term 'double disadvantage' as they argue that the impacts of intersecting identities are not merely additive but are *multiplicative* suggesting the magnified and complex forms of disadvantages resulting from compounded levels of discrimination faced by these groups.

Empirical support for the double-jeopardy hypothesis can be found in various case studies and large-scale studies. Hughes (2011**b**), in a multi-country analysis, demonstrates that minority women are the most disadvantaged from both gender and ethnic quotas; majority women benefit the most from gender quotas and ethnic minority men benefit the most from ethnic quotas, thus, leaving ethnic minority women the most disadvantaged in both situations. Similarly, Htun (2014) in the Latin American context finds that Afro-descendant women lag behind both dominant women and Afro-descendant men in terms of political representation.

However, an alternative perspective suggests that intersecting oppressed identities can also be advantageous. This *double-advantage hypothesis* is primarily supported by empirical evidence from European countries. Ethnic minority women may be perceived as embodying a concentrated diversity, ticking multiple identity boxes for both party selectors and citizens. Parties may strategically nominate ethnic minority women when they are perceived as more assimilative or easier to coopt than dominant women or ethnic minority men, thus allowing the maintenance of hegemonic power by dominant groups. Candidates with multiple identities are also seen as more effective in fostering cross-group coalitions (Ramirez et al. 2006). Party leaders may choose to nominate ethnic minority women to portray a progressive image or appeal to more progressive voters (Celis et al. 2014; Hughes 2016). For instance, Bird (2016)'s comparative analysis of Belgium and the Netherlands demonstrates that parties tend to nominate more ethnic minority women. Murray (2016) note that the inclusion of ethnic minority women in France is strong when they tend to be conformist. In the context of the US, Ramirez et al. (2006) find that Latina women elected officials are perceived as better consensus builders across groups than Latina men. This research also suggests that ethnic minority women may face less racial backlash than ethnic minority men.

In summary, this body of literature highlights the complexity of political inclusion for women

with intersecting identities. Based on these competing hypotheses, contradictory expectations emerge about gender quotas' impact on the upward mobility of diverse groups of women. On one hand, entry-level electoral quotas may provide minority women with more leverage than majority women in advancing their political careers. On the other hand, quotas may make little difference for minority women and instead serve as a stepping stone for majority women. In the following section, I attempt to reconcile and refine these competing expectations in the context of hierarchical ethnic societies.

3.3 Theoretical Expectations

Do women across all sections gain from entry-level gender quotas in progressing in politics? In hypothesizing this relationship, I build on the above-discussed literature and discuss how political recruitment and citizens' preferences may shape political opportunities for subgroups of women.



Figure 3.1: An illustration of the theoretical context

Political recruitment and nominations often lack transparency, making it difficult to identify potential implicit and explicit biases in the selection process (Mügge and Erzeel 2016). Historically privileged groups tend to have greater access to financial resources and influential networks, providing them with an advantage in accessing "inner political circles". Women from privileged groups may leverage this experience to advance to higher positions of power, whereas minority women may face additional barriers (Bird 2016). Biases among party recruiters may also play a role, as

they may perceive minority women as less competitive (Jensenius 2016; Fox and Lawless 2004). Consequently, minority women candidates could be more likely to be rejected during the nomination phase (Fox and Lawless 2010). Based on these considerations, I hypothesize that women from historically underprivileged groups will face greater challenges in contesting higher-level elections, even in the presence of local-level gender quotas. This hypothesis can be formulated as follows:

H_1: Women from underprivileged groups are less likely than women from privileged groups to contest higher-level elections in the presence of local-level gender quotas.

Drawing insights from the literature on political psychology and behavior, I turn to how voters perceive majority and minority women candidates differently. Intergroup stereotypes, prejudices, or biases are often deeply ingrained and can have enduring repercussions on various facets of the sociopolitical milieu. Voters often exhibit a preference for traditional candidates, typically men from the dominant group. One explanation is that when voters tend to possess limited information about the leadership qualities and competence of candidates, they rely on cues such as gender and minority status for making a voting decision (Hajnal 2001). Quotas aimed at improving descriptive representation in politics provide voters an opportunity to gain first-hand information about the qualities of minority or women leadership (Gilardi 2015). Studies exploring the psychological aspects of discrimination against political candidates have found that negative perceptions about women and minorities can change in the presence of political leaders from these groups (Dunning and Nilekani 2013) or with sustained exposure to their leadership (Gangadharan et al. 2016; Beaman et al. 2009). Consequently, the implementation of gender quotas at one level of government can lead to increased voter support for women candidates even at other levels (O'Connell 2020; Kaur and Philips 2022).

Qualitative evidence presented by Jensenius (2015) suggests that minority political leaders are often perceived unfavorably, and their competence is questioned. This view may be attributed to dominant groups perceiving political opportunities as a zero-sum game and feeling threatened by the rise of women and minorities in positions of power (Gangadharan et al. 2016; Hajnal 2001).

Thus, minority groups may face backlash that restricts their political opportunities (Claassen 2020). Chauchard (2014)'s work highlights the limited effectiveness of descriptive representation in improving prejudices and biases. Experimental evidence indicates that positive discrimination toward dominant or privileged groups leads to electoral favoritism (Portmann 2021)suggesting that positive stereotypes persist more for privileged groups, while negative stereotypes persist for underprivileged groups. Stereotypes associated with candidates' identity characteristics also influence voters' evaluations of candidates(Washington 2006). Furthermore, women and minority candidates are often perceived as more liberal, which may impact their appeal among conservative co-ethnics (Fulton and Gershon 2018).

The literature on ethnic voting emphasizes that voters tend to value candidates who share their own identity characteristics (Mansbridge 1999**b**). White voters, for example, tend to favor White candidates over non-White candidates (Washington 2006), and voter turnout is generally higher among White voters compared to non-White voters (Medenica and Fowler 2020). Ethnic parties tend to be successful when they mobilize voters by invoking shared ethnic experiences or promising material benefits for their community (Chandra 2007; Wantchekon 2003). Overall, women from minority groups may face additional discrimination based on gender from their co-ethnic groups, as well as discrimination based on both gender and minority status from other groups (Htun 2004**b**; Mügge and Erzeel 2016). Considering these factors, I anticipate differential electoral outcomes for women from privileged and underprivileged groups. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H_2: Women from privileged groups win more elections than women from underprivileged groups.

3.4 Research Setting: The Indian Case

The Indian context provides an ideal setting to analyze the research question regarding the impact of gender quotas on women's political representation. India's political institutions operate at three levels: central, state, and local (both rural and urban). The 73rd and 74th constitutional amend-

ments of 1993 and 1994 respectively introduced a decentralized system of governance, empowering local governing bodies in rural and urban areas. These amendments mandated the reservation of one-third of seats for women, including those from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, at the local level. The implementation of these reservations required state governments to create new laws and provisions for local-level elections. The initial provision reserved one-third of seats for women at the local level, but subsequently, several states increased the proportion to 50%. West Bengal was the first one to conduct rural elections under these provisions of 33% reservations. The last state to have adopted new changes was Arunachal Pradesh where the first rural elections took place in 2003. Bihar was the first state to adopt the 50% reservation in 2006, and many other states followed suit.

Caste has a significant impact on everyday life in India, with deeply entrenched caste hierarchies and associated notions of purity and pollution (Berreman 1965). These dynamics have perpetuated inequality in Indian society, with Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes historically facing restrictions on access to capital assets, education, and employment opportunities. Despite constitutional safeguards and reservation rights in various domains, caste-based differences persist in developmental indicators (Dutta et al. 2020; Sabharwal and Sonalkar 2015). Even economically well-off Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes face higher discrimination than poor households (Chakraborty, Babu and Chakravorty 2006), suggesting that economic empowerment alone is insufficient to address systematic discrimination. Furthermore, access to public provisions such as electricity, drinking water, and sanitation remains lowest for Scheduled Tribes (Commission et al. 2005). It is also worth noting that despite traditional egalitarianism among Scheduled Tribes, women within these groups face subordinate status (Xaxa 2004).

Given this context, a subnational analysis of India allows for a comparison across state elections held after the implementation of local-level gender quotas, while keeping other potentially confounding factors constant. This subnational analysis is well-suited to test the theoretical expectations discussed earlier.

3.5 Data and Methods

Data

To test the above-described hypotheses, I leverage India's subnational data from assembly elections from 1977 to 2018.[5] The data include candidates' and constituencies' information such as caste, type of constituency, vote share, and position in the race. My analysis is based on 26 Indian states, excluding Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland which have different political institutions at the local level. I also exclude bye-elections from this analysis.



Figure 3.2: A timeline of gender quotas implemented at the village council level.

Note: I consider the quotas to be in effect when the first elections took place after changing quota proportions. The tan shade in the maps shows the non-implementation or inapplicability of quotas.

[5] I use data from the SHRUG dataset, released by the Development Data Lab (Jensenius and Verniers 2017; Asher et al. 2019).

Empirical Strategy

As shown in Figure 3.2, gender quota policies were implemented in different states at different times. Therefore, the conventional difference-in-differences strategy is not applicable in this case (Cunningham 2021). In my sample, 17 Indian states have 50% reservations in effect at the village level. To test my hypotheses, I analyze data on the constituency level using the following outcome variables: (1) Percentage of women candidates; (2) Percentage of women winners.

Candidates' ethnic data is available for elections post-year 2003. I use these data to categorize the proportion of women candidates and winners based on their ethnic group. By 2003, every state had already implemented 33 % of women's reservations. Thus, it is only possible to assess the impact of 50 % reservation on how different groups of women emerge as candidates and winners. To assess the impact of panchayat-level gender quotas, I use the following empirical strategy for constituency-level analysis:

$$Women'srepresentation_{it} = \beta_1 50\% reservation_{it} + \delta_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3.1}$$

Where *women's representation* variable in the state i in election t is a function of β_1 50 % reservation). α_i signifies state-fixed effects to account for unit-specific trends. δ_t captures time trends measured as election-fixed effects. As women's representation is measured at the state-election level, election fixed effects account for time-specific trends that may otherwise explain outcomes of interest[6] . ϵ_{it} represents an error term. *50% reservation* is a dummy variable where 1 indicates state-elections when 50% reservation is in effect, and 0 otherwise.[7]

To address concerns that states implementing 50% reservations may be inherently different or have unique factors that could affect the outcome variables, I take three different approaches. First, I consider the analysis conducted by (Kaur and Philips 2022) where they utilize indicators from India's National Family Health Survey (2005-06), which was conducted right before the im-

[6] Due to the asynchronous nature of assembly elections, I use election counters to account for election-specific trends. The election counter is assigned based on the oldest to the most recent election in my data.

[7] I consider reservation *in effect* when the first local-level elections take place.

plementation of 50% reservations, to examine potential systematic differences between states that implemented the reservations and those that did not. Their analysis indicates no significant variations between these two groups of states, suggesting that the states implementing 50% reservations are not inherently more progressive than others. Second, I track women's electoral performance in state-level elections comparing states that adopted 50% reservations with those that did not. As shown in graphs 3.3 and 3.4, it is unlikely that states that adopted 50% reservations had any better or worse outcomes for women's electoral performance pre-2005 than other states.



Figure 3.3: Percentage of women candidates in state-level elections

Third, I adopt the variation of equation 3.1 by accounting for a variation that may be unique to the states that implemented 50% reservations. The term $\gamma_i \mathit{TreatedState} * \delta_t$ as specified in the equation 3.2 captures this variation where *TreatedState* is the dummy variable where 1 indicates whether the state implemented 50% reservation and 0 otherwise.



Figure 3.4: Percentage of women winners in state-level elections

$$Women'srepresentation_{it} = \beta_1 50\%reservation_{it} + \gamma_i TreatedState * \delta_t + \alpha_i + \epsilon_{it} \tag{3.2}$$

I also include lagged dependent variables to account for the influence of past levels of women's representation on the current outcomes.

3.6 Results

I first present the results of the impact of village-level 50% women's reservations on the state-level women's representation across ST, SC, and General groups. As results in Table 3.1 show, the proportion of women MLA candidates across all ethnic groups remains statistically indistinguishable. These results are consistent across other specifications. Thus, I find no support for H_1 that privileged women are more likely to contest higher-level elections in the presence of local-level gender quotas to gain upward mobility in their careers. Moving on to the second hypothesis, I examine the

results concerning the proportion of women who win MLA elections across the three ethnic groups. Similar to the previous findings, there is no support for H_2 that privileged women are more likely to win state-level elections once the 50% reservation in village elections is in effect. These results are robust across different levels of specifications, reinforcing the absence of a significant relationship.

Table 3.1: The impact of local-level gender quotas on women's candidature in state-level elections across ethnic groups

Dependent variable	% women candidates								
Ethnic Group	ST			SC			General		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
50% reservation	0.98	-0.31	-2.30	-1.35	0.17	-5.99	0.87	1.41	0.54
	(2.12)	(1.99)	(6.33)	(3.01)	(3.50)	(5.67)	(0.86)	(1.11)	(1.06)
Lagged DV			Y			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated state*Election FE		Y			Y			Y	
R^2	0.90	0.92	0.98	0.91	0.91	0.96	0.98	0.99	1.00
Adj. R^2	0.80	0.80	0.91	0.82	0.80	0.85	0.96	0.97	0.98
N	68	68	43	70	70	45	70	70	45

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$. Robust standard errors clustered by the state are given in parentheses.

Figure 3.5 provides a visual analysis of the representation of different groups of women MLA candidates before and after the implementation of 50% reservations. The data suggest that the candidate pool for all groups of women has expanded following the reservation change. Notably, ST women have experienced the most significant increase in representation, followed by SC women and women from the General category. These patterns suggest a broadening of opportunities for women across all three groups in the political arena after the implementation of 50% reservations. It would be interesting to revisit these trends in subsequent elections to observe any further developments and assess the long-term effects of the reservation policy.

The Moderating Role of Institutional Context

To investigate the impact of village-level gender quotas on women's representation at the state level, I consider the presence of caste quotas for state-level elections. In addition to the 50%

Table 3.2: The impact of local-level gender quotas on women's winnability in state-level elections across ethnic groups

Dependent variable	% women winners								
Ethnic Group	ST			SC			General		
	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
50% reservation	-0.13	0.05	-0.31	-0.46	-0.95	-0.52	0.17	0.25	-0.07
	(0.54)	(0.70)	(1.75)	(0.73)	(1.08)	(1.01)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Lagged DV			Y			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated state*Election FE		Y			Y			Y	
R^2	0.82	0.84	0.91	0.66	0.69	0.94	0.95	0.96	0.99
Adj. R^2	0.62	0.62	0.63	0.33	0.29	0.75	0.90	0.90	0.95
N	68	68	43	70	70	45	70	70	45

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors clustered by the state are given in parentheses.



Figure 3.5: Proportion of women MLA candidates pre and post 50% reservation

reservation, I also incorporate the village-level 33% women's reservation into the analysis, allowing

for a comprehensive examination of women's representation across seats reserved based on different ethnic groups in the state-level elections.

The analysis reveals that the initial 33% gender quota policy had a positive effect on women's candidacy in ST (Scheduled Tribe) and unreserved constituencies. Two out of three models demonstrate that the pool of ST women candidates expanded by 3.35 to 3.46 percentage points (Models 20 and 21). Similarly, two out of three models indicate that the proportion of General women candidates increased by 0.80 percentage points after the implementation of the 33% reservation policy (Models 25 and 27). Furthermore, there is limited evidence suggesting that the subsequent 50% reservation policy further enhanced ST women's representation by 7.07 percentage points, as depicted in Model 19. However, despite improvements in the proportion of women candidates in ST and General reserved seats, there is no significant improvement in women's winnability, as demonstrated in Table 3.4.

SC and ST candidates can also contest elections from unreserved seats. I also measure whether local-level reservation policies have created more opportunities for ST and SC women from unreserved seats. The analysis indicates that, following the implementation of 50% reservations, there is no significant improvement or deterioration in the representation of ST and SC women on unreserved seats, although the relationships between the implementation of reservations and women's representation are in the negative direction (Tables 3.5 and 3.6). These results indicate that opportunities for progressing further in their career are only limited to the reserved seats.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion

The findings of this study shed light on the impact of local-level gender quotas on diversity in women's representation at the state level, taking into account the availability of caste quotas at the state level. The analysis reveals that the adoption of local-level gender quotas does not manifest differently for women from privileged groups and subordinate groups in improving women's upward mobility, although it appears that the share of ST women's candidature has increased in the recent years (Figure 3.5). A closer examination further indicates that ST women groups have been able

Table 3.3: The impact of local-level gender quotas on women's candidature in state-level elections across caste-based reserved and unreserved seats

Dependent variable	% women candidates								
Group-based reserved seat	ST			SC			Unreserved		
	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
33% reservation	2.56	3.35*	3.46*	2.25	2.02	2.32	0.80*	0.70	0.81*
	(1.33)	(1.32)	(1.49)	(1.49)	(1.37)	(1.66)	(0.32)	(0.39)	(0.35)
50% reservation	7.07*	6.86	6.09	0.53	2.35	0.47	0.63	0.95	0.60
	(3.31)	(3.76)	(3.28)	(1.19)	(1.19)	(1.37)	(0.47)	(0.57)	(0.51)
Lagged DV			Y			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated state*Election FE		Y			Y			Y	
R^2	0.72	0.74	0.74	0.85	0.86	0.85	0.96	0.97	0.97
Adj. R^2	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.82	0.82	0.81	0.96	0.96	0.96
N	159	159	134	188	188	163	194	194	168

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors clustered by state are given in the parentheses.

Table 3.4: The impact of local-level gender quotas on women's winnability in state-level elections across caste-based reserved and unreserved seats

Dependent variable	% women winners								
Group-based reserved seat	ST			SC			Unreserved		
	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36
33% reservation	1.49	1.43	1.95	0.28	0.38	0.23	0.10	0.01	0.24
	(0.96)	(0.86)	(1.12)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.17)
50% reservation	0.71	0.79	1.47	0.68	0.70	0.63	0.19	0.25	0.11
	(0.73)	(0.88)	(1.01)	(0.37)	(0.50)	(0.33)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Lagged DV			Y			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated state*Election FE		Y			Y			Y	
R^2	0.51	0.52	0.56	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.75	0.76	0.81
Adj. R^2	0.37	0.35	0.41	0.55	0.54	0.54	0.69	0.69	0.76
N	159	159	134	188	188	163	194	194	168

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors clustered by state are given in the parentheses.

Table 3.5: The impact of local-level gender quotas on SC and ST women's candidature in state-level elections on unreserved seats

Dependent variable	% women candidates					
Ethnic group	ST			SC		
	37	38	39	40	41	42
50% reservation	-3.25	-2.24	-9.40	-1.41	-0.75	-3.34
	(5.54)	(6.68)	(17.39)	(2.38)	(3.11)	(3.47)
Lagged DV			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated State* Election FE		Y			Y	
R^2	0.77	0.79	0.88	0.94	0.95	0.98
Adj. R^2	0.52	0.48	0.45	0.87	0.88	0.90
Num. obs.	67	67	41	63	63	39

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors clustered by state are given in the parentheses.

Table 3.6: The impact of local-level gender quotas on SC and ST women's winnability in state-level elections on unreserved seats

Dependent variable	% women winners					
Ethnic group	ST			SC		
	43	44	45	46	47	48
50% reservation	-0.17	-0.13	-0.04	-0.86	-0.83	-0.71
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(1.17)	(1.34)	(0.91)
Lagged DV			Y			Y
State FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Election FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Treated State* Election FE		Y			Y	
R^2	0.84	0.84	1.00	0.70	0.70	0.97
Adj. R^2	0.67	0.61	1.00	0.37	0.25	0.88
Num. obs.	67	67	41	63	63	39

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$ Robust standard errors clustered by state are given in the parentheses.

to make some inroads likely due to the ethnic quota provisions at the state level.

Overall, these results demonstrate that gender quotas can facilitate the upward mobility of diverse groups of women, but only if the institutional context provides equitable political opportunities. Had there been no caste quotas at the state level, only privileged women would likely have

benefited from local-level gender quotas. Thus, this work alleviates some concerns that quotas reinforce within-group inequalities (Hughes 2011**b**) and aligns with the previous findings that gender quotas improve legislative diversity along identity dimensions (Barnes and Holman 2020; Cassan and Vandewalle 2021).

It is also worthwhile to consider the implications of these results in the context of changing dynamics around state-level ethnic quotas in India. The Delimitation Commission as per the Delimitation Commissions Acts periodically delineates the boundaries of state assembly constituencies to ensure each constituency represents roughly the same electorate size. As per the latest delimitation exercise in 2008, the number of ST constituencies increased from 532 to 554, and the number of SC constituencies increased from 570 to 607. The number of unreserved constituencies, on the other hand, decreased from 3007 to 2872 (ECI 2008). The next delimitation exercise is due in 2031 and considering the faster population growth of SCs and STs than the General population, it appears that the proportion of SC and ST reserved seats may further increase in the coming years. If so, the results from this analysis indicate that local-level gender quotas may further increase subordinate women's representation in reserved seats.

Interestingly, within the underprivileged groups of women, the positive local gender quota effect seems to be stronger for ST women than for SC women. These results are somewhat puzzling considering that both groups continue to face systematic exclusion. Empirical studies highlight significant differences between dominant caste groups and SC and ST groups across various developmental indicators. However, SC and ST categories are rarely analyzed separately, limiting the ability to provide informed commentary on the observed differences in this study. Future research should explore these subgroup differences to gain a deeper understanding.

To further explore how village-level reservations have shifted the characteristics of women candidates and winners, I use variables available from affidavit-level data.[8] These include age, education, assets, liability, and criminal record. I also add constituency-level information such as

[8] Affidavit-level information of MLA candidates is available from 2004 onwards. As mentioned above, 33% of women's reservations were rolled out in all states by then. Therefore, this analysis is only limited to the pre-post 50% reservation.

the total number of candidates in an election, and the effective number of parties. The dependent variables are (1) the likelihood of a woman contesting the state-level elections, and (2) the likelihood that a woman would win the state-level elections. The results from logit regression indicate similar characteristics of women contesting and winning elections regardless of the reservation status of the constituency and ethnic category of women (Tables 7.1 and 7.2). However, this analysis misses two important explanatory variables as the affidavit-level information does not provide dynastic status as well as whether a candidate has previously held a government position at the village level of political office using gender quotas. These variables could provide additional insights into how exposure to local-level reservations and the political capital of a candidate's family influence the likelihood of women contesting or winning state-level elections. Without accounting for these two variables, the results should be considered as merely suggestive evidence rather than definitive conclusions. Including dynastic status and previous government positions in future analyses could contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the factors influencing women's participation and success in state-level elections.

This analysis also raises several questions that warrant further exploration. For instance, it remains unclear which mechanisms contribute to the improvement in women's higher-level representation due to local-level gender quotas. Do quota beneficiaries gain experience, build networks, contest, and win higher-level elections? Or do local-level gender quotas have an exposure effect, making the party selectorate and voters more accepting of women politicians for higher-level positions, thereby opening up space for women in general? Additionally, do women from subordinate groups face unique challenges compared to privileged women? These questions highlight the need for future research to delve deeper into the mechanisms and dynamics of gender quotas and their impact on women's representation in politics.

Chapter 4

Implications of Affirmative Action on Political Attitudes

4.1 Introduction

In representative democracies, ensuring equitable political representation remains a cornerstone of fostering inclusive governance. To tackle persistent inequalities in political representation, many nations have turned to electoral quotas as a means to foster balanced participation for women and ethnic minorities. While existing research has extensively examined the impact of electoral quotas on descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation, a notable gap persists in understanding their broader implications on political behavior, particularly from an intersectional perspective. The widespread adoption of electoral quotas over the last few decades underscores the need for a comprehensive understanding of their effects on political engagement.

Electoral quotas act as a signaling mechanism for citizens to achieve democratic ideals of equality and justice. Descriptive representation improves the trust and confidence of underrepresented groups in political institutions (Clayton, O'Brien and Piscopo 2019; Verge, Wiesehomeier and Espírito-Santo 2020; Arnesen and Peters 2018) and strengthens their political participation (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2006; Mansbridge 1999**a**; Barnes and Burchard 2013). Quotas also shape substantive representation and facilitate meaningful policy-level gains for underrepresented communities (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004**a**). Thus, quotas create winners and losers. They work towards breaking down the hegemony of the dominant groups and making space for groups that have been systematically excluded from the positions of power; as a result, quota implementation may be threatening to dominant groups' status quo. As Mansbridge (1999**a**) puts it, descriptive

representation holds "communicative advantages" for those who face higher levels of barriers in politics. It may then also mean that descriptive representation through quotas holds a communicative disadvantage to those who may find that their position in politics is now being restricted to make space for others. Therefore, examining the nuanced effects of electoral quotas on diverse societal groups becomes imperative to fully understand the impacts of quotas. As Htun (2004**a**) mentions in case of affirmative action in Brazil, "Talking about quotas makes people really angry" (p. 72-73). Thus, examining how various sub-groups of society respond to quotas can improve our understanding of the broader implications of inclusive institutions on political engagement. If affirmative action policies are perceived poorly, efforts to strengthen representative democracies can be undermined. In the context of growing democratic backsliding, this question becomes even more important for improving support for democracy among citizens.

In this chapter, I examine the implications of electoral quotas implemented in the form of reserved seats on mass political engagement in the Indian context. Unlike party quotas or legislative quotas, in the context of reserved seats, candidates from the target group compete with each other. Reserved seats tackle candidate selection at the seat level as opposed to at the party level, thus presenting a unique dynamic in electoral competition. Therefore, reserved seats can be seen as potentially thwarting political competition by artificially constraining who gets to contest elections. This set up stands in contrast to statutory or voluntary quotas where candidates from underrepresented groups compete directly with others, fostering a different landscape of electoral dynamics.

Causally identifying the effects of affirmative action policies remains challenging using observational data, as all units are treated simultaneously. Further, while many State Election Commissions in India decide to reserve seats for women randomly, reserved seats for Scheduled Castes (SCs) are based on the proportion of their total population. Therefore, seats reserved for SCs are systematically different from unreserved seats. Moreover, data on electoral voter turnout on the basis of gender and ethnicity are unavailable. In the absence of such vital data and difficulty in using available data for making causal claims, I turn to original data collected through a field-based survey

experiment conducted in rural India[1] , encompassing 1,989 respondents. Respondents are provided with information regarding the existence of reservation policies for women and SC groups, followed by prompts to consider various scenarios regarding their village's reservation status: unreserved (treatment 1), reserved for women (treatment 2), reserved for SCs (treatment 3), and reserved for women from SC groups (treatment 4). This experimental setup not only facilitates a comparison of effect sizes between treatments and the control group but also facilitates a comparison of respondents' reactions to having their village reserved compared to the unreserved seat.

This analysis shows a notable increase in political participation among individuals receiving information about their villages reserved for either women, SC, or SC women in the upcoming elections compared to those in the control group, with the most pronounced positive effect observed in seats reserved for women. Interestingly, these effects are predominantly driven by female respondents, particularly those from non-dominant groups. Conversely, while male respondents exhibit no discernible negative or positive effects on political participation upon receiving quota information, dominant men, those belonging to the Forward Caste and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) are notably less inclined to engage in politics in seats reserved for women from SC groups compared to unreserved seats. These effects remain robust even when controlling for baseline levels of electoral and non-electoral participation. In exploring mechanisms underlying the reduced participation of dominant groups, my analysis suggests that quotas exacerbate attitudes toward underrepresented groups. Higher levels of discriminatory attitudes interact with the quota information and diminish their political engagement.

This nuanced analysis contributes significantly to the literature on electoral quotas and political behavior by shedding light on their differential effects on various societal groups. I draw on the literature on social psychology, and gender and ethnicity. to spell out how and why electoral quotas may affect political engagement. These findings show that quotas have mobilizing effects — positive effects on those whose group sets out to gain and negative effects on those who may perceive themselves as losing out. From a policy perspective, these findings carry significant im-

[1] Refer to pre-registration plan at https://osf.io/587ue

plications. Democracy requires active citizenship without which there runs the risk of democratic deficit. If people feel alienated or unsatisfied with the current institutional environment, this has implications for democratic governance. This sense of alienation can further have implications on the legitimacy of decision-making and voter apathy. My research highlights that while electoral quotas are a vital tool for enhancing the political participation of historically underrepresented groups, there are some potential costs in terms of lower levels of political engagement of dominant groups. However, these findings underscore the importance of designing quotas in a manner that mitigates the potential costs of alienating dominant groups (Mansbridge 1999**a**).

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. I first outline my arguments and hypotheses of how quotas shape the political behavior of different groups. Then I describe the vignettee experiment. Following this, I describe my methods of analysis and interpret results. Finally, I discuss the implications of these results for the literature on participation and gender and ethnic politics.

4.2 Exposure Effect of Quotas

Inequality in political representation and participation constitutes fundamental challenges for representative democracies. Lijphart (1997) calls it a 'democratic dilemma'. Historically, both political representation and participation have been dominated by high-status groups, posing a fundamental threat to policymaking processes as the underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities in politics not only undermines the principles of democracy but also perpetuates systematic inequalities faced by these marginalized groups in society.

In such a context, electoral quotas emerge as potential mechanisms to disrupt the cycle of inequality. Regardless of the motives behind quota adoption, quotas signal the state's commitment to inclusive political representation. Depending on the context and the quota design, quotas have shown varying degrees of success in narrowing gaps in political inclusion in formal and descriptive representation. Moreover, quotas have been instrumental in driving meaningful policy changes. The inclusion of marginalized groups in political processes not only legitimizes their presence but also

acts as a catalyst for increased engagement with politics. As a result, these groups reportedly have higher levels of political efficacy indicating their increased competence and confidence in influencing political decisions.

If quotas positively influence the electoral mobilization of underrepresented groups and bridge many gaps in political representation and participation, then a logical question is: how do privileged groups react to quotas? What is the effect of quotas on the political engagement of privileged groups? I develop an intuitive theoretical framework for explaining the linkage between electoral quotas to political participation.

Building on contextual cue theory (Bobo and Gilliam 1990), this theoretical framework posits that quotas provide distinct cues to different social groups, thereby affecting their political engagement based on their perceptions, and attitudes towards traditionally subordinate groups. I theorize that while electoral quotas may enhance political participation and efficacy among underrepresented groups, they may simultaneously undermine the political engagement of dominant groups. This framework acknowledges the intersectionality of identities and oppression, suggesting that individuals' political engagement may be influenced by overlapping identity traits and societal hierarchies.

Exposure Effect of Quotas on Underrepresented Groups

Political participation among underrepresented groups is a function of individual-level factors and sociopolitical dynamics. Previous studies have highlighted various reasons contributing to women's lower political ambition and reluctance to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2004). Factors such as socialization during upbringing, limited resources due to lower labor market participation, and traditional household divisions of labor all contribute to women's limited exposure to politics, resulting in lower levels of political participation.

The introduction of quotas signifies a significant opening in political processes for marginalized groups. It signals to underrepresented groups that their voices have a greater chance of being heard (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012). This increase in political opportunities can reshape views about the political system, suggesting that politics is not solely the domain of dominant

men. Such a shift in perception has implications for political efficacy (Atkeson 2003; Kim 2019; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Additionally, politicians from underrepresented groups are likely to mobilize party activists and voters from their communities (Goyal 2020). Underrepresented groups prefer to contact representatives who share similar descriptive traits (Banducci, Donovan and Karp 2004; Broockman 2014). All these factors have implications for political behavior. For instance, (Bobo and Gilliam 1990) found that higher levels of Black representation in positions of political power corresponded to increased political engagement, trust, efficacy, and knowledge among Black individuals. Similar effects were observed among African Americans and Latinos, who showed higher levels of voting when they perceived greater representation of their group in positions of power (Rocha et al. 2010). Similarly, the election of women has been linked to increased political knowledge and interest among women voters (Burns, Schlozman and Verba 1997). Moreover, following Pitkin (1967**b**), some scholars have found positive linkages between increased descriptive representation the substantive representation. Research indicates that women politicians often prioritize women's issues such as health, education, social welfare, and women's rights. Similarly, policy outcomes for Black communities tend to improve with increased Black representation in government (Owens 2005). Taking all of these factors as a whole, the overall expectation is that the introduction of electoral quotas improves the political participation of groups receiving the benefits of quotas.

H_1: Political participation of underprivileged groups increases with the exposure to quotas.

Exposure Effect of Quotas on Dominant Groups

There are compelling reasons to expect differential responses to quotas between dominant and under-represented groups. For example, the literature on descriptive representation has found that the higher the levels of blacks in positions of power, the lower the levels of political knowledge among whites (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Similarly, research shows that blacks' descriptive representation depresses the political participation of whites (Gay 2001). Observational evidence from

India's state-level elections similarly suggests that the descriptive representation of historically marginalized communities correlates with reduced overall electoral engagement (Jensenius 2017, p. 143). Similarly, while women's political participation improves when more women occupy political positions (Parthasarathy, Rao and Palaniswamy 2019; Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007), men's political engagement reduces (Deininger et al. 2015; Brulé 2020, p. 153). The study by Wolak (2015) conducted in the US context, where there are no gender or ethnic quotas, reveals that men are less likely to engage in politics when their party nominates a woman as a congressional candidate. These findings collectively suggest that the representation of underrepresented groups may dampen the political engagement of dominant groups.

Several factors may influence the political behavior of dominant groups in response to quotas. Research indicates that voters often evaluate political candidates based on identity traits to judge their perceived competence (Dolan and Lynch 2014). By allowing women and minorities entry into political competition through quotas, voters may perceive that 'deserving' candidates are artificially restricted from entering the candidate pool. This perception may be more pronounced in the context of reserved seats where only underrepresented groups compete against each other. Thus, voters may perceive the overall candidate pool as inferior, incompetent, anti-meritocratic, and undeserving of holding positions of power. Duflo (2005) finds that reservations place less educated and less experienced in political positions, even though their presence does not adversely affect the quality of public goods and services. Further, shifting standards theory explains that voters hold different and higher standards to evaluate women candidates (Schneider and Bos 2019).

While women and minorities face identity-based stereotypes, the label of being a 'quota beneficiary' may further perpetuate perceptions of incompetence among quota candidates (Nanivadekar 2006). The literature on affirmative action in education also shows that the students admitted through affirmative action are perceived as incompetent despite no significant differences in academic effort post-admission (Deshpande 2019). Thus, quota beneficiaries can be perceived as 'low quality' who would not have been in political positions if not for quotas. Quota beneficiaries face such attitudes not only from citizens but also from their peers. For instance, quota representatives

are less likely to receive recognition in the Ugandan parliament than non-quota beneficiaries including both male and female counterparts (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang 2014). If voters perceive that quotas bring in low-quality candidates, they may feel less inclined to participate in electoral politics, i.e., their voting proportion may decline in the presence of gender and minority quotas.

Dominant groups may perceive quota candidates as inclined to favor their own groups in policy-making, leading to decreased motivation to participate in elections. For instance, women politicians are often perceived as prioritizing women's interests (Childs 2002). Similarly, research in rural India suggests that female politicians tend to prioritize issues such as water provisions, which disproportionately affect women constituents (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004**a**). This phenomenon extends to ethnic quotas, where leaders from minority ethnic groups are more likely to advocate for policies benefiting their own communities (Besley, Pande and Rao 2007; Pande 2003). These perceptions about politicians may be exacerbated in contexts of clientelism and patronage, where politicians have incentives to allocate resources based on group affiliations (Franck and Rainer 2012). Ethnic favoritism further reinforces this dynamic, wherein individuals from certain ethnic groups receive preferential treatment in resource distribution (Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson 2018). Consequently, voters from dominant groups may become disillusioned with electoral politics in the presence of quotas and exhibit decreased turnout during elections.

Voters negatively perceive inclusive institutions due to prevalent biases and stereotypes against women and minorities. Existing research shows that stereotypes are sticky and persisting shaping individuals' behaviors per perceived social norms (Allport, Clark and Pettigrew 1954). According to social role theory, individuals exhibit a preference for men in leadership positions than women (Schneider and Bos 2019). In-group bias and gendered stereotypes influence voters' evaluation of political candidates (Sanbonmatsu 2002). In such a context, the political representation of women and minority candidates can be seen as violating prevailing social norms. As a result, voters penalize women seeking higher political positions (Okimoto and Brescoll 2010). Studies have shown that men are less supportive of women politicians compared to women themselves (Kerevel and Atkeson 2015). Additionally, men's support of gender quotas tends to be lower than that of

women (Bos 2017; Barnes 2016). Negative stereotypes can persist even in the presence of new information such as observing members of underrepresented groups in positions of power (Chauchard 2014). Therefore, voters may have unfavorable attitudes towards electoral quotas not because of the quality of political candidates and representatives, but because of their inherent biases and stereotypes against women and minority groups (Peyton and Huber 2021).

Individuals belonging to dominant groups often exhibit reluctance to support inclusive institutions, perceiving themselves as the rightful holders of power. Placing historically excluded groups in political positions may symbolize empowerment for these groups, but is viewed as threatening by dominant groups. This perception stems from the belief that political power operates as a zero-sum game, where the dominance of one group diminishes in the presence of inclusive institutions, leading to reduced engagement with such institutions (Kanthak and Krause 2012). For example, women leaders frequently encounter backlash from men who feel threatened by women assuming influential positions (Gangadharan et al. 2016). Women often face backlash on multiple fronts, including from family, community members, and fellow politicians (Burnet 2011; Berry, Bouka and Kamuru 2021). Research by Shiran (2024) in the Sub-Saharan context suggests that gender quotas can provoke a backlash against women, especially when implemented in the form of reserved seats. Moreover, these perceptions can escalate into hostile interactions within communities, as evidenced by studies showing increased violence against minorities when their economic well-being improves (Mosse 2018).

Based on these reasons, I expect that dominant groups' political engagement will reduce with the exposure to quotas.

H_2: Political participation of privileged groups decreases with the exposure to quotas.

4.3 Research Design

In 2023, I administered an individual-level survey across 89 villages in the North Indian states of Haryana and Rajasthan. These villages were carefully chosen from the bordering districts of Haryana and Rajasthan to leverage the variance in the proportion of seats reserved for women

in these two states while controlling for other confounding factors. It is worth noting that the determination of the proportion of seats reserved for women falls under the jurisdiction of state governments. In Rajasthan, 50% of all local government seats have been reserved for women since 2009, whereas in Haryana, this proportion stands at 33%. In Haryana and Rajasthan, the population share of SC is 20.17% and 17.83% respectively. While there is no ST population in Haryana, the population share of STs in Rajasthan is 13.48%.

Each of the 89 villages was surveyed by randomly selecting approximately 22-23 households. Any individual in the house of age 18 years and above available for the interview was selected. Thus, the survey team interviewed 1,989 respondents. The survey team comprised both male and female enumerators. To address gender-specific concerns and to remain consistent with prevalent gender norms, female enumerators interviewed female respondents, while male enumerators engaged with male respondents. The surveys were conducted in the Hindi language using Android devices. To mitigate social desirability bias and enable illiterate respondents to participate in the survey, treatment and post-treatment questions was designed in an audio format. Respondents could hear the question or statements in the audio form and indicate their responses using emojis, as depicted in Figure 4.1.[2]

Figure 4.1: An illustration of answer options in the survey

At the beginning of the survey, respondents answered a series of questions pertaining to

[2] Respondents were first given two practice questions in the audio format to make them understand how to answer questions using emojis on a tablet. The first question was, "Now you will listen to some questions and answer them based on what you think or feel. For example, if you are asked 'Drug consumption is injurious to health,' which of the following will you say?" Respondents were then shown the emojis illustrated in Figure 4.1. The interviewers continued, "Now let's do another one, 'A teacher makes a huge contribution to the future of a child?'"

political interest, knowledge, and participation. Subsequently, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the following five groups:

"**Treatment 1: Unreserved seats**": As per the reservation policy, some sarpanch-level (village council head) seats are reserved based on gender and/or caste. Imagine that in upcoming sarpanch-level elections, your village is unreserved in the next election cycle, i.e. anyone can contest for the sarpanch seat.

"**Treatment 2: Seats reserved for women**": As per the reservation policy, some sarpanch-level (village council head) seats are reserved based on gender and/or caste. Imagine that in upcoming sarpanch-level elections, your village is reserved for women in the next election cycle, i.e. only women can contest for the sarpanch seat.

"**Treatment 3: Seats reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs)**": As per the reservation policy, some sarpanch-level (village council head) seats are reserved based on gender and/or caste. Imagine that in upcoming sarpanch-level elections, your village is reserved for Scheduled Castes in the next election cycle, i.e. only people from Scheduled Castes can contest for the sarpanch seat.

"**Treatment 4: Seats reserved for women belonging to SC groups**": As per the reservation policy, some sarpanch-level (village council head) seats are reserved based on gender and/or caste. Imagine that in upcoming sarpanch-level elections, your village is reserved for women from Scheduled Castes in the next election cycle, i.e. only women from Scheduled Castes can contest for the sarpanch seat.

Control: No information about reservations. They are simply asked to think about upcoming sarpanch-level elections.

Following this, respondents were asked: "If local elections are to be held now, which of the following would you do as an eligible voter of [an unreserved village/a village reserved for women/reserved for SCs/reserved for SC women]? Respondents were to answer eight questions on a five-point Likert scale from 1 being the most likely to 5 being the least likely. These questions included a battery of indicators related to electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation. 1. vote in the upcoming elections, 2. participate in a political rally, 3. campaign for a candidate,

4. encourage someone to contest local elections, 5. attend a public meeting, 6. donate or collect money from others for a political candidate, 7. organize or participate in a social media group, 8. educate others or share political developments with others either online or offline.

For the analysis, I initially adjusted the scale to improve the intuitiveness of responses, where 1 represents the least likely action and 5 represents the most likely action. I then computed an average of the first four indicators to establish an electoral participation index. Likewise, I averaged the last four indicators to create a non-electoral participation index. Additionally, I formulated a political participation index by incorporating all eight indicators mentioned above.

After responding to the questions on political participation, respondents proceeded to answer a series of attitudinal questions reflecting their attitudes towards women and SCs.

4.4 Analysis and Results

To estimate the impact of quota exposure on political participation, I estimate the individual-level intent-to-treat (ITT) effect of treatments by comparing respondents in each treatment category to those in the control condition:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Unreserved_{ij} + \beta_2 Womenreserved_{ij} + \beta_3 SCreserved_{ij} + \beta_4 SCandwomenreserved_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Where Y_{ij} represents the outcome of interest for individual i in state j. The coefficient β_1 corresponds to respondents who received treatment 1, indicating their village is unreserved in the upcoming elections. Similarly, β_2 is the coefficient for respondents in treatment 2, representing seats reserved for women. β_3 signifies the coefficient for treatment 3, denoting seats reserved for SCs. β_4 represents the coefficient for treatment 4, which pertains to seats reserved for SC women. The constant term β_0 reflects the coefficient for the control group. The error term ϵ_i captures unexplained variability in the model. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.

I first present the results for all respondents, followed by a disaggregation of these results by gender. Subsequently, I further categorize respondents into four groups: dominant men and women, those belonging to Forward caste or Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and non-dominant

men and women belonging to SC and ST groups. It is important to note that while OBCs are disadvantaged socially and economically in many parts of India, this is not the case in the rural areas of Rajasthan and Haryana. In these regions, OBCs predominantly comprise farming communities and hold significant social, economic, and cultural influence.

When comparing treatment groups with the control group regarding outcome variables of political participation, as illustrated in Table 4.1, it becomes apparent that political participation increases when respondents are informed about their village being reserved for either women, SCs, or SC women. Quantifying these findings for the political participation indicator in model 3 of Table 4.1, exposure to information on women's reservations elevates political participation from 2.83 to 3.028 on a five-point scale, equating to a seven percent increase compared to the control group. For seats reserved for either SCs or SC women, a relatively smaller increase of 4.5 percent in political participation is observed. Although a similar effect size is noted for seats reserved for SC women compared to the control group, the relationship is weakly statistically significant at p 0.1.

Table 4.1: Effect of treatments on political participation compared to the control group

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.071	0.108	0.089
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Women reserved	0.179**	0.217**	0.198***
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.058)
SC reserved	0.060	0.199**	0.129*
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.064)
SC+women reserved	0.095	0.162*	0.129+
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Constant	3.266***	2.394***	2.830***
	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.047)
Observations	1,989	1,989	1,989
R^2	0.003	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.003	0.002
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses.		
	Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.		

Upon segregating the results for women and men respondents, it becomes evident that these

findings are primarily driven by women, as depicted in Table 4.2. Exposure to women's reservations boosts political participation by 10 percent compared to the control group that does not receive any information. Conversely, men's inclination to participate in politics remains largely unchanged when exposed to quota information (Table 4.3), except for a weak statistical significance observed in comparing men's non-electoral participation in SC reserved seats to the control group, as indicated in model 2 of Table 4.3.

Table 4.2: Effect of treatments on political participation compared to the control group for women respondents

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.089	0.180^{+}	0.135
	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.092)
Women reserved	0.245^{*}	0.328^{***}	0.286^{***}
	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.086)
SC reserved	0.114	0.223^{*}	0.168^{+}
	(0.105)	(0.108)	(0.096)
SC+women reserved	0.197^{+}	0.318^{*}	0.258^{*}
	(0.107)	(0.133)	(0.111)
Constant	3.267^{***}	2.364^{***}	2.815^{***}
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.071)
Observations	986	986	986
R^2	0.007	0.009	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.005	0.005
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses.		
	Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.		

To further refine my analysis, I delve into the political participation of dominant men, dominant women, non-dominant men, and non-dominant women. For dominant men, I find a negative, albeit weakly statistically significant effect (p0.1) on electoral participation in reserved seats for SC women compared to the control group (Model 1 in Table 4.4). Conversely, for dominant women, the inclination towards political participation increases by 8.6 percent in seats reserved for women compared to the control group, although the relationship only achieves significance at p0.1 (Model 3 in Table 4.5). Similarly, non-dominant women also exhibit heightened political participation, with an increase of 8.3 percent observed in seats reserved for women compared to the control group

Table 4.3: Effect of treatments on political participation compared to the control group on male respondents

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.052	0.037	0.045
	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.093)
Women reserved	0.110	0.108	0.109
	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.087)
SC reserved	0.005	0.179^{+}	0.092
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.091)
SC+women reserved	-0.0001	0.017	0.009
	(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.103)
Constant	3.265***	2.420***	2.843***
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.070)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003
R^2	0.002	0.004	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	0.0004	-0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.

Table 4.4: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the control group on political participation on dominant men

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.104	0.034	0.069
	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.100)
Women reserved	0.032	0.007	0.020
	(0.129)	(0.120)	(0.113)
SC reserved	-0.082	0.015	-0.034
	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.109)
SC+women reserved	-0.228^{+}	-0.155	-0.191
	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.118)
Constant	3.252***	2.479***	2.866***
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.079)
Observations	657	657	657
R^2	0.010	0.005	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.004	-0.001	0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.

Table 4.5: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the control group on political participation for dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.064	0.104	0.084
	(0.122)	(0.145)	(0.121)
Women reserved	0.242^{+}	0.229^{+}	0.235^{+}
	(0.137)	(0.135)	(0.124)
SC reserved	0.063	0.136	0.099
	(0.120)	(0.132)	(0.113)
SC+women reserved	0.143	0.135	0.139
	(0.135)	(0.170)	(0.138)
Constant	3.146^{***}	2.280^{***}	2.713^{***}
	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.084)
Observations	604	604	604
R^2	0.007	0.004	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	-0.003	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.

Table 4.6: Effect of treatments compared to the control group on political participation for non-dominant men

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	-0.119	0.055	-0.032
	(0.218)	(0.206)	(0.191)
Women reserved	0.183	0.275	0.229
	(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.155)
SC reserved	0.155	0.489^{**}	0.322^{*}
	(0.187)	(0.181)	(0.164)
SC+women reserved	0.398^{+}	0.339^{+}	0.369^{*}
	(0.210)	(0.205)	(0.185)
Constant	3.320^{***}	2.338^{***}	2.829^{***}
	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.130)
Observations	332	332	332
R^2	0.024	0.030	0.028
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.018	0.016

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 4.7: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the control group on political participation for non-dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.093	0.329	0.211
	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.195)
Women reserved	0.319^{+}	0.633^{**}	0.476^{**}
	(0.175)	(0.201)	(0.167)
SC reserved	0.228	0.450^{*}	0.339^{+}
	(0.204)	(0.192)	(0.173)
SC+women reserved	0.278	0.605^{**}	0.441^{*}
	(0.185)	(0.231)	(0.192)
Constant	3.472^{***}	2.454^{***}	2.963^{***}
	(0.142)	(0.172)	(0.143)
Observations	347	347	347
R^2	0.012	0.032	0.025
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.021	0.014

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.

(Model 3 in Table 4.7). Non-dominant men, on the other hand, display higher levels of political participation in reserved seats for SCs as well as for SC women, as depicted in Table 8.30. Overall, these results suggest that exposure to quota information enhances the political participation of quota-receiving groups.

Is it the policy or the policy implementation?

To disentangle the effects observed in the results, it is essential to examine which component of the vignette drives these outcomes. Recall that the vignette comprises two key pieces of information: 1. Information about the existence of quotas, and 2. Information about the reservation status of respondents' villages for the upcoming elections. While all treatments provide the same first piece of information, the second piece varies. Therefore, this design aids in identifying not only the conventional effect size between the treatment and the control group but also how respondents react to seats reserved for women and ethnic minorities compared to unreserved seats. To disaggregate

these effects, I estimate the individual-level intent-to-treat (ITT) effect by comparing respondents in the unreserved category to respondents in other treatment conditions as follows:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Womenreserved_{ij} + \beta_2 SCreserved_{ij} + \beta_3 SCandwomenreserved_{ij} + \beta_4 Control_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Where Y_{ij} represents the outcome of interest for individual i in the state j. The constant term, β_0 signifies the coefficient for the unreserved group. β_1 represents the coefficient for respondents who received treatment with seats reserved for women, while β_2 is the coefficient for respondents in treatment 3, corresponding to seats reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs). β_4 signifies the control group. ϵ_{ij} represents an error term. As before, standard errors are clustered at the village level.

As depicted in Table 4.8, although the coefficients for political participation on reserved seats are positive, indicating an increase in political participation compared to unreserved seats, only the treatment of women's reservation is weakly statistically significant at p0.1. This suggests that respondents experience some positive impact due to the second piece of information, i.e., when their village seat is reserved for women, their political participation improves.

Upon disaggregating the results for sub-groups of respondents, it becomes evident that these findings are primarily driven by women, as illustrated in Table 4.9, although dominant women's political participation is statistically indistinguishable in reserved and unreserved seats (Table 4.12). Men's inclination to participate in politics remains statistically insignificant in reserved seats compared to unreserved seats, as shown in Table 4.10. However, dominant men respond negatively to reserved seats for SC women compared to unreserved seats, as indicated in Table 4.11. Their political participation decreases by 8.8 percent, driven by a decline in their electoral participation. Their electoral participation is reduced by seven percent comparing their electoral participation on SC+women reserved seats compared to the control group. But comparing the same effect for unreserved groups, their electoral participation drops by 9.89 percent. This suggests that this additional drop occurs as a result of them learning about their seat being reserved for SC women.

Non-dominant women demonstrate higher levels of political participation in reserved seats for women compared to unreserved seats (Table 4.14). This suggests that the second piece of informa-

Table 4.8: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.108	0.110	0.109^{+}
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.062)
SC reserved	-0.011	0.091	0.040
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.067)
SC+women reserved	0.024	0.054	0.039
	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.067)
Control	-0.071	-0.108	-0.089
	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Constant	3.337***	2.502***	2.919***
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.048)
Observations	1,989	1,989	1,989
R^2	0.003	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.003	0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the unreserved treatment.

Table 4.9: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for women respondents

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.156^{+}	0.147	0.152^{+}
	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.078)
SC reserved	0.025	0.043	0.034
	(0.088)	(0.107)	(0.090)
SC+women reserved	0.108	0.138	0.123
	(0.104)	(0.124)	(0.107)
Control	-0.089	-0.180^{+}	-0.135
	(0.098)	(0.105)	(0.092)
Constant	3.356***	2.544***	2.950***
	(0.072)	(0.077)	(0.068)
Observations	986	986	986
R^2	0.007	0.009	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.005	0.005

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the unreserved treatment.

Table 4.10: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for male respondents

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.058	0.071	0.064
	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.097)
SC reserved	-0.047	0.142	0.047
	(0.116)	(0.100)	(0.100)
SC+women reserved	-0.052	-0.020	-0.036
	(0.110)	(0.107)	(0.099)
Control	-0.052	-0.037	-0.045
	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.093)
Constant	3.317***	2.458***	2.887***
	(0.084)	(0.076)	(0.073)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,003
R^2	0.002	0.004	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.002	0.0004	-0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the unreserved treatment.

Table 4.11: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for dominant men

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	-0.073	-0.026	-0.049
	(0.141)	(0.115)	(0.117)
SC reserved	-0.186	-0.019	-0.103
	(0.130)	(0.112)	(0.111)
SC+women reserved	-0.332*	-0.188	-0.260*
	(0.130)	(0.119)	(0.114)
Control	-0.104	-0.034	-0.069
	(0.118)	(0.114)	(0.100)
Constant	3.356***	2.513***	2.935***
	(0.097)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Observations	657	657	657
R^2	0.010	0.005	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.004	-0.001	0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the unreserved treatment.

Table 4.12: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.177	0.125	0.151
	(0.124)	(0.123)	(0.115)
SC reserved	-0.001	0.032	0.015
	(0.111)	(0.140)	(0.116)
SC+women reserved	0.079	0.031	0.055
	(0.135)	(0.176)	(0.145)
Control	-0.064	-0.104	-0.084
	(0.122)	(0.145)	(0.121)
Constant	3.210***	2.384***	2.797***
	(0.090)	(0.112)	(0.094)
Observations	604	604	604
R^2	0.007	0.004	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	-0.003	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the unreserved treatment.

Table 4.13: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for non-dominant men

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.302	0.220	0.261
	(0.207)	(0.191)	(0.184)
SC reserved	0.274	0.435*	0.355+
	(0.218)	(0.202)	(0.195)
SC+women reserved	0.517*	0.285	0.401*
	(0.215)	(0.210)	(0.195)
Control	0.119	-0.055	0.032
	(0.218)	(0.206)	(0.191)
Constant	3.201***	2.393***	2.797***
	(0.154)	(0.139)	(0.134)
Observations	332	332	332
R^2	0.024	0.030	0.028
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.018	0.016

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 4.14: Effect of treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for non-dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.227	0.304^{+}	0.265^{+}
	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.142)
SC reserved	0.135	0.121	0.128
	(0.156)	(0.181)	(0.154)
SC+women reserved	0.185	0.276	0.231
	(0.174)	(0.181)	(0.166)
Control	-0.093	-0.329	-0.211
	(0.207)	(0.218)	(0.195)
Constant	3.565***	2.782***	3.174***
	(0.143)	(0.111)	(0.120)
Observations	347	347	347
R^2	0.012	0.032	0.025
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.021	0.014

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses
Constant reflects the coefficient for the control group.

tion in the vignette, indicating that their village would be reserved for women, yielded additional positive effects on political participation. Similarly, non-dominant men responded positively to the information about SC-reserved or SC women-reserved seats. Compared to unreserved seats, the SC reserved vignette increased their political participation by 12.7 percent, while the SC+women vignette positively improved their political participation by 14.3 percent. This contrasts with the control group, where the SC reserved vignette and SC women's vignette improved their political participation by 11.38 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Thus, the second piece of information leads to minor improvements in political participation for non-dominant men. Taken together, these results suggest that both dominant and non-dominant men's political participation is largely affected by the second piece of exposure i.e., they are less concerned about the overall policy environment and the presence of quotas in politics. But they are more concerned about the political power being in the hands of the out-group. Women, on the other hand, seem to be responding to the overall policy environment and their inclusion in politics through quotas.

Table 4.15: Effect of treatments on political efficacy compared to the control group

	Dependent variable: Political efficacy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All respondents	Dominant men	Non-dominant men	Dominant women	Non-dominant women
Unreserved	0.015	0.088	0.083	-0.060	-0.041
	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.146)	(0.076)	(0.094)
Women reserved	0.043	0.003	0.179	0.043	0.021
	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.119)	(0.078)	(0.101)
SC reserved	0.041	0.072	0.208^{+}	-0.004	-0.035
	(0.046)	(0.085)	(0.116)	(0.078)	(0.100)
SC + women reserved	0.004	-0.023	0.281^{*}	-0.136^{+}	0.046
	(0.048)	(0.090)	(0.129)	(0.071)	(0.114)
Constant	3.162^{***}	3.267^{***}	3.138^{***}	3.082^{***}	3.104^{***}
	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.096)	(0.054)	(0.077)
Observations	1,979	651	332	601	346
R^2	0.001	0.004	0.017	0.010	0.004
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.003	0.005	0.004	-0.008

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

I also investigate the effect of quota exposure on political efficacy, as this concept measures psychological dispositions on citizens' beliefs about their confidence in the systems and their belief about their impact on systems (Niemi, Craig and Mattei 1991). To measure political efficacy, I used the responses for the following questions on a five-point scale: 1. I think I am better informed about politics than most people in my village. 2. I consider myself to be well-qualified to participate in politics (such as voting or campaigning). 3. Public officials don't care much about what people like me think. 4. People like me don't have any say in what the local government does. 5. It is easy for me to approach local elected officials such as ward members and sarpanch. 6. Voting in local elections is very important for a thriving democracy like India.

Upon comparing the effect sizes for treatments with the control group, I find no discernible difference in political efficacy for dominant men. However, non-dominant men exhibit 6.6 percent and 8.95 percent higher levels of efficacy on both reserved seats for SCs and SC women, respectively, compared to the control group (Model 3 in Table 4.15). In contrast, dominant women demonstrate lower levels of political efficacy when they are informed about seats reserved for SC women, with a decrease of 4.4 percent. On the other hand, non-dominant women's political efficacy is statistically insignificant compared to the control group, although the effect sizes are negative for unreserved and SC reserved seats, and positive for seats reserved for women or SC women.

On comparing the effect sizes for reserved treatments with unreserved seats, I find that non-dominant men exhibit higher levels of political efficacy on seats reserved for SC+women, but not for SC reserved seats, as previously shown in comparison to the control group. This indicates that there is an additional effect of the second piece of information when respondents are informed about the seat being reserved for SC women. Furthermore, the political efficacy of dominant women is statistically insignificant on SC+women seats compared to unreserved seats. This implies that the negative effect observed on political efficacy in Model 4 of Table 4.15 is in relation to the first piece of information i.e. simply the information about the presence of electoral quotas reduces their political efficacy.

Table 4.16: Effect of reserved treatments on political efficacy compared to the unreserved treatment

	Dependent variable: Political efficacy				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	All respondents	Dominant men	Non-dominant men	Dominant women	Non-dominant women
Women reserved	0.028	-0.085	0.096	0.102	0.062
	(0.046)	(0.096)	(0.139)	(0.082)	(0.079)
SC reserved	0.026	-0.016	0.125	0.055	0.006
	(0.048)	(0.102)	(0.129)	(0.083)	(0.075)
SC + women reserved	-0.011	-0.111	0.198^{+}	-0.076	0.088
	(0.048)	(0.092)	(0.116)	(0.073)	(0.111)
Control	-0.015	-0.088	-0.083	0.060	0.041
	(0.048)	(0.086)	(0.134)	(0.076)	(0.094)
Constant	3.177***	3.355***	3.221***	3.022***	3.062***
	(0.036)	(0.072)	(0.099)	(0.058)	(0.059)
Observations	1,979	651	332	601	346
R^2	0.001	0.004	0.017	0.010	0.004
Adjusted R^2	-0.001	-0.003	0.005	0.004	-0.008

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 4.17: Effect of treatments on discriminatory attitudes compared to the control group

	Dependent variable:			
	Taste-based discrimination towards women	Statistical discrimination towards women	Taste-based discrimination towards SCs	Statistical discrimination towards SCs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Unreserved	-0.189^{+}	-0.053	-0.064	-0.012
	(0.102)	(0.071)	(0.145)	(0.090)
Women reserved	-0.062	-0.020	0.090	0.015
	(0.094)	(0.070)	(0.152)	(0.077)
SC reserved	-0.063	-0.080	0.236^{+}	0.099
	(0.097)	(0.064)	(0.137)	(0.078)
SC + women reserved	-0.047	-0.049	-0.028	-0.063
	(0.099)	(0.078)	(0.147)	(0.067)
Constant	3.121***	1.693***	1.023***	2.197***
	(0.070)	(0.047)	(0.141)	(0.051)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,261	1,261
Respondents	Male	Male	Dominant caste	Dominant caste
R^2	0.004	0.001	0.005	0.003
Adjusted R^2	-0.0001	-0.003	0.001	0.0003

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 4.18: Effect of reserved treatment on discriminatory attitudes compared to the unreserved treatment

	Dependent variable:			
	Taste-based discrimination towards women	Statistical discrimination towards women	Taste-based discrimination towards SCs	Statistical discrimination towards SCs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women reserved	0.127	0.034	0.154	0.028
	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.141)	(0.078)
SC reserved	0.126	-0.027	0.301*	0.111
	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.142)	(0.078)
SC + women reserved	0.142	0.004	0.036	-0.051
	(0.102)	(0.076)	(0.147)	(0.081)
Control	0.189+	0.053	0.064	0.012
	(0.099)	(0.074)	(0.144)	(0.080)
Constant	2.932***	1.639***	0.958***	2.184***
	(0.071)	(0.053)	(0.101)	(0.056)
Observations	1,003	1,003	1,261	1,261
Respondents	Male	Male	Dominant caste	Dominant caste
R^2	0.004	0.001	0.005	0.003
Adjusted R^2	-0.0001	-0.003	0.001	0.0003

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Role of Gender Quota Proportions

The research design of surveying respondents in the bordering areas of Rajasthan and Haryana allows us to examine whether treatment effects are conditional on respondents being exposed to different proportions of reserved seats for women. Recall that in Rajasthan since 2009, half of the seats in local councils including ward members and council heads are reserved for women, while in Haryana this proportion stands at one-third of the seats.

As shown in Table 4.19, the interaction between treatment and the state-level dummy variable indicates that political participation is higher in Rajasthan, particularly on seats reserved for SC women, compared to Haryana. This finding suggests that the gender quota policy in Rajasthan, where half of the seats in local councils are reserved for women, has a more pronounced impact on political participation among SC women compared to the one-third reservation policy in Haryana. These findings suggest that the higher levels of political participation in SC women-reserved seats in Rajasthan may be attributed to their increased exposure to quota provisions. In Rajasthan, half of the seats reserved for SCs are designated for women, leading to greater opportunities for quota exposure among SC women in comparison to other states. However, it is noteworthy that no other interaction variables are significant, indicating that there are no differential treatment effects between Rajasthan and Haryana for other treatments compared to the control group. Additionally, when comparing the treatment effects of reservations on unreserved seats, no significant differences are observed between Rajasthan and Haryana (Table 4.20).

Role of Discriminatory Attitudes

I delve deeper into examining whether discriminatory attitudes towards women among men and discriminatory attitudes of dominant group members towards SCs exacerbate quota exposure. Existing literature has mainly focused on two sources of prejudicial behavior — statistical discrimination and taste-based discrimination — as the drivers of inequality in political representation. Statistical discrimination is explained from a rational actor perspective that in the absence of

Table 4.19: Interactive effect of treatments and state-level factors on political participation

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	-0.0005	0.088	0.044
	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.087)
Women reserved	0.225**	0.287**	0.256***
	(0.082)	(0.092)	(0.071)
SC reserved	0.015	0.188^{+}	0.102
	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.085)
SC + women reserved	-0.008	0.044	0.018
	(0.109)	(0.102)	(0.092)
Rajasthan	-0.135	-0.296**	-0.216*
	(0.097)	(0.108)	(0.089)
Unreserved:Rajasthan	0.152	0.033	0.093
	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.121)
Women reserved:Rajasthan	-0.083	-0.121	-0.102
	(0.128)	(0.133)	(0.115)
SC reserved:Rajasthan	0.092	0.001	0.046
	(0.145)	(0.145)	(0.128)
SC + women reserved:Rajasthan	0.218	0.250^{+}	0.234^{+}
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.136)
Constant	3.330***	2.534***	2.932***
	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.064)
Observations	1,989	1,989	1,989
R^2	0.006	0.022	0.014
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.017	0.009
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		

complete information, people choose identity traits to make a rational decision to maximize their payoffs (Butler and Broockman 2011). Taste-based discrimination refers to the people's prejudices emanating from in-group and out-group biases (Becker 1957; Butler and Broockman 2011). [3] My conceptualization of taste-based discrimination differs from (Becker 1957)'s definition. He considers this in monetary terms as to what price one is willing to pay to maintain prejudiced distance towards others. I consider taste-based discrimination as a blatant form of prejudice. It could be costly to the decision-maker as this can result in losing out on competent and effective candidates.

Both these two categories could be masking multiple mechanisms. For instance, statistical discrimination can occur when people may either use identity-based attributes as a signal for competence or as a signal for policy positions. Similarly, taste-based discrimination can either be

[3] Though these both types eventually lead to the same result, some argue that statistical discrimination could not be categorized as discrimination as people may rely on identity traits as heuristic and reduce their cognitive overload in decision-making (Sanbonmatsu 2002). In this dissertation, I consider statistical discrimination as a form of discrimination.

Table 4.20: Interactive effect of reserved treatments and state-level factors on political participation compared to unreserved treatment

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.225**	0.199*	0.212**
	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.080)
SC reserved	0.016	0.100	0.058
	(0.101)	(0.097)	(0.093)
SC + women reserved	-0.008	-0.044	-0.026
	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.092)
Control	0.0005	-0.088	-0.044
	(0.094)	(0.104)	(0.087)
Rajasthan	0.017	-0.263**	-0.123
	(0.109)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Women reserved:Rajasthan	-0.235+	-0.154	-0.195
	(0.139)	(0.137)	(0.126)
SC reserved:Rajasthan	-0.060	-0.033	-0.047
	(0.143)	(0.142)	(0.132)
SC + women reserved:Rajasthan	0.066	0.216	0.141
	(0.139)	(0.154)	(0.133)
Control:Rajasthan	-0.152	-0.033	-0.093
	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.121)
Constant	3.329***	2.622***	2.975***
	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.066)
Observations	1,989	1,989	1,989
R^2	0.006	0.022	0.014
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.017	0.009
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		

subtle or explicit and the level of hostility towards out-group could be different.

Statistical discrimination arises when individuals make decisions based on inferred identity traits. To gauge statistical discriminatory attitudes, I assess individuals' perceptions of competence and policy provisions. For measuring statistical discriminatory attitudes towards women, respondents are asked the following questions: 1. Generally, the working style of a female leader is the same as that of a male leader. 2. When a woman becomes a sarpanch, she works for women constituents. Similarly, to evaluate statistical discrimination towards Scheduled Castes (SCs), the following questions are posed: 1. SC politicians are as qualified as General caste politicians. 2. SCs perform as well as any other *sarpanch*.

To measure taste-based discrimination towards women, I analyze respondents' responses to the following five questions, rated on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree: 1. A man's job is to earn money, while a woman's job is to take care of home and family. 2. Women

are less interested in politics by nature. 3. If some women gain political power, other women pay the price. 4. If a woman earns more than a man, she will almost certainly encounter problems. 5. It is detrimental to the social system to have women in positions of political power. It's worth noting that the first two questions indicate respondents' attitudes towards prevalent sexist social norms or subtle sexism, while the last three questions reflect backlash or hostile attitudes towards women.

I measure taste-based discriminatory attitudes towards SCs using the following questions: 1. Caste hierarchy is there for a reason and General caste groups, by nature, are superior. 2. Overall, if the individual from Scheduled Caste do not remain within their purview, the results will not be good. 3. SC are increasingly demanding more political power. 4. SC holding political positions is a threat to the social fabric. The first question reflects respondents' attitudes towards prevalent social norms, while the remaining three questions indicate backlash or hostile attitudes towards SCs. Additionally, questions capturing hostile behavior towards SCs were exclusively directed toward respondents from dominant groups. I re-scaled all the answers so that higher values reflect higher levels of discriminatory attitudes.

Based on the findings presented in Table 4.17, taste-based discrimination towards women remains unchanged among men when exposed to gender quotas. Surprisingly, however, taste-based discrimination diminishes on unreserved seats compared to the control group. Conversely, taste-based discrimination towards SCs intensifies among dominant groups upon receiving information about quotas, showing a 23 percent increase compared to the control group. Moreover, when examining the levels of taste-based discrimination towards SCs in Table 4.18, it is revealed that dominant groups experience a 31 percent increase in taste-based discrimination when exposed to the SC reserved vignette compared to unreserved seats. These results suggest that informing dominant groups about the reservation of their village seat for SCs leads to a rise in taste-based discrimination. Notably, no statistically significant effects are observed on statistical discrimination towards women or SCs.

I further investigate the moderating effects of discrimination and quota exposure on political



Figure 4.2: Moderating effect of statistical-based discriminatory attitudes towards women and vignette treatments on political participation among men



Figure 4.3: Moderating effect of statistical-based discriminatory attitudes towards women and vignette treatments on political participation among men

participation. Notably, higher levels of taste-based discrimination towards women exhibit the most pronounced effect on political participation among men when they are exposed to the treatment for



Figure 4.4: Moderating effect of taste-based discriminatory attitudes towards SCs and vignette treatments on political participation among dominant groups



Figure 4.5: Moderating effect of statistical-based discriminatory attitudes towards SCs and vignette treatments on political participation among dominant groups

SC women (Figure 4.2). Conversely, statistical discrimination towards women yields an opposite effect (Figure 4.3), where political participation among men increases on seats reserved for either

women or specifically for SC women when they perceive that women are as competent as men and prioritize policies for women constituents. Additionally, taste-based discrimination towards SCs among dominant groups has the most negative effect on political participation in SC women's reserved seats (Figure 4.4). Conversely, higher levels of statistical discrimination reduce political participation upon receiving the vignette about SC reserved seats, although these effects are not statistically significant compared to those who exhibit lower levels of statistical discrimination (Figure 4.5).

4.5 Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I empirically investigate the causal effect of electoral quotas in rural council elections on political engagement. This analysis reveals the mobilizing effects of quotas, with positive mobilization observed among groups benefiting from quotas and negative mobilization among dominant men. Exposure to electoral quotas reduces political participation among dominant groups, while simultaneously increasing the political engagement of quota benefitting groups. Moreover, exposure to quotas can exacerbate discriminatory attitudes among dominant groups, which, in conjunction with quota exposure, influences political participation. Overall, these results contribute to the contextual cue theory in the literature, highlighting that electoral quotas cue mass opinion based on individuals' positions in ranked societies.

These findings broaden our understanding of quota impacts and shed light on the dynamics between quota exposure, discriminatory attitudes, and political participation. My analysis focuses on taste-based and statistical discrimination towards women and SCs, examining their effects on political engagement in the context of quota exposure. Notably, taste-based discrimination towards SCs worsened among dominant groups with quota exposure, indicating a reinforcement of discriminatory attitudes in response to quota implementation. Further, these attitudes interact with quotas to shape political participation. These results also highlight the role of intersectionality in studying intergroup attitudes and behaviors as higher levels of distaste towards SCs have the highest negative effect on SC-reserved seats in reducing the political participation of dominant groups.

More generally, this research holds implications in the fields of political equality and democratic representation. As Verba (2003) argues disadvantaged groups are less likely to be resourceful and politically efficacious to participate in politics. In exploring factors that can increase their motivation to participate in politics, Verba does not take into account the role of quotas and the political representation of disadvantaged groups. These findings highlight one mechanism to improve political participation is through quotas. Furthermore, these findings underscore the enduring impact of quotas on ethnic minorities, who have benefited from quota policies for over seven decades. Contrary to previous suggestions that political involvement among minority groups may decline once they achieve representation (Tate 1991), the results indicate that our hypothetical treatment vignette has been instrumental in increasing political engagement among these communities. However, this political mobilization is at the expense of elite groups as I find the erosion of dominant groups' political participation.

These findings highlight difficulties in balancing descriptive representation and political participation of dominant groups and underscore the importance of addressing deeply ingrained biases within dominant groups to ensure the effectiveness of affirmative action policies. Moreover, these patterns indicate the cyclical nature of discrimination. Underrepresented groups are unlikely to progress in their career because of multi-step discrimination faced by them from voters as well as from party selectorate; such systemic exclusion necessitates affirmative action which can further exacerbate distaste towards quota-receiving groups. Furthermore, these findings underscore the significance of intersectionality, as they reveal divergent responses among dominant men and women. Similarly, the impacts of quotas on political participation varied between dominant women and non-dominant women. These results highlight the importance of strategies to combat discrimination within society. Efforts aimed at mitigating discriminatory attitudes, particularly those rooted in gender and caste, are crucial for fostering an inclusive political environment and facilitating a meaningful participation of all segments of society.

The results from this study raise many questions for future research. First, it appears that the procedural context can have a conditional effect in shaping the impact of quotas on political en-

gagement. Speculatively, the implementation of quotas within proportional representation systems might mitigate the adverse effects of political involvement of dominant groups, unlike in plurality electoral systems as PR systems are often argued to be more conducive to diversity representation (Skorge 2023) unlike in plurality electoral systems. Similarly, quota design also matters. As (Htun 2016, p. 73) writes, candidate quotas are not as threatening to elites, at the same time, they are accommodating of diversity in representation. Hence, future research could explore the variations in quota designs and their repercussions on political behavior. Second, this study solely focused on gauging self-reported measures for measuring discriminatory attitudes, potentially leading to conservative estimates in the results (Mo 2015). We can also benefit from learning more about the role of implicit attitudes and examining behavioral measures over attitudinal ones when exploring these questions. Third, delving into the factors elucidating the impacts of quotas on political participation among dominant groups could be illuminating. For instance, individuals acknowledging the existence of gender or caste-based discrimination may exhibit differing responses to political quotas, potentially maintaining or even increasing their engagement. Fourth, it remains to be seen how the information about partisanship interacts with quota context in affecting the vote choice of dominant groups. By incorporating such dimensions, researchers can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex interplay between quota exposure, discriminatory attitudes, and political participation. Fifth, these results demonstrate that while women's political participation increases when they receive information about the presence of quotas in politics, men's political participation hinges on whether the political power will be with the in-group or out-group. This will be a fruitful research avenue to examine the kinds of threats they perceive when political power goes to out-groups (Thompson 2023).

If political representation of underrepresented groups were to be strengthened without the exogenous intervention of quotas, we might still anticipate a similar decline in political participation among dominant groups. While future research could delve deeper into this question, existing literature provides many examples illustrating disengagement, disempowerment, and hostility towards underrepresented groups whenever they make gains economically or politically (Gay

2001; Mosse 2018). This indicates that negative attitudes towards underrepresented groups are deeply entrenched and may persist regardless of the mechanisms by which marginalized groups are empowered. Thus, it seems unlikely that the response of dominant groups towards the political empowerment of underrepresented groups would differ significantly in the absence of quotas. This research, thus, calls for future research to find interventions that best target dominant groups' attitudes toward the empowerment of marginalized groups.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have explored various aspects of quota implementation (or lack thereof) by focusing on the Indian experience of gender and ethnic quotas. At the heart of this empirical investigation lies the recognition of quotas as critical instruments for addressing historical and systemic inequalities in political representation. Quotas serve as indispensable tools for amplifying the voices of marginalized communities, including women, Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs). By mandating reserved seats in legislative bodies and local governments, quotas create avenues for underrepresented groups to access positions of power and influence decision-making processes. Moreover, quotas play a vital role in fostering inclusive governance, ensuring that diverse perspectives and experiences are reflected in policy deliberations and outcomes.

By empirically investigating the consequences of inequitable political representation and the role of quotas in remedying such disparities, this research offers valuable insights that extend beyond the specific context of India, informing broader discussions on social justice, equal representation, and inclusive governance worldwide.

A central finding of this dissertation is that the over-representation of men in legislative bodies is detrimental to the adequate representation of women's policy concerns. The analysis of parliamentary questions posed by Indian Members of Parliament over two decades revealed a striking pattern: women's issues received scant attention in legislative discourse. This underscores the grave implications of male-dominated legislatures, where women's priorities and perspectives are likely to be overlooked or marginalized. Consequently, a gender-balanced legislature is imperative

to ensure that women's voices are heard and their policy needs are given due consideration.

My research also demonstrated that well-designed quotas coupled with facilitative institutional context can yield an equitable effect on fostering the career progression of women from various subgroups. By analyzing four decades of state-level election data in India, the research revealed that local-level gender quotas had a positive spillover effect on the career progression of women at higher levels of government. Notably, women from traditionally disadvantaged communities, such as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), benefited significantly from the presence of caste quotas at higher levels. This finding underscores the importance of an intersectional approach in designing institutional reforms, ensuring that the benefits of quotas are distributed equitably among various subgroups of women.

While quotas are effective in enhancing numerical representation, their impact extends far beyond mere statistical gains. This research has uncovered the asymmetric effects of quotas on political behavior, with quotas leading to increased political participation and efficacy among women, SCs, and STs, while simultaneously resulting in reduced political engagement among dominant groups. These findings shed light on the unintended consequences of quotas, prompting further reflection on their broader societal implications. Alarmingly, my research revealed that exposure to quotas was associated with higher levels of discriminatory attitudes held by dominant groups towards women and SCs. This backlash and resistance from groups that stand to lose from quotas underscore the deeply ingrained nature of societal hierarchies and the limited role of quotas in dismantling entrenched power structures.

While quota implementation fosters inclusive political representation for underprivileged groups, like other progressive policy tools, this presents its own set of challenges. Central to a vibrant democracy is the mobilization of citizens for political engagement. However, the introduction of quotas may inadvertently provoke resistance and backlash from dominant groups. It is imperative to recognize and address any group-level systematic decline in political participation, as it carries significant implications for policy legitimacy and democratic integrity.

The nuanced insights derived from this dissertation shed light on the complex dynamics be-

tween quotas and political engagement in hierarchical societies, offering valuable implications for policymakers, practitioners, and advocates committed to fostering inclusive governance and social justice. These findings underscore the role of interventions such as quotas in addressing persistent gaps in political inequality. Without such measures, it is unlikely that meaningful progress toward equitable representation can be achieved. While quotas have demonstrated the potential to empower marginalized communities, they may inadvertently contribute to the demobilization of dominant groups from political participation and exacerbate discriminatory attitudes toward beneficiaries of quotas. This underscores the imperative for complementary interventions aimed at mitigating these adverse effects and fostering constructive intergroup relations. The empowerment experienced by marginalized communities through quotas must be balanced with efforts to minimize any disempowerment experienced by dominant groups, thus promoting harmony and inclusion in the political landscape.

Directions for Future Research

As I conclude my dissertation, it is evident that while a rich body of work has informed our understanding of quotas, many questions remain for further exploration and inquiry. The insights from my dissertation lay the groundwork for future investigations to further deepen our understanding of this field. Below, I outline some key questions for future research endeavors:

The insights presented in Chapter 2 lay a foundational framework for future scholars interested in exploring the effects of women's reservations in legislatures. While my research shows gendered trends in legislative behavior within the national parliament, there remains a need to investigate whether similar patterns exist at the state level. Additionally, this study does not delve deeply into the underlying motivations driving the questions posed by legislators. Is the frequency and content of these questions influenced primarily by constituency-level dynamics, or are they reflective of the legislators' interests and priorities? Moreover, given that women from underrepresented groups are shown to be the most active questioners, a more detailed analysis of legislators' activities could offer insights into the varying levels of engagement among different sub-groups of

women on women-centric issues. Thus, further exploration at a granular level is essential to understanding the complex factors shaping women's participation in legislative processes and informing future policy interventions aimed at promoting gender equality in political representation.

Building on the insights from Chapter 3, it becomes apparent that quotas at the local political office can act as a mechanism for upward mobility, facilitating the rise of leaders from marginalized communities to positions of higher authority. The equitable effects of gender quotas on the upward mobility of various sub-groups of women underscore the potential of quotas to foster inclusive political systems. However, further investigation is needed to understand the mechanisms driving this upward mobility. Is it primarily due to increased exposure to quotas, or do quota beneficiaries leverage their political experience to successfully contest higher-order elections? Additionally, an exploration into how party elites and voters perceive candidates who have benefited from quotas in contesting elections is crucial. Furthermore, given the distinct context of electioneering at the local level compared to the state level, it remains to be seen which politicians transition from local politics to higher echelons of leadership. These questions open avenues for future research to delve deeper into the dynamics of quota implementation and its sustainable effects on political representation and participation showing that women from underprivileged backgrounds are more likely to contest elections on reserved seats for their ethnic groups. It is unclear as to why that is the case. (Jensenius 2016) hints that the party elite find it easier to replace non-dominant men in favor of diversity. Future research can disentangle the factors in this direction.

While quotas hold promise as tools for democratic state-building, it is imperative to delve deeper into their legitimacy, overall acceptance, and their effects on intergroup relations. As discussed in Chapter 4, quotas can induce demobilization among dominant groups, highlighting the need for a comprehensive understanding of their impact. While reserved seats offer a strong case for assessing the role of discrimination in shaping the effects of quotas on political behavior, further exploration can help ascertain if similar dynamics prevail across different quota designs. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether worsening discriminatory attitudes towards quota-receiving groups are unique to reserved seats as opposed to other candidate quotas. I speculate that the pronounced

effects may be unique to the reserved seats context, where competition at the candidate level is restricted in favor of quota-receiving groups, which may contribute to a sense of alienation among citizens who find their preferred candidates marginalized from the electoral arena. This is in contrast to the candidate quotas where quotas are designed at the party level as opposed to the seat level in case of reserved seats. Consequently, examining these phenomena within the context of candidate quotas could yield valuable insights into the broader implications of quota implementation. Furthermore, the attitudes of dominant groups towards quotas may be contingent on their perception of themselves as allies to marginalized communities. Individuals who exhibit lower levels of prejudice may demonstrate greater support for quotas, acknowledging the historical exclusion faced by marginalized groups (Turgeon and Habel 2022).

The research outlined in Chapter 4 provides valuable insights into outgroup discriminatory attitudes, offering a foundation for further exploration of the relationship between attitudes towards quotas and perceptions towards quota beneficiary groups. These findings suggest that quotas have the potential to significantly impact intergroup relations, potentially amplifying tensions between privileged groups and those who stand to benefit from quota policies. Moreover, my research has focused on measuring attitudinal measures. There is a scope for refining these findings using behavioral measures. Consequently, delving deeper into these dynamics can improve our understanding of intergroup politics.

Finally, I acknowledge that my research focuses on three broad caste categories, this approach may obscure nuanced patterns that could be observed at the sub-caste or *jati*level. Indeed, scholarly literature has demonstrated that sociopolitical dynamics are highly intricate at the *jati* level. Each sub-caste is an endogamous group in itself. While these groups may have a shared history of oppression, it does not guarantee congruence over policy preferences. For example, affirmative action in economic and educational domains has benefited the *Jatav* community among SCs. Consequently, their attitudes and responses towards affirmative action may be different from other SC sub-groups. Therefore, while this dissertation addresses critical issues at a broad level, it also lays the groundwork for future research to delve into more granular questions, thereby enriching our

understanding of sub-caste dynamics in Indian politics.

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Chapter 6

Appendix for Chapter 2

Summary Statistics

Table 6.1: Term-wise total number of questions asked in Lok Sabha

Lok Sabha Term	N of men MPs	N of women MPs	N of questions asked by men MPs individually	N of questions asked by women MPs individually	N of questions asked by men MPs jointly	N of questions asked by women MPs jointly
1999-2004	494	49	53127	3318	15909	1096
2004-2009	498	45	45244	2262	17394	1449
2009-2014	484	59	46042	4004	26255	3099
2014-2019	464	66	48259	6144	21505	2992

Table 6.2: Term-wise total number of MPs and number of MPs who asked questions in Lok Sabha

Lok Sabha Term	N MPs men	N MPs women	N MPs asked questions individually men	N MPs asked questions individually women	N MPs asked questions jointly men	N MPs asked questions jointly women
1999-2004	494	49	426	42	352	35
2004-2009	498	45	432	37	350	29
2009-2014	484	59	410	49	387	46
2014-2019	464	66	443	55	398	50

Table 6.3: Term-wise and gender-wise average number of questions asked by MPs in Lok Sabha

Lok Sabha Term	Single questions asked by a male MP	Single questions asked by a female MP	Joint questions asked by a male MP	Joint questions asked by a female MP
1999-2004	124.7	79.0	45.1	31.3
2004-2009	104.7	61.1	49.7	50.0
2009-2014	112.3	81.7	67.8	67.3
2014-2019	108.9	111.7	54.0	59.8

Data Preprocessing

We first created a corpus of question texts using the Quanteda package in R (Benoit et al. 2018). After tokenizing the corpus, we carried out standard preprocessing steps that involved removing URLs, punctuation, numbers, letters, symbols, separators, hyphens, tags, and capitalization. We applied stemming to keep the words in the base form and to further reduce the dimensionality of data. In addition to removing common stopwords in English, we also removed some stopwords unique to our dataset that add little substantive information. These include stemmed words such as whether, detail, thereof, please, therefor, regard, likely, said, propos, may, shall, can, must, upon, with, without, govern, countri, reason, state, step, number, last, time, scheme, project, action, say, fund, make, india, year, three, amount, various, union, committe, set, area, post, like, alongwith, pradesh, thereto, includ. We then trimmed infrequent terms and kept both the minimum term frequency and minimum document frequency as three, i.e. we kept the words that occurred at least three times and in at least three documents.

Following the processing steps, we then constructed a document-term matrix (DTM) wherein every row corresponds to an individual document, and each column signifies a distinct word. In the DTM, each cell encompasses data concerning the frequency of occurrence of each word within a document.

KeyATM

We selected 48 keywords for our topic on women's issues including child, school, woman, girl, female, women, teach, mother, empower, widow, birth, juvenile, gender, marriage, maternal, preg-

nancy, infant, rape, sex, dowry, natal, wife, baby, lady, abortion, prostitution, foeticide, daughter, abduction, molestation, preschool, honourkill, eveteasing, csection, infanticide, womb, sister, beti, bride, shishu. Though we expected some of these terms to be rare, we sought to cast as wide a net as possible to capture most of the questions that engaged with women's issues. The frequency of keywords pertaining to queries posed by individual MPs is presented in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1: Frequency of keywords on women's topics in the documents based on questions posed by individual MPs

6.0.0.1 *

Model Diagnostics To assess the model fitting process, we generate plots depicting the log-likelihood and perplexity measures. As expected for a well-performing model, we observe improvement in log-likelihood with each iteration, coupled with a concurrent reduction in perplexity. These trends are illustrated in Figure 6.3.



Figure 6.2: Frequency of keywords on women's topics in the documents based on joint (multiple-MP) questions



(a) For single questions

(b) For joint questions

Figure 6.3: Log-likelihood and perplexity for model fitting

Supervised Classification

Labeling Questions as Women's Issues

In the process of manually coding 5519 questions, we meticulously crafted a comprehensive codebook to facilitate the categorization of these questions into either women's issues (coded as 1) or



(a) For individual questions



(b) For individual questions

Figure 6.4: Gender-wise marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on all the keywords.



(a) For individual questions



(b) For joint questions

Figure 6.5: Gender-wise marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on six keywords.

other topics (coded as 0). Presented below are select examples excerpted from our codebook for illustrative purposes:

- Question 1: whether attention of the Government has been drawn to the news-item captioned 'Ghatiya Khane Ke Birodh Mein Lady Harding College Ki Chhatraon ne Rally Nikali' appearing in the 'Rashtriya Sahara' dated February 2, 2001; (b) if so, the number



(a) For individual questions

(b) For joint questions

Figure 6.6: Constituency-wise marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on all keywords.



(a) For individual questions

(b) For joint questions

Figure 6.7: Constituency-wise marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on six keywords.

of complaints regarding sub-standard food received from the students during the last year; and (c) the remedial measures taken by the Government to improve the conditions of the mess and to bring the erring officials of the college to book?

* Coded as 1

* Rationale: Lady Harding College is a women's college. The question pertains to the



(a) For individual questions

(b) For joint questions

Figure 6.8: Constituency-wise marginal posterior mean of document-topic distributions along with 90% credible intervals

These results are based on three keywords.

food received by the students there. Therefore, it is considered a women's issue.

- Question 2: the gender-wise enrolment of students in the primary, upper primary and secondary schools in each State/U.T. during each of the last three years and the current year; (b) whether there has been increase in the dropout of girls both in the urban and rural areas during the above period; (c) if so, the details thereof and the reasons therefor; (d) whether the Government proposes to provide additional incentives to the States to increase the enrolment of girls in the above schools; (e) if so, the details thereof; and (f) the steps

  * Coded as 1

  * Rationale: Women's educational issue.

- Question 3: whether the Government has implemented Ujjawala Scheme; (b) if so, the details and the salient features thereof ; (c) the number of beneficiaries therefrom, State-wise; (d) the funds sanctioned and utilized by the State Governments during each of the last there years and the current year; (e) whether the Government has reviewed the scheme vis-a-vis the targets fixed and achievements made therein; and (f) if so, the details and outcome thereof?"

- Coded as 1
- Ujjawala scheme aims to safeguard the health of women and children by providing them with a clean cooking fuel – LPG. Therefore, even though the question does not directly mention women, it is categorized as 1.

Training and Testing the Model

We initially converted the question text into vectorized input variables. Subsequently, we partitioned the hand-coded data into training and test sets using a ratio of 70:30.

Given that our hand-labeled dataset exhibits an imbalance, specifically with regard to questions pertaining to women's issues being in the minority, it is important to acknowledge that disregarding this disparity could lead to suboptimal predictive performance from our models. In order to address the imbalance within our training data, we employed the following sampling strategies:

- Random Oversampler
- Synthetic Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE)
- Adaptive Synthetic (ADASYN) Approach
- Borderline-SMOTE
- SMOTE with Edited Nearest Neighbor (SMOT-ENN)

In our assessment, we have evaluated the performance of the aforementioned models, focusing on the F-1 score. The F-1 score, a composite metric that considers both precision and recall, was employed for this evaluation. Referring to the F1-scores depicted in Figure 6.9, we have opted for the Borderline-SMOTE sampling strategy. This strategy was utilized to generate a balanced dataset specifically for training purposes.

Our subsequent task involved selecting the optimal classification method to train our model. We assessed three frequently employed classification methods: Support Vector Machine (SVM),

XGBoost, and Random Forest (RF). Model performance was evaluated using the F1-score metric. As depicted in Figure 6.9, XGBoost exhibited superior performance, leading us to select it as the classifier for subsequent model training and prediction.

Based on training the final model, we present our confusion matrix in Table 6.4 which indicates that the numbers of false positives and false negatives are very small. Based on the confusion matrix, we present the model metrics of the fitted model in Table 6.5. Subsequently, we proceeded to predict the unlabeled data utilizing the features extracted from the unlabeled questions.



(a) For selecting an optimum classifier



(b) For selecting an optimum model for training the data

Figure 6.9: Diagnostics for supervised classification

Table 6.4: Confusion Matrix

	Predicted 0	Predicted 1
Actual 0	1547	2
Actual 1	23	104

Note: 1 corresponds to women-related questions and 0 otherwise.

Table 6.5: Training Model Metrics

Metric	Class 0	Class 1
Precision	0.99	0.98
Recall	1.00	0.82
Specificity	0.82	1.00
F1 score	0.99	0.89

Note: 1 corresponds to women-related questions and 0 otherwise.



Figure 6.10: Year-wise overview of questions predicted as on women's issues using supervised classification method

Structural Topic Models

We initially employed the searchK function from the stm package in R to evaluate the model's performance for the selection of an optimal number of topics (Roberts, Stewart and Tingley 2019). In this process, we configured the model initialization as "Spectral" to attain the most suitable parameters. The range of topics was set between 10 and 30 to assess the model's efficacy. The outcomes of this evaluation are depicted in Figure 6.11. These findings provided us with four metrics for determining the ideal number of topics. The optimal number of topics should be the point at which the held-out likelihood, semantic coherence, and lower bound are maximized, while simultaneously minimizing the dispersion of residuals. Based on these outcomes, we arrived at a final choice of 18 topics.

Table 6.6: Logistic Regression

Dependent variable: Likelihood a question addressing women's issues		
	Model 1 Single questions	Model 2 Joint questions
Male	-0.38^{***}	-0.91^{***}
	(0.03)	0.09
SC constituency type	0.03	
	(0.03)	
ST constituency type	0.10^{**}	
	(0.04)	
Unstarred	-0.15^{***}	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Lok Sabha 14	0.28^{***}	0.35^{***}
(2004-09)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Lok Sabha 15	0.59^{***}	0.59^{***}
(2009-14)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Lok Sabha 16	0.74^{***}	0.83^{***}
(2014-19)	(0.03)	(0.05)
(Intercept)	-2.93^{***}	-2.34^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.10)
AIC	80326.91	31556.52
BIC	80408.88	31611.56
Log Likelihood	-40155.45	-15772.26
Deviance	80310.91	31544.52
N	208282	71211

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$



Figure 6.11: Diagnostics for selecting optimum number of topics

Chapter 7

Appendix for Chapter 3

Table 7.1: Likelihood of a woman contesting state-level elections

	Dependent variable: A woman candidate					
Period	Pre-50%			Post-50%		
Seat	ST	SC	Unreserved	ST	SC	Unreserved
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.037***	0.037***	0.041***	0.041***	0.042***	0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education	0.167***	0.168***	0.169***	0.151***	0.159***	0.178***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Net worth[1]	0.313***	0.297***	0.251***	0.176***	0.145***	0.239***
(in 100 millions INR)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.020)
Criminal record	0.108***	0.107***	0.121***	0.168***	0.166***	0.122***
(Number of crimes)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Punishment	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***	0.009**	0.003	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Number of candidates	−0.095***	−0.095***	−0.089***	−0.097***	−0.089***	−0.081***
competing in each constituency	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Effective number of parties	−0.060***	−0.057***	−0.058***	−0.047	−0.064**	−0.068***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.019)
Constant	−4.463***	−4.494***	−4.806***	−4.637***	−4.786***	−5.105***
	(0.132)	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.178)	(0.170)	(0.125)
Observations	36,404	37,156	48,581	19,329	22,253	44,290
Log Likelihood	−11,398.280	−11,681.210	−14,778.230	−6,036.930	−6,828.243	−13,264.520
Akaike Inf. Crit.	22,812.550	23,378.420	29,572.470	12,089.860	13,672.490	26,545.030

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The table displays results from logit regression.

Table 7.2: Likelihood of a woman winning state-level elections

	Dependent variable: A woman winner					
Period	Pre-50%			Post-50%		
Seat	ST	SC	Unreserved	ST	SC	Unreserved
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.037***	0.038***	0.039***	0.040***	0.042***	0.041***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Education	0.167***	0.172***	0.170***	0.159***	0.176***	0.178***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Net worth	0.317***	0.304***	0.211***	0.112***	0.086***	0.193***
(in 100 millions INR)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.018)
Criminal record	0.108***	0.109***	0.119***	0.169***	0.179***	0.118***
(number of crimes)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.007)
Punishment	0.007***	0.008***	0.007***	0.009**	0.002	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Number of candidates	−0.094***	−0.095***	−0.087***	−0.095***	−0.092***	−0.075***
competing in each constituency	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Effective number of parties	−0.060***	−0.040*	−0.048***	0.011	−0.002	−0.049**
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.019)
Constant	−4.497***	−4.691***	−4.783***	−4.937***	−5.323***	−5.130***
	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.181)	(0.174)	(0.128)
Observations	36,704	38,580	46,895	19,949	25,058	40,911
Log Likelihood	−11,433.210	−11,772.280	−14,453.130	−5,956.684	−6,788.977	−12,719.700
Akaike Inf. Crit.	22,882.410	23,560.570	28,922.260	11,929.370	13,593.950	25,455.410

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The table displays results from logit regression.

Chapter 8

Appendix for Chapter 4

Table 8.1: Gender-wise and vignette-wise sample size

Vignette	Male	Female
Unreserved	197	214
Women reserved	213	226
SC reserved	206	214
Sc + women reserved	193	185
Control	205	187

Table 8.2: Gender-wise and vignette-wise sample size

Caste	Male	Female
Forward caste	221	209
Other Backward Classes (OBC)	436	395
Scheduled Castes (SC)	327	320
Scheduled Tribes (ST)	5	27
Other (including Don't know, Declined to answer, does not affiliate their identity with any caste)	14	35

Table 8.3: Compared to unreserved seats, SC reservations increase taste-based discrimination among dominant groups

	Dependent variable:			
	Taste-based discrimination	Statistical discrimination	Statistical discrimination	Taste-based discrimination
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women reserved	0.154	0.028	-0.005	0.078
	(0.149)	(0.110)	(0.052)	(0.080)
SC reserved	0.301*	0.111	-0.006	0.071
	(0.132)	(0.094)	(0.057)	(0.096)
SC + women reserved	0.036	-0.051	-0.080	0.034
	(0.160)	(0.082)	(0.060)	(0.097)
Control	0.064	0.012	0.024	0.132
	(0.145)	(0.090)	(0.055)	(0.086)
Constant	0.958***	2.184***	1.738***	2.984***
	(0.126)	(0.070)	(0.038)	(0.071)
Observations	1,261	1,261	1,261	1,261
R^2	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.0003	-0.0005	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.4: Compared to unreserved seats, SC reservations increase taste-based discrimination among dominant men

	Dependent variable:			
	Taste-based discrimination towards SCs	Statistical discrimination towards SCs	Statistical discrimination towards women	Taste-based discrimination towards women
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Women reserved	0.179	-0.010	0.037	0.200
	(0.177)	(0.145)	(0.137)	(0.137)
SC reserved	0.371*	0.098	-0.054	0.084
	(0.182)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.136)
SC + women reserved	0.159	-0.177	-0.104	0.100
	(0.210)	(0.129)	(0.138)	(0.131)
Control	0.051	0.027	0.078	0.167
	(0.173)	(0.129)	(0.136)	(0.136)
Constant	0.871***	2.077***	2.463***	2.907***
	(0.139)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.104)
Observations	657	657	657	657
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.003	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.0004	0.002	-0.003	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.5: Effect of treatments compared to the control group on political participation for swing voters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.140	0.143	0.141
	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.093)
Women reserved	0.237**	0.299**	0.268**
	(0.091)	(0.098)	(0.082)
SC reserved	0.043	0.214*	0.129
	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.091)
SC+women reserved	0.126	0.209*	0.167+
	(0.109)	(0.097)	(0.090)
Constant	3.120***	2.319***	2.719***
	(0.070)	(0.079)	(0.064)
Observations	1,086	1,086	1,086
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.6: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved group on political participation for swing voters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.098	0.156	0.127
	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.088)
SC reserved	-0.096	0.071	-0.013
	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.087)
SC+women reserved	-0.014	0.066	0.026
	(0.107)	(0.112)	(0.100)
Control	-0.140	-0.143	-0.141
	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.093)
Constant	3.259***	2.461***	2.860***
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.069)
Observations	1,086	1,086	1,086
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.7: Effect of treatments compared to the control group on political participation for strong party or leader supporters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.038	0.092	0.065
	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.115)
Women reserved	0.131	0.098	0.115
	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.110)
SC reserved	0.138	0.260*	0.199+
	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.110)
SC+women reserved	0.128	0.148	0.138
	(0.139)	(0.153)	(0.134)
Constant	3.471***	2.526***	2.998***
	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.085)
Observations	708	708	708
R^2	0.003	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.0003	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.8: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for a strong leader or party supporters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.098	0.156	0.127
	(0.119)	(0.137)	(0.117)
SC reserved	-0.096	0.071	-0.013
	(0.134)	(0.145)	(0.133)
SC+women reserved	-0.014	0.066	0.026
	(0.134)	(0.156)	(0.137)
Control	-0.140	-0.143	-0.141
	(0.123)	(0.127)	(0.115)
Constant	3.259***	2.461***	2.860***
	(0.087)	(0.095)	(0.086)
Observations	1,086	1,086	1,086
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.9: Effect of treatments compared to the control group on political participation for strong party supporter

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.140	0.143	0.141
	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.125)
Women reserved	0.237	0.299*	0.268*
	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.134)
SC reserved	0.043	0.214	0.129
	(0.136)	(0.150)	(0.132)
SC+women reserved	0.126	0.209	0.167
	(0.171)	(0.170)	(0.156)
Constant	3.120***	2.319***	2.719***
	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.104)
Observations	1,086	1,086	1,086
R^2	0.006	0.008	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.004	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.10: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for strong party supporters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.069	0.012	0.040
	(0.122)	(0.151)	(0.125)
SC reserved	0.142	0.121	0.131
	(0.136)	(0.154)	(0.137)
SC+women reserved	0.108	0.040	0.074
	(0.151)	(0.175)	(0.154)
Control	-0.060	-0.195	-0.128
	(0.134)	(0.143)	(0.125)
Constant	3.500***	2.637***	3.069***
	(0.092)	(0.105)	(0.093)
Observations	553	553	553
R^2	0.004	0.007	0.006
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	-0.0002	-0.001

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.11: Effect of treatments compared to the control group on political participation for strong leader supporters

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.019	-0.174	-0.077
	(0.334)	(0.249)	(0.263)
Women reserved	0.194	-0.164	0.015
	(0.271)	(0.250)	(0.239)
SC reserved	-0.113	0.249	0.068
	(0.260)	(0.248)	(0.219)
SC+women reserved	0.039	-0.033	0.003
	(0.281)	(0.299)	(0.265)
Constant	3.533***	2.694***	3.114***
	(0.161)	(0.179)	(0.154)
Observations	155	155	155
R^2	0.007	0.015	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.020	-0.011	-0.025

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.12: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment on political participation for strong leader supporter

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.175	0.009	0.092
	(0.391)	(0.299)	(0.327)
SC reserved	-0.132	0.422	0.145
	(0.355)	(0.300)	(0.305)
SC+women reserved	0.020	0.140	0.080
	(0.390)	(0.310)	(0.325)
Control	-0.019	0.174	0.077
	(0.334)	(0.249)	(0.263)
Constant	3.552***	2.521***	3.036***
	(0.298)	(0.215)	(0.242)
Observations	155	155	155
R^2	0.007	0.015	0.002
Adjusted R^2	-0.020	-0.011	-0.025

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.13: Effect of treatments on political participation controlling for baseline levels of electoral and non-electoral participation

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	0.056	0.082	0.069
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.060)
Women reserved	0.171**	0.203**	0.187**
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.058)
SC reserved	0.036	0.163*	0.100
	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.061)
SC + women reserved	0.093	0.158*	0.125+
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.068)
Base electoral participation	-0.062	-0.211***	-0.137*
	(0.052)	(0.063)	(0.053)
Base non-electoral participation	0.354***	0.484***	0.419***
	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.056)
Constant	3.045***	2.186***	2.615***
	(0.078)	(0.090)	(0.077)
Observations	1,989	1,989	1,989
R^2	0.022	0.042	0.037
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.039	0.034
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		

Table 8.14: Effect of treatments compared to the control group for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.095	0.082	0.089
	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.110)
SC reserved	0.178	0.199	0.188+
	(0.112)	(0.134)	(0.112)
SC+women reserved	0.198+	0.450***	0.324**
	(0.117)	(0.122)	(0.108)
Control	0.260+	0.318*	0.289*
	(0.139)	(0.132)	(0.123)
Constant	3.231***	2.319***	2.775***
	(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.081)
Observations	668	668	668
R^2	0.007	0.022	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.017	0.009
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		

Table 8.15: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.083	0.116	0.100
	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.107)
SC reserved	0.103	0.368**	0.235*
	(0.125)	(0.123)	(0.116)
SC+women reserved	0.164	0.236	0.200
	(0.136)	(0.149)	(0.132)
Control	-0.095	-0.082	-0.089
	(0.114)	(0.122)	(0.110)
Constant	3.327***	2.401***	2.864***
	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.084)
Observations	668	668	668
R^2	0.007	0.022	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.017	0.009

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.16: Effect of treatments compared to the control group for dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.234	0.054	0.144
	(0.210)	(0.179)	(0.176)
SC reserved	0.026	0.021	0.023
	(0.191)	(0.188)	(0.175)
SC+women reserved	0.113	0.212	0.162
	(0.234)	(0.200)	(0.201)
Control	-0.065	-0.039	-0.052
	(0.216)	(0.215)	(0.195)
Constant	3.184***	2.430***	2.807***
	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.127)
Observations	273	273	273
R^2	0.009	0.007	0.008
Adjusted R^2	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.17: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	-0.208	-0.033	-0.120
	(0.208)	(0.149)	(0.161)
SC reserved	-0.121	0.158	0.019
	(0.207)	(0.161)	(0.157)
SC+women reserved	-0.298	-0.092	-0.195
	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.194)
Control	-0.234	-0.054	-0.144
	(0.210)	(0.179)	(0.176)
Constant	3.418***	2.484***	2.951***
	(0.149)	(0.111)	(0.119)
Observations	273	273	273
R^2	0.009	0.007	0.008
Adjusted R^2	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.18: Effect of treatments compared to the control group for non-dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	-0.013	0.099	0.043
	(0.160)	(0.176)	(0.154)
SC reserved	0.275+	0.325+	0.300*
	(0.144)	(0.168)	(0.143)
SC+women reserved	0.239+	0.605***	0.422**
	(0.143)	(0.168)	(0.136)
Control	0.488**	0.575**	0.531**
	(0.175)	(0.201)	(0.164)
Constant	3.266***	2.237***	2.752***
	(0.109)	(0.117)	(0.099)
Observations	395	395	395
R^2	0.030	0.044	0.041
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.034	0.031

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.19: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for non-dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is unreserved

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.288^{+}	0.226	0.257^{+}
	(0.148)	(0.173)	(0.152)
SC reserved	0.252	0.507^{**}	0.380^{*}
	(0.161)	(0.185)	(0.165)
SC+women reserved	0.501^{**}	0.476^{*}	0.488^{*}
	(0.184)	(0.227)	(0.194)
Control	0.013	-0.099	-0.043
	(0.160)	(0.176)	(0.154)
Constant	3.253^{***}	2.336^{***}	2.794^{***}
	(0.119)	(0.140)	(0.123)
Observations	395	395	395
R^2	0.030	0.044	0.041
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.034	0.031

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.20: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who do not know the current sarpanch seat's reservation status

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.090	0.313	0.202
	(0.168)	(0.218)	(0.181)
SC reserved	-0.201	-0.005	-0.103
	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.154)
SC+women reserved	0.184	0.360^{+}	0.272
	(0.209)	(0.217)	(0.196)
Control	0.184	0.251	0.218
	(0.172)	(0.204)	(0.168)
Constant	3.189^{***}	2.234^{***}	2.711^{***}
	(0.113)	(0.138)	(0.111)
Observations	288	288	288
R^2	0.017	0.016	0.018
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.002	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.21: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.090	0.313	0.202
	(0.159)	(0.192)	(0.167)
SC reserved	-0.201	-0.005	-0.103
	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.148)
SC+women reserved	0.184	0.360^{+}	0.272
	(0.177)	(0.191)	(0.170)
Control	0.184	0.251	0.218
	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.155)
Constant	3.189^{***}	2.234^{***}	2.711^{***}
	(0.125)	(0.150)	(0.131)
Observations	288	288	288
R^2	0.017	0.016	0.018
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.002	0.004

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.22: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for women or SC women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.235	0.140	0.188
	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.155)
SC reserved	0.363^{*}	0.176	0.270^{+}
	(0.182)	(0.157)	(0.158)
SC+women reserved	0.353^{*}	0.134	0.244^{+}
	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.145)
Control	0.211	0.097	0.154
	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.176)
Constant	3.074^{***}	2.360^{***}	2.717^{***}
	(0.127)	(0.117)	(0.110)
Observations	386	386	386
R^2	0.015	0.003	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.005	-0.008	-0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.23: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.128	0.036	0.082
	(0.159)	(0.192)	(0.167)
SC reserved	0.118	-0.006	0.056
	(0.151)	(0.165)	(0.148)
SC+women reserved	-0.024	-0.043	-0.034
	(0.177)	(0.191)	(0.170)
Control	-0.235	-0.140	-0.187
	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.155)
Constant	3.309***	2.500***	2.904***
	(0.125)	(0.150)	(0.131)
Observations	386	386	386
R^2	0.015	0.003	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.005	-0.008	-0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.24: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.235	0.140	0.188
	(0.153)	(0.186)	(0.155)
SC reserved	0.363*	0.176	0.270+
	(0.182)	(0.157)	(0.158)
SC+women reserved	0.353*	0.134	0.244+
	(0.159)	(0.163)	(0.145)
Control	0.211	0.097	0.154
	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.176)
Constant	3.074***	2.360***	2.717***
	(0.127)	(0.117)	(0.110)
Observations	386	386	386
R^2	0.015	0.003	0.009
Adjusted R^2	0.005	-0.008	-0.002

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.25: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for non-dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.156	0.042	0.099
	(0.382)	(0.286)	(0.309)
SC reserved	-0.180	-0.263	-0.221
	(0.398)	(0.342)	(0.358)
SC+women reserved	-0.164	-0.279	-0.221
	(0.274)	(0.248)	(0.245)
Control	-0.016	-0.227	-0.121
	(0.343)	(0.338)	(0.324)
Constant	3.382***	2.715***	3.049***
	(0.303)	(0.248)	(0.266)
Observations	209	209	209
R^2	0.011	0.017	0.016
Adjusted R^2	-0.008	-0.002	-0.003

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.26: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for respondents who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for non-dominant women

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.016	0.227	0.121
	(0.343)	(0.338)	(0.324)
SC reserved	0.172	0.269	0.220
	(0.266)	(0.246)	(0.223)
SC+women reserved	-0.164	-0.036	-0.100
	(0.218)	(0.263)	(0.209)
Control	-0.148	-0.052	-0.100
	(0.223)	(0.206)	(0.194)
Constant	3.366***	2.488***	2.927***
	(0.172)	(0.203)	(0.171)
Observations	209	209	209
R^2	0.011	0.017	0.016
Adjusted R^2	-0.008	-0.002	-0.003

Note: + p¡0.1; * p¡0.05; ** p¡0.01; *** p¡0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.27: Effect of reserved treatments compared to the unreserved treatment for dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for non-dominant groups

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.032	0.018	0.025
	(0.312)	(0.272)	(0.271)
SC reserved	-0.328	-0.208	-0.268
	(0.298)	(0.266)	(0.264)
SC+women reserved	-0.228	-0.128	-0.178
	(0.292)	(0.239)	(0.253)
Control	0.187	0.208	0.197
	(0.252)	(0.209)	(0.200)
Constant	3.350***	2.621***	2.986***
	(0.236)	(0.200)	(0.205)
Observations	170	170	170
R^2	0.026	0.022	0.029
Adjusted R^2	0.002	-0.001	0.006

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.28: Effect of treatments compared to the control group for dominant men who think their current sarpanch seat is reserved for non-dominant groups

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	-0.187	-0.208	-0.197
	(0.252)	(0.209)	(0.200)
SC reserved	-0.154	-0.190	-0.172
	(0.257)	(0.223)	(0.220)
SC+women reserved	-0.515**	-0.416+	-0.466**
	(0.195)	(0.216)	(0.175)
Control	-0.415	-0.336+	-0.375+
	(0.277)	(0.203)	(0.221)
Constant	3.537***	2.829***	3.183***
	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.116)
Observations	170	170	170
R^2	0.026	0.022	0.029
Adjusted R^2	0.002	-0.001	0.006

Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses

Table 8.29: Non-dominant men in villages with unreserved seats at the time of the survey participate more in politics when those seats are reserved than when those seats are unreserved.

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Women reserved	0.100	0.193	0.146
	(0.305)	(0.289)	(0.275)
SC reserved	0.297	0.811**	0.554+
	(0.344)	(0.314)	(0.309)
SC+women reserved	0.777**	0.717*	0.747**
	(0.285)	(0.303)	(0.267)
Control	0.427	0.716*	0.572+
	(0.348)	(0.345)	(0.328)
Constant	3.263***	2.105***	2.684***
	(0.239)	(0.231)	(0.220)
Observations	135	135	135
R^2	0.067	0.100	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.072	0.060
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		

Table 8.30: Non-dominant men in villages with unreserved seats at the time of the survey participate less in politics when they receive unreserved seats' treatment compared to control.

	Dependent variable:		
	Electoral Participation	Non-electoral Participation	Political Participation
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Unreserved	-0.427	-0.716*	-0.572+
	(0.348)	(0.345)	(0.328)
Women reserved	-0.328	-0.523+	-0.425+
	(0.262)	(0.292)	(0.248)
SC reserved	-0.130	0.095	-0.017
	(0.274)	(0.259)	(0.235)
SC+women reserved	0.350	0.001	0.175
	(0.329)	(0.332)	(0.294)
Constant	3.690***	2.821***	3.256***
	(0.223)	(0.249)	(0.214)
Observations	135	135	135
R^2	0.067	0.100	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.038	0.072	0.060
Note:	+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001		
	Standard errors clustered by village are given in parentheses		