

Investigating Culture and Emotion

From Responses to Ideals

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Introduction

Like many psychologists interested in culture, ethnicity, and race, I grew up knowing that my parents were different from those of my European American friends. But it wasn't until I was an undergraduate at Stanford that I began to understand why. There I started learning about naive realism, attribution theory, and the power of the situation from Lee Ross, Mark Lepper, and other professors in the psychology department; at the same time, I was swapping stories with my dormmates about our shared experiences as children of East Asian immigrants. I started realizing that my parents' beliefs and actions were less idiosyncratic than I had thought, and instead reflected the shared ideas, values, and practices of Taiwanese and many other East Asian cultures. And I began to see that many of my parents' conflicts—with their friends, their co-workers, and even my brother and me—were due to cultural differences between the Taiwanese society in which they were raised and the American society in which they were working and raising a family.

These insights fueled my interest in understanding how culture influenced human behavior. Therefore, for my senior honors thesis, supervised by Laura Carstensen, I examined whether Chinese American college students would be more respectful to older adults, given Confucian values of filial piety and respect for the elderly. Although European American and Chinese American participants both believed that Chinese Americans would be more respectful than European Americans toward older adults, in terms of their own behavior, they were equally respectful toward older (vs. younger) confederates in the lab (Tsai & Carstensen, 1991). These findings made me curious about the distinction between what people believed to vary across cultures and what actually did.

Because of my work in Laura's lab, I also started to become increasingly more interested in emotion and how it might be influenced by culture. I was particularly intrigued by descriptions of East Asians as moderating, controlling, and hiding their emotional responses more than Westerners (e.g., Chiu & Kosinski, 1994; Klineberg, 1938; LaBarre, 1947; Leung & Lind, 1986; Russell & Yik, 1996; Song, 1985), in part because members of my own family did not seem to control or hide their emotions at all. On the contrary, my parents often described Americans as being the ones who hid their emotions, especially when they were angry or upset. Fortunately, Bob Levenson at the University of California (UC), Berkeley was just beginning to consider culture and ethnicity in his research on emotion, so I decided to move to the East Bay for graduate school.

Background and Status of the Field

Until the early 1990s, when I started graduate school, most of the work on culture and emotion revolved around the question of whether emotions were culturally constructed or biologically hardwired. Scholars who argued for cultural constructivism based their arguments on rich ethnographic descriptions of emotion in different cultural contexts—for example, among Ifaluk (Lutz, 1988), Ukta Eskimos (Briggs, 1971), Tahitians (R. Levy, 1973), and Bedouin (Abu-Lughod, 1986/2016). These reports not only described different practices related to emotion in other cultures but also argued that the way that psychologists and other social scientists conceived of emotion reflected uniquely Western cultural ideas and practices (Lutz, 1988). In contrast, scholars who argued for universality viewed emotions as evolutionary adaptations that allowed our ancestors to respond quickly to environmental threats, a la Darwin (1872). They based their arguments mainly on studies that showed that individuals from cultures with minimal visual contact with the Western world could recognize Western emotional facial expressions at above chance levels (Ekman et al., 1969; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Importantly, these scholars also recognized the important role that culture played in influencing the elicitors of emotion, rules about what emotions were appropriate to show (“display rules”), and the consequences of emotion. However, they asserted that deep down, the relationship between specific emotions and their facial expressions were “pancultural” (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Ekman et al., 1969; Matsumoto, 1991).

These discussions about culture and emotion intersected with ongoing debates among affective scientists about what emotions were and how best to study them (Ekman & Davidson, 1994). I had the great fortune to learn about these debates because Bob Levenson, Paul Ekman, Richie Davidson, Klaus Scherer, and other “affective scientists” had just started a postdoctoral training program funded by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which brought them and others to Berkeley to share their research and perspectives.

All of the scholars involved in this program encouraged and supported my interest in culture and emotion. What they did not provide, however, were the theoretical and methodological tools to study culture and ethnicity. Fortunately, Yu-Wen Ying, a leading researcher in Asian American mental health (Ying, 1988, 1995; Ying & Miller, 1992) and professor in the School of Social Welfare at UC Berkeley, taught a class on Asian American communities and mental health. Her work, as well as that of Stanley Sue, Ricardo Muñoz, and others, not only identified the specific challenges that Asian immigrant and other minority populations faced but also demonstrated why understanding cultural influences on emotion mattered in clinical settings (e.g., Miranda et al., 1996; S. Sue et al., 1991). Yu-Wen taught me about the enormous diversity within Asian American communities and how to study it (e.g., Ying et al., 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007).

At the same time, Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama published their now classic piece on “Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation,” which articulated how differences in views of the self, of others, and of the relationship between self and others shaped cognitive, motivational, and emotional processes and could account for inconsistencies in the literature (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In particular, they argued that other people played a different role in contexts that promoted more interdependent selves (i.e., many East Asian contexts) than they did in contexts that promoted more independent selves (i.e., many North American contexts). With respect to emotion specifically, Hazel and Shinobu argued that emotions were more other-oriented for interdependent selves, which ultimately led to decades of work examining the emotions that facilitated adjustment to and connection with others, including our own work.

Therefore, thanks to funding from NIMH, Bob Levenson and I started conducting a series of studies that integrated state-of-the-art methods of eliciting and measuring emotion with more in-depth ways of assessing culture and ethnicity to understand how culture influenced people’s emotional responses in the lab.

Does Culture Influence How People Actually Feel?

Does culture shape how people feel? On the one hand, the answer seems obvious. If culture teaches people how to perceive, interpret, and understand an event, then how people respond to that event should depend on culture. As mentioned above, even the scholars advocating the most universalist views of emotion agreed with this premise (Ekman et al., 1969). But do people from cultures that differ in their views of emotion respond differently to the same event? Do their bodies respond in ways that are consistent with their views? What about their facial expressions? Do they cope in different ways?

When I started graduate school, there were only a handful of cross-cultural studies that used physiological and behavioral measures to answer these questions (Averill et al., 1969; Friesen, 1972; Lazarus et al., 1966; Levenson et al., 1992). Because these studies observed both cultural differences and similarities, they were seen as providing evidence for both constructivist and universalist approaches. But they contained limitations that raised more questions than answers about how culture shaped different components of emotional response.

Limitations of Previous Research

First, the stimuli used to elicit emotion in these studies were often unfamiliar to the study participants (e.g., film clips showing genital mutilation) or strikingly “nonsocial” in nature (e.g., viewing sinus surgery, moving facial muscles). As a result, one could easily argue that because the stimuli and tasks lacked social significance, sociocultural values and norms might be less relevant to participants’ responses to them. A second limitation was that the existing studies typically did not include any measure of cultural values or cultural orientation, and as a result, it was difficult to demonstrate empirically that the study participants from the different groups varied along the cultural dimensions of interest or that the observed differences in emotion were related to these cultural factors. A third limitation was that most of the existing studies focused on one or at most two components of emotional response (e.g., self-report or behavior but not physiology), and therefore it was difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the meaning of participants’ responses.

Comparing European American and Asian American Emotional Responses

To address the previously mentioned limitations, I conducted a series of studies first as a graduate student with Bob Levenson and then as an assistant professor at the University of Minnesota with my wonderful graduate student, Yulia Chentsova-Dutton (now an associate professor at Georgetown University). In these studies, we compared the physiological, self-report, and expressive responses of European Americans and Asian Americans while they were engaged in socially relevant and interpersonally meaningful tasks, such as watching sad and amusing film clips (Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2010; Tsai, Levenson, et al., 2000); recalling and reliving emotional episodes (Tsai et al., 2002); and discussing conflicts about sex, jealousy, and communication with their romantic partners (Tsai, Knutson, et al., 2006; Tsai & Levenson, 1997).¹

We measured all three components of emotional responding to test our emerging prediction that cultural differences would be more pronounced for more socially visible components (e.g., facial behavior) than less visible ones (e.g., heart rate, sweating, and respiration), especially during social situations. We used specific cultural criteria to ensure that the individuals we were studying were oriented to the cultures of interest. We created a measure of cultural orientation (the General Ethnicity Questionnaire) to assess variation among participants in their orientation to Chinese culture (i.e., use of Chinese language, affiliation with other Chinese Americans, engagement in Chinese activities, attitudes toward Chinese culture, exposure to Chinese culture, and consumption of Chinese food) as well as their orientation to similar aspects of American culture (Tsai, Ying, et al., 2000).² In addition, we included measures of individualism–collectivism (e.g., Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and the independent and interdependent values (e.g., maintaining interpersonal harmony) that we predicted would be linked to emotional response based on Markus and Kitayama (1991).

Based on notions that East Asians moderate and control their emotions to maintain interpersonal harmony and balance, we had predicted that the

¹ Anyone who employs these methods in their research knows that these studies are extremely time- and labor-intensive. Our studies involved armies of graduate students, undergraduates, and volunteers from the University of Minnesota, UC Berkeley, and Stanford from start to finish. As I review all of the papers that emerged from this time, I am so proud of the work we did together, and I wonder about all of the research assistants who worked on these projects. I hope they are well and that we'll reunite one day.

² Because of its format, the General Ethnicity Questionnaire can be easily adapted to any culture of interest; therefore, we (and other research teams) have consistently used it to describe the cultural orientation of our diverse research samples.

Asian Americans in our studies, especially the ones who were most oriented to their Asian cultures, would show less intense emotional responses, especially negative ones. Based on previous work by Friesen (1972) suggesting that Japanese masked their negative emotion with smiles, we also predicted that Asian American participants would smile more during negative events.

Study after study, however, we found more similarities than differences (Tsai et al., 2002; Tsai & Levenson, 1997; Tsai, Levenson, et al., 2000, 2006). In terms of autonomic physiology (heart rate and skin conductance), there were almost no differences between the European Americans and Asian Americans we studied, despite their differences in cultural orientation. In terms of self-reports of emotional experience, there were again few differences. And in terms of emotional behavior, we observed no differences in the expression of negative emotion, despite using the most microanalytic systems to code facial behavior, such as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS; Ekman & Friesen, 1978) and the Specific Affect Coding System (Gottman, 1989).

The overall pattern of results from these studies was initially surprising, especially for someone interested in cultural variation. I had been confident that using state-of-the-art tools to measure both emotion and culture would reveal more cultural differences than previous studies had observed, and I thought we would certainly find differences in negative emotional expression. There were, however, differences in positive emotional expression, but not in the direction suggested by previous work. Rather than Asian Americans smiling more during negative events to mask their negative emotion, European Americans smiled more, not only during discussions about relationship conflicts (Tsai, Levenson, et al., 2006) but also while they were reliving episodes of happiness (Tsai et al., 2002). European Americans were smiling more, perhaps to mask their negative emotions, but also to amplify their positive emotions. Later, we observed similar patterns: In response to an amusing film clip, European Americans expressed more positive emotion than did Asian Americans (Chentsova-Dutton et al., 2007). These findings were consistent with other work suggesting that U.S. contexts value maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative, as a way of enhancing the independent self (Heine et al., 1999).

Taken together, these studies identified the specific ways in which culture influenced responses to similarly meaningful events. As we had predicted, more cultural differences emerged in the socially visible aspects of emotional response (i.e., expressive behavior) than the less visible ones (i.e., physiology). Although differences did not emerge for negative emotional expression as we had predicted, our findings dispelled a common belief that Asian Americans were overall less emotional than European Americans and instead revealed

that they showed less positive emotion than European Americans. At the time, however, I was confused by our findings, and I felt disappointed that we had not observed more group differences. But like many disappointments, this one forced me to reflect and re-evaluate my working assumptions about emotion and culture, which turned out to be critical to launching the next stage of my research.

Rethinking Emotion and Other Affective States

At almost exactly the same time, I returned to Stanford as an assistant professor, which brought me closer to affective scientists and cultural psychologists. The discussions I had with other affective scientists, including my partner and collaborator Brian Knutson, and other cultural psychologists, including Hazel Markus, changed my thinking about culture and emotion in three important ways.

The first was a change in my assumption that people do what they want to do, and that their behaviors to a large degree reflect their values. For example, while developmental psychologists acknowledged that children had to learn specific attitudes toward emotions, feeling rules, display rules, and other “meta aspects of emotion” (e.g., Saarni, 1979; Underwood et al., 1992), it was largely assumed that once children became adults, they had adopted these rules and attitudes, and their emotional responses reflected them. So, if Chinese Americans wanted to moderate and control their negative emotions, they should show less intense psychological responses, report less intense negative emotions, and express less negative emotion on their faces. But Brian argued that people often fail to realize their values, goals, and ideals, raising the possibility that culture might influence ideals more than actual responses. To test this idea, we decided to measure both.

The second change was moving from measuring specific emotions to measuring affective states.³ For various reasons, Brian had already made this switch in his neuroimaging studies. At the time, if you were trained in the basic emotion perspective, you measured how intensely participants felt anger, sadness, fear, disgust, contempt, and happiness. However, as shown in Figure 2.1, if you were measuring affective states, you assessed valence (positive to negative) as well as arousal (high to low), the two dimensions of the affective circumplex model (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1991; Thayer, 1989; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).

³ Although I switched from a basic emotion to dimensional perspective, I believe both approaches are useful and can be integrated.




Figure 2.1 The affective circumplex. HAN, high arousal negative states; HAP, high arousal positive states; LAN, low arousal negative states; LAP, low arousal positive states.

As shown in Figure 2.1, one of the advantages of the affective circumplex model is that it includes a variety of high arousal positive states (HAP), such as excitement and enthusiasm, as well as a variety of low arousal positive states (LAP), such as calm and relaxation, which we predicted might be valued more in East Asian contexts because of their relation to emotional moderation and balance. Another advantage was that the affective circumplex had been replicated in the cultures that I was primarily interested in comparing. Finally, the circumplex model included several items for each octant, which allowed us to assess reliability and measurement equivalence in ways single items could not.

The third change was an even bigger shift. I had been trained to use and value a multimethod approach to studying emotion that included not only self-report but also physiology and expressive behavior. But because I observed few differences in physiology, I decided to stop collecting additional physiological data until I knew I could find a more robust difference with less time- and labor-intensive methods. In other words, I decided to see what I could find with self-reports of affect with the intention of incorporating more time- and labor-intensive measures once I did.

These three changes—the measurement of ideal and actual affect, the use of items from the affective circumplex, and the focus on self-report—led to a

series of studies and a theoretical framework that organized my research for the next 20 years.

Does Culture Influence How People Ideally Want to Feel?

We started by simply having Stanford introductory psychology participants complete questionnaires asking them how much they actually felt the different states listed in Figure 2.1 on average (“actual affect”) and then how much they ideally wanted to feel those states on average (“ideal affect”). We initially played with different rating formats, but we finally settled on a simple 5-point scale, ranging from 1 = “not at all” to 3 = “a moderate amount” to 5 = “an extreme amount.” This first study focused on European Americans and East Asian Americans because we predicted that East Asian Americans would value LAP more than would European Americans, whereas European Americans would value HAP more than would East Asian Americans. Our findings not only supported these predictions, but they occurred against a backdrop of almost no differences in actual affect (Tsai, Knutson, et al., 2006, Study 1).

After observing few cultural differences in my earlier work, it was almost shocking to see differences in ideal affect emerge time after time. Because self-report data are so much easier to collect than physiological or behavioral data, I was able to determine relatively quickly whether these differences replicated, and they did. We then speculated that if these differences were cultural, we should see even greater differences between our American samples and an East Asian sample living in East Asia. Therefore, we started collaborating with Helene Fung at Chinese University of Hong Kong. This was the first time I had collected East Asian data, and it was the beginning of a decades-long collaboration with Fung and her wonderful team (including Dannii Yeung, Da Jiang, Dwight Tse, and Yuen Wan Ho).

Working with Hong Kong Chinese samples required us to translate our measures, demonstrate that they were equivalent across the cultural groups using structural equation modeling, and adjust for cultural differences in response styles by ipsatizing participants’ ratings (i.e., for each item, mean deviating and dividing by the standard deviation across items for each individual). As expected, the differences between European American and Hong Kong Chinese college students were even more pronounced than those between European Americans and East Asian Americans (Figure 2.2; Tsai, Knutson, et al., 2006, Study 2).




Figure 2.2 Cultural differences in ideal affect (ipsatized mean and standard error). CA, Chinese Americans; CH, Hong Kong Chinese; EA, European Americans; HAP, high arousal positive states; LAP, low arousal positive states. * $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$.

Adapted from Figure 3, “Cultural Variation in Affect Valuation,” by J. L. Tsai, B. K. Knutson, and H. H. Fung, 2006, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90, p. 300. Copyright 2006 by American Psychological Association.

When we started this work, we were primarily interested in between-group differences in the valuation of HAP and LAP. The group difference emerged in the *relative* value that participants of different cultures placed on HAP and LAP: European Americans wanted to feel HAP more than did Hong Kong Chinese, and Hong Kong Chinese wanted to feel LAP more than did European Americans. There were also differences *within* cultural groups: Whereas European Americans wanted to feel HAP and LAP to similar degrees (which was different from our first study, in which they wanted to feel HAP more than LAP), Hong Kong Chinese wanted to feel LAP much more than they wanted to feel HAP (see Figure 2.2). But it is also important to note that these differences occurred against a backdrop of between-group similarities in ideal affect. In all three groups, participants reported wanting to feel positive states (P, HAP, and LAP) more than negative states (N, HAN, and LAN), and they wanted to feel more positive and less negative than they actually felt. Where they differed were the specific positive states that they ideally wanted to feel.

Adding the Hong Kong Chinese samples shed new light on the East Asian American data. While East Asian Americans resembled their European American counterparts in valuing HAP more than did Hong Kong Chinese, they also valued LAP more than did European Americans. East Asian Americans also valued LAP *more* than did Hong Kong Chinese. We suspected

that this might be because the first- and second-generation East Asian Americans in our studies were raised by immigrant parents (like my own) who had left their homelands decades ago and who may have socialized their children to more traditional East Asian cultural ideas and practices. Of course, there were other possibilities: Being a minority in the United States might make East Asian Americans value LAP more, or growing up in a culture that valued HAP might amplify the value that East Asian Americans placed on LAP.

Of the research teams that focus on culture and emotion, we are one of the few to consistently treat East Asian Americans as a distinct group from East Asians. I am sure this is because as a U.S.-born Taiwanese American, I know the difference between first- and second-generation Asian Americans and people who have stayed in their countries of origin. But after all these years, I am still impressed by the variability of East Asian American ideal affect (see “Current Mysteries”).

Affect Valuation Theory

The initial empirical findings led to the development of affect valuation theory (AVT). As illustrated in Figure 2.3, AVT has three main premises (Tsai, 2007, 2017; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). The first is that people’s actual affect differs from their ideal affect. The second is that cultural factors influence people’s ideal affect more than their actual affect, whereas temperamental factors shape people’s actual affect more than their ideal affect. The third premise is




Figure 2.3 The premises of affect valuation theory. Thicker arrows indicate stronger relationships.

Adapted from Figure 3, “Ideal Affect: Cultural Causes and Behavioral Consequences,” by J. L. Tsai, 2007, *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 2, p. 251. Copyright 2007 by Association for Psychological Science. Adapted with permission.

that ideal affect guides people's perceptions, thoughts, and behaviors, whether or not they realize it.

The first premise formally distinguishes ideal affect from actual affect. As mentioned above, despite work in sociology on feeling rules (e.g., Hochschild, 1983), in psychology, most researchers either conflated desired with actual states or were primarily focused on actual states. Only a handful of studies had focused on desired states (e.g., Eid & Diener, 2001; Feldman Barrett, 1996; Izard, 1971; Rusting & Larsen, 1995; Sommers, 1984; Vastfjall et al., 2001), and none had examined cultural variation in desired affective states. In Tsai, Knutson, & Fung (2006), we demonstrated that actual and ideal affect were distinct constructs by showing that (a) the correlations between actual and ideal affect were weak to moderate; (b) the fit of models that treated ideal affect and actual affect as two distinct factors was better than that of models which treated them as one; and (c) people distinguished between actual and ideal affect in their self-reports: They reported wanting to feel more positively and less negatively than they actually did.

The second premise of AVT predicts that while culture might influence both actual and ideal affect, cultural factors shape how people want to feel more than how they actually feel. In contrast, temperamental factors (i.e., individual differences in emotional reactivity and regulation that appear early in life and that remain relatively stable across the life span; Kagan, 1998) shape how people actually feel more than how they want to feel. Although previous scholars had examined the link between actual and desired states, none had directly tested the possibility that culture might exert a greater influence on one versus the other. Moreover, few had considered the relative role of cultural and temperamental factors on people's feelings, despite the fact that temperament is by definition closely tied to emotional response (Kagan, 1998).

We based these predictions on several lines of work. First, based on Shweder (2003)'s argument that culture defines what people see as good, moral, and virtuous, we proposed that culture defines what *feelings* people see as good, moral, and virtuous (as well as bad, immoral, and sinful). Second, consistent with this idea, behavioral genetic twin studies suggested that whereas personality is highly heritable (Bouchard, 1994; Finkel et al., 1998; Goldsmith & Campos, 1986; Goldsmith & Lemery, 2000; Hettema et al., 2001; Krueger, 2000; Lemery & Goldsmith, 2002; Plomin & Caspi, 1999; Tellegen et al., 1988), attitudes and values are more environmentally influenced (e.g., Coon & Carey, 1989; Miles et al., 2001; Olsen et al., 2001; Petrill & Willkerson, 2000; Waller & Shaver, 1994). Given the links between personality and trait affect (Costa & McCrae, 1980; David et al., 1997; Diener & Larsen, 1984; Emmons & Diener, 1985; Gomez et al., 2000; Gross et al., 1998; McCrae et al., 1996; Rusting &

Larsen, 1995; Schimmack, Radhakrishnan, et al., 2002), and findings that actual trait affect is highly heritable (Diener & Lucas, 1999; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996), we predicted that whereas genetic factors such as temperament would exert a greater influence on actual affect than ideal affect, environmental factors such as culture would exert a greater influence on ideal than actual affect.

At the time, some colleagues questioned whether I needed to make assertions about the relative influence of culture on ideal and actual affect. Was I suggesting that culture did not influence actual affect? I was not: Clearly, there are cultural differences in the experience of specific emotional states, especially when the meaning of particular situations differs (e.g., Boiger et al., 2013; Kitayama et al., 2000; Mesquita, 2001; Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; Scollon et al., 2004). But I wanted to develop a theory that could be more specific about when culture did and did not play a role in emotion, and I knew from my own work and that of others that cultural similarities in emotion did exist (e.g., Breugelmans et al., 2005; Scherer, 1997; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994).

The third premise of AVT is that differences in ideal affect predict what people consciously or unconsciously do to feel good (virtuous, right, and moral) and to stop feeling bad (sinful, wrong, and immoral) came later, and it attempted to address the “So what?” question. This work was also critical to showing that ideal affect mattered above and beyond actual affect, especially given the overlap between the two (Eid & Diener, 2001; Feldman Barrett, 1996; Rusting & Larsen, 1995; Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006; see “Current Mysteries”).

Taking Culture Seriously

In order to demonstrate that the observed differences were cultural, we (a) ruled out alternative sources of variation, (b) used the culture cycle to demonstrate how these differences in ideal affect might be learned, and (c) linked these differences to broader cultural constructs.

Ruling Out Other Sources of Variation

Our first task was to show that the observed cultural differences in ideal HAP or ideal LAP between European Americans, East Asian Americans, and Hong Kong Chinese could not be explained by other known sources of variation. Some compelling possibilities were affective traits such as extraversion and neuroticism, sensation-seeking, and promotion and prevention focus (e.g., Elliot et al., 2001; A. Lee et al., 2000). Therefore, we administered self-report measures of these constructs alongside our measure of actual and ideal affect

(the Affect Valuation Index [AVI]). Although these constructs were highly correlated with actual HAP and LAP, they were only weakly correlated with ideal HAP and LAP. Most important, the observed cultural differences in ideal HAP and ideal LAP could not be explained by any of these constructs (Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007; reported in Tsai, 2007).

The Culture Cycle: Identifying Processes of Cultural Transmission

Our second task was to examine the role of culture. Although most theories of human behavior recognize the role of culture, they often use the term “culture” in a loose and unspecified way. If one is truly committed to understanding how culture shapes emotion, then it becomes critical to clarify what one exactly means by “culture.” And here is where being in the same department as Hazel Markus made a world of difference for my research.

Hazel and her students based their theorizing about culture on anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s (1952) classic definition, which asserts that cultural ideas (a) are reflected in the content of institutions, practices, and artifacts that people are exposed to and engage with; (b) are socially transmitted over historical time; and (c) are created by humans and at the same time create humans, or what Shweder (1995) and Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett (1998) called “mutual constitution,” and what Markus and Snibbe (2014) later referred to as the “culture cycle.” In other words, if something is “cultural,” it should not only be linked to cultural variables (e.g., concepts of the self) but also be socially transmitted through engagement in and exposure to different aspects of the cultural environment. The definition lays out exactly where researchers should look for evidence of cultural transmission: in practices, products, and institutions.

So I started comparing U.S. American and East Asian, specifically Chinese cultural products and practices. First, there were the big, toothy Julia Roberts’ smiles found not only in photos of celebrities but also in photos of my friends and me. Then there were all the messages about the importance of passion, fun, and enthusiasm (“Are we having fun yet?” “Did you have fun?”). When writing letters of recommendation, I found myself describing my best students as “enthusiastic” and “passionate,” and these were the same characteristics that I looked for when admitting students into my own lab.

In addition, I started thinking about my parents’ photos a little differently, especially the ones taken in Taiwan. From an American perspective, it seems like my parents and relatives were not smiling at all. But based on our research, I started wondering whether they were in fact trying to show calm and equanimity. I even began to have new insight into my parents’ warnings

when I was growing up: “Don’t be so high key. Don’t show too much excitement.” I finally understood why they teased me when I greeted my friends on the phone, “HI!!! HOW ARE YOU?!?!?” They were mocking my high arousal positive affect!

Could this collection of impressions and observations be related to cultural differences in ideal affect? Inspired by the work of Hazel and her student Hee-jung Kim, which compared independent and interdependent themes in U.S. and Korean advertisements (Kim & Markus, 1999), and the discussions we were having in our weekly culture meeting (“Culture Collab”), my students and I decided to do a systematic analysis of the content of popular and widely distributed cultural products that we expected would explicitly teach children and adults to want to feel a certain way. We looked at a variety of types of popular media, including children’s storybooks (Tsai, Louie, Chen, et al., 2007), women’s magazines, Christian and Buddhist self-help books (Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007), and later leaders’ official website photos (Tsai et al., 2016).

Ideal Affect in the United States and Taiwan: Children’s Storybooks

I conducted one of the first studies on cultural products with two creative and talented undergraduates, Jenny Louie (now a practicing clinical psychologist) and Eva Chen (now an associate professor in Hong Kong), as well as the wonderful Yukiko Uchida, who was a postdoc then but is now a professor at Kyoto University (Tsai, Louie, Chen, et al., 2007). Another great student, Arielle Reinstein, had just completed her honors thesis; she asked children to draw pictures of happy and sad faces, and she found consistently that the Asian American preschool children drew smaller smiles than did the European American preschool children, even after taking into account the overall size of the face. Jenny and I wondered if this was related to cultural differences in ideal affect. Therefore, we designed a series of studies that more directly examined children’s affective preferences.

First, we examined whether preschool children from the United States and Taiwan actually differed in their affective preferences in ways that were consistent with our university samples. For obvious reasons, we could not use our usual self-report measures of ideal affect, so we created different tasks that could be used with young children. In one task, we showed children two smiley faces, one with an open toothy “excited” smile  and another with a closed “calm” smile , and we asked children to choose the smile that they would prefer to be, as well as the one that they thought was more happy. Compared to Taiwanese preschoolers, European American preschoolers were more likely to choose the excited (vs. calm) smile in response to both questions. We also told children a story of two characters, one

who preferred to engage in activities in an excited way (e.g., “likes to jump and splash in the swimming pool”) and another who preferred to engage in the same activities but in a calm way (e.g., “likes to sit and float on an inner tube in the swimming pool”), and then we asked the children whom they themselves were more like. Compared to Taiwanese preschoolers, more European American preschoolers said that they more closely resembled the character who liked to engage in the activities in an excited (vs. calm) way, with Asian Americans falling in between the two groups. To ensure that these differences were not due to temperamental factors, we asked preschoolers’ teachers to rate children’s temperamental styles. Surprisingly few cultural differences in teacher’s ratings of children’s temperament emerged, and those that did emerge did not account for preschoolers’ affective preferences.⁴

We were then interested in examining how preschoolers *learn* how to want to feel. Could we identify and demonstrate paths of social transmission? We decided to look at the content of the most popular children’s storybooks for kids between ages 4 and 6 years in the United States and Taiwan to determine if U.S. storybooks contained more excitement versus calm compared to Taiwanese storybooks. We compared the emotional facial expressions of the human and nonhuman characters in the storybooks. First, we measured the width of the mouth relative to the size of the face, as we had in Arielle’s study. We also adapted FACS, which was developed by Paul Ekman to record minute facial muscle movements, to capture the different facial expressions of the characters in these storybooks. By the end of the project, my team had coded 2,610 facial expressions. Finally, we coded the physical intensity of the activities the characters were engaged in.

Best-selling storybooks in both the United States and Taiwan contained more positive expressions (e.g., smiles) than negative expressions (e.g., frowns). Consistent with cultural differences in ideal affect, however, U.S. storybooks contained wider smiles than did Taiwanese storybooks, even after controlling for the size of the face. Moreover, the U.S. storybooks contained more open and toothy “excited” smiles (in FACS terms, AU 12 + AU 25) vs. closed “calm” smiles (in FACS terms, AU 12 without AU 25) compared to Taiwanese storybooks. Similarly, the characters in the U.S. storybooks were engaged in higher intensity activities such as running and jumping than were the characters in the Taiwanese storybooks. These findings supported our

⁴ After we published the study, a colleague asked whether the differences might be due to experimenter demand. Therefore, we coded the emotional expressions of the researcher during each session; no group differences emerged in researchers’ emotional expressions.

prediction that cultural differences in ideal affect would be reflected in the emotional content of children's storybooks.

We then looked at the effects of short-term exposure to different types of affective content on children's affective preferences. European American, East Asian American, and Taiwanese children were randomly assigned to read either an "exciting" or "calm" storybook, in which the main character engaged in various activities in an exciting or calm way, and their mother praised them for it (e.g., "His mommy says, 'Good splashing!'"). To ensure that children saw the different types of smiles that the characters showed, we told them to "Look at the smile, see how happy s/he is?" Contrary to predictions, the type of storybook that children read did not change which smile they preferred: European American children were approximately four times more likely to prefer the excited (vs. calm) smile compared to East Asian American and Taiwanese Chinese children, regardless of what type of storybook they had just read. However, across cultural groups, children who read the "exciting" storybook were more likely to perceive the excited (vs. calm) smile as happy than those who read the "calm" storybook. We also devised a task in which preschoolers chose different activities for their "ideal playground." They were given choices between pairs of activities, including one that was more exciting and one that was more calming (e.g., "a drum that you play fast, BOOM-BOOM-BOOM!" vs. "a drum that you play slow and soft, tap-tap-tap"). Again, across cultural groups, children who read the "exciting" storybook chose more exciting (vs. calm) activities for their ideal playground compared to those who read the "calm" storybook.

Together, these findings suggest that at least in the short term, exposure to specific types of affective content in popular media influences children's desires to want to feel a certain way. We infer that chronic exposure to popular media produces even more enduring cultural differences in ideal affect, but this, of course, remains an empirical question.

We also analyzed the affective content of other types of popular media. We compared the expressions of the faces in U.S. and Chinese women's magazines and found similar differences: There were more excited (vs. calm) faces in U.S. women's magazines than in Hong Kong Chinese women's magazines. We also looked at students' Facebook profiles: European American students showed bigger smiles and were engaged in more high arousal activities (e.g., jumping into a lake) more than their Hong Kong peers. These latter findings were supported by another research team (Huang & Park, 2013).

At the same time that we started brainstorming different ways in which people might learn to want to feel a certain way, I started reviewing the existing literature to determine if there was any evidence that Western cultural ideas and practices might emphasize HAP more and LAP less than

East Asian cultural ideas and practices (Tsai, 2007). Viewed through this lens, I started seeing new patterns in the literature that I had not noticed before. For instance, Anna Wierzbicka's work on communication scripts in the United States, which include expressions of HAP such as 'You look great! Your X (hair, garden, apartment, etc.) looks great! It's great! That's great! Great!' (Wierzbicka, 1994, p. 246) and Caudill and Weinstein's work comparing U.S. and Japanese mothers' responses to their infants (Caudill, 1972; Caudill & Schooler, 1973; Caudill & Weinstein, 1969; Minami & McCabe, 1995; Morikawa et al., 1988) suggest that cultural differences in HAP and LAP may be long-standing. It is important to note that it would be easy to miss the overlap in these findings, but the affective circumplex helped me see "Great!" and stimulation as different manifestations of HAP.

Ideal Affect in Buddhism and Christianity: Texts and Meditation

Interestingly, it was difficult to find studies of calm and other low arousal states in the empirical literature because most researchers only measured high arousal positive states. Low arousal positive states were either not measured or labeled as "neutral." Could this be another effect of cultural differences in ideal affect? Western researchers who value high arousal positive states might not count low arousal positive states as positive.

Where I did find a lot of discussion of calm and other low arousal positive states was in the popular and scientific literature on Buddhism and mindfulness. Thanks to Richie Davidson, I participated in a scientific exchange with His Holiness the Dalai Lama on destructive emotions in 2000 (Goleman, 2004).⁵ This occurred during a time when I was also becoming personally interested in Buddhism, and I was struck by the fact that the states that meditation, mindfulness, and Buddhism cultivated were the low arousal states of calm, peace, and tranquility because they allowed people to be more attentive and aware of their connection to the larger world.

Because the dominant religion in many East Asian cultures is Buddhism, and the dominant religion in many Western cultures is Christianity, I was interested in whether comparing the two religions would yield similar differences in ideal HAP and ideal LAP. The first data were collected by Emma Seppala, who had access to a group of Taiwanese Buddhist monks with whom she worked one summer. These monks ($n = 80$) valued HAP less than European American and Hong Kong Chinese university students

⁵ The Dalai Lama raised important questions about culture and emotion during this dialogue. He himself appeared to be skeptical of cultural differences (Goleman, 2004). Twenty plus years later, we know so much more about how culture shapes emotion, and I wonder if his views about culture have changed.

(European American mean = .69, SE = .03; Hong Kong Chinese mean = .45, SE = .03; Taiwanese Monk mean = .08, SE = .04), but they valued LAP more than Hong Kong Chinese and European Americans (European American mean = .73, SE = .03; Hong Kong Chinese mean = .78, SE = .02; Taiwanese Monk mean = .87, SE = .03). Would such differences emerge in more controlled comparisons of Buddhists and Christians?

First, we compared the ideal affect of Buddhist and Christian practitioners in the United States. As predicted, Buddhists valued HAP less and LAP more than their Christian counterparts. But again, in the spirit of the culture cycle, we wanted to identify the specific ways in which Buddhists and Christians learned to want to feel a certain way. Therefore, we compared the affective content of Buddhist and Christian texts. First, we looked at classic Christian (e.g., Gospels in the New Testament) and Buddhist (e.g., Heart Sutra) texts. As we predicted, Christian classic texts encouraged their readers to experience more HAP than did Buddhist classic texts (e.g., “Be strong”) (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007). Although Buddhist texts encouraged readers to feel more LAP than did Christian texts, these differences were not significant, suggesting that both traditions encourage the experience of calm states. We then decided to look at more contemporary Christian (e.g., *Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living to Your Full Potential* by Joel Osteen) and Buddhist (e.g., *The Art of Happiness* by the Dalai Lama and Howard Cutler) best-selling self-help books, which are more accessible to most laypeople. As predicted, we found not only that Christian self-help books encouraged readers to feel more HAP than did Buddhist self-help books but also that Buddhist self-help books encouraged readers to feel more LAP than did Christian self-help books (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007).

In another paper (Koopmann-Holm et al., 2013), my talented and resourceful graduate student Birgit Koopmann-Holm (now an associate professor at Santa Clara University) examined whether Buddhist-inspired meditative practice decreased participants’ valuation of HAP and increased their valuation of LAP. First, we compared the ideal affect of a university sample of Buddhist-inspired meditators and non-meditators and found that as predicted and consistent with the work described above, meditators valued LAP more and HAP less than non-meditators. There were no differences, however, in how much they actually experienced HAP and LAP (or how much they experienced or valued negative states). Because these were correlational data, we conducted another study in which we randomly assigned participants to one of two 8-week Buddhist-inspired mindfulness meditation classes (mindfulness or compassion) or to one of two control groups (an improvisational theater class or a no-class

control group). We assessed actual and ideal affect before and after the 8-week period.

Consistent with our previous study, participants who were randomly assigned to the meditation classes were more likely to value LAP than were those assigned to the control groups (there were no differences between the two meditation class groups or between the two control groups), supporting our prediction that engaging in Buddhist-inspired meditation increases the valuation of calm (Koopmann et al., 2013). Contrary to prediction, however, there were no differences in how much participants valued HAP, suggesting that changing ideal HAP in a culture that chronically values it may take more than 8 weeks of instruction. Interestingly, there were also no differences across conditions in how much people actually experienced various affective states or even in their well-being after the 8 weeks.

These findings suggest that engagement in Buddhist-inspired meditation selectively increased the valuation of calm, at least in U.S. samples. A remaining question is whether meditation would decrease the valuation of excitement and other HAP in East Asian contexts. Indeed, I have always wanted to see how religion and national culture may work together or against each other to shape ideal affect.

Linking to Broader Cultural Constructs

The third step to assessing whether the observed group differences were cultural was to show empirically that the group differences in ideal HAP and ideal LAP that we observed were indeed linked to the predicted cultural variables. In Tsai, Knutson, & Fung (2006), we had predicted that differences in ideal HAP and LAP were linked to differences in independent and interdependent models of the self, specifically the emphasis on influencing versus adjusting to one's environment (Hofstede, 2001; Morling et al., 2022; Triandis, 1989). Although we found evidence supporting these hypotheses, we wanted to test them more directly and experimentally.

Here again, it was important to know different theoretical models in psychology. As described above, Markus and Kitayama (1991) theorized about how cultural differences in individualism and collectivism would translate into psychological differences associated with the self, specifically the emphasis on asserting one's self versus adjusting one's self to others. But this tension between one's autonomy (or independence) and one's connection to others (or interdependence) has also been described in other subfields of psychology (Horowitz et al., 2006; Leary, 1957; Wiggins, 1979).

For instance, interpersonal circumplex models describe the different ways people behave in relation to others in terms of two dimensions: affiliation/

communion and agency/dominance. The affiliation/communion dimension describes behaviors or characteristics ranging from warm (high affiliation) to hostile (low affiliation), whereas the dominance dimension describes behaviors or characteristics ranging from dominant (high dominance) to submissive (low dominance).⁶ To me, the high end of the dominance dimension sounded like “influence,” whereas the low end sounded like “adjustment.” Influencing one’s environment means acting and changing one’s environment to be consistent with one’s own desires, preferences, and values, whereas adjusting to one’s environment means changing one’s desires, preferences, and values to be consistent with the demands of the environment (Morling et al., 2002).

It struck me that different levels of arousal facilitate influence and adjustment. High arousal states focus attention and allow individuals to change their environments (Obrist, 1981; Schupp et al., 1997; Tomaka et al., 1993), whereas low arousal states allow individuals to pay attention to their environments (Libby et al., 1973; Schupp et al., 1997) so that they can subsequently change themselves to be consistent with them. Indeed, previous research demonstrated that influencing others was positively associated with high arousal and negatively associated with low arousal (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Murray & Nakajima, 1999). Scholars had also linked the interpersonal and affective circumplexes (Plutchik & Conte, 1997), suggesting that affiliation maps onto valence, and dominance maps onto arousal. Brian’s dissertation (Knutson, 1996) showed these links in the context of person perception: People judge expressions of happiness as more affiliative, expressions of anger as more hostile and dominant, and expressions of sadness as more submissive.

Thus, compared to their East Asian counterparts, European Americans might value HAP more because individualistic cultures such as the United States value influence more, and high arousal states facilitate influence. In contrast, compared to their European American counterparts, East Asians might value LAP more because collectivistic cultures such as those in East Asia value adjustment more, and low arousal states facilitate adjustment. We tested this hypothesis in four studies (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007).

This is work that I started with my amazing student Felicity Miao when she was undergraduate research assistant (she went on to get her PhD at the University of Virginia). First, we examined whether group differences in ideal HAP and ideal LAP were associated with differences in influence and adjustment values, using existing measures of interpersonal values. My colleague Len Horowitz used interpersonal models of behavior to understand people’s

⁶ From an American perspective, “dominance” and “influence” seem better than “submission” and “adjustment,” but these terms are meant to be descriptive, not evaluative.

goals during therapeutic encounters (Horowitz et al., 2006); he measured these interpersonal goals with the Circumplex Scale of Interpersonal Values (CSIV; Locke, 2000). Therefore, we administered the CSIV and the AVI, our self-report measure of actual and ideal affect, to a sample of European American, East Asian American, and Hong Kong Chinese university students.

As predicted, European Americans valued HAP more and LAP less than did Hong Kong Chinese, and East Asian Americans fell in the middle, valuing HAP more than Hong Kong Chinese and LAP more than European Americans. Also as predicted, although all groups valued influence more than adjustment, European Americans valued influence more and adjustment less than did Hong Kong Chinese, and East Asian Americans fell in the middle of both groups. Finally, the group differences in ideal HAP were fully mediated by the group differences in influence goals, and the group differences in ideal LAP between European Americans and Hong Kong Chinese were partially mediated by cultural differences in adjustment goals (Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007, Study 1), raising the possibility that ideal LAP may be related to other factors.

To assess causality, we then conducted four experimental studies in the United States and Hong Kong. Across the studies, we used an interpersonal task in which one partner gives the other instructions to build a shape (i.e., influences the partner), and the other partner listens carefully to the instructions to build the shape (i.e., adjusts to the partner), adapted from Schober and Clark (1989). In the first two experimental studies, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two roles, asked to begin the task, and then were stopped approximately halfway through and asked to indicate how they actually and ideally want to feel at that moment. As predicted, participants randomly assigned to the “influencer” condition reported valuing HAP more and LAP less than did those randomly assigned to the “adjuster” condition. In the final study, we wanted to see if these differences emerged even when people were simply preparing to play the game, to simulate having a goal. When participants arrived in the lab, we told them that they needed to wait for their partner to arrive but, while they were waiting, they could learn about what they were going to do. After receiving either influencing or adjustment instructions, they were then offered a CD in order to help them prepare for the task.

The exciting CD was “Soundsplash” and included reviews extolling the stimulating music on the CD; the calm one was “Windchants” and included reviews praising the calm and tranquil music on the CD. In both the United States and Hong Kong, participants who received instructions to influence their partners were *more* likely to choose the exciting (vs. calm) CD, and

the participants who received instructions to adjust to their partners were less likely they were to choose the excited (vs. calm) CD. Across conditions, however, European Americans still chose the excited (vs. calm) CD more than did their Hong Kong Chinese counterparts. Moreover, none of these manipulations altered actual HAP or actual LAP.

These experimental studies were our first demonstrations that across cultures, people want to feel varying degrees of HAP and LAP in the moment. Although we observed global differences in influence and adjustment goals and in ideal HAP and ideal LAP, participants also varied in how much they wanted to influence or adjust in a particular situation, which altered their ideal affect in that situation.

It is important to note that we tried a variety of experimental manipulations before we settled on this one, reflecting the many different processes associated with independence and interdependence. For instance, we experimentally manipulated prevention focus and promotion focus (A. Lee et al., 2004; Lee & Aaker, 2004), competitive versus cooperative goals (“Wall Street Game” vs. “Community Game”; Liberman et al., 2004), and independent versus interdependent selves (“I” vs. “We”; Gardner et al., 1999), but none of these manipulations altered the valuation of HAP and LAP. This illustrates the specificity of the links between influence goals and ideal HAP and between adjustment goals and ideal LAP, although again, ideal LAP may be related to other factors as well. In these studies, we also demonstrated that the effects were specific to ideal affect (and not to actual affect, as mentioned above) and that they were not explained by neuroticism or extraversion.

In summary, we took culture seriously. We first ruled out alternative sources of variation such as temperament. We then used the culture cycle to identify specific ways in which people might be socialized to want to feel a certain way, and we even showed how short-term exposure to affective texts (e.g., children’s storybooks) and engagement in affective practices (e.g., meditation) changed individuals’ affective preferences. Finally, we predicted and tested the link between ideal HAP and LAP and specific cultural variables, specifically influence and adjustment goals. Collectively, this work demonstrates that culture shapes how people ideally want to feel.

What About the Role of Temperament?

In these studies, we controlled for neuroticism and extraversion, which are in many people’s minds close cousins of temperament. In the studies with preschoolers, we also controlled for teachers’ ratings of temperament. But critics could rightly argue that these are very cursory tests of the temperament alternative. AVT has a clear prediction about temperament, and it would be

wonderful to be able to test it. For instance, I would like to be able to follow a group of infants from birth to early adulthood at least to see what links there are between infant temperament and later actual affect, as well as socialization and later ideal affect. Although we have cross-sectional data comparing ideal affect across age groups in the United States (European Americans and Chinese Americans) and Hong Kong (Tsai et al., 2018) starting at age 18 years, only longitudinal data would allow us to truly examine developmental changes (see “Current Mysteries”). Indeed, in some of Jerome Kagan’s early work, he talked about mothers actively socializing their young children to be more social and more extraverted because it was what American culture values, and he observed actual change in these children (Kagan et al., 1987). So, I am not arguing that socialization cannot alter actual affect, but only that it likely alters ideal affect first. The most interesting questions revolve around how the two interact.

The Valuation of Other Types of Affect

Most of our initial work focused on the distinction between high arousal and low arousal *positive* states because across the cultures we studied, participants reported wanting to feel more positive than negative, and there were no consistent differences in the valuation of negative states (e.g., Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006; ; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007). But many people asked about differences in the valuation of negative states. Birgit, who had worked with me on the meditation studies, was one of these people, and she primarily worked on this when she was in my lab. Birgit is from Germany, and her interest in cultural views of negative emotions stemmed from her experiences in the United States, especially when she first arrived here as a Fulbright fellow. When her American friends asked how she was doing, she thought that they really wanted to hear about her daily hassles and frustrations, so she told them. However, based on their responses, she quickly realized that if she wanted to keep them as friends, she would have to smile and say that everything was “great!” Birgit felt that Americans avoided negative emotions more than did Germans, which reminded me of my parents’ impression that Americans hid their anger.

To test her hypotheses, Birgit asked European American and German participants how much they wanted to *avoid* various affective states. This was our first attempt to apply AVT to negative states, and we assumed that in the same way that culture should shape what feelings are good, virtuous, and moral, culture should shape what feelings are bad, sinful, and immoral

(Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014). First, Birgit showed that avoided affect was distinct from ideal and actual affect, and that at least in European American and German contexts, individuals wanted to avoid negative states more than they actually and ideally wanted to feel them.

Then, as she predicted, she showed in four studies that European Americans wanted to avoid negative affect more than did Germans, and this held across different negative emotions. Consistent with AVT, there were fewer cultural differences in actual negative affect, suggesting that like ideal affect, avoided affect was shaped by culture more than actual affect.

Birgit went beyond this and showed how these cultural differences in avoided negative affect were related to cultural differences in how people expressed sympathy, differences that she had to adjust to when she first arrived in the United States. She predicted that because European Americans wanted to avoid negative affect more, they are more likely to focus on the positive when coping with negative events such as the death of a loved one. In contrast, because Germans accept negative affect more, Birgit thought they would focus on the negative more when coping with negative events. Birgit found that this difference was reflected in the affective content of sympathy cards: American sympathy cards contained more positive phrases such as “Love lives on” and “Memories will bring comfort,” whereas German sympathy cards contained more negative phrases such as “In deep sadness” and “Words will not lighten a heavy heart.” American sympathy cards were also more colorful and contained more living (vs. dying) imagery than did German sympathy cards (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014). Birgit conducted a similar comparison of American and German baby cards, but no such differences emerged suggesting that they were specific to expressions of sympathy.

Do Americans and Germans actually differ in the types of sympathy cards they prefer to give? Birgit created three pairs of sympathy cards that had similar nature images (e.g., a sunset) but differed in whether they focused on the negative (“A severe loss . . . take time to grieve”) or the positive (“Remembering . . . let time heal your soul”). Then she had European Americans and Germans imagine that they wanted to send one of those cards to an acquaintance whose father had recently died. Participants were asked to rate how comfortable they would be sending each card and which one they preferred to send. European Americans were more comfortable sending the “positive” sympathy card and less comfortable sending the “negative” sympathy card compared to Germans, and these cultural differences were specifically mediated by cultural differences in how much participants wanted to avoid avoided negative affect. Whereas only 36% of European Americans chose to send a negative card among the three pairs, 72% of Germans chose to do so.

In a final study, to assess causality, Birgit experimentally manipulated how much European Americans and Germans wanted to avoid negative affect by having them push negative pictures away from them (i.e., increasing how much participants wanted to avoid negative affect) or pull negative pictures closer to them (i.e., decreasing how much participants wanted to avoid negative affect). Across cultures, the more people pushed negative images away, or the more they wanted to avoid negative affect, the less likely they were to choose the negative sympathy card, suggesting that at least temporarily, wanting to avoid negative emotion can make people express sympathy in less negative terms.

This work has important implications for understanding how culture shapes people's responses to grief and suffering. Germans and other Europeans who do not want to avoid negative affect may be more comfortable focusing on their sadness and grief, whereas European Americans who want to avoid negative affect (and minimize it) may prefer to focus on the positive even when responding to another's grief.

In addition to Birgit's work, we started to revisit ideal negative affect. Another incredible graduate student, Tamara Sims, wondered if there were differences between European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong Chinese samples in the degree to which they wanted to feel positive relative to negative states (Sims et al., 2015). Various research teams had already described and documented a greater emphasis on positivity in the United States, especially compared to the greater emphasis on emotional moderation and balance in many East Asian contexts (e.g., Heine et al., 1999; Kitayama et al., 2000; S. J. Lee & Wu, 2008; Schimmack, Oishi, et al., 2002; Uchida et al., 2004; Uchida & Kitayama, 2009), and we observed evidence of this in our own early work (Tsai, Levenson, et al., 2006). However, no one had empirically distinguished between the valuation and the actual experience of positive relative to negative states.

Therefore, in two large experience sampling studies—one of European American and Chinese American men and women aged 20–79 years and of different education levels (one-third high school educated and two-thirds college educated) and another with two American (European American and Chinese American) and two Chinese (Hong Kong Chinese and Beijing Chinese) college student samples from top- and middle-tier universities—Tamara showed that on average (across 30–39 time samples), American participants wanted to feel positive relative to negative states much more than did their Chinese counterparts, controlling for how positive and negative they actually felt. These cultural differences were mediated by independent versus interdependent values: Americans valued positive (vs. negative) states more than did Chinese in part because they valued independence (vs.

interdependence) more (Sims et al., 2015). Furthermore, these differences in the relative emphasis on positive (vs. negative) states influenced people's experience of positive and negative emotions (see "Current Mysteries").

The most recent examination of ideal negative affect was conducted by the fantastic Magali Clobert, then a postdoc and now an associate professor at Caen University (Clobert et al., 2022). Magali was particularly interested in distinguishing between dominant high arousal negative states (HAN-dominant) such as anger and submissive high arousal negative states (HAN-submissive) such as fear. Given the greater emphasis on adjustment in many collectivistic East Asian contexts described above (Morling et al., 2002; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007), Magali predicted and observed that Taiwanese valued HAN-submissive states more than did European Canadians (Clobert et al., 2022). But despite these differences, Magali observed that valuing HAN was associated with increased prejudice toward out-groups across cultures, which I describe in greater detail below.

In summary, although the bulk of our work has focused on the valuation of high versus low arousal positive states, we have also examined the avoidance of negative affect (Koopmann-Holm & Tsai, 2014); the valuation of positive versus negative states (Sims et al., 2015); and, most recently, the valuation of HAN-dominant versus HAN-submissive states (Clobert et al., 2022).⁷

Why Ideal Affect Matters Psychologically

I entered the field wanting to understand how cultural differences in emotion shaped not only my own experiences but also the experiences of other Asian Americans. Very little research on culture and emotion actually made connections to real-world issues, and therefore, I spent the next stage of my research career examining how and why cultural (and individual) differences in ideal affect mattered.

How Ideal Affect Influences Mood-Regulating Behaviors

Mood regulation theories (e.g., Erber & Erber, 2001; Larsen, 2000) suggest that people—consciously and unconsciously—do things to feel good. They

⁷ Other teams have focused on how much people ideally want to feel specific emotional states (e.g., Tamir et al., 2016) and related constructs, such as how people think they ought to feel (e.g., Thompson et al., 2016), the "valuation of extreme happiness" (Mausse et al., 2011), "attitudes toward negative emotions" (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011), the "social valuation of affect" (Bastian et al., 2014), the "perceived utility of emotions" (Chow & Berenbaum, 2012), and "negative affect valuation" (Luong et al., 2016). In Tsai (2007), I conceptually distinguished ideal affect from attitudes, norms, and feeling rules, but it would be important to examine the amount of empirical overlap that actually exists among these constructs.

choose places to go, activities to engage in, and even people to interact with who will make them feel good. Based on this idea, the third premise of AVT is that people select places, activities, and other people that help them achieve their ideal affect.

Specifically, we predicted that the more individuals value HAP, the more likely they are to consume more “energizing” products, listen to more arousing music, and engage in more physically rigorous activities. Similarly, the more that individuals value LAP, the more likely they are to consume more “calming” products, listen to more soothing music, and engage in less physically rigorous activities. To test this idea, we presented participants with pairs of calm and exciting music and asked them to choose the one they preferred more. The more individuals valued LAP, the more likely they were to choose the calm options (Tsai, 2007). In another study, we experimentally manipulated the degree to which people valued excitement, calm, or neutral states and then gave participants choices between different stimulating versus soothing consumer products. As predicted, participants in the “value excitement” condition chose more stimulating versus soothing consumer products (e.g., drinks, lotions) compared to those in the “value calm” or neutral control conditions. In yet other studies, we asked participants to indicate how much they engaged in higher arousal and lower arousal physical activities. As predicted, the more people valued HAP, the more they engaged in physically rigorous activities such as running (Tsai et al., 2015).

Of course, we also predicted that cultural differences in ideal affect would lead to cultural differences in people’s mood-producing behaviors. Indeed, previous studies hinted that this might be the case. For instance, European Americans and Canadians are more likely to consider having fun and experiencing thrills as important benefits of leisure than are Japanese and Taiwanese (Yoshioka et al., 2002). Caucasian Canadians are less likely to view wildlife and scenery but are more likely to hike than are Chinese Canadians at a park (Walker et al., 2001). Similarly, Gobster and Delgado (1992) found that European Americans are more likely to engage in “active individual” activities (e.g., jogging, running, and rollerblading) and less likely to engage in “passive” activities (e.g., sightseeing, hanging out, and picnicking) than are Asian Americans. Yu and Berryman (1996) even found that as Chinese immigrant adolescents become more acculturated to American culture, they also become more likely to engage in active sports (e.g., basketball) and other outdoor activities (e.g., bicycling). However, none of these studies examined potential links to ideal affect.

Therefore, we examined these links in several studies. In one study, we asked European Americans, Chinese Americans, and Hong Kong Chinese to

describe their ideal vacations. European Americans described vacations that were more exciting and that involved more activities compared to Hong Kong Chinese, and these differences were mediated by ideal HAP. In the studies described above, Asian American chose calm music more than did their European American counterparts (Tsai, 2007), and U.S. samples (European Americans and Chinese Americans) chose more stimulating (vs. soothing) consumer products than did Chinese samples (Hong Kong Chinese and Beijing Chinese) (Tsai et al., 2015). Again, these differences in mood producing behaviors were mediated by ideal affect.

Perhaps most compelling are the possibilities for understanding cultural differences in drug use, such as psychotropic medications. For example, lithium treatment seems to be more effective in Hong Kong than in the United States for the treatment of bipolar disorder, in part because bipolar patients in Hong Kong are more likely to take their lithium (Keck et al., 1997; S. Lee, 1993). Could it be Hong Kong patients are more likely to take their lithium because it is helping them achieve their ideal state of calm, whereas it is hindering U.S. patients from achieving their ideal state of excitement? Obviously, there are many other factors that influence these trends; nevertheless, the possible connections to ideal affect are intriguing and might ultimately be central to effective treatment.

How Ideal Affect Might Explain Disparities in Mental Health

As a graduate student in clinical psychology, one of the most concerning disparities was the underutilization of mental health services by Asian Americans compared to European Americans and other ethnic groups. Work by various scholars suggested that even when language was not a barrier, Asian Americans (immigrants and those born in the United States) were extremely reluctant to use mental health services, and when they sought treatment, the majority of Asian Americans did not return to therapy after the first session (Cheung & Snowden, 1990; S. Sue et al., 1991; Ying & Hu, 1994). This is still true decades later, especially among Asian immigrants (e.g., Abe-Kim et al., 2007; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Minority Health, n.d.). Scholars and clinicians suspect that one of the barriers is related to cultural differences between Western clinicians and their Asian American clients, including differences in their views of emotion and emotional distress (e.g., Kleinman & Good, 1986; S. Sue & Sue, 1999). Could our work on ideal affect shed some light on this?

Based on our findings, I thought that Western clinicians might view mental health as more HAP and less LAP compared to their East Asian patients, and this might result in misdiagnosis and inappropriate treatment. To explore

this possibility, Janie Hong (then a postdoc in my lab and now a therapist working in the Bay Area) and I created a “Conceptions of Mental Health” scale in which we asked participants to identify the emotions that they viewed as central to “happiness” and “well-being” (Tsai et al., 2023). We predicted and found that European Americans used more HAP terms to describe “happiness” and “well-being” than did Hong Kong Chinese, whereas Hong Kong Chinese used more LAP terms to describe happiness and well-being than did European Americans. East Asian Americans resembled their European American counterparts. When we asked the same participants to indicate the emotions that they viewed as central to “depression” and “distress,” European Americans used more low arousal negative terms (i.e., the opposite of HAP states) than did Hong Kong Chinese, whereas Hong Kong Chinese used more HAN terms (i.e., the opposite of LAP states) than did European Americans. Again, East Asian Americans most closely resembled their European American counterparts. These findings suggest that individuals’ concepts of health and illness reflect their culture’s ideal affect.

These different ideals should play a role in the expression of depression and other forms of emotional distress, or what Yulia (with whom I did a lot of the work on emotional reactivity) and I refer to as the “cultural norm hypothesis” (Chentsova-Dutton et al., 2007, 2010, 2014; Chentsova-Dutton & Tsai, 2009). We hypothesized that depression may alter people’s abilities to abide by cultural norms: In cultures in which more intense emotional expression is the norm or ideal, depressed individuals may have less intense emotional responses, whereas in cultures in which emotional moderation is the norm or ideal, depressed individuals may have more intense emotional responses. Similarly, in cultures that value high arousal positive states, depressed individuals should show decreased arousal, whereas in cultures that value low arousal positive states, depressed individuals should show increased arousal. Thus, ideal affect may not only influence conceptions of well-being and depression but also might influence how depression is expressed.

In support of this hypothesis, we observed that whereas depressed European Americans showed less intense (also described as flattened or blunted) responses to a sad film clip compared to non-depressed European Americans (e.g., smaller increases in reports of sadness and less crying), depressed Asian Americans showed more intense responses to the sad film clip compared to their nondepressed peers (e.g., greater increases in reports of sadness and more crying) (Chentsova-Dutton et al., 2007). Interestingly, among depressed Asian Americans, those who were more oriented to East Asian culture showed more intense responses to the sad film clip. In another study, we examined whether similar patterns emerged for responses to an

amusing film clip. Again, consistent with the cultural norm hypothesis, depressed European Americans showed less intense responses (fewer smiles and decreases in reports of enjoyment) compared to their nondepressed European American peers, whereas depressed Asian Americans showed more intense (greater cardiac reactivity) or similar responses (smiles) compared to their nondepressed Asian American peers (Chentsova-Dutton et al., 2010). The findings for the European American groups were consistent with previous findings (e.g., Renneberg et al., 2005; Rottenberg et al., 2002), but the findings for the Asian Americans were novel and suggested that the emotional impact of depression varied across these cultural groups.

These differences have important implications for assessment and diagnosis. If European American clinicians use expressions of excitement as an indicator of well-being, but their Asian American clients value and show calm, clinicians might misdiagnose them as depressed when they are not. Conversely, if Asian Americans show more high arousal states when they are depressed, their depression may be overlooked by Western clinicians who are using flat affect as an indicator of depression. Indeed, we observed that when U.S. clinical psychologists-in-training were shown clips of depressed and non-depressed European American and Asian American women watching film clips and were asked to rate how depressed the women were, they rated Asian Americans as overall more depressed than European Americans, and they based their ratings on how much excitement women showed while watching the film clips (Tsai et al., 2023).

Next, we wanted to examine whether commonly used inventories in clinical practice and research might reflect American ideals because they are primarily created and developed by Western clinicians and scientists. We coded the affective content of each item and found that as predicted, the most popular measures of well-being and depression contained more HAP than LAP. Contrary to our hypothesis, however, they included more HAN than LAN (Tsai et al., 2023), perhaps illustrating the comorbidity of depression and anxiety.

Together, these findings suggest that Western clinicians and their non-Western clients may differ in their views of well-being and depression because of cultural differences in ideal affect. Although our studies have focused on how these mismatches might shape assessment, they might affect treatment as well. For instance, if clinicians encourage their patients who value calm to engage in activities that elicit excitement, these patients may be less likely to comply with treatment.

Is there anything clinicians can do to offset the effects of these cultural mismatches? Our preliminary data suggest that just teaching clinicians

about cultural differences in ideal affect might help. For instance, when we told clinicians-in-training about cultural differences in the valuation of HAP and LAP, they used both excitement and calm as indicators of well-being, suggesting that educating clinicians about differences in the types of happiness that people want to feel can curb their cultural biases (Tsai et al., 2023).

How Ideal Affect Shapes Personal Views of Old Age

In another set of studies, Tamara and I examined whether ideal affect shaped other conceptions, such as personal views of age. Because old age is associated with decreases in physiological arousal and increases in the experience of low arousal states (Kessler & Staudinger, 2009; Scheibe et al., 2013; Tsai, Levenson, et al., 2000), we predicted that the more individuals valued HAP, the more they would dread old age. Furthermore, we predicted that there would be cultural differences in how much people looked forward to (vs. dreaded) old age, with European Americans having less positive views of old age compared to Chinese Americans and Hong Kong Chinese because of cultural differences in ideal affect.

European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong adults between the ages of 18 and 90 years completed our measure of ideal affect and then described what they were looking forward to and what they were dreading about being age 75 years or older. As predicted, the more individuals valued HAP, the less positively they viewed their own aging (i.e., the more they dreaded vs. looked forward to being age 75 years or older). Also as predicted, European Americans had less positive views of their own aging compared to Chinese Americans and Hong Kong Chinese, especially among older adults, and these cultural differences were partly due to differences in ideal HAP (Tsai et al., 2018, Study 1). To assess causality, we conducted a second study in which we experimentally manipulated ideal HAP by having European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong Chinese participants read a passage extolling the benefits of feeling HAP (vs. LAP states in the control condition) and then describe what they were dreading and looking forward to regarding their old age. Consistent with our hypotheses, across cultures, participants in the “value HAP” condition reported dreading old age more than did those in the control condition (Tsai et al., 2018, Study 2).

Understanding the role of valuing excitement and other HAP on views of old age matters because having more positive views of old age is associated with better health and longer life (B. Levy, 2009; B. Levy & Langer, 1994; B. Levy, Slade, & Kasl, 2002; B. Levy, Slade, Kunkel, & Kasl, 2002). If we can reduce the degree to which people value excitement and other HAP, we might be able to improve their views of old age, which may ultimately lead to better health in old age. Ideal affect may also influence other conceptions that

contain a core affective component, including conceptions of other stages of life (e.g., adolescence) and romantic love, which Julie Cachia, another wonderful and talented graduate student in my lab, is currently exploring.

Why Ideal Affect Matters Interpersonally

Most recently, we have been examining the interpersonal consequences of “ideal affect match” (i.e., when a target shows the emotion that the judge values), thanks to consistent funding from the National Science Foundation. Historically in affective science, researchers have distinguished between beliefs about experience and beliefs about expression (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Matsumoto, 1991), but in real life, the two are likely related, in part because people convey their emotional experiences and ideals through their facial expressions. For example, when Tamara and I first explored whether ideal affect match would matter for individuals choosing physicians, it became clear that patients made inferences about their physicians based on their facial expressions (Sims et al., 2014). In these studies, participants viewed the physicians who focused on the emotions that the participants valued as more trustworthy and as better physicians. Might this reflect a more general process?

I scoured the literature for previous evidence that this might be the case but was struck by how little data existed examining whether the link between emotional expressions and interpersonal traits varied by culture (for a rare exception, see Matsumoto & Kudoh, 1993). Researchers largely assumed that the emotional cues associated with affiliation, dominance, and competence were similar across cultures. Therefore, Elizabeth Blevins, Lucy Zhang Bencharit, Louise Chim, Helene Fung, Dannii Yeung, and I conducted several studies in which we showed European Americans and Hong Kong Chinese faces that varied by race (White, Asian), sex (male, female), and emotional expression (excited, calm, neutral), and we asked participants to rate these faces in terms of affiliation (extraverted, friendly, agreeable), dominance (dominant, assertive), and competence (intelligent, competent) (Tsai et al., 2019). “Excited” smiles are open, toothy smiles (like that of Julia Roberts), whereas “calm” smiles are closed smiles (like that of Guanyin, Goddess of Compassion). Participants rated computer-generated and real faces as well as static images and dynamic videos. In some studies, participants viewed the faces by themselves; in other studies, they viewed the faces in a specific context (e.g., on Facebook or when hiring an employee).

We predicted that ideal affect match would result in more positive judgments of the targets. If an individual who values HAP meets a person

who expresses excitement, that individual should view the “excited” person as friendlier, warmer, and more trustworthy than a person who expresses calm. At the cultural level, European Americans should rate excited targets more positively and calm targets less positively compared to Hong Kong Chinese.

Although both groups rated excited smiles as more extraverted than calm smiles, as predicted, European Americans consistently rated the excited faces as twice as extraverted than did the Hong Kong Chinese. Moreover, this difference was mediated by ideal HAP (Figure 2.4). Importantly, emotional expression mattered more than target’s race or sex. Although we sometimes found that Hong Kong Chinese rated the calm faces as more extraverted than did the European Americans, most of the time there were no cultural differences in how extraverted participants rated the calm faces (Tsai et al., 2019). Moreover, there were no consistent differences in how participants of either culture rated the dominance or competence of the excited and calm targets, suggesting that whereas the excited smile may be a stable signal of extraversion across cultures, the specific smiles associated with dominance and competence may depend more on the situation.

These findings are consistent with decades of work in social and personality psychology illustrating that affiliation is the primary trait that people use when they are judging others, especially when meeting someone for the first time (Abele & Bruckmuller, 2011; Abele & Wojciszke, 2007). People need to




Figure 2.4 Cultural differences in extraversion judgments of excited versus calm targets. Adapted from Figure 5, “Cultural Variation in Social Judgments of Smiles: The Role of Ideal Affect,” by J. L. Tsai, E. Blevins, L. Z. Bencharit, L. Chim, H. H. Fung, and D. Y. Yeung, 2019, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 116, p. 983. Copyright 2019 by American Psychological Association.

know whether to engage or withdraw, and our data suggest that ideal affect match helps people make this decision. These findings are related to previous work by Nalini Ambady and Hillary Elfenbein (2002) showing that people are better at recognizing the emotions of their in-groups than those of their out-groups. Our findings take their work one step further by suggesting that people may use ideal affect match—even more than race or sex—as a signal of in-group affiliation.

Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to Illuminate Underlying Mechanisms

Why do we judge targets whose expressions match our ideal affect as more affiliative? Do we pay greater attention to faces that match our ideals? Do we identify with them more? Maybe we like them more (or dislike them less)? To answer these questions, we turned to neuroimaging, like other scholars interested in understanding how deeply culture influences the psyche (e.g., Ames & Fiske, 2010; Chiao et al., 2013; Han et al., 2013; Kim & Sasaki, 2014). I had decided to put physiological measures on hold until I found robust cultural differences in emotion self-report and behavior. Now that I had, it felt like the right time to return to physiological measures to understand the mechanisms underlying the differences we were observing. We turned to neuroimaging specifically because it can capture processes that occur automatically, spontaneously, and outside of individuals' awareness. Moreover, unlike behavioral studies that can typically only assess one mechanism at a time, with the right design, neuroimaging allows simultaneous assessment of multiple mechanisms.

For example, we wanted to understand *why* people rate targets whose expressions match their ideal affect as more affiliative. Most people do not know and therefore cannot describe what they are doing second by second. By measuring people's brain activity, we could see what parts of the brain are active right before, during, and after people view a target. For instance, if valuing HAP increases individuals' attention to excited faces, then they should show greater activation in the fusiform gyrus when they view excited versus calm faces (Grill-Spector et al., 2004; Kanwisher et al., 1997). If valuing HAP increases individuals' personal identification with excited faces, then individuals should show greater activation in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex when they view excited (vs. calm) faces (Knutson et al., 2005; van den Bos et al., 2007). If valuing HAP increases how rewarding individuals find excited faces, then individuals should show greater activation in the ventral striatum when they view excited (vs. calm) faces (Knutson & Greer, 2008). If valuing HAP increases how negatively individuals view non-excited faces, then individuals should show greater activation in the anterior insula when viewing calm

(vs. excited) faces (Barrett et al., 2007; Chiao et al., 2008; Knutson et al., 2014; Wager & Barrett, 2004). And if more than one of these mechanisms is at work, neuroimaging would reveal greater activity in multiple areas of the brain.

Thanks to the creativity and persistence of BoKyung Park (now an assistant professor at University of Texas at Dallas), we were able to examine these mechanisms (Park et al., 2016). We showed European Americans and Chinese calm and excited faces, and we looked at participants' brain activity after they had viewed the faces and right before they were asked to judge how good of a leader or how familiar the face was. Although we did not find evidence that visual attention mechanisms were underlying cultural differences, we did find evidence that reward mechanisms might be. Compared to Chinese, European Americans showed greater activity in the ventral striatum in response to excited versus calm smiles. When we looked within each cultural group, we found that European Americans reacted similarly to the excited versus calm smiles, whereas Chinese showed greater ventral striatum responses to the calm versus excited smiles. These findings paralleled participants' ideal affect data: In this study, European Americans valued HAP and LAP to similar degrees, but Chinese valued LAP more than they valued HAP. Although contrary to prediction, there were no cultural differences in ventral striatum activity in response to the excited faces, this was consistent with their ideal affect. In this particular sample, European Americans and Chinese did not differ in how much they valued HAP. This might have had something to do with our recruitment of Chinese participants: Many of the Chinese participants reported being scared of the scanner, and therefore it is likely that those who actually participated in the study valued HAP more than their Chinese peers. In our subsequent studies, we addressed this by providing potential participants with materials demonstrating the safety of the scanner.

Across cultural groups, the more individuals valued LAP, the less ventral striatal activity they showed in response to excited (vs. calm) smiles. Many months later, we had participants engage in a face preference task in which they were presented with pairs of two faces, one excited and one calm, and needed to choose which of the two they wanted to see again. The more rewarding participants found the excited (vs. calm) faces in the scanner session, the more likely they were to choose the excited (vs. calm) face in the preference task. These findings suggest that the activity we found in the scanner was a stable difference that had enduring behavioral consequences.

In a secondary analysis of these data (Park et al., 2018), ventral striatal activity right before participants made their leadership and familiarity ratings selectively predicted how affiliative (friendly, likeable, similar) participants rated the faces after the session. In other words, the more rewarding

participants found the faces, the more likely they were to rate the face as affiliative. There were no links between ventral striatal activity and judgments of competence or dominance, nor did activity in other areas of the brain correlate with social judgments. These findings suggest that reward processes underlie the links between ideal affect match and judgments of affiliation.

In addition to reward, we found some evidence supporting a personal identification mechanism (i.e., the more individuals value HAP, the more likely they will be to identify with excited vs. calm faces). Compared to European Americans, Chinese showed greater activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex in response to Asian calm versus all of the other smiles (Asian excited, White excited, White calm) (Park et al., 2016).

This study raised other interesting questions. First, Brian's work suggested that ventral striatal activity was particularly high during anticipation versus receipt of monetary rewards, but because we did not distinguish between these two phases in our study, we could not determine if this was also the case with smiles (a social reward). Second, we did not include other types of rewards, and therefore, we could not know whether European Americans show greater ventral striatal activity in response to all rewards or just smiles. Third, because we focused on smiles only, we could not know whether European Americans show greater responses to intense expressions more generally.

To address these issues, Elizabeth Blevins—who started in my lab as a project manager but then continued as a graduate student—completed a follow-up study that addressed each of these concerns. Here is yet another case of a creative, talented, and dedicated graduate student who pulled off a very difficult study. First, she created a task that distinguished between anticipation and outcome, much like Brian's monetary incentive delay task, but with smiles. This was no small feat—even though other teams had created “social incentive delay tasks,” they had a number of issues that precluded direct comparison with the monetary incentive delay task. Second, she had participants complete both the monetary incentive task and the social incentive task. Finally, as part of the social incentive task, she also had participants anticipate and then view high-intensity angry faces.

In this study (Blevins et al., 2023), although European Americans did show greater ventral striatal activity than Chinese when anticipating excited (vs. neutral) smiles, the largest cultural difference was when participants were viewing the smiles (i.e., during outcome). European Americans showed greater ventral striatal activity in response to viewing excited (vs. neutral) smiles. This is different from responses to monetary rewards, for which the greatest ventral striatal activity occurs in anticipation of the money, perhaps because money is more certain (and therefore easier to anticipate) than smiles. Moreover, European Americans and Chinese did not show different neural responses

to winning \$5 or to high-intensity angry faces, suggesting that the observed cultural differences in ventral striatal activity were indeed specific to excited smiles. Furthermore, across the cultural groups, the more individuals valued HAP, the greater nucleus accumbens (part of the ventral striatum) activity participants showed in response to the viewing excited (vs. neutral) smiles.

Interestingly, participants' ventral striatal activity in response to the excited smiles correlated with the number of "excited" friends that participants had on social media, demonstrating that their responses in the scanner were related to real-world behavior. Together, these findings suggest that when we meet people whose emotional expressions match our ideal, we find them more rewarding, and this may strengthen our interactions and subsequent relationships with them. Of course, it is also possible and likely that the reverse is also true: When our friends show particular smiles, we begin to find those smiles more rewarding.

Although ideal affect seems to be most strongly associated with reward processing, we have also found other interesting associations. For example, we examined the links between ideal affect and unreciprocated giving in a sample of European Americans and Korean international students (Park et al., 2017). Increased activity in the nucleus accumbens in response to a target predicted greater giving to that target, as predicted. In addition, decreased activity in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) predicted greater giving. Increases in the rTPJ are associated with the detection of differences in beliefs; therefore, decreases in the rTPJ may be associated with detection of similarities in beliefs. These findings suggest that when the norms for giving are clear, the more participants find a recipient rewarding and perceive the recipient as having similar beliefs, the more likely they are to give to that recipient.

Importantly, ideal affect match decreased rTPJ activity, suggesting that when people see a target, if the face matches their ideal affect, then the person is more likely to be perceived as having similar beliefs, and this facilitates people's giving. Specifically, individuals who valued HAP more than LAP showed decreased rTPJ activity when they viewed excited versus calm faces, and this was associated with greater giving. Conversely, individuals who valued LAP more than HAP showed decreased rTPJ activity when they viewed calm versus excited faces, and this was associated with greater giving. In other words, faces that match people's ideal affect require less processing and, therefore, may facilitate perceived similarity and, in this case, actual resource sharing.

So far, this work has helped us isolate and identify some of the mechanisms that might explain the links between ideal affect match and judgments of affiliation. We are currently using functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine whether these mechanisms are altered when individuals are weighing ideal affect match against other types of information when deciding with

whom to share resources. So far, these findings suggest that culturally shaped ideal affect goes deep into the brain and appears to influence judgments of affiliation through affective (e.g., reward-related) and social cognitive (e.g., personal identification and perceptions of similar vs. different beliefs) mechanisms even more than attentional or perceptual ones. These findings also suggest that, if we want to reduce the effects of ideal affect match on how we treat others, we will have to change how rewarding smiles that match our ideal affect are to us, how much we identify with them, and how much we perceive them as holding similar beliefs as us.

Why Ideal Affect Matters Practically

If ideal affect match influences whom we judge as a friend or foe, it should influence how we treat others. The more positively we judge others, the more likely we will share resources with them, as demonstrated above and illustrated in Figure 2.5. Next, I describe how this process works in health, financial, and employment settings.




Figure 2.5 How ideal affect may influence social judgments and resource allocation. From Tsai, J. L. (2021). Why does passion matter more in individualistic cultures? *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA*, 118(14), e2102055118. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2102055118>.

Health Care

Might ideal affect play a role in other health care settings beyond mental health? This was the main question that Tamara brought to the lab as a graduate student, even though she worked on many different questions, as described above. Although we had explored how ideal affect influenced choices of consumer products and leisure activities, Tamara's work was the first to examine how differences in ideal affect might matter for more serious and consequential decisions such as whom patients chose as their physician and whether they adhered to their physician's recommendations. She had the important insight that when patients are seeking care from doctors, they are looking for doctors who understand who patients want to be and how they want to feel. Patients infer this from how doctors present themselves as well as what recommendations they make. Although previous research had shown that patients respond more favorably to physicians who express more emotion (for reviews, see Beck et al., 2002; di Blasi et al., 2001; DiMatteo, 1979; Levine & Ambady, 2013) and whose values align with their own (Street et al., 2008), no one had examined how physicians' affective expressions *interacted* with patients' affective values to influence how patients respond to physicians. We predicted that patients would more positively evaluate and prefer physicians who express the affective states that patients value and ideally want to feel.

In our first study (Sims et al., 2014), we examined whether individual differences in ideal HAP and ideal LAP were related to physician choice in a U.S. sample. Participants were asked to imagine that their current primary care physician was no longer available, and they needed to choose a new physician for their regular care. Participants then read descriptions of three physicians who were comparable in terms of education and experience (all excellent) but who differed in their views on patient care and outside interests, which varied in their affective focus (excitement-focused, calm-focused, neutral). Whereas the excitement-focused physician aimed to "enhance my patients' well-being by increasing their activity levels and overall vitality so my patients can lead healthy, dynamic lifestyles," the calm-focused physician aimed to "ensure that my patients have peace of mind when it comes to their health by promoting a calm and relaxed lifestyle." As predicted, the more people valued HAP, the more trustworthy they found the excitement-focused physician and the more likely they were to select that physician for their care. Similarly, the more people valued LAP, the more trustworthy they found the calm-focused physician and the more likely they were to select that physician for their care. Neither ideal HAP nor ideal LAP was related to selection of the

neutral physician. Importantly, the degree to which people actually felt HAP and LAP did not influence their decisions, suggesting that *actual* affect match did not matter as much as *ideal* affect match.

The limitation of this study, of course, was that it was hypothetical. Tamara predicted that ideal affect match would also influence patients' actual responses to physicians, including their evaluation of the physicians and their likelihood of adhering to physicians' recommendations. In the United States, getting patients to follow doctors' recommendations is a major challenge to improving health outcomes (Martin et al., 2005). But how were we going to observe patients' real responses to physicians? We spent a lot of time trying to gain access into hospitals, but that required significant funding and afforded little experimental control.

So, Tamara did the next best thing. She had the idea—long before video visits became common and desirable—of piloting a virtual physician website as the cover story for randomly assigning community adult participants (mean age = 56 years, standard deviation = 12 years) to either an excitement-focused or a calm-focused physician and then observing participants' responses to those physicians (Sims & Tsai, 2015). Participants were screened to ensure that they did not have any major mental or physical health problems. Research assistants contacted participants, asked them to complete a health assessment, and then showed them a video of their randomly assigned physician. After 1 day, participants received feedback from the physician on their health based on the assessment, and then the physician recommended different ways that participants could improve their health (e.g., by taking a brisk walk after dinner, or doing 10 minutes of muscle strengthening). In actuality, these recommendations were the same for all participants. Participants reported how much they adhered to each recommendation each day for 5 days, and then they completed a final survey evaluating their physician, whom by that time they had met three times.

Tamara predicted and found that even after multiple encounters, the more patients valued HAP, the more positively (trustworthy, competent, and knowledgeable) they evaluated the excitement-focused physician, and the more patients valued LAP, the more positively they evaluated the calm-focused physician. But what about adherence? Tamara predicted that the more patients valued HAP, the more likely they would be to adhere to recommendations made by an excitement-focused physician, and the more patients valued LAP, the more likely they would be to adhere to recommendations made by a calm-focused physician. As predicted, how patients wanted to feel on a given day predicted their adherence to a

physician's recommendations on that day if delivered by the physician who matched their ideal affect (Sims & Tsai, 2015).

In a third series of studies (Sims et al., 2018), Tamara examined whether cultural differences in ideal affect resulted in cultural differences in responses to excitement-focused versus calm-focused physicians. They did: (a) European Americans preferred excitement-focused versus calm-focused physicians more than did Chinese Americans and Hong Kong Chinese, in part because they valued influence and HAP more; (b) European Americans recalled the recommendations of excitement-focused versus calm-focused physicians more than did Asian Americans; and (c) after multiple encounters, European Americans rated excitement-focused versus calm-focused physicians more positively than did Asian Americans. In other words, European Americans showed a greater preference for excitement-focused over calm-focused physicians, whereas Asian Americans and Hong Kong Chinese did not.⁸ When I presented these findings at a Stanford grand rounds, one of the physicians said that my presentation made him rethink what he had been taught in medical school: to express a lot of enthusiasm with his patients. Clearly, he was being taught how to be with European American patients but not Asian American ones.

All of these studies focused on how patients' ideal affect influenced their perceptions of and responses to their physicians, but what role did *physicians'* ideal affect play in their perceptions of and responses to their patients? In her honors thesis, Alexis Charles found that physicians rated patients whose expressions matched their ideal affect as being more compliant, more responsive to their recommendations, and overall "better" patients, suggesting that similar processes likely occur for physicians as well (Charles, 2010).

Might ideal affect match influence actual patient care? Tamara examined this in the context of cancer screening (mammogram and colorectal), for which ethnic disparities exist (National Center for Health Statistics, 2021). Stanford medical students reviewed hypothetical female patient profiles (ages 47–49 years) that varied by emotional expression (excited, calm, neutral), self-descriptions (excited, calm, neutral) and ethnicity (White, Asian, Black) and that contained information about their medical history and current health. After reviewing each profile, medical students rated patients along several dimensions (health; risk for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer) and then made a recommendation for screening tests (mammogram, pap

⁸ This was one of the few studies in which we combined South and Southeast Asian Americans and East Asian Americans to increase our sample size. We need to do more work comparing different Asian American subgroups.

smear, or fecal occult blood test). Because clear recommendations for breast and cervical cancer screening already existed for women older than age 40 years, Tamara predicted that patients' emotional expressions would not matter for these screenings. However, she also predicted that for colorectal cancer screening, for which clear age recommendations do not exist for women younger than age 50 years, patients' emotional expressions would matter more; specifically, medical students would recommend more screening for patients whose emotional expressions matched their ideal affect because they wanted to help them more. As predicted, patients' emotional expressions did not matter for breast or cervical cancer screening; medical students recommended these screenings for all patients. However, medical students were indeed more likely to recommend colorectal screening for excited than calm and neutral patients, and this was not because they perceived excited patients as being in poorer health or at higher risk for cancer. Patient ethnicity also did not matter; only their emotional expression did (Sims & Tsai, 2022). Given the increasing prevalence of cancer worldwide, this work is more relevant now than ever before.

Together, these findings suggest that physicians' ideal affect may consciously and unconsciously influence how they perceive and ultimately treat their patients.

Charitable Giving and Financial Lending

Might cultural and individual differences in ideal affect also play a role in financial resource allocation, especially when people are choosing with whom to share desired resources? As described earlier, BoKyung predicted that cultural differences in the valuation of HAP and LAP would increase how trustworthy people found excited versus calm targets, which would in turn increase their likelihood of giving or lending money to them. In one study (Park et al., 2017), European Americans and Koreans played multiple trials of the dictator game (a measure of unreciprocated giving), but with different partners each time. European Americans indeed gave more to excited targets than did Koreans regardless of targets' race and sex, and this was due to European Americans valuing HAP more than did Koreans.

But what about when people expect their resources to be returned? We partnered with Kiva, a web-based microlending platform (<https://www.kiva.org>), to answer this question (Park et al., 2020). Although this platform allows lenders from all over the world to give directly to borrowers from all over the world, the vast majority of loans are made by lenders from the United States to borrowers from Latin America, Asia/Pacific Islands, and Africa. Borrowers create profiles with photos of themselves as well as information about who

they are, why they are requesting a loan, and how much they are requesting, and lenders decide whether and how much to loan to borrowers. Using a database that included 13,500 borrowers' profiles from loans requested during the 2012 calendar year (Genevsky & Knutson, 2015), we predicted and found that if borrowers showed excited expression on their profiles, they were more likely to have received a loan from a North American (United States and Canada) lender, and they were less likely to receive a loan from a Taiwanese lender (Study 1). In addition, we randomly sampled lenders from 11 different nations and coded the emotional expressions of the borrowers to whom they had lent money. Lenders from nations that valued HAP more were more likely to have lent money to "excited" borrowers and were less likely to have lent money to "calm" borrowers. Indeed, borrowers who showed excited smiles were twice as likely to receive a loan from a lender from a nation that valued HAP more than from a lender from a nation that valued HAP less. These findings held even after controlling for gross domestic product per capita.

To directly examine the link between individuals' ideal affect and their lending, BoKyung gave European Americans and Koreans the choice to lend money to different "borrowers" whose faces varied in terms of emotion (excited, calm, neutral), race (White, Asian), and sex (male, female). Once again, European Americans lent more than Koreans did to excited borrowers, regardless of borrowers' race or sex, because European Americans valued HAP more and rated excited borrowers as more affiliative than did Koreans. These data demonstrate that lenders decide whom to trust with their resources based on their *own* ideal affect, raising the possibility that lenders might be investing in people who seem trustworthy in their own cultures but not necessarily in borrowers' cultures.

Employment and Leadership Choice

We have also been interested in how cultural differences in ideal affect shape whom we choose to be our employees and our leaders. Thanks to the boundless energy of Jen Ang, we demonstrated that in their official website photos, U.S. leaders were six times more likely to show excited smiles than were Chinese leaders, and this held for leaders in business, government, and industry, regardless of rank (Tsai et al., 2016, Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, in a comparison of 11 nations, the more a nation valued HAP, the more likely its legislators were to show excited smiles in their official website photos, and the more a nation valued LAP, the more likely legislators were to show calm smiles in their photos. National levels of ideal affect mattered not only more than national levels of actual affect but also more than how economically developed or democratic the nations were, suggesting that ideal affect shapes the

emotions that are associated with leadership. How might ideal affect shape actual hiring and leadership choice?

Minority applicants are less likely to be called back for an interview and to be hired for a job compared to their European American counterparts, even when they have comparable or higher educational training (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Bursell, 2007; Gaddis, 2015; Oreopoulos, 2011; Pager et al., 2009; Pew Research Center, 2012). A case study found that 60% of evaluators at top-tier U.S. recruitment firms rated “cultural fit” (e.g., based on leisure pursuits, background, and self-presentation styles) as the most important criterion used to assess applicants during job interviews (Rivera, 2012), suggesting that cultural mismatches may explain disparities in hiring. To what degree is ideal affect match signaling cultural fit, and are calm candidates at a disadvantage when applying for a job in the United States?

The creative and resourceful Lucy Bencharit (now an assistant professor at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo) conducted a series of studies to examine whether ideal affect influences how people present themselves when they are applying for a job (Bencharit et al., 2019). As predicted, European American participants reported wanting to convey more HAP and less LAP than did Hong Kong Chinese participants, and they actually used more HAP words on their job applications compared with Hong Kong Chinese. In addition, when recording video introductions of themselves, European American participants smiled more than did Hong Kong Chinese participants. Lucy then examined people’s views of the ideal applicant and found that European Americans viewed the ideal applicant as being more HAP and less LAP than did Hong Kong Chinese.

So does this influence whom people actually choose for a human resources internship? We looked at this in three samples: a sample of community adults (Tsai et al., 2019, Study 3), a sample of business students (Bencharit et al., 2019, Study 4a), and a sample of employees at a mid-sized U.S.-based company (Bencharit et al., 2019, Study 4b). The first two samples included European Americans and Hong Kong Chinese, and in both samples, European Americans chose the excited candidate more and the calm candidate less than did Hong Kong Chinese. Hong Kong Chinese chose the calm candidate more than the excited candidate in both samples, but whereas European Americans chose the excited candidate more than the calm candidate in the community sample, they chose excited and calm candidates equally in the business student sample.

But what about at a real company? Thanks to Ranier Cabezas-Rayas (Bencharit et al., 2019, Study 4b), we traveled to the annual retreat of a mid-sized company

and were able to show employees three videos of potential interns and collect data on their choices. As predicted, the employees were more likely to choose the excited candidate than the calm or neutral one. But perhaps most interesting was the discussion we had with the employees afterwards about why they chose the candidates they did. The excited candidate did not require any justification: “I chose him because he was excited.” But when explaining why they did not choose the calm candidate, participants said things such as “He seemed so obsessed with being calm. . . . he kept talking about being calm.” Of course, the three videos were carefully constructed so that the calm candidate talked about being calm as much as the excited candidate talked about being excited. When someone fits the ideal, their expressions require very little processing, but when someone does not fit the ideal, their expressions are questioned more (this is consistent with the rTPJ findings discussed earlier).

Recently, we have been interested in whether these findings apply to leadership choices and whether this depends on how well an organization is doing. This was in part inspired by Donald Trump’s election as President in 2016: Why did some Americans find his negative emotion desirable as a leader? Some pundits argued that Trump was particularly popular among Americans who were not doing well socioeconomically. To assess whether this was the case, we created different scenarios—one in which an organization was doing well (growth), one in which an organization was stable (stability), and one in which an organization was in crisis (crisis)—and asked participants to choose the best candidate to lead the organization under those conditions (Bencharit et al., 2023). Across cultures, people were more likely to choose leaders who matched their ideal affect during growth but not crisis: European Americans chose excited leaders, and Hong Kong Chinese chose calm leaders during growth but not crisis. This held for organizations in business, research, and government. During crisis, participants across cultures appeared to be more open to different options, including the neutral candidate. Furthermore, the more favorable conditions were, the more likely participants’ ideal affect was related to their social judgments of the candidates, resulting in them being more likely to choose the candidate who matched their ideal affect. But when conditions were not favorable (i.e., organizations were in crisis), whether or not candidates matched people’s ideal affect seemed to matter less.

Prejudice and Discrimination

Most of the previously discussed work has focused on positive social interactions. Obviously our world has a long history of prejudice, discrimination, and other negative social interactions, and they become even more likely as our world becomes increasingly multicultural. Might ideal affect play a role in these interactions as well? The insightful Magali Clobert predicted that

differences in the valuation of negative emotion might play a role in how we respond to cultural out-groups. Although previous studies have shown that the more people experience high arousal negative states (HAN) such as anger and fear, the more prejudice they show toward out-groups (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 2001; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dasgupta et al., 2009; Smith & Mackie, 2010; Tapias et al., 2007), only recently have researchers been interested in the role that emotional goals play in intergroup conflict (e.g., Goldenberg et al., 2016; Porat et al., 2016; Smith & Mackie, 2021). Magali predicted and found that the more people value HAN, above and beyond how much they actually feel it, the more negative they feel in everyday interactions with culturally unfamiliar groups, and the more they view harm as an appropriate way to respond to these groups (Clobert et al., 2022). These associations emerged in Western (United States and Canada) and East Asian (Taiwan) contexts.

As mentioned previously, cultures differ in their valuation of specific types of HAN. Magali predicted and found that these differences were related to the endorsement of specific types of harm against out-groups. For instance, Canadians value HAN-dominant emotions such as anger more and value HAN-submissive emotions such as fear less than do Taiwanese, and these differences translate into Canadians endorsing more active harm (e.g., complaining about an out-group member) and less passive harm (e.g., avoiding interactions with out-group members) toward cultural outgroups than do Taiwanese (Clobert et al., 2022). This work suggests that one way of fostering multicultural tolerance might be to reduce exposure to high arousal negative states in general, and specifically dominant high arousal negative states such as anger in media and political discourse.

Social Media and Online Communication

Throughout the world, people are increasingly interacting with each other within and across cultures through social media and other forms of online communication. Although there are many benefits to online communication, there is also increasing concern about its harms, ranging from depression to cyberbullying, political polarization, and the spread of false news and information (e.g., Crockett, 2017; Vogel et al., 2014; Vosoughi et al., 2018). Might cultural differences in ideal affect play a role here as well?

For instance, scholars and laypeople are concerned about the prevalence of high arousal negative emotions such as anger, contempt, disgust, and rage on social media and other forms of online communication and also its role in political polarization in the United States (Brady & Crockett, 2019; Brady et al., 2020; Brady et al., 2017; Crockett, 2017; Vosoughi et al., 2018; Williams, 2018). Based on Magali's research, they should be concerned. Absent from this discussion is why high arousal negative states are so contagious in the United States.

One theory is that these states signal threat and anxiety, but another is that these states violate the value that American culture places on positivity. The first theory implies that if we were to examine the social media content of users from other cultures, high arousal negative states would be just as contagious as they are in the United States. The second theory implies that the states that are most contagious would be those that violate the dominant cultural values of the users. To test these theories, Tiffany Hsu used her computational chops to develop a Japanese version of SentiStrength, a sentiment analysis program originally developed in English for short text (Thelwall et al., 2010), and used it to examine the types of affect that U.S. and Japanese Twitter users produce online as well as the types of affect that they were most influenced by in others' posts (Hsu et al., 2021).

Like other researchers, Hsu et al. (2021) observed that U.S. users produced more positive than negative content and that U.S. users were more likely to be influenced by others' posts when those posts contained high arousal negative affect. Japanese Twitter users, however, were more likely to produce low arousal than high arousal content, which is consistent with the Japanese emphasis on moderation and balance. Furthermore, they were more influenced by others' posts not when they contained high arousal negative affect but, rather, when they contained high arousal *positive* affect. Thus, across cultures, users produced more content that supported their cultural values but were more likely to be influenced by others' posts when they contained affect that violated those cultural values. These findings suggest that the types of affect linked to misinformation or polarization may vary across cultures. We are currently exploring if this is the case.

Current Mysteries

There are, of course, many more research avenues to pursue, including more theoretically driven work on different national cultures and different emotional states (see Tsai & Clobert, 2019). Here, I discuss a few additional mysteries that we hope to solve in the years to come.

Measures of Ideal Affect

Across most of the studies described above, we included our self-report measure of ideal affect and a behavioral or physiological measure, and predicted that cultural differences in self-reports of ideal affect would mediate the cultural differences in behavior or physiology. And many times, this was

the case. Other times, however, differences emerged in behavior but not in self-reports of ideal affect. For instance, in Bencharit et al. (2019, Study 4a), Hong Kong Chinese were more likely to choose the calm applicant LAP for a job internship than were European Americans or Asian Americans, despite no cultural differences in self-reported ideal LAP. These discrepancies raise questions about how implicit or explicit ideal affect is, whether explicit self-report measures of ideal affect fully capture deeper affective preferences, and whether there are certain times when implicit measures of ideal affect may be more predictive than explicit ones.

Links to Actual Affect

Another major mystery has been the relationship between ideal and actual affect. We initially aimed to illustrate the distinction between the two and to show that ideal affect exerted an influence on behavior above and beyond actual affect. But we are also interested in how the two interact. One example is from our work on the valuation of positive versus negative states, in which we found in experience-sampling, survey, and experimental studies that wanting to maximize the positive and minimize the negative decreased individuals' *actual* experiences of mixed emotions (i.e., the co-occurrence of experiences of positive and negative emotion) (Sims et al., 2015). Another example was spearheaded by the ingenious and resourceful Louise Chim (now an associate professor at the University of Victoria), who was interested in how ideal affect influenced people's actual enjoyment of activities that matched or did not match their ideal affect. In these studies, Louise and her team not only brought participants to the lab to engage in low- or high-intensity exercise on a treadmill but also brought participants to amusement parks in Canada, the United States, and Hong Kong to experience exciting versus calm rides. In North America and Hong Kong, the more individuals valued LAP, the more likely they were to enjoy calming activities such as low-intensity exercise on a treadmill and the Ferris wheel (Chim et al., 2018). However, there was no link between ideal HAP and the online enjoyment of high-intensity treadmill exercise or exciting rides such as the free fall, perhaps because excitement may be more difficult to elicit in a research study.⁹

⁹ These findings are consistent with Scheibe et al. (2013), who found that across age groups, individuals were better able to meet their LAP than HAP goals. When we have asked study participants to describe their most calming or exciting events, the exciting events tend to be infrequent and involve personal achievement (e.g., "winning a competition", "going on a date with someone I have had a crush on") compared to the calming events (e.g., "reading a book", "taking a nap"). These findings also raise questions regarding the conditions under which ideal HAP and ideal LAP predict behavior.

Although these studies suggest that ideal affect can alter actual affect, there are many more unanswered questions. How does global ideal affect influence momentary actual affect? Does global actual affect influence momentary ideal affect? If people engage in activities to achieve their ideal affect, why don't they always achieve their actual affect? How do individuals' regulatory abilities and immediate circumstances make a difference, and are there conditions under which people are more or less able to overcome these obstacles?

Asian American Ideal Affect

As mentioned previously, we still have not solved the mystery of what East Asian American ideal affect looks like. Research by Hong et al. (2000) and others suggests that situational cues might explain why East Asian Americans would look more like European Americans at one time but more like Hong Kong Chinese at another, but our attempts to test this hypothesis suggest greater complexity. As we would expect, among Chinese Americans, the more oriented they are to Chinese culture, the more they prefer a calm-focused physician, and the more oriented they are to American culture, the more they prefer an excitement-focused physician (Sims et al., 2018). But when we compare Asian Americans as a group with European Americans and their East Asian counterparts, the patterns are more mixed. Although East Asian Americans typically resemble European Americans in terms of their valuation of HAP (Bencharit et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2018; Tsai, Knutson, et al., 2006; Tsai, Louie, Chen, et al., 2007; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007), there are some exceptions (Sims et al., 2018; Tsai et al., 2018). East Asian Americans also have a tendency to value LAP more than do European Americans (Bencharit et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2018; Tsai, Leverson, et al., 2006; Tsai, Miao, & Seppala, 2007; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007), but here too there are exceptions (Tsai et al., 2018). East Asian Americans sometimes report significantly higher ideal LAP than do Hong Kong Chinese (Bencharit et al., 2019; Tsai et al., 2019; Tsai, Knutson, et al., 2006); other times, East Asian Americans report and display significantly lower ideal LAP than do Hong Kong Chinese (Bencharit et al., 2019; Tsai, Miao, Seppala, et al., 2007). And there are some studies in which there are no cultural differences in ideal LAP (Bencharit et al., 2019; Sims et al., 2018). Although we still do not have a clear theory about when East Asian Americans should resemble European Americans more, Hong Kong Chinese more, or be right in the middle, it is clear that investigating these processes will contribute to our broader understanding

of East Asian Americans specifically, and more generally of how people integrate different cultural values regarding emotion. Also, as stated above, much more work should be done on other ethnic groups that fall under the category, “Asian American.”

Changes in Ideal Affect Over Time

As mentioned above, we have been interested in examining changes in ideal affect across the life span. To date, we have examined this in several studies. In one study (Scheibe et al., 2013), Susanne Scheibe (who was a postdoc working with Laura Carstensen but is now a professor at University of Groningen), looked at the ideal HAP and ideal LAP of a European American and African American sample between the ages of 18 and 93 years. Consistent with evidence that older adults are better able to regulate their emotions compared to younger adults because of differences in actual affect (Blanchard-Fields, 2007; S. Charles, 2010; Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009), discrepancies in actual-ideal affect were smaller among older than younger adults. In our study of European American, Chinese American, and Hong Kong Chinese older adults (Tsai et al., 2018), we also found that across cultural groups, discrepancies in actual and ideal affect were smaller among older than younger adults. However, we found that Chinese American and Hong Kong Chinese older adults showed even smaller discrepancies than European American older adults because they differed from their younger counterparts in both actual and ideal affect. Clearly, much more work is needed to understand how ideal affect changes over the course of the human life span and what implications this has for overall functioning.

In addition to biological time, we have been interested in changes in ideal affect across chronological and historical time. Since we first started collecting data on ideal affect, we have noticed trends that have made us wonder how sociopolitical factors influence ideal affect. For instance, the original cultural differences in ideal LAP that we observed in the early 2000s are smaller now in part because European Americans seem to value LAP states more (Tsai, 2017). Could these changes have to do with increasing threats and anxiety in the world? Indeed, across three studies, Da Jiang and Helene found that when people perceive their time as short and close-ended (“limited time perspective”), as they do in the face of threats to one’s safety and security, they value LAP states more (Jiang et al., 2015). These changes in ideal LAP may not, however, be linked to deeper cultural values and goals and therefore may be less reflected in behavior. To address the links between levels of ideal affect and

chronological time, we have compiled ideal affect data from our own projects and others' projects during the past 20 years to examine whether ideal affect has changed over time, and whether this varies across cultures.

Interaction with Other Factors

Another mystery is how cultural and individual differences in ideal affect interact with other influences on behavior. These factors might include other social categories such as gender and sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and minority status. However, they might also include other situational factors. For example, if people use ideal affect match as an indicator of a target's trustworthiness, what happens when we provide direct information about that target's trustworthiness? Do people still rely on the target's emotional expressions, and does this vary by culture (Cachia et al., 2023)? We are currently exploring these questions and others related to identifying the situational factors that diminish or amplify the effects of ideal affect match on resource sharing and other behaviors. These studies should inform future interventions to reduce affective biases that may result from cultural differences in ideal affect.

Conclusion

It has been 30 + years since I started studying culture and emotion. Through our work, my incredible research team and I have shown that cultural differences in ideal affect play a central role in what people do, how they perceive others, and how they respond to and communicate with each other. Furthermore, we have shown how in multicultural societies such as the United States and other areas of the world, cultural differences in ideal affect may be an unconscious source of bias and disparity in health, employment, leadership, and financial lending. Indeed, cultural variation in emotion is related to almost every issue facing contemporary society, ranging from health disparities to prejudice and discrimination to the problems associated with social media. I am convinced more than ever that understanding how culture shapes emotion is a critical step toward solving many of society's deepest challenges. That is why I have been studying culture and emotion for so long and why I hope to continue studying it for many more years to come.

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