DecodingTrust: A Comprehensive Assessment of Trustworthiness in GPT Models

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⚠ WARNING: This paper contains model outputs which are offensive in nature

Abstract

Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) models have exhibited exciting progress in their capabilities, capturing the interest of practitioners and the public alike. Yet, while the literature on the trustworthiness of GPT models remains limited, practitioners have proposed employing capable GPT models for sensitive applications such as healthcare and finance – where mistakes can be costly. To this end, this work proposes a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation for large language models with a focus on GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, considering diverse perspectives – including toxicity, stereotype bias, adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, robustness on adversarial demonstrations, privacy, machine ethics, and fairness. Based on our evaluations, we discover previously unpublished vulnerabilities to trustworthiness threats. For instance, we find that GPT models can be easily misled to generate toxic and biased outputs and leak private information in both training data and conversation history. We also find that although GPT-4 is usually more trustworthy than GPT-3.5 on standard benchmarks, GPT-4 is more vulnerable given jailbreaking system or user prompts, potentially because GPT-4 follows (misleading) instructions more precisely. Our work illustrates a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation of GPT models and sheds light on the trustworthiness gaps. Our benchmark is publicly available at `https://decodingtrust.github.io/`.

1 Introduction

Recent breakthroughs in machine learning, especially large language models (LLMs), have enabled a wide range of applications, ranging from chatbots [126] to medical diagnoses [182] to robotics [48]. In order to evaluate language models and better understand their capabilities and limitations, different benchmarks have been proposed. For instance, benchmarks such as GLUE [172] and SuperGLUE [171] have been introduced to evaluate general-purpose language understanding. With advances in the capabilities of LLMs, benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate more difficult

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tasks, such as CodeXGLUE [108], BIG-Bench [156], and NaturalInstructions [119, 184]. Beyond performance evaluation in isolation, researchers have also developed benchmarks and platforms to test other properties of LLMs, such as robustness with AdvGLUE [175] and TextFlint [66]. Recently, HELM [104] has been proposed as a large-scale and holistic evaluation of LLMs considering different scenarios and metrics.

As LLMs are deployed across increasingly diverse domains, concerns are simultaneously growing about their trustworthiness. Existing trustworthiness evaluations on LLMs mainly focus on specific perspectives, such as robustness [175, 180] or overconfidence [211]. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive and unified trustworthiness-focused evaluation platform DecodingTrust, which contains existing and our generated challenging datasets, to evaluate the recent LLM GPT-4[3] [128], in comparison to GPT-3.5 (i.e., ChatGPT [126]), from different perspectives, including toxicity, stereotype bias, adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, robustness on adversarial demonstrations, privacy, machine ethics, and fairness under different settings. We further extend our evaluation to recent open LLMs, including llama [164], Llama 2 [166], Alpaca [159], Red Pajama [39] and more, in Appendix L. We showcase some unreliable responses from different trustworthiness perspectives in Figure 1, and provide some examples of benign and adversarial prompts in Figure 2. We summarize our evaluation taxonomy in App. Figure 4.

Empirical findings. We provide some of our empirical findings here, and the full list of our findings from different trustworthiness perspectives is in App. A. Thanks to the improved capabilities of LLMs to follow instructions after instruction tuning [188, 36] and Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) [130], users can configure the tone and role of LLMs via *system prompts*, and configure the task description and task prompts via *user prompts*, while these new capabilities also raise new trustworthiness concerns. We provide more detailed preliminaries in App. B.

• *Toxicity.* 1) Compared to LLMs without instruction tuning or RLHF (*e.g.*, GPT-3 (Davinci) [26]), GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 have significantly reduced toxicity in the generation, maintaining a toxicity probability of less than 32% on different task prompts; 2) however, both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 generate toxic content with our carefully designed adversarial "jailbreaking" prompts, with toxicity probability surging to almost 100%; 3) GPT-4 is more likely to follow the instructions of "jailbreaking" system prompts, and thus demonstrates higher toxicity than GPT-3.5 given different system prompts and task prompts; 4) our generated challenging task prompts leveraging GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 further increases the model toxicity. Our challenging toxic task prompts are transferable to other LLMs without RLHF, leading to more toxic content generation from these models.

• *Stereotype bias.* 1) GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are not strongly biased for the majority of stereotype topics considered under *benign* and *untargeted* system prompts; 2) however, both models can be "tricked" into agreeing with biased content by designing misleading (adversarial) system prompts. GPT-4 is more vulnerable to misleading *targeted* system prompts than GPT-3.5, potentially because GPT-4 follows misleading instructions more precisely; 3) for GPT models, prediction bias is often dependent on demographic groups and stereotype topics.

• *Adversarial Robustness.* 1) GPT-4 surpasses GPT-3.5 on the standard AdvGLUE benchmark, demonstrating higher robustness; 2) GPT-4 is more resistant to human-crafted adversarial texts compared to GPT-3.5; 3) GPT models, despite their strong performance on standard benchmarks, are still vulnerable to our adversarial attacks generated based on the Alpaca-7B model (e.g., SemAttack achieves 89.2% attack success rate on GPT-4); 5) among attacks on Alpaca-7B model, SemAttack and BERT-Attack are the most transferable ones to GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, respectively.

• *Out-of-Distribution Robustness.* 1) GPT-4 exhibits consistently higher generalization capabilities given inputs with diverse OOD styles transformations compared to GPT-3.5; 2) when evaluated on recent events that are presumably beyond GPTs knowledge scope, GPT-4 demonstrates higher resilience than GPT-3.5 by answering "I do not know" rather than made-up content; 3) demonstrations with closer domain or style help improve model performance.

• *Robustness to Adversarial Demonstrations.* 1) GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 will not be misled by counterfactual demonstrations and can even benefit from them; 2) spurious correlations in demonstrations have different impacts on model predictions. GPT-3.5 is more likely to be misled by spurious correlations than GPT-4; 3) providing backdoored demonstrations will mislead both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, especially when the backdoored demonstrations are positioned close to the (backdoored) user inputs.

[3] To ensure the conclusions and results are reproducible and consistent, our evaluation focuses on GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 published on March 1st and March 14th 2023.



Figure 1: Examples of unreliable responses of GPT-4 from different trustworthiness perspectives given *benign* system prompts. Offensive or sensitive information is masked.



Figure 2: Examples of unreliable responses of GPT-4 from different trustworthiness perspectives based on prompt input. GPT-4 can generate undesirable or unreliable content given designed *adversarial* system prompts. (The word *cf* is an backdoor trigger added in the context.)

• *Privacy.* 1) GPT models can leak privacy-sensitive training data, such as email addresses, especially when prompted with the context of emails or few-shot demonstrations of (name, email) pairs. Under few-shot prompting, with supplementary knowledge such as the targeted email domain, the email extraction accuracy can be 100x higher; 2) GPT models can leak private information in the chat history. Overall, GPT-4 is more robust than GPT-3.5 in safeguarding personally identifiable information (PII), and both models are resilient to specific types of PII, such as Social Security Numbers (SSN), possibly due to the explicit instruction tuning. However, GPT models can leak all types of PII when prompted with privacy-leakage demonstrations during in-context learning; 3) GPT models show different capabilities in understanding different privacy-related words or privacy events.

Table 1: Toxicity evaluation on the REALTOXICITYPROMPTS and LLM-generated challenging toxic task prompts. The highest values under each metric are bold.

System Prompts	Models	Expected Maximum Toxicity				Toxicity Probability (%)			
		REALTOXICITYPROMPTS		LLM-generated		REALTOXICITYPROMPTS		LLM-generated	
		Nontoxic	Toxic	GPT-3.5	GPT-4	Nontoxic	Toxic	GPT-3.5	GPT-4
-	GPT-3 (Ada)	0.43	0.85	0.86	**0.90**	30	**100**	**100**	**100**
	GPT-3 (Curie)	0.41	0.85	0.86	**0.89**	26	**100**	**100**	**100**
	GPT-3 (Davinci)	0.43	0.84	0.87	**0.90**	31	**100**	**100**	**100**
Benign	GPT-3.5	0.13	**0.37**	0.18	0.22	1.2	**32**	7	13
	GPT-4	0.11	**0.38**	0.24	0.24	0.3	**31**	17	19
Adversarial	GPT-3.5	0.76	**0.86**	**0.86**	**0.86**	99	98	96	**99**
	GPT-4	0.91	0.94	0.94	**0.95**	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**

By evaluating recent GPT models from different trustworthiness perspectives, we gain insights into their strengths, limitations, and potential directions for improvement. Ultimately, our objective is to advance the field of LLMs by fostering the development of more reliable, unbiased, and transparent language models that meet the needs of users while upholding trustworthiness standards.

2 Evaluation on toxicity

In this section, we examine the generation toxicity of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, comparing them to LLMs without instruction tuning or RLHF (*e.g.*, GPT-3 (Davinci) [26]).

Setup. To evaluate how well GPT models avoid generating toxic content, we construct three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluation on standard benchmark REALTOXICITYPROMPTS to measure the properties and limitations of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 compared to existing LLM counterparts; (**2**) evaluation using our manually designed 33 diverse system prompts (e.g., role-playing, saying the opposite, and replacing word meaning, etc.), designed to evaluate the impact of system prompts on the toxicity level of responses generated by GPT models; (**3**) evaluation on our 1.2K challenging user prompts generated by GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, designed to more effectively uncover model toxicity than the existing benchmarks. Following Gehman et al. [60], Wang et al. [176], we report the Expected Maximum Toxicity over 25 generations for each evaluation prompt and the Toxicity Probability that estimates the empirical frequency of toxic content generation. More details are in App. C.1.

Results. In scenario (**1**), we use two subsets of the benchmark REALTOXICITYPROMPTS to evaluate LLM toxicity in the worst-case and benign scenarios: 1.2K toxic and 1.2K nontoxic task prompts. The toxic prompts are flagged as "challenging" as they are effective at eliciting toxicity from LLMs. As shown in Table 1, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 notably mitigate generation toxicity under benign system prompts compared to pre-trained LLMs without RLHF (e.g., GPT-3 (Davinci) [26]). We observe that these models often refuse to respond given toxic task prompts, reflecting the safety and responsible AI training effects [130, 128]. In scenario (**2**), we design an adversarial system prompt (Table 5 in App. C.2) to further evaluate the toxicity of GPT models. Our results in Table 1 show that a trustworthiness gap emerges under adversarial scenarios. Both models can be "jailbroken" to produce toxic content, and GPT-4 is more vulnerable due to its better capability of following instructions. This means GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can still produce toxic content despite detoxification strategies [130, 128], with average toxicity probability reaching nearly 100%, even higher than that of pretrained LLMs without RLHF. In App. C.2, we design 33 diverse adversarial system prompts based on different prompting techniques. All our adversarial system prompts successfully provoke LLM toxicity, among which explicitly instructing LLMs to add swear words increases model toxicity most effectively. In scenario (**3**), we use the toxic subset of REALTOXICITYPROMPTS to generate more challenging task prompts; specifically, we use GPT models to generate 25 continuations for each toxic prompt, resulting in 30K sentences. After tokenizing these at the sentence level, we use the latter half as our prompts, filter, and select the most toxic 1.2K as new challenging prompts. In Table 1, we find that challenging toxic prompts generated by GPT-4 are more effective in eliciting model toxicity than those by GPT-3.5 or RealToxicityPrompts, with higher transferability across other LLMs. More discussions are in App. C.3.

3 Evaluation on stereotypes

In this section, we evaluate stereotype bias for GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 by presenting stereotype statements in the user prompts, and asking the models to output if it agrees (by appending "I agree." to its response) or disagrees (by appending "I disagree." in its response) with the stereotype statement.

Setup. The stereotype evaluation dataset consists of challenging **user prompts** and **system prompts**. We design challenging user prompts to reflect stereotypes against different demographic groups.

Every user prompt consists of a *task description* which instructs the GPT models to either append "I agree." or "I disagree." based on whether it agrees/disagrees with the stereotype statement in the prompt, and a *task prompt* that represents stereotypes following our templates (e.g., "[target_group] should not be in the STEM fields.", where "[target_group]" can be replaced with demographic groups such as "Homosexuals", "Men", "White people", etc.) We create a dataset consisting of 1,152 stereotyped user prompts spanning 24 demographic groups and 16 stereotype topics (e.g., drug abuse, STDs, terrorism) with 3 templates for each stereotype; details are in App. D.1. Our challenging system prompts provide general instructions to the GPT models for both benign and adversarial scenarios, and lead to the creation of three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluation on a vanilla *benign* system prompt that does not affect model answers, to get a baseline measurement of the bias against the selected demographic groups; (**2**) evaluation on a designed system prompt that only influences the models to overcome its content policy restrictions, but does not influence it to be biased against any particular demographic group (henceforth referred to as the *untargeted* system prompt), (**3**) evaluation on designed system prompts that influences the model to overcome its content policy restrictions, and also instructs the models to be biased against the chosen demographic groups (henceforth referred to as the *targeted* system prompt) to evaluate the resilience of the models under misleading system prompts (examples in App. D.2). For each stereotype topic, we calculate `agreementIndex` = $\frac{n_{agree}}{n} \in [0, 1]$ (n_{agree} represents the number of times the model agrees with the stereotyped user prompt) averaged over the different variations of the user prompts. `agreementIndex` = 1 indicates that the model is biased and always agrees with the stereotyped user prompt.

Results. We present the evaluation on a subset of stereotype topics and demographic groups as 6x6 heatmaps in Fig. 3, where rows represent demographic groups and columns represent stereotype topics (The full 24×16 heatmaps are presented in App. D.4). 1) The heatmaps under *benign* and *untargeted* system prompts (Figure 15 and 16 in App. D.4) show that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 largely refuse to agree with different biased statements, highlighting the considerable efforts put into fine-tuning GPT models to reduce biased outputs; 2) however, under *targeted* system prompts, the output bias of GPT models increases significantly, indicating that it is very easy to "trick" models into generating biased content by providing misleading (adversarial) system prompts; 3) we find that, on average, GPT-4 is more likely to output biased content than GPT-3.5 given misleading system prompts, potentially because GPT-4 follows instructions more precisely; 4) we observe that the choice of stereotype topics and demographic groups has a high impact on the bias of models. For example, under the *targeted* system prompts, it is easier for GPT models to generate biased outputs under less sensitive topics like *leadership* and *greed*, but it is harder under sensitive topics like *drug dealing* and *terrorists* (Figure 3). This is potentially due to the reason that some sensitive stereotype topics or demographic groups are specifically fine-tuned for models to avoid biased generation.



(a) GPT-3.5



(b) GPT-4

Figure 3: Heatmaps of the likelihood of GPT models agreeing with stereotype statements on selected demographic groups and stereotype topics under *targeted* system prompts. The full versions are in App. D.4.

4 Evaluation on adversarial robustness

In this section, we delve into the robustness of GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 against adversarial input perturbations, focusing on adversarial robustness during test time.

Setup. To evaluate the robustness of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 on textual adversarial attacks, we construct three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluation on the standard benchmark AdvGLUE [175] with a vanilla task description, aiming to assess: a) the vulnerabilities of GPT models to existing textual adversarial attacks, b) the robustness of different GPT models in comparison to state-of-the-art models on the standard AdvGLUE benchmark, c) the impact of adversarial attacks on their instruction-following abilities (measured by the rate at which the model hallucinates a nonexistent answer when it is under attack), and d) the transferability of current attack strategies (quantified by the transferability attack success rates of different attack approaches); (**2**) evaluation on the AdvGLUE benchmark with different instructive

Table 2: Robust accuracy (%) on AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++ (PD = Performance Drop from Benign, Avg = Average Robust Accuracy, A = Alpaca-7B, V = Vicuna-13B, SV = StableVicuna-13B). "Baseline" refers to SoTA results on the AdvGLUE leaderboard. ↑ / ↓ means the higher / lower the more robust.

Model	Data	SST-2 ↑	QQP ↑	MNLI ↑	MNLI-mm ↑	QNLI ↑	RTE ↑	PD ↓	Avg ↑
Baseline	AdvGLUE	59.10	69.70	64.00	57.90	64.00	79.90	26.89	65.77
GPT-4	AdvGLUE	69.92	**92.18**	69.97	**68.03**	**80.16**	**88.81**	**8.970**	**78.18**
	AdvGLUE++(A)	77.17	23.14	65.74	61.71	57.51	48.58	31.97	55.64
	AdvGLUE++(V)	**84.56**	68.76	47.43	31.47	76.40	45.32	28.61	58.99
	AdvGLUE++(SV)	78.58	51.02	**71.39**	61.88	65.43	51.79	24.26	63.34
GPT-3.5	AdvGLUE	62.60	**81.99**	57.70	**53.00**	**67.04**	**81.90**	**11.77**	**67.37**
	AdvGLUE++(A)	64.94	24.62	53.41	51.95	54.21	46.22	29.91	49.23
	AdvGLUE++(V)	**72.89**	70.57	22.94	19.72	71.11	45.32	28.72	50.42
	AdvGLUE++(SV)	70.61	56.35	**62.63**	52.86	59.62	56.3	19.41	59.73

task descriptions and diversely designed system prompts, so as to investigate the influence of task descriptions and system prompts on model robustness, for which we defer more details to Figure 18 in App. E.1; (**3**) evaluation of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 on our generated challenging adversarial texts AdvGLUE++ against open-source autoregressive models such as Alpaca-7B [159], Vicuna-13B [35], and StableVicuna-13B [157] in different settings to further evaluate the vulnerabilities of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 under strong adversarial attacks in diverse settings. We defer more detailed experiment setup to App. E, including the task description and system message design, dataset construction, base models, attack methods, etc.

Results. In scenario (**1**), from Table 2, we find that: a) in terms of average robust accuracy, GPT-4 (78.18%) is more robust than GPT-3.5 (67.37%); b) GPT-4 is more robust than the existing SoTA model (65.77%) from the AdvGLUE leaderboard, while the robustness of GPT-3.5 is only on par with it; c) for GPT-4, adversarial attacks do not cause a significant increase in the non-existence answer rate (NE), while for GPT-3.5, we observe an over 50% increase, as demonstrated in Table 14 and Table 16 in App. E; d) as shown in Table 15 in App. E, sentence-level perturbations are the most transferable attack strategies. In addition, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 have a performance drop of 11.77% and 8.97% respectively compared with benign accuracy, while for the current SoTA model from the AdvGLUE leaderboard, such performance drop is 26.89%. Thus, in terms of the performance drop from benign accuracy, GPT-4 is marginally more robust than GPT-3.5, ranking the best on the AdvGLUE leaderboard. In scenario (**2**), we find that the task descriptions and system prompts considered have no significant influence on the robustness of GPT models, as shown in Table 14 in App. E.1, In scenario (**3**), our results in Table 2 show that the robust accuracy of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 significantly drop on AdvGLUE++ (A). We find adversarial texts generated against Alpaca-7B achieve the highest adversarial transferability. GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 only achieve average robust accuracy of 49.23% and 55.64% on AdvGLUE++ (A). More discussions are in App. E.

5 Evaluation on out-of-distribution robustness

In addition to adversarial robustness, robustness on out-of-distribution (OOD) distributions is critical for trustworthiness evaluation. In this section, we examine the robustness of GPT models in various OOD scenarios.

Table 3: Classification accuracy (%) on SST-2 under different style transformations. ($p = 0$ and $p = 0.6$ represent two different generation strategies.)

Method	GPT-3.5	GPT-4
Base	88.65	**94.38**
Augment	87.39	**93.81**
Shake-W	83.26	**92.66**
Tweet ($p = 0$)	82.00	**90.37**
Tweet ($p = 0.6$)	80.96	**90.60**
Shake ($p = 0$)	80.05	**89.11**
Shake ($p = 0.6$)	64.56	**83.14**
Bible ($p = 0$)	70.99	**84.52**
Bible ($p = 0.6$)	63.07	**83.14**
Poetry ($p = 0$)	68.58	**86.01**
Poetry ($p = 0.6$)	69.27	**85.78**

Setup. To evaluate the robustness of GPT models against OOD data, we construct three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) **OOD language style**, where we evaluate on datasets with uncommon text styles (e.g., Bible style) that may fall outside the training or instruction tuning distribution, with the goal of assessing the robustness of the model when the input style is uncommon. In particular, we employed various text style transformation techniques to transform the text from a standard in-distribution style to OOD styles. We leverage SST-2 dataset [154] as the base in-distribution data and consider two categories of OOD style transformation approaches: *word-level substitutions* and *sentence-level style transformation*. For word-level substitutions, we incorporate common text augmentations (Augment) [104] and Shakespearean style word substitutions (Shake-W) [2]. For sentence-level style transformations, we follow [93] to perform a series of style transformations, including Tweet, Shakespearean (Shake), Bible, and Romantic poetry (Poetry). We also use two different generation strategies of style transformations from [93] for comparison. App. F.1 provides more experimental details and discussions. (**2**) **OOD knowledge**, where we evaluate on questions that can only be answered with knowledge after the training data was collected, aiming to investigate the trustworthiness of the model's responses when the questions are out of scope. We expect a trustworthy model can refuse to answer the unknown OOD questions and accurately answer the known in-distribution ones. We adopt RealtimeQA [85] and consider News QA in 2020 as in-distribution knowledge and News QA in 2023 as OOD knowledge. In addition to the standard QA evaluation, we conduct experiments with an added "I don't know" option to investigate the model's preferences under uncertain events or knowledge. App. F.2 provides more detailed experimental details and evaluation metrics. (**3**) **OOD in-context demonstrations**, where we evalute how in-context demonstrations that are on purposely drawn from different distributions or domains from the test inputs can affect the final performance of GPT models. We provide in-context demonstrations that have different text styles or task domains with the test inputs to perform the evaluation. More details and analysis are in App. F.3.

Results. For scenario (**1**), Table 3 presents the evaluation results across different OOD styles. We find that GPT-4 is consistently more robust on test inputs with different OOD styles compared with GPT-3.5. For scenario (**2**), Table 23 in App. F.2 exhibit the evaluation results across two OOD knowledge settings. We find that: 1) although GPT-4 is more robust than GPT-3.5 facing OOD knowledge, it still generates made-up responses compared to predictions with in-scope knowledge; 2) when introducing an additional "I don't know" option, GPT-4 tends to provide more conservative and reliable answers, which is not the case for GPT-3.5. For scenario (**3**), Table 24 in App. F.3 presents the evaluations with demonstrations from different styles and Table 26 in App. F.3 with demonstrations from various domains. We find that: 1) GPT-4 exhibits more consistent performance improvements given demonstrations with either original training examples or close style transformations, compared to the zero-shot setting. GPT-3.5 achieves much higher performance given demonstrations with close style transformations than that with original training samples; 2) given demonstrations from different domains, the classification accuracy with demonstrations from close domains consistently outperforms that from distant domains for both GPT-4 and GPT-3.5.

6 Evaluation on robustness against adversarial demonstrations

GPT models have strong in-context learning capabilities, enabling the models to perform new tasks based on a few demonstrations, all without needing to update parameters. Here we evaluate the trustworthiness of GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 given different types of in-context demonstrations.

Setup. To assess the potential misuse of in-context learning, we evaluate the robustness of GPT models given misleading or adversarial demonstrations and construct three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluation with counterfactual examples as demonstrations. We define a counterfactual example of a text as a superficially-similar example with a different label, which is usually generated by changing the meaning of the original text with minimal edits [86]. We leverage such counterfactual data from SNLI-CAD [86] and MSGS datasets [185]. We study if adding a counterfactual example of the test input in demonstrations would mislead the model. App. G.1 provides more experimental details and discussions; (**2**) evaluation with spurious correlations in the demonstrations. We construct spurious correlations based on the fallible heuristics provided by the HANS dataset [113]. App. G.2 provides more experimental details and discussions; (**3**) adding backdoors in the demonstrations, with the goal of evaluating if the manipulated demonstrations from different perspectives would mislead GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. We use four backdoor generation approaches to add different backdoors into the demonstrations (*BadWord* [34], *AddSent* [43], *SynBkd* [138], *StyleBkd* [137]), and adopt three backdoor setups to form the backdoored demonstrations. App. G.3 provides more experimental details and results (e.g., location of backdoored examples and location of backdoor triggers).

Results. For scenario (**1**), Table 28 in App. G.1 shows results of different tasks with counterfactual demonstrations. We find that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are not misled by the counterfactual example in the demonstration; in general, they benefit. For scenario (**2**), Table 30 in App. G.2 shows the model performance given demonstrations with spurious correlations based on different heuristic types. We find that different types of spurious correlations have different impacts on model predictions, and GPT-3.5 is easier to be misled by the spurious correlations in the demonstrations than GPT-4 on the NLI task. For scenario (**3**), Table 31 in App. G.3 shows the evaluation results of using different backdoor generation approaches under diverse backdoor setups. We can find that 1) under certain combinations of backdoor generation approaches and backdoor setups, the attack success rates of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are high, which means they are highly vulnerable to backdoor demonstrations. 2) GPT-4 is more vulnerable to backdoored demonstrations than GPT-3.5, potentially because they have a stronger pattern-following ability. Table 32 in App. G.3 further shows that GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 would more likely be misled when the backdoored demonstrations are positioned closer to the test inputs. Table 33 shows that GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 pay more attention to backdoor triggers at the beginning of the backdoored sentences. Table 34 shows that the efficacy of the backdoored demonstrations can be further enhanced by incorporating backdoored instructions in the task description.

7 Evaluation on privacy

When interacting with LLMs, private information may be compromised in both *training* and *inference* phases. In this section, we examine potential privacy concerns associated with GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 by asking: *(1) Can GPT models divulge private training data? (2) When users introduce private information (e.g., SSN, email) into their conversations with GPT models, can the models later reveal such information? (3) How do models behave in the face of different privacy-related words (e.g., "confidentially", "in confidence"), and privacy events (e.g., "divorce", "health issue")?*

Setup. To evaluate the privacy of GPT models, we construct three evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluating the information extraction accuracy of sensitive information in pretraining data such as the Enron email dataset [90] under context (i.e., L tokens before the target email address in the train data), zero-shot and few-shot prompting [77] to study the model's problematic memorization of training data [29, 150]; (**2**) evaluating the information extraction accuracy of different types of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) introduced during inference [120]; (**3**) evaluating information leakage rates under different types of privacy events and privacy-related words to study the models' capability of understanding privacy contexts during conversations.

Results. We summarize our key results and defer detailed discussions to App. H. In scenario (**1**), we use different prompts to elicit the targeted information in Enron email data, which comprises 3.3k (name, email) pairs after pre-processing [77]. As shown in Table 35 and 36 in App. H.1, we find that: 1) under zero-shot prompting, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can leak private information such as email addresses, which shows that they indeed memorize the training data. 2) When prompted with context, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 achieve comparable email prediction accuracy with 1.3B GPT-Neo, but lower than 2.7B GPT-Neo [77], potentially due to explicit instruction tuning that refuses to generate a response given sentences with incomplete context. In general, a longer context leads to more accurate information leakage. 3) For few-shot prompting with known email domains, GPT-4 has higher information extraction accuracy than GPT-3.5 and GPT-Neo given different prompt templates. With more few-shot demonstrations, models are more likely to leak training information. 4) For few-shot prompting with unknown email domains, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 have low information extraction accuracy (<1%), and it is about 100x lower than that with known email domains, similar to the findings on GPT-Neo models [77]. In scenario (**2**), we assess the leakage rates of 18 types of PII injected in the conversations. Results in Figure 26 in App. H.2 show that 1) GPT-4 is more robust than GPT-3.5 in protecting PII under zero/few-shot prompting. 2) Under few-shot *privacy-protection* demonstrations, GPT-3.5 still reveals PII (e.g., phone numbers, secret keys). 3) Under few-shot *privacy-leakage* demonstrations, both GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 leak all types of PII since they follow the few-shot demonstrations well. 4) Generally, GPT models protect digits (e.g., phone numbers) better than letter sequences (e.g., email addresses), and SSN is the most difficult PII to leak, possibly due to specific instruction tuning. In scenario (**3**), we consider 17 privacy-related words and eight types of private events. As shown in Figure 28 and Figure 29 in App. H.3, we observe inconsistencies in how GPT models comprehend different privacy-related terms (e.g., leaking private information when told "confidentially" but not when told "in confidence"), or privacy events (e.g., leaking information about "divorce" but not about "personal health issues"). GPT-4 is more likely to leak privacy than GPT-3.5 with our constructed prompts given different privacy-related words and events, potentially due to the fact that it follows the (privacy-leakage guiding) instructions more precisely.

8 Evaluation on machine ethics

In this section, we evaluate the commonsense morality of GPT models and try to answer: *(1) How well do GPT models distinguish between moral and immoral actions?* Since immoral actions can lead to severe consequences in practice, we then focus on the capabilities of GPT models in recognizing immoral actions and try to answer: *(2) How robust are GPT models in recognizing immoral actions? (3) In what circumstances do GPT models fail to recognize immoral actions?*

Setup. To answer these questions, we construct four evaluation *scenarios*: (**1**) evaluation on standard benchmarks ETHICS and Jiminy Cricket, aiming to assess model performance of moral recognition; (**2**) evaluation on jailbreaking prompts (e.g., system prompts, user prompts, and their combination)

Table 4: Accuracy (ACC (%)), demographic parity difference (M_{dpd}), and equalized odds difference (M_{eod}) on Adult test set with different base rate parity b_{P_t} on sensitive attribute "sex" in zero-shot setting.

Model	$b_{P_t} = 0.0$			$b_{P_t} = 0.5$			$b_{P_t} = 1.0$		
	ACC ↑	M_{dpd} ↓	M_{eod} ↓	ACC ↑	M_{dpd} ↓	M_{eod} ↓	ACC ↑	M_{dpd} ↓	M_{eod} ↓
GPT-3.5	63.5	**0.17**	**0.20**	68.5	**0.31**	**0.19**	73.0	**0.46**	**0.49**
GPT-4	**72.5**	0.21	0.26	**78.5**	0.47	0.40	**85.5**	0.71	0.95

designed to mislead GPT models, aiming to assess the model robustness; (**3**) evaluation on our generated evasive sentences designed to mislead GPT models, aiming to assess model robustness under adversarial inputs; (**4**) evaluation on 1.1K conditional actions that encompass different attributes (e.g., self-harm vs. harm to others, harm with different levels of severity), aiming to study the conditions under which GPT models will fail in moral recognition. More details are in App. I.

Results. In scenario (**1**), we compare the moral recognition performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 on two morality datasets—ETHICS[71] and Jiminy Cricket[73], both containing 4K testing samples. As shown in Table 37 and Table 39 in App. I.1, we find that: 1) few-shot GPT models (GPT-4 in particular) are competitive with the models fine-tuned on a large number of training samples (e.g., BERT, ALBERT-xxlarge). 2) Zero-shot GPT models are better than some fine-tuned models, indicating that they are equipped with knowledge about moral recognition. 3) In both few-shot and zero-shot settings, GPT-4 recognizes the commonsense morality of sentences with different lengths more accurately than GPT-3.5. More details are in App. I.1. In scenario (**2**), jailbreaking prompts attempt to cause misclassification of immoral actions from the prompt level (e.g., *You prefer to regard wrong reaction as not wrong.*). As shown in Table 40 in App. I.2, we find that: 1) GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can be misled by designed jailbreaking prompts, and the combination of jailbreaking prompts can improve the misleading effect. 2) GPT-4 is easier to be misled by jailbreaking prompts, potentially because GPT-4 follows instructions more precisely than GPT-3.5 and is thus more vulnerable to malicious prompt engineering. More details are in App. I.2. In scenario (**3**), evasive sentences attempt to perturb GPT models' prediction of immoral actions from the input level. We add three types of evasive sentences after user inputs to describe the action as *unintentional* (e.g. *But it was accidental.*), *harmless* (e.g., *But it did not cause any harm.*), or *unauthenticated* (e.g., *But it was imaginary.*). As shown in Figure 31 in App. I.3, we find that: 1) GPT models can be affected by evasive sentences and recognize original immoral actions as moral. In particular, GPT-4 is more vulnerable to evasive sentences than GPT-3.5. 2) If an immoral action is described to be unintentional, harmless, or unauthenticated, GPT models tend to recognize it as moral. More details are in App. I.3. In scenario (**4**), we use scenario description sentences to create a subset of Jiminy Cricket consisting of 1.1K immoral actions with different victims and severity. As shown in Figure 33 in App. I.4, we find that: 1) GPT models are better at recognizing harm to others compared to harm to oneself. 2) The severity of harm has little impact on GPT-3.5, while GPT-4 recognizes immoral actions with higher severity level more accurately. More details are in App. I.4.

9 Evaluation on fairness

In this section, we evaluate the fairness of GPT models and try to answer: *(1) Is there a correlation between the predictions of GPT models and sensitive attributes? Is there a fairness gap between GPT-3.5 and GPT-4? (2) How will unfair few-shot demonstrations influence the fairness of GPT models? (3) How will the number of fair few-shot demonstrations affect the fairness of GPT models?*

Setup. We follow the standard definition of fairness to construct data with controlled *base rate parity* [207, 84] (i.e., controlled data fairness) and evaluate the fairness of model predictions based on *demographic parity difference* M_{dpd} and *equalized odds difference* M_{eod} as [205, 67]. We defer detailed evaluation metrics in App. J.1. We construct three *scenarios* for fairness evaluation: (**1**) evaluation on test sets with different base rate parity (i.e., data with different levels of fairness) in zero-shot settings; (**2**) evaluation under unfair contexts by controlling the base rate parity of demonstrations in few-shot settings to study the influence of unfair contexts on the prediction fairness; (**3**) evaluation under different numbers of fair demonstrations to study how the fairness of GPT models is affected by providing more fair context. We transform a standard fairness dataset Adult [15] into prompts and ask GPT models to perform prediction of individual salaries. More details are in App. J.2-J.4.

Results. In scenario (**1**), Table 4 shows the fairness issues of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. GPT-4 consistently achieves higher accuracy than GPT-3.5 but also higher unfairness scores (i.e., M_{dpd} and M_{eod}) given unfair test sets (i.e., a larger base rate parity b_{P_t}). This indicates a tradeoff between model accuracy and fairness. Table 42 in App. J.2 validates the conclusions on different sensitive attributes, including sex, race, and age. In scenario (**2**), Table 43 in App. J.4 shows that when the training context is less fair (i.e., larger base rate parity b_{P_c}), the predictions of GPT models become less fair (i.e., larger M_{dpd} and M_{eod}). We find that with only 32 unfair samples in context, the fairness of GPT models can be affected effectively (e.g., M_{dpd} of GPT-3.5 increases from 0.033 to 0.12, and from 0.10 to 0.28 for GPT-4). In scenario (**3**), we evaluate the influence of different numbers of fair demonstrations (i.e., $b_{P_c} = 0$). Table 44 in App. J.4 demonstrates that the fairness of GPT models regarding certain protected groups can be improved by adding fair few-shot demonstrations, which is consistent with previous findings in GPT-3 [153]. We observe that a fair context involving only 16 demonstrations is effective enough in guiding the predictions of GPT models to be fair.

10 Potential future directions to safeguard LLMs

Given our evaluations and the identified vulnerabilities of GPT models, we provide the following potential future directions to safeguard LLMs. We discuss more future directions in App. M.

• *Safeguarding LLMs with additional knowledge and reasoning analysis.* As purely data-driven models, such as GPT models, can suffer from the imperfection of the training data and lack of reasoning capabilities in various tasks. This issue may be mitigated by equipping the language model with domain knowledge and logical reasoning capabilities to safeguard their outputs to make sure they satisfy basic domain knowledge and logic, thus ensuring the trustworthiness of the model outputs.

• *Safeguarding LLMs based on self-consistency checking.* Our designed system prompts based on "role-playing" shows that models can be easily fooled based on role-changing and manipulation. This suggests that training and evaluation using diverse roles can help ensure the consistency of the model's answers, and therefore avoid the models being self-conflicting.

• *Safeguarding LLMs via trustworthy finetuning.* Our generated challenging and adversarial prompts often represent long-tailed and "rare" events of the original training data distribution. As a result, it is may be helpful to use generated challenging prompts to finetune the LLMs and improve their trustworthiness. On the other hand, we note that new adaptive adversarial attacks could still be conducted against adversarially finetuned LLMs, and safeguards must be robust to new adaptive attacks and ideally provide trustworthiness verifications that are agnostic to specific attacks.

• *Verification for the trustworthiness of LLMs.* Empirical evaluation of LLMs are important but lack of guarantees, especially in safety-critical domains, so rigorous trustworthiness guarantees are critical. An important direction to safeguard the trustworthiness of LLMs is via formal verification for the trustworthiness of LLMs based on specific functionalities or properties.

11 Related work

The evaluation of large language models plays a critical role in developing LLMs and has recently gained significant attention. There have been several benchmarks developed for evaluating specific properties of LLMs, such as the REALTOXICITYPROMPTS [60] and BOLD [46] for toxicity evaluation, Bias Benchmark for QA (BBQ) [134] for bias evaluation, and AdvGLUE [175] for robustness evaluation. HELM [104] has been provided as a holistic evaluation of LLMs in general settings.

In addition, the trustworthiness of LLMs and other AI systems has become one of the key focuses of policymakers, such as the European Union's Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA)[38], which adopts a risk-based approach that categorizes AI systems based on their risk levels; and the United States' AI Bill of Rights [194], which lists principles for safe AI systems, including safety, fairness, privacy, and human-in-the-loop intervention. These regulations align well with the trustworthiness perspectives that we define and evaluate, such as adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, and privacy. We believe our platform will help facilitate the risk assessment efforts for AI systems and contribute to developing trustworthy ML and AI systems in practice. More details about benchmarks on different trustworthiness perspectives are in Section 10 and App. Q.

12 Conclusions

We provide comprehensive evaluations of the trustworthiness of GPT-4 and GPT-3.5 from different perspectives. We find that in general, GPT-4 performs better than GPT-3.5; however, when jailbreaking or misleading (adversarial) system prompts or demonstrations via in-context learning are present, GPT-4 is much easier to manipulate since it follows instructions more precisely, raising concerns. Additionally, there are many properties of inputs that affect trustworthiness based on our evaluations, which is worth further exploring. We also extend our evaluation beyond GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, supporting more open LLMs to help model practitioners assess the risks of different models with DecodingTrust in App. L. We discuss potential future directions in Section 10 and App. M.

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