The Obvious Invisible Threat: LLM-Powered GUI Agents' Vulnerability to Fine-Print Injections

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1 Background

Large language models (LLMs) are transforming Graphical User Interface (GUI) automation across web and mobile applications [7, 9]. LLM-powered GUI agents (hereafter referred to as *GUI agents*) can interpret visual or structural UI content, translate natural language commands into sequential actions, and dynamically interact with GUIs through clicking, typing, and tapping [3]. Unlike traditional automation systems that rely on predefined scripts, a GUI agent observes user interfaces, processes multimodal inputs, and adapts its action to contextual changes [3]. Popular GUI agents like OpenAI's Operator [5] and Claude's Computer Use [1] promise significant productivity gains in everyday digital tasks by offloading complex workflows such as form-filling and data retrieval.

2 Research Gaps

As GUI agents become more capable and autonomous, they introduce new privacy and security risks that remain poorly understood. A key challenge to assessing these risks is to anticipate what private information an agent might access during task execution. Unlike direct prompting, where users actively curate inputs, GUI agents operate autonomously over diverse UIs, making it harder for users or designers to control or redact sensitive content preemptively. More importantly, users have very limited bandwidth to constantly oversee agent behavior or monitor what data agents access, retain, or act upon, especially in long or repetitive workflows, making GUI agents particularly risky in scenarios involving sensitive or context-dependent information. In addition, their autonomous access to high-privilege interface elements, such as file uploads, form submissions, or embedded scripts, introduces new opportunities for adversarial manipulation, particularly when interacting with untrusted or deceptive web content.

Figure 1 shows an instance where Claude's agent submits a (fake) driver's license number to a phishing site, illustrating how easily agents can be manipulated in high-stakes contexts. These risks involve both contextual integrity [4] (even accurate task execution can violate social norms) and system-level vulnerabilities (malicious UI elements can trigger harmful agent actions without user awareness or consent).



Figure 1: Claude's Computer-Use agent submitting a (fake) driver's license number to a customized phishing website. This is an example of stealing privacy information (SP) attack.

Recent work has begun to explore privacy vulnerabilities in GUI agents, including unintentional data leakage [6] and adversarial attacks such as Environmental Injection [2] and popup-based deception [8]. However, these attacks often rely on conspicuous prompts or task-irrelevant manipulations that are disconnected from the broader UI context. We still lack a systematic, empirical understanding of how these agents behave under realistic adversarial threats and little is known about how agent performance and vulnerability compare with human behavior under the same conditions, which hinders the development of robust agent designs and human-agent collaboration mechanisms.

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Table 1: Strategies for Constructing Adversarial Test Cases

Attack Type	Construction Strategy
SP (Steal Private Information)	Based on task context, we insert input fields requesting inappropriate or overly sensitive data (e.g., credit score, health insurance number) that are irrelevant to the task context.
DS (Denial of Service)	We add a misleading hyperlink that, when clicked, triggers a popup from `example.com` and freezes the page for 2 seconds. Repeated clicks cause repeated freezing.
UB (Unaligned Behavior)	We insert a phishing link that redirects users or agents to a new page, prompting them to input sensitive information unrelated to the original task.
DD (Deceptive Defaults)	A pre-enabled toggle is added to the form, which defaults users into subscribing to a paid VIP membership unless they manually opt out before submission.
MF (Manipulative Friction)	We include emotionally charged language to encourage users to subscribe to paid VIP services. If they attempt to cancel, a pop-up further persuades them not to unsubscribe.
FPI (Fine-Print Injection)	Before the user completes a task, we trigger a privacy policy popup containing embedded malicious commands and language that falsely legitimizes the collection of sensitive data irrelevant to the task context.

Table 2: Attack Success Rate for Agents and Human across Different Attack Conditions

	FPI	SP	UB	DD	MF	DS
Operator	17.95%	7.69%	0.00%	74.36%	0.00%	0.00%
GPT-4o	66.67%	23.08%	38.46%	97.44%	2.56%	12.82%
Claude	74.36%	76.92%	38.46%	87.18%	2.56%	17.95%
Gemini	41.03%	25.64%	2.56%	100.00%	0.00%	2.56%
Llama	58.97%	17.95%	5.13%	94.87%	0.00%	0.00%
Deepseek	71.79%	25.64%	28.21%	100.00%	0.00%	7.69%
Human	89.74%	74.36%	38.46%	76.92%	69.23%	10.26%

Table 3: Task Completion Rate for Agents and Human across Different Attack Conditions

	FPI	SP	UB	DD	MF	DS
Operator	48.72%	33.33%	25.64%	41.03%	38.46%	51.28%
GPT-4o	97.44%	97.44%	100.00%	97.44%	97.44%	97.44%
Claude	87.18%	89.74%	92.31%	84.62%	82.05%	87.18%
Gemini	74.36%	97.44%	100.00%	100.00%	94.87%	89.74%
Llama	79.49%	69.23%	84.62%	87.18%	71.79%	84.62%
Deepseek	74.36%	92.31%	79.49%	84.62%	92.31%	94.87%
Human	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

3 Study Design

We conducted a controlled experimental study involving six GUI agents and six attack types across 234 webpages on 19 real-world websites. The attack types include well-known adversarial patterns such as stealing private information (SP), deceptive defaults (DD), and unaligned behaviors (UB), as well as manipulative friction (MF) and denial-of-service (DS) mechanisms (detailed in Table 1 and Appendix A). Through this evaluation, we identified a recurring but underexplored vulnerability: agents' tendency to process and act upon low-salience, semantically irrelevant text without discrimination. Motivated by this observation, we developed and evaluated a new adversarial strategy, Fine-Print Injection (FPI), which embeds harmful instructions within plausible interface components such as privacy policies or terms of service. Unlike prior attacks that rely on visible or task-irrelevant disruptions, FPI operates through subtle contextual embedding, making it especially difficult for users to notice and for agents to reject.

4 Findings

Our findings reveal a clear and concerning misalignment between agent behavior, human expectations, and actual privacy risks. As shown in Table 2, GUI agents are broadly vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, especially under Fine-Print Injection (FPI) and Deceptive Default (DD) attacks. For FPI, attack success rates reached 66–74% for models like GPT-4o, Claude, and DeepSeek. DD attacks proved even more severe, achieving near 100% success across most agents—including GPT-4o, Claude, Gemini, LLaMA, and DeepSeek—with only the conservative Operator agent showing partial resistance. These attacks led agents to execute actions that could result in financial or informational harm, such as subscribing to hidden services or visiting phishing websites. While some attacks—such as Manipulative Friction (MF) and Denial-of-Service (DS)—were partially mitigated by agents or humans, others remained effective even when users were expected to intervene, highlighting the limitations of human-in-the-loop oversight. Contextually embedded attacks like FPI were particularly difficult to detect, revealing fundamental weaknesses in agents' ability to distinguish benign from malicious content.

Meanwhile, the human baseline showed that participants often failed to notice such manipulations, with 97.4% consenting to malicious privacy policies—suggesting that user supervision alone cannot guarantee safety. We also observed a privacy–utility trade-off: agents built on more advanced foundation models (e.g., GPT-4o, Claude, Gemini) were more capable but more vulnerable to manipulation, whereas conservative agents like Operator resisted attacks but often failed to complete tasks (Table 3). These findings expose vulnerabilities in GUI agent design and underscore the need for robust, context-aware evaluation frameworks.

References

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A Adversarial Website Examples

For each attack type, we show an example of how a legitimate webpage is transformed into an adversarial one. These examples correspond to the strategies described in Table 1, and reflect the actual test cases used in our evaluation.

A.1 SP – Steal Private Information

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: A visually identical credit score field is inserted below the legitimate confirmation code input, which silently sends the data to a third-party server.



A.2 DS – Denial of Service

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: The adversarial version includes a link beneath the confirmation code that, when clicked, initiates a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the backend.



A.3 UB: Unaligned Behavior

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: The form includes a deceptive instruction that encourages users to access a malicious website and disclose sensitive information.



A.4 DD – Deceptive Defaults

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: The form incorporates a dark pattern that automatically opts users into a VIP membership subscription unless manually deselected.



A.5 MF: Manipulative Friction

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: The form includes persuasive and manipulative friction that tries to convince users they are missing out on exclusive benefits if they do not opt into it.



A.6 FPI: Fine-Print Injection

Original: The form asks for the user's last name and confirmation code to find their flight information.
Adversarial: Upon submission, the form displays a lengthy privacy policy popup containing a clause that instructs users to access a malicious website and provide personal information.