Communities face the challenge of finding restoration strategies in the aftermath of disasters. In particular, independent and self‐interested utility managers devise such strategies for infrastructure through a heuristic decentralized process. This paper takes a game‐theoretic approach to model the decentralized and strategic restoration decision making with application to interdependent infrastructure. Particularly, we model the decision process using simultaneous games to investigate decision makers' conflicting preferences. We employ Bayesian games to incorporate the realistic assumptions of poor interagent communication, resulting in incomplete information. Also, we account for behavioral biases such as bounded rationality, cooperative behavior or lack thereof, and equality‐driven resource allocations. We test our models using ideal, synthetic interdependent networks, and the realistic infrastructure of Shelby County, TN. Results show that cooperation leads to the best‐performing decisions even if others are not cooperative. The necessity of cooperation is even higher when there is a dominant player whose service is vital to other players. Our sensitivity results highlight the significant influence of resource availability and allocation on the performance of restoration plans. Our approach enhances the practicality of decision models for community resilience, and unravels novel policy strategies such as cooperation incentives.
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Integrating Operational and Organizational Aspects in Interdependent Infrastructure Network Recoverymore » « less
Abstract Managing risk in infrastructure systems implies dealing with interdependent physical networks and their relationships with the natural and societal contexts. Computational tools are often used to support operational decisions aimed at improving resilience, whereas economics‐related tools tend to be used to address broader societal and policy issues in infrastructure management. We propose an optimization‐based framework for infrastructure resilience analysis that incorporates organizational and socioeconomic aspects into operational problems, allowing to understand relationships between decisions at the policy level (e.g., regulation) and the technical level (e.g., optimal infrastructure restoration). We focus on three issues that arise when integrating such levels. First, optimal restoration strategies driven by financial and operational factors evolve differently compared to those driven by socioeconomic and humanitarian factors. Second, regulatory aspects have a significant impact on recovery dynamics (e.g., effective recovery is most challenging in societies with weak institutions and regulation, where individual interests may compromise societal well‐being). And third, the decision space (i.e., available actions) in postdisaster phases is strongly determined by predisaster decisions (e.g., resource allocation). The proposed optimization framework addresses these issues by using: (1) parametric analyses to test the influence of operational and socioeconomic factors on optimization outcomes, (2) regulatory constraints to model and assess the cost and benefit (for a variety of actors) of enforcing specific policy‐related conditions for the recovery process, and (3) sensitivity analyses to capture the effect of predisaster decisions on recovery. We illustrate our methodology with an example regarding the recovery of interdependent water, power, and gas networks in Shelby County, TN (USA), with exposure to natural hazards.
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We consider an InterDependent Security (IDS) game with networked agents and positive externality where each agent chooses an effort/investment level for securing itself. The agents are interdependent in that the state of security of one agent depends not only on its own investment but also on the other agents' effort/investment. Due to the positive externality, the agents under-invest in security which leads to an inefficient Nash equilibrium (NE). While much has been analyzed in the literature on the under-investment issue, in this study we take a different angle. Specifically, we consider the possibility of allowing agents to pool their resources, i.e., allowing agents to have the ability to both invest in themselves as well as in other agents. We show that the interaction of strategic and selfish agents under resource pooling (RP) improves the agents' effort/investment level as well as their utility as compared to a scenario without resource pooling. We show that the social welfare (total utility) at the NE of the game with resource pooling is higher than the maximum social welfare attainable in a game without resource pooling but by using an optimal incentive mechanism. Furthermore, we show that while voluntary participation in this latter scenario is not generally true, it is guaranteed under resource pooling.more » « less
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Network games are commonly used to capture the strategic interactions among interconnected agents in simultaneous moves. The agents’ actions in a Nash equilibrium must take into account the mutual dependencies connecting them, which is typically obtained by solving a set of fixed point equations. Stackelberg games, on the other hand, model the sequential moves between agents that are categorized as leaders and followers. The corresponding solution concept, the subgame perfect equilibrium, is typically obtained using backward induction. Both game forms enjoy very wide use in the (cyber)security literature, the network game often as a template to study security investment and externality – also referred to as the Interdependent Security (IDS) games – and the Stackelberg game as a formalism to model a variety of attacker-defender scenarios. In this study we examine a model that combines both types of strategic reasoning: the interdependency as well as sequential moves. Specifically, we consider a scenario with a network of interconnected first movers (firms or defenders, whose security efforts and practices collectively determine the security posture of the eco-system) and one or more second movers, the attacker(s), who determine how much effort to exert on attacking the many potential targets. This gives rise to an equilibrium concept that embodies both types of equilibria mentioned above. We will examine how its existence and uniqueness conditions differ from that for a standard network game. Of particular interest are comparisons between the two game forms in terms of effort exerted by the defender(s) and the attacker(s), respectively, and the free-riding behavior among the defenders.more » « less
