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Abstract—Recent work has demonstrated the security risk associated with micro-architecture side-channels. The cache timing side-channel is a particularly popular target due to its availability and high leakage bandwidth. Existing proposals for defending cache side-channel attacks either degrade cache performance and/or limit cache sharing, hence, should only be invoked when the system is under attack. A lightweight monitoring mechanism that detects malicious micro-architecture manipulation in realistic environments is essential for the judicious deployment of these defense mechanisms. In this paper, we propose PREDATOR, a cache side-channel attack detector that identifies cache events caused by an attacker. To detect side-channel attacks in noisy environments, we take advantage of the observation that, unlike non-specific noises, an active attacker alters victim’s micro-architectural states on security critical accesses and thus causes the victim extra cache events on those accesses. PREDATOR uses precise performance counters to collect detailed victim’s access information and analyzes location-based deviations. PREDATOR is capable of detecting five different attacks with high accuracy and limited performance overhead in complex noisy execution environments. PREDATOR remains effective even when the attacker slows the attack rate by 256 times. Furthermore, PREDATOR is able to accurately report details about the attack such as the instruction that accesses the attacked data. In the case of GnuPG RSA [20], PREDATOR can pinpoint the square/multiply operations in the Modulo-Reduce algorithm; and in the case of OpenSSL AES [45], it can identify the accesses to the Te-Table.
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RCoal: Mitigating GPU Timing Attack via Subwarp-Based Randomized Coalescing Techniques
Graphics processing units (GPUs) are becoming default accelerators in many domains such as high-performance computing (HPC), deep learning, and virtual/augmented reality. Recently, GPUs have also shown significant speedups for a variety of security-sensitive applications such as encryptions. These speedups have largely benefited from the high memory bandwidth and compute throughput of GPUs. One of the key features to optimize the memory bandwidth consumption in GPUs is intra-warp memory access coalescing, which merges memory requests originating from different threads of a single warp into as few cache lines as possible. However, this coalescing feature is also shown to make the GPUs prone to the correlation timing attacks as it exposes the relationship between the execution time and the number of coalesced accesses. Consequently, an attacker is able to correctly reveal an AES private key via repeatedly gathering encrypted data and execution time on a GPU. In this work, we propose a series of defense mechanisms to alleviate such timing attacks by carefully trading off performance for improved security. Specifically, we propose to randomize the coalescing logic such that the attacker finds it hard to guess the correct number of coalesced accesses generated. To this end, we propose to randomize: a) the granularity (called as subwarp) at which warp threads are grouped together for coalescing, and b) the threads selected by each subwarp for coalescing. Such randomization techniques result in three mechanisms: fixed-sized subwarp (FSS), random-sized subwarp (RSS), and random-threaded subwarp (RTS). We find that the combination of these security mechanisms offers 24- to 961-times improvement in the security against the correlation timing attacks with 5 to 28% performance degradation. Online copy: http://adwaitjog.github.io/docs/pdf/rcoal-hpca18.pdf
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- Award ID(s):
- 1717532
- PAR ID:
- 10059888
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2018 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 156 to 167
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/HPCA.2018.00023
