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Automated marker makers (AMMs) are decentralized exchanges that enable the automated trading of digital assets. Liquidity providers (LPs) deposit digital tokens, which can be used by traders to execute trades, which generate fees for the investing LPs. In AMMs, trade prices are determined algorithmically, unlike classical limit order books. Concentrated liquidity market makers (CLMMs) are a major class of AMMs that offer liquidity providers flexibility to decide not onlyhow muchliquidity to provide, butin what ranges of pricesthey want the liquidity to be used. This flexibility can complicate strategic planning, since fee rewards are shared among LPs. We formulate and analyze a game theoretic model to study the incentives of LPs in CLMMs. Our main results show that while our original formulation admits multiple Nash equilibria and has complexity quadratic in the number of price ticks in the contract, it can be reduced to a game with a unique Nash equilibrium whose complexity is only linear. We further show that the Nash equilibrium of this simplified game follows a waterfilling strategy, in which low-budget LPs use up their full budget, but rich LPs do not. Finally, by fitting our game model to real-world CLMMs, we observe that in liquidity pools with risky assets, LPs adopt investment strategies far from the Nash equilibrium. Under price uncertainty, they generally invest in fewer and wider price ranges than our analysis suggests, with lower-frequency liquidity updates. In such risky pools, by updating their strategy to more closely match the Nash equilibrium of our game, LPs can improve their median daily returns by $116, which corresponds to an increase of 0.009% in median daily return on investment (ROI). At maximum, LPs can improve daily ROI by 0.855% when they reach Nash equilibrium. In contrast, in stable pools (e.g., of only stablecoins), LPs already adopt strategies that more closely resemble the Nash equilibrium of our game.
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Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Bubbles: Credit Risk, Liquidity, and Bubbles
- Award ID(s):
- 1714984
- PAR ID:
- 10078550
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Review of Finance
- ISSN:
- 1369-412X
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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