The pervasive use of databases for the storage of critical and sensitive information in many organizations has led to an increase in the rate at which databases are exploited in computer crimes. While there are several techniques and tools available for database forensics, they mostly assume apriori database preparation, such as relying on tamper-detection software to already be in place or use of detailed logging. Alternatively, investigators need forensic tools and techniques that work on poorly-configured databases and make no assumptions about the extent of damage in a database. In this paper, we present our database forensics methods, which are capable of examining database content from a database image without using any log or system metadata. We describe how these methods can be used to detect security breaches in untrusted environments where the security threat arose from a privileged user (or someone who has obtained such privileges).
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Establishing Independent Audit Mechanisms for Database Management Systems
The pervasive use of databases for the storage of critical and sensitive information in many organizations has led to an increase in the rate at which databases are exploited in computer crimes. While there are several techniques
and tools available for database forensic analysis, such tools usually assume an apriori database preparation, such as relying on tamper-detection software to already be in place and the use of detailed logging. Further, such tools
are built-in and thus can be compromised or corrupted along with the database itself. In practice, investigators need forensic and security audit tools that work on poorlyconfigured systems and make no assumptions about the extent of damage or malicious hacking in a database.
In this paper, we present our database forensics methods, which are capable of examining database content from a storage (disk or RAM) image without using
any log or file system metadata. We describe how these methods can be used to detect security breaches in an untrusted environment where the security threat arose from a privileged user (or someone who has obtained such privileges). Finally, we argue that a comprehensive and independent audit framework is necessary in order to detect and counteract threats in an environment where the security breach originates from an administrator (either
at database or operating system level).
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- Award ID(s):
- 1656268
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10078873
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- The DOI is not currently available.
