Disagreements between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and content providers over peering fees have risen to the level of potential government regulation. ISPs assert that content providers should pay peering fees based on the volume of downstream traffic. Content providers assert that consumers pay ISPs to transmit the content they request, and thus peering agreements should be settlement-free.
We determine the fair peering fee between an ISP and a transit provider or content provider. We first consider cost sharing between an ISP and a transit provider. We derive the peering fee that equalizes their net backbone transportation costs. We illustrate how the peering fee depends on the traffic ratio and the amount of localization of that content. We then derive the peering fee between an ISP and a content provider that results in the same net cost to the ISP, and illustrate how the peering fee depends on the number of interconnection points and the amount of localization. We use these results to dispense with the ISP argument that they should be paid regardless of the amount of localization of content.
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A system for profiling the IXPs in a region and monitoring their growth: Spotlight at the internet frontier
This work aims at designing and implementing a system able to profile and help manage the set of Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) in an Internet region. As part of the Internet Society's strategy to help monitor and understand the evolution of IXPs in a particular region, a route‐collector data analyzer tool was developed before being deployed and tested in AfriNIC. In fact, traffic localization efforts in the African peering ecosystem would be more sustained, and their efficacy assessed if they were supported by a platform, which evaluates and reports in real time about their impact on the Internet. We, thus, built the “African” Route‐collectors Data Analyzer (ARDA), an open source web platform for analyzing publicly available routing information collected since 2005, by local route‐collectors. ARDA evaluates predefined metrics that picture the status of the interconnection at local, national, and regional levels. It shows that a small proportion of AfriNIC ASes (roughly 17%) are peering in the region. Through them, 58% of all African networks are visible at one IXP or more. These have been static from April to September 2017, and even February 2018, underlining the need for increased efforts to improve local interconnectivity. We show how ARDA can help detect the impact of policies on the growth of local IXPs or continually provide the community with up‐to‐date empirical data on the evolution of the IXP substrate. Given its features, this tool will be a helpful compass for stakeholders in the quest for better traffic localization and new interconnection opportunities in the targeted region.
more » « less- Award ID(s):
- 1724853
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10453272
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley Blackwell (John Wiley & Sons)
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Journal of Network Management
- Volume:
- 29
- Issue:
- 2
- ISSN:
- 1055-7148
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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