Human communication relies on the ability to take into account the speaker's mental state to infer the intended meaning of an utterance in context. For example, a sentence such as ‘Some of the animals are safe to pet’ can be interpreted as giving rise to the inference ‘Some and not all animals are safe to pet’ when uttered by an expert. The same inference, known as a
Upon hearing a scalar adjective in a definite referring expression such as “
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10116419
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Cognitive Science
- Volume:
- 43
- Issue:
- 8
- ISSN:
- 0364-0213
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
more » « less
Abstract scalar implicature , does not arise when the sentence is spoken by someone with partial knowledge. Adults have been shown to derive scalar implicatures in accordance with the speaker's knowledge state, but in young children this ability is debated. Here, we revisit this question using a simple visual world paradigm. We find that both 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds successfully incorporate speaker knowledge into the derivation of scalar inferences. However, this ability does not generalize immediately to non‐linguistic communicative contexts. These findings have important implications for the development of pragmatic abilities. -
Human communication relies on the ability to take into account the speaker's mental state to infer the intended meaning of an utterance in context. For example, a sentence such as 'Some of the animals are safe to pet' can be interpreted as giving rise to the inference 'Some and not all animals are safe to pet' when uttered by an expert. The same inference, known as a scalar implicature, does not arise when the sentence is spoken by someone with partial knowledge. Adults have been shown to derive scalar implicatures in accordance with the speaker's knowledge state, but in young children this ability is debated. Here, we revisit this question using a simple visual world paradigm. We find that both 4- and 5-year-olds successfully incorporate speaker knowledge into the derivation of scalar inferences. However, this ability does not generalize immediately to non-linguistic communicative contexts. These findings have important implications for the development of pragmatic abilities.more » « less
-
more » « less
Abstract Prior work shows that people respond more plastically to environmental influences, including cultural influences, if they carry the 7 or 2‐repeat (7/2R) allelic variant of the dopamine D4 receptor gene (
DRD4 ). The 7/2R carriers are thus more likely to endorse the norms and values of their culture. So far, however, mechanisms underlying this moderation of cultural acquisition byDRD4 are unclear. To address this gap in knowledge, we tested the hypothesis thatDRD4 modulates the processing of reward cues existing in the environment. About 72 young adults, preselected for theirDRD4 status, performed a gambling task, while the electroencephalogram was recorded. Principal components of event‐related potentials aligned to the Reward‐Positivity (associated with bottom‐up processing of reward prediction errors) and frontal‐P3 (associated with top‐down attention) were both significantly more positive following gains than following losses. As predicted, the gain‐loss differences were significantly larger for 7/2R carriers than for noncarriers. Also, as predicted, the cultural backgrounds of the participants (East Asian vs. European American) did not moderate the effects ofDRD4 . Our findings suggest that the 7/2R variant ofDRD4 enhances (a) the detection of reward prediction errors and (b) controlled attention that updates the context for the reward, thereby suggesting one possible mechanism underlying theDRD4 × Culture interactions. -
more » « less
Abstract As we gather noisy sensory information from the environment, prior knowledge about the likely cause(s) of sensory input can be leveraged to facilitate perceptual judgments. Here, we investigated the computational and neural manifestation of cued expectations in human subjects as they performed a probabilistic face/house discrimination task in which face and house stimuli were preceded by informative or neutral cues. Drift-diffusion modeling of behavioral data showed that cued expectations biased both the baseline (pre-sensory) and drift-rate (post-sensory) of evidence accumulation. By employing a catch-trial functional MRI design we were able to isolate neural signatures of expectation during pre- and post-sensory stages of decision processing in face- and house-selective areas of inferior temporal cortex (ITC). Cue-evoked timecourses were modulated by cues in a manner consistent with a pre-sensory prediction signal that scaled with probability. Sensory-evoked timecourses resembled a prediction-error signal, greater in magnitude for surprising than expected stimuli. Individual differences in baseline and drift-rate biases showed a clear mapping onto pre- and post-sensory fMRI activity in ITC. These findings highlight the specificity of perceptual expectations and provide new insight into the convergence of top-down and bottom-up signals in ITC and their distinct interactions prior to and during sensory processing.
-
more » « less
Abstract The posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) is a brain region characterized by perceptual representations of human body actions that promote the understanding of observed behavior. Increasingly, action observation is recognized as being strongly shaped by the expectations of the observer (Kilner 2011; Koster-Hale and Saxe 2013; Patel et al. 2019). Therefore, to characterize top-down influences on action observation, we evaluated the statistical structure of multivariate activation patterns from the action observation network (AON) while observers attended to the different dimensions of action vignettes (the action kinematics, goal, or identity of avatars jumping or crouching). Decoding accuracy varied as a function of attention instruction in the right pSTS and left inferior frontal cortex (IFC), with the right pSTS classifying actions most accurately when observers attended to the action kinematics and the left IFC classifying most accurately when observed attended to the actor’s goal. Functional connectivity also increased between the right pSTS and right IFC when observers attended to the actions portrayed in the vignettes. Our findings are evidence that the attentive state of the viewer modulates sensory representations in the pSTS, consistent with proposals that the pSTS occupies an interstitial zone mediating top-down context and bottom-up perceptual cues during action observation.
