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Securing the Internet’s inter-domain routing system against illicit prefix advertisements by third-party networks remains a great concern for the research, standardization, and operator communities. After many unsuccessful attempts to deploy additional security mechanisms for BGP, we now witness increasing adoption of the RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure). Backed by strong cryptography, the RPKI allows network operators to register their BGP prefixes together with the legitimate Autonomous System (AS) number that may originate them via BGP. Recent research shows an encouraging trend: an increasing number of networks around the globe start to register their prefixes in the RPKI. While encouraging, the actual benefit of registering prefixes in the RPKI eventually depends on whether transit providers in the Internet enforce the RPKI’s content, i.e., configure their routers to validate prefix announcements and filter invalid BGP announcements. In this work, we present a broad empirical study tackling the question: To what degree does registration in the RPKI protect a network from illicit announcements of their prefixes, such as prefix hijacks? To this end, we first present a longitudinal study of filtering behavior of transit providers in the Internet, and second we carry out a detailed study of the visibility of legitimate and illegitimate prefix announcements in the global routing table, contrasting prefixes registered in the RPKI with those not registered. We find that an increasing number of transit and access providers indeed do enforce RPKI filtering, which translates to a direct benefit for the networks using the RPKI in the case of illicit announcements of their address space. Our findings bode well for further RPKI adoption and for increasing routing security in the Internet.
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Unison: Enabling Content Provider/ISP Collaboration using a vSwitch Abstraction
BGP was initially created assuming by default that all ASes are equal. Its policies and protocols, namely BGP, evolved to accommodate a hierarchical Internet, allowing an autonomous system more control over outgoing traffic than incoming traffic. However, the modern Internet is flat, making BGP asymmetrical. In particular, routing decisions are mostly in the hands of traffic sources (i.e., content providers). This leads to suboptimal routing decisions as traffic sources can only estimate route capacity at the destination (i.e., ISP). In this paper, we present the design of Unison, a system that allows an ISP to jointly optimize its intra-domain routes and inter-domain routes, in collaboration with content providers. Unison provides the ISP operator and the neighbors of the ISP with an abstraction ISP network in the form of a virtual switch. This abstraction allows the content providers to program the virtual switch with their requirements. It also allows the ISP to use that information to optimize the overall performance of its network. We show through extensive simulations that Unison can improve ISP throughput by up to 30% through cooperation with content providers. We also show that cooperation of content providers only improves performance, even for non-cooperating content providers (e.g., a single cooperating neighbour can improve ISP throughput by up to 6%).
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- Award ID(s):
- 1816331
- PAR ID:
- 10166580
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2019 IEEE International Conference on Network Protocols
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1 to 11
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the protocol that networks use to exchange (announce) routing information across the Internet. Unfortunately, BGP has no mechanism to prevent unauthorized announcement of network addresses, also known as prefix hijacks. Since the 1990s, the primary means of protecting against unauthorized origin announcements has been the use of routing information databases, so that networks can verify prefix origin information they receive from their neighbors in BGP messages. In the 1990s, operators deployed databases now collectively known as the Internet Routing Registry (IRR), which depend on voluntary (although sometimes contractually required) contribution of routing information without strict (or sometimes any) validation. Coverage, accuracy, and use of these databases remains inconsistent across ISPs and over time. In 2012, after years of debate over approaches to improving routing security, the operator community deployed an alternative known as the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). The RPKI includes cryptographic attestation of records, including expiration dates, with each Regional Internet Registry (RIR) operating as a "root" of trust. Similar to the IRR, operators can use the RPKI to discard routing messages that do not pass origin validation checks. But the additional integrity comes with complexity and cost. Furthermore, operational and legal implications of potential malfunctions have limited registration in and use of the RPKI. In response, some networks have redoubled their efforts to improve the accuracy of IRR registration data. These two technologies are now operating in parallel, along with the option of doing nothing at all to validate routes. Although RPKI use is growing, its limited coverage means that security-conscious operators may query both IRR and RPKI databases to maximize routing security. However, IRR information may be inaccurate due to improper hygiene, such as not updating the origin information after changes in routing policy or prefix ownership. Since RPKI uses a stricter registration and validation process, we use it as a baseline against which to compare the trends in accuracy and coverage of IRR data.more » « less
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ICNP.2019.8888032
