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You Are Who You Appear to Be: A Longitudinal Study of Domain Impersonation in TLS Certificates
- Award ID(s):
- 1901325
- PAR ID:
- 10170469
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’19)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 2489 to 2504
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3319535.3363188
