We study the design of a class of incentive mechanisms that can effectively prevent cheating in a strategic classification and regression problem. A conventional strategic classification or regression problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, or a principal-agent problem between the designer of a classifier (the principal) and individuals subject to the classifier's decisions (the agents), potentially from different demographic groups. The former benefits from the accuracy of its decisions, whereas the latter may have an incentive to game the algorithm into making favorable but erroneous decisions. While prior works tend to focus on how to design an algorithm to be more robust to such strategic maneuvering, this study focuses on an alternative, which is to design incentive mechanisms to shape the utilities of the agents and induce effort that genuinely improves their skills, which in turn benefits both parties in the Stackelberg game. Specifically, the principal and the mechanism provider (which could also be the principal itself) move together in the first stage, publishing and committing to a classifier and an incentive mechanism. The agents are (simultaneous) second movers and best respond to the published classifier and incentive mechanism. When an agent's strategic action merely changes its observable features, it hurts the performance of the algorithm. However, if the action leads to improvement in the agent's true label, it not only helps the agent achieve better decision outcomes, but also preserves the performance of the algorithm. We study how a subsidy mechanism can induce improvement actions, positively impact a number of social well-being metrics, such as the overall skill levels of the agents (efficiency) and positive or true positive rate differences between different demographic groups (fairness).
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Learning From Strategic Agents: Accuracy, Improvement, and Causality, ICML
In many predictive decision-making scenarios, such as credit scoring and academic testing, a decision-maker must construct a model that accounts for agents' incentives to ``game'' their features in order to receive better decisions. Whereas the strategic classification literature generally assumes that agents' outcomes are not causally dependent on their features (and thus strategic behavior is a form of lying), we join concurrent work in modeling agents' outcomes as a function of their changeable attributes. Our formulation is the first to incorporate a crucial phenomenon: when agents act to change observable features, they may as a side effect perturb unobserved features that causally affect their true outcomes. We consider three distinct desiderata for a decision-maker's model: accurately predicting agents' post-gaming outcomes (accuracy), incentivizing agents to improve these outcomes (improvement), and, in the linear setting, estimating the visible coefficients of the true causal model (causal precision). As our main contribution, we provide the first algorithms for learning accuracy-optimizing, improvement-optimizing, and causal-precision-optimizing linear regression models directly from data, without prior knowledge of agents' possible actions. These algorithms circumvent the hardness result of Miller et al. (2019) by allowing the decision maker to observe agents' responses to a sequence of decision rules, in effect inducing agents to perform causal interventions for free.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1908774
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10190171
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of Machine Learning Research
- ISSN:
- 2640-3498
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Celis, L. Elisa (Ed.)In this work, we consider classification of agents who can both game and improve. For example, people wishing to get a loan may be able to take some actions that increase their perceived credit-worthiness and others that also increase their true credit-worthiness. A decision-maker would like to define a classification rule with few false-positives (does not give out many bad loans) while yielding many true positives (giving out many good loans), which includes encouraging agents to improve to become true positives if possible. We consider two models for this problem, a general discrete model and a linear model, and prove algorithmic, learning, and hardness results for each. For the general discrete model, we give an efficient algorithm for the problem of maximizing the number of true positives subject to no false positives, and show how to extend this to a partial-information learning setting. We also show hardness for the problem of maximizing the number of true positives subject to a nonzero bound on the number of false positives, and that this hardness holds even for a finite-point version of our linear model. We also show that maximizing the number of true positives subject to no false positive is NP-hard in our full linear model. We additionally provide an algorithm that determines whether there exists a linear classifier that classifies all agents accurately and causes all improvable agents to become qualified, and give additional results for low-dimensional data.more » « less
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