Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions (Conference Paper) | NSF PAGES

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Citation Details

Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

Award ID(s):: 1715187

NSF-PAR ID:: 10204478

Author(s) / Creator(s):: Daskalakis, Constantinos; Fishelson, Maxwell; Lucier, Brendan; Syrgkanis, Vasilis; Velusamy, Santhoshini

Date Published:: 2020-07-09

Journal Name:: {EC} '20: The 21st {ACM} Conference on Economics and Computation

Page Range / eLocation ID:: 713 to 713

Format(s):: Medium: X

Sponsoring Org:: National Science Foundation

Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
Accepted Manuscript1.0
Conference Paper:
https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399535