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Title: JVM fuzzing for JIT-induced side-channel detection
Timing side channels arise in software when a program's execution time can be correlated with security-sensitive program input. Recent results on software side-channel detection focus on analysis of program's source code. However, runtime behavior, in particular optimizations introduced during just-in-time (JIT) compilation, can impact or even introduce timing side channels in programs. In this paper, we present a technique for automatically detecting such JIT-induced timing side channels in Java programs. We first introduce patterns to detect partitions of secret input potentially separable by side channels. Then we present an automated approach for exploring behaviors of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to identify states where timing channels separating these partitions arise. We evaluate our technique on three datasets used in recent work on side-channel detection. We find that many code variants labeled "safe" with respect to side-channel vulnerabilities are in fact vulnerable to JIT-induced timing side channels. Our results directly contradict the conclusions of four separate state-of-the-art program analysis tools for side-channel detection and demonstrate that JIT-induced side channels are prevalent and can be detected automatically.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1901098 1817242
PAR ID:
10253478
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ICSE '20: Proceedings of the ACM/IEEE 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1011 to 1023
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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