In recent years, studies in engineering education have begun to intentionally integrate disability into discussions of diversity, inclusion, and equity. To broaden and advocate for the participation of this group in engineering, researchers have identified a variety of factors that have kept people with disabilities at the margins of the field. Such factors include the underrepresentation of disabled individuals within research and industry; systemic and personal barriers, and sociocultural expectations within and beyond engineering education-related contexts. These findings provide a foundational understanding of the external and environmental influences that can shape how students with disabilities experience higher education, develop a sense of belonging, and ultimately form professional identities as engineers. Prior work examining the intersections of disability identity and professional identity is limited, with little to no studies examining the ways in which students conceptualize, define, and interpret disability as a category of identity during their undergraduate engineering experience. This lack of research poses problems for recruitment, retention, and inclusion, particularly as existing studies have shown that the ways in which students perceive and define themselves in relation to their college major is crucial for the development of a professional engineering identity. Further, due to variation in defining ‘disability’ acrossmore »
From a figment of your imagination: Disabled marginal cases and underthought experiments
Abstract Philosophers often enroll disabled bodies and minds as objects of thought in their arguments from marginal cases and in thought experiments: for example, arguments for animal ethics use cognitively disabled people as a contrast case, and Merleau-Ponty uses a blind man with a cane as an exemplar of the relationship of technology to the human, of how technology mediates. However, these philosophers enroll disabled people without engaging significantly in any way with disabled people themselves. Instead, disabled people are treated in philosophy as literal objects—and in many cases, as less than human. (This sense of a categorical difference between disabled and nondisabled people is becoming especially clear during the Covid-19 pandemic, as I write this article.) Philosophical reflection thus makes assumptions—often wrong—about disabled people’s lives, experiences, and relationships to technology. Outside of philosophy as well as in, disabled people are not regarded as experts about our own experiences and lives; our testimony is paternalistically written over. We need better consideration of disabled people as people as we consider the future. Lack of disabled people’s points of view in philosophy colors—and sometimes invalidates—views of technological change.
- Award ID(s):
- 1750260
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10254010
- Journal Name:
- Human Affairs
- Volume:
- 30
- Issue:
- 4
- Page Range or eLocation-ID:
- 608 to 616
- ISSN:
- 1210-3055
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
-
How has recent AI Ethics literature addressed topics such as fairness and justice in the context of continued social and structural power asymmetries? We trace both the historical roots and current landmark work that have been shaping the field and categorize these works under three broad umbrellas: (i) those grounded in Western canonical philosophy, (ii) mathematical and statistical methods, and (iii) those emerging from critical data/algorithm/information studies. We also survey the field and explore emerging trends by examining the rapidly growing body of literature that falls under the broad umbrella of AI Ethics. To that end, we read and annotated peer-reviewed papers published over the past four years in two premier conferences: FAccT and AIES. We organize the literature based on an annotation scheme we developed according to three main dimensions: whether the paper deals with concrete applications, use-cases, and/or people’s lived experience; to what extent it addresses harmed, threatened, or otherwise marginalized groups; and if so, whether it explicitly names such groups. We note that although the goals of the majority of FAccT and AIES papers were often commendable, their consideration of the negative impacts of AI on traditionally marginalized groups remained shallow. Taken together, our conceptual analysis andmore »
-
This Research Full Paper examines the concept of flow, derived from Zen philosophy and positive psychology, and how interdisciplinary STEAM (science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics) and disciplinary electrical engineering students find flow within their coursework and their capstone design experiences. STEAM education incorporates the arts and humanities into the traditional disciplines of STEM. However, students involved in this interdisciplinary space often struggle to find a balance in applying both creative and logical knowledge in their work. The theoretical framework for this study leverages the concept of pure experience from Zen philosophy to analyze flow states in students’ interdisciplinary experiences. This theory focuses on the unity of subject/object and rejection of purely logical, positivist thinking for more integrative knowledge acquisition while in flow states. In this secondary analysis, we analyzed interviews conducted with electrical engineering and STEAM students. STEAM students from an interdisciplinary program were found to approach their coursework differently than engineering students, likely because of a difference in assignment guidelines. The engineering students in the study had more restrictive guidelines, while the STEAM students were given more freedom to move between disciplines. Alternatively, students from both disciplines shared many similar values about education and knowledge including the needmore »
-
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European scholars began to search for a new kind of knowledge, what Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in 1620 would call a ‘New Philosophy; or Active Science’ (The Great Instauration, 1620), and what we have come to see as the beginnings of the modern natural sciences. These scholars sought to engage with the things of nature, in addition to the words of texts, and, as they looked about for models of this new kind of enquiry, they took up the case history used by their medical colleagues. They also looked to the methods of history, for history involved gathering observations and experiences about the human world, just as the new type of investigation these scholars sought would observe and collect experiences of the natural realm. They began to call what they did ‘natural history’. These scholars also looked to the handwork of craftspeople and their ability to manipulate natural materials in order to produce valuable products. Where these newly self-described ‘natural historians’ and ‘experimental philosophers’ could read the texts of their medical and historian colleagues, they generally had no such familiar entry point into handwork, for craftspeople produced things, and only rarely recorded their work inmore »
-
In our everyday lives, we often have to choose between many different options. When deciding what to order off a menu, for example, or what type of soda to buy in the supermarket, we have a range of possibilities to consider. So how do we decide what to go for? Researchers believe we make such choices by assigning a subjective value to each of the available options. But we can do this in several different ways. We could look at every option in turn, and then choose the best one once we have considered them all. This is a so-called ‘rational’ decision-making approach. But we could also consider each of the options one at a time and stop as soon as we find one that is good enough. This strategy is known as ‘satisficing’. In both approaches, we use our eyes to gather information about the items available. Most scientists have assumed that merely looking at an item – such as a particular brand of soda – does not affect how we feel about that item. But studies in which animals or people choose between much smaller sets of objects – usually up to four – suggest otherwise. The resultsmore »