Monitoring Sustainability and Targeting Interventions: Indicators, Planetary Boundaries, Benefits and Costs

Randall, Alan

doi:10.3390/su13063181

This article shows how sustainability indicators (SIs) which have proliferated, and downscaled planetary boundaries (DPBs) which have recently emerged, can be used to target remedial interventions. I offer an integrative analysis drawing upon the existing literature, challenging, clarifying, and amending it in some ways, and extending it with new insights. The exposition is couched in the example of pollution control, but the analysis also applies to resource management with only modest amendments. Key conclusions are summarized. (i) In a default case where damage is indifferent to location within the problem shed and transactions costs are trivial, minimizing abatement costs requires that all units face the same marginal price of emissions and can be implemented by price setting at the jurisdictional level or cap and trade in pollution reduction credits. Larger geographic scale tends to reduce the average cost of abatement, an argument for coordination at the problem-shed level. Deviations from the default policy may be appropriate for addressing large point sources and local hot spots where damage is concentrated. (ii) A framework winnowing the proliferation of SIs includes the following principles: for quantitative target setting, SIs should address sustainability in its long-term context; SIs should be measured in ratio scale, whereas ordinal-scale SIs are common; and SIs should be selected for their usefulness in mapping the relationships among emissions, ambient concentrations, and damage. (iii) Target setting requires science-based empirical relationships and social values to assess trade-offs between abatement and its opportunity costs and suggest upper limits on tolerable damage. (iv) PBs that address global public goods can usefully be downscaled to set abatement targets. The PBs are science based and, in their original form, propose replacing social values with imperatives: violating the PB will doom the planet, which is unacceptable given any plausible value system. Given that PB = ∑DPB over all jurisdictions, global trading of credits would minimize costs of honoring the PB. Trade among a willing subset of jurisdictions could minimize the costs of meeting its aggregate DPB. (v) In contrast to most SI approaches, a cost–benefit (CB) approach can deal with substitutability and complementarity among sustainability objectives and evaluate multi-component policies. Net benefits are maximized when the marginal cost of abatement equals the marginal benefit for all units in the problem shed. This can be attained by price setting at the jurisdictional level or trade in credits. (vi) A major advantage of the CB approach is its well-defined relationship to weak sustainability. However, its value measures over-weight the preferences of the well-off. Equity considerations suggest relief from strict CB criteria in the case of essentials such as human health and nutrition, and subsidization by rich countries of sustainability projects in low-income countries.

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