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1. Limited-trust equilibria

   https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.07.009  

   Murray, Timothy; Garg, Jugal; Nagi, Rakesh (February 2021, European Journal of Operational Research)

   null (Ed.)
2. Intervention with limited information

   https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00796-8  

   Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. (October 2021, International Journal of Game Theory)
3. Auctions with Limited Commitment

   https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170882  

   Liu, Qingmin; Mierendorff, Konrad; Shi, Xianwen; Zhong, Weijie (March 2019, American Economic Review)

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   We study the role of limited commitment in a standard auction environment. In each period, the seller can commit to an auction with a reserve price but not to future reserve prices. We characterize the set of equilibrium profits attainable for the seller as the period length vanishes. An immediate sale by efficient auction is optimal when there are at least three buyers. For many natural distributions two buyers is enough. Otherwise, we give conditions under which the maximal profit is attained through continuously declining reserve prices. (JEL D44, D82) 

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4. Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment

   https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16846  

   Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki (July 2022, Econometrica)

   Lizzeri, Alessandro (Ed.)

   We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism‐selection games in which the designer can only commit to short‐term mechanisms. We identify acanonicalclass of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of any equilibrium in a mechanism‐selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information the designer obtains from the interaction with the agent. Therefore, how much the designer learns, which is the key tension in design with limited commitment, becomes an explicit part of the design. Our result simplifies the search for the designer‐optimal outcome by reducing the agent's behavior to a series of participation, truth telling, and Bayes' plausibility constraints the mechanisms must satisfy. 

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5. On stretch-limited elastic strings

   https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2021.0181  

   Rodriguez, Casey (May 2021, Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences)

   Motivated by the increased interest in modelling non-dissipative materials by constitutive relations more general than those from Cauchy elasticity, we initiate the study of a class of stretch-limited elastic strings : the string cannot be compressed smaller than a certain length less than its natural length nor elongated larger than a certain length greater than its natural length. In particular, we consider equilibrium states for a string suspended between two points under the force of gravity (catenaries). We study the locations of the supports resulting in tensile states containing both extensible and inextensible segments in two situations: the degenerate case when the string is vertical and the non-degenerate case when the supports are at the same height. We then study the existence and multiplicity of equilibrium states in general with multiplicity differing markedly from strings satisfying classical constitutive relations. 

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