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As multi-tenant FPGA applications continue to scale in size and complexity, their need for resilience against environmental effects and malicious actions continues to grow. To ensure continuously correct computation, faults in the compute fabric must be identified, isolated, and suppressed in the nanosecond to microsecond range. In this paper, we detail a circuit and system-level methodology to detect compute failure conditions due to on-FPGA voltage attacks. Our approach rapidly suppresses incorrect results and regenerates potentially-tainted results before they propagate, allowing time for an attacker to be suppressed. Instrumentation includes voltage sensors to detect error conditions induced by attackers. This analysis is paired with focused remediation approaches involving data buffering, fault suppression, results recalculation, and computation restart. Our approach has been demonstrated using an RSA encryption circuit implemented on a Stratix 10 FPGA. We show that a voltage attack using on-FPGA power wasters can be effectively detected and computation halted in 15 ns, preventing the injection of timing faults. Potentially tainted results are successfully regenerated, allowing for fault-free circuit operation. A full characterization of the latency and resource overheads of fault detection and recovery is provided.
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Intelligent Electromagnetic Sensors for Non-Invasive Trojan Detection
Rapid growth of sensors and the Internet of Things is transforming society, the economy and the quality of life. Many devices at the extreme edge collect and transmit sensitive information wirelessly for remote computing. The device behavior can be monitored through side-channel emissions, including power consumption and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. This study presents a holistic self-testing approach incorporating nanoscale EM sensing devices and an energy-efficient learning module to detect security threats and malicious attacks directly at the front-end sensors. The built-in threat detection approach using the intelligent EM sensors distributed on the power lines is developed to detect abnormal data activities without degrading the performance while achieving good energy efficiency. The minimal usage of energy and space can allow the energy-constrained wireless devices to have an on-chip detection system to predict malicious attacks rapidly in the front line.
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- PAR ID:
- 10315310
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Sensors
- Volume:
- 21
- Issue:
- 24
- ISSN:
- 1424-8220
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.3390/s21248288
