Models produced by machine learning, particularly deep neural networks, are state-of-the-art for many machine learning tasks and demonstrate very high prediction accuracy. Unfortunately, these models are also very brittle and vulnerable to specially crafted adversarial examples. Recent results have shown that accuracy of these models can be reduced from close to hundred percent to below 5\% using adversarial examples. This brittleness of deep neural networks makes it challenging to deploy these learning models in security-critical areas where adversarial activity is expected, and cannot be ignored. A number of methods have been recently proposed to craft more effective and generalizable attacks on neural networks along with competing efforts to improve robustness of these learning models. But the current approaches to make machine learning techniques more resilient fall short of their goal. Further, the succession of new adversarial attacks against proposed methods to increase neural network robustness raises doubts about a foolproof approach to robustify machine learning models against all possible adversarial attacks. In this paper, we consider the problem of detecting adversarial examples. This would help identify when the learning models cannot be trusted without attempting to repair the models or make them robust to adversarial attacks. This goal of finding limitations of the learning model presents a more tractable approach to protecting against adversarial attacks. Our approach is based on identifying a low dimensional manifold in which the training samples lie, and then using the distance of a new observation from this manifold to identify whether this data point is adversarial or not. Our empirical study demonstrates that adversarial examples not only lie farther away from the data manifold, but this distance from manifold of the adversarial examples increases with the attack confidence. Thus, adversarial examples that are likely to result into incorrect prediction by the machine learning model is also easier to detect by our approach. This is a first step towards formulating a novel approach based on computational geometry that can identify the limiting boundaries of a machine learning model, and detect adversarial attacks.
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Enhancing Adversarial Defense by k-Winners-Take-All
We propose a simple change to existing neural network structures for better defending against gradient-based adversarial attacks. Instead of using popular activation functions (such as ReLU), we advocate the use of k-Winners-Take-All (k-WTA) activation, a C0 discontinuous function that purposely invalidates the neural network model's gradient at densely distributed input data points. The proposed k-WTA activation can be readily used in nearly all existing networks and training methods with no significant overhead. Our proposal is theoretically rationalized. We analyze why the discontinuities in k-WTA networks can largely prevent gradient-based search of adversarial examples and why they at the same time remain innocuous to the network training. This understanding is also empirically backed. We test k-WTA activation on various network structures optimized by a training method, be it adversarial training or not. In all cases, the robustness of k-WTA networks outperforms that of traditional networks under white-box attacks.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1816041
- PAR ID:
- 10347305
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Conference on Learning Representations
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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