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Cyber-defenders must account for users’ perceptions of attack consequence severity. However, research has yet to investigate such perceptions of a wide range of cyber-attack consequences. Thus, we had users rate the severity of 50 cyber-attack consequences. We then analyzed those ratings to a) understand perceived severity for each consequence, and b) compare perceived severity across select consequences. Further, we grouped ratings into the STRIDE threat model categories and c) analyzed whether perceived severity varied across those categories. The current study’s results suggest not all consequences are perceived to be equally severe; likewise, not all STRIDE threat model categories are perceived to be equally severe. Implications for designing warning messages and modeling threats are discussed.
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User Perceptions of Phishing Consequence Severity and Likelihood, and Implications for Warning Message Design
To combat phishing, system messages warn users of suspected phishing attacks. However, users do not always comply with warning messages. One reason for non-compliance is that warning messages contradict how users think about phishing threats. To increase compliance, warning messages should align with user perceptions of phishing threat risks. How users think about phishing threats is not yet known. To identify how users perceive phishing threats, participants were surveyed about their perceptions of the severity and likelihood of 9 phishing consequences. Results revealed perceived severity and likelihood levels for each consequence, as well as relative differences between consequences. Concrete examples of warning messages that reflect these findings are provided.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1564293
- PAR ID:
- 10350804
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Purpose Nonexperts do not always follow the advice in cybersecurity warning messages. To increase compliance, it is recommended that warning messages use nontechnical language, describe how the cyberattack will affect the user personally and do so in a way that aligns with how the user thinks about cyberattacks. Implementing those recommendations requires an understanding of how nonexperts think about cyberattack consequences. Unfortunately, research has yet to reveal nonexperts’ thinking about cyberattack consequences. Toward that end, the purpose of this study was to examine how nonexperts think about cyberattack consequences. Design/methodology/approach Nonexperts sorted cyberattack consequences based on perceived similarity and labeled each group based on the reason those grouped consequences were perceived to be similar. Participants’ labels were analyzed to understand the general themes and the specific features that are present in nonexperts’ thinking. Findings The results suggested participants mainly thought about cyberattack consequences in terms of what the attacker is doing and what will be affected. Further, the results suggested participants thought about certain aspects of the consequences in concrete terms and other aspects of the consequences in general terms. Originality/value This research illuminates how nonexperts think about cyberattack consequences. This paper also reveals what aspects of nonexperts’ thinking are more or less concrete and identifies specific terminology that can be used to describe aspects that fall into each case. Such information allows one to align warning messages to nonexperts’ thinking in more nuanced ways than would otherwise be possible.more » « less
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Phishing scam emails are emails that pretend to be something they are not in order to get the recipient of the email to undertake some action they normally would not. While technical protections against phishing reduce the number of phishing emails received, they are not perfect and phishing remains one of the largest sources of security risk in technology and communication systems. To better understand the cognitive process that end users can use to identify phishing messages, I interviewed 21 IT experts about instances where they successfully identified emails as phishing in their own inboxes. IT experts naturally follow a three-stage process for identifying phishing emails. In the first stage, the email recipient tries to make sense of the email, and understand how it relates to other things in their life. As they do this, they notice discrepancies: little things that are off'' about the email. As the recipient notices more discrepancies, they feel a need for an alternative explanation for the email. At some point, some feature of the email --- usually, the presence of a link requesting an action --- triggers them to recognize that phishing is a possible alternative explanation. At this point, they become suspicious (stage two) and investigate the email by looking for technical details that can conclusively identify the email as phishing. Once they find such information, then they move to stage three and deal with the email by deleting it or reporting it. I discuss ways this process can fail, and implications for improving training of end users about phishing.more » « less
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-79997-7_33
