Rowhammer is an increasingly threatening vulnerability that grants an attacker the ability to flip bits in memory without directly accessing them. Despite efforts to mitigate Rowhammer via software and defenses built directly into DRAM modules, more recent generations of DRAM are actually more susceptible to malicious bit-flips than their predecessors. This phenomenon has spawned numerous exploits, showing how Rowhammer acts as the basis for various vulnerabilities that target sensitive structures, such as Page Table Entries (PTEs) or opcodes, to grant control over a victim machine.
However, in this paper, we consider Rowhammer as a more general vulnerability, presenting a novel exploit vector for Rowhammer that targets particular code patterns. We show that if victim code is designed to return benign data to an unprivileged user, and uses nested pointer dereferences, Rowhammer can flip these pointers to gain arbitrary read access in the victim's address space. Furthermore, we identify gadgets present in the Linux kernel, and demonstrate an end-to-end attack that precisely flips a targeted pointer. To do so we developed a number of improved Rowhammer primitives, including kernel memory massaging, Rowhammer synchronization, and testing for kernel flips, which may be of broader interest to the Rowhammer community. Compared to prior works' leakage rate of .3 bits/s, we show that such gadgets can be used to read out kernel data at a rate of 82.6 bits/s.
By targeting code gadgets, this work expands the scope and attack surface exposed by Rowhammer. It is no longer sufficient for software defenses to selectively pad previously exploited memory structures in flip-safe memory, as any victim code that follows the pattern in question must be protected.
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Holistic Control-Flow Protection on Real-Time Embedded Systems with Kage
This paper presents Kage: a system that protects the control data of both application and kernel code on microcontroller-based embedded systems. Kage consists of a Kage-compliant embedded OS that stores all control data in separate memory regions from untrusted data, a compiler that transforms code to protect these memory regions efficiently and to add forward-edge control-flow integrity checks, and a secure API that allows safe updates to the protected data. We implemented Kage as an extension to FreeRTOS, an embedded real-time operating system. We evaluated Kage’s performance using the CoreMark benchmark. Kage incurred a 5.2% average run-time overhead and 49.8% code size overhead. Furthermore, the code size overhead was only 14.2% when compared to baseline FreeRTOS with the MPU enabled. We also evaluated Kage’s security guarantees by measuring and analyzing reachable code-reuse gadgets. Compared to FreeRTOS, Kage reduces the number of reachable gadgets from 2,276 to 27, and the remaining 27 gadgets cannot be stitched together to launch a practical attack.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1955498
- PAR ID:
- 10350950
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Usenix Security Symposium
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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