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The increasing harms caused by hate, harassment, and other forms of abuse online have motivated major platforms to explore hierarchical governance. The idea is to allow communities to have designated members take on moderation and leadership duties; meanwhile, members can still escalate issues to the platform. But these promising approaches have only been explored in plaintext settings where community content is public to the platform. It is unclear how one can realize hierarchical governance in the huge and increasing number of online communities that utilize end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) messaging for privacy. We propose the design of private, hierarchical governance systems. These should enable similar levels of community governance as in plaintext settings, while maintaining cryptographic privacy of content and governance actions not reported to the platform. We design the first such system, taking a layered approach that adds governance logic on top of an encrypted messaging protocol; we show how an extension to the message layer security (MLS) protocol suffices for achieving a rich set of governance policies. Our approach allows developers to rapidly prototype new governance features, taking inspiration from a plaintext system called PolicyKit. We report on an initial prototype encrypted messaging system called MlsGov that supports content-based community and platform moderation, elections of community moderators, votes to remove abusive users, and more.
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Abuse Resistant Law Enforcement Access Systems
The increasing deployment of end-to-end encrypted communications services has ignited a debate between technology firms and law enforcement agencies over the need for lawful access to encrypted communications. Unfortunately, existing solutions to this problem suffer from serious technical risks, such as the possibility of operator abuse and theft of escrow key material. In this work we investigate the problem of constructing law enforcement access systems that mitigate the possibility of unauthorized surveillance. We first define a set of desirable properties for an abuse-resistant law enforcement access system (ARLEAS), and motivate each of these properties. We then formalize these definitions in the Universal Composability (UC) framework, and present two main constructions that realize this definition. The first construction enables prospective access, allowing surveillance only if encryption occurs after a warrant has been issued and activated. The second, more powerful construction, allows retrospective access to communications that occurred prior to a warrant’s issuance. To illustrate the technical challenge of constructing the latter type of protocol, we conclude by investigating the minimal assumptions required to realize these systems.
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- PAR ID:
- 10354328
- Editor(s):
- Canteaut, A.
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Advances in Cryptology, EUROCRYPT 2021
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77883-5_19
