This paper studies the optimal investment problem with random endowment in an inventory‐based price impact model with competitive market makers. Our goal is to analyze how price impact affects optimal policies, as well as both pricing rules and demand schedules for contingent claims. For exponential market makers preferences, we establish two effects due to price impact: constrained trading and nonlinear hedging costs. To the former, wealth processes in the impact model are identified with those in a model without impact, but with constrained trading, where the (random) constraint set is generically neither closed nor convex. Regarding hedging, nonlinear hedging costs motivate the study of arbitrage free prices for the claim. We provide three such notions, which coincide in the frictionless case, but which dramatically differ in the presence of price impact. Additionally, we show arbitrage opportunities, should they arise from claim prices, can be exploited only for limited position sizes, and may be ignored if outweighed by hedging considerations. We also show that arbitrage‐inducing prices may arise endogenously in equilibrium, and that equilibrium positions are inversely proportional to the market makers' representative risk aversion. Therefore, large positions endogenously arise in the limit of either market maker risk neutrality, or a large number of market makers.
Contractors will play a vital role in providing farms with access to new precision farming technologies, especially in small-scale farming systems. We investigate the impact of spatial competition among contractors on the uptake of precision farming and the effectiveness of policy interventions, considering alternative spatial price schedules. Conceptual analyses show that a lack of spatial competition among contractors hinders uptake of precision farming technology. The effectiveness of policy interventions to support precision farming also depends on the market structure and contractors’ price schedules. In addition, we illustrate the results in a Swiss case study based on a specific contractors’ service market of plant protection technologies.
more » « less- PAR ID:
- 10367771
- Publisher / Repository:
- Oxford University Press
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Q Open
- Volume:
- 2
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 2633-9048
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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