Anthropogenic aerosols are hazardous to human health but have helped offset warming from greenhouse gases (GHGs), creating a potential regulatory tradeoff. As countries implement their GHG reduction targets under the Paris climate agreement, the co‐emissions of aerosols and their precursors will also change. Since these co‐emissions vary by country and by economic sector, each country will face different tradeoffs between aerosol‐driven health or temperature co‐benefits. We combine simple parameterizations of physical processes and health outcomes to examine three idealized climate policy approaches that are consistent with the Paris Agreement targets, which (i) optimize for local air quality, (ii) reduce global temperature change, or (iii) reduce emissions equally from all domestic economic sectors. We evaluate aerosol impacts on premature mortality and global mean temperature change under these three policy approaches and find that by 2030 the three policies yield differences of over 1 million annual premature deaths and global temperature differences of the same magnitude as those from GHG reductions. We also show that implementing equal reductions between all economic sectors can actually result in less beneficial health and temperature outcomes than either of the other options, especially in less industrialized regions. We therefore conclude that aerosol‐related co‐benefits and aerosol accounting guidelines should be explicitly considered in setting international climate policy.
Quantifying which nations are culpable for the economic impacts of anthropogenic warming is central to informing climate litigation and restitution claims for climate damages. However, for countries seeking legal redress, the magnitude of economic losses from warming attributable to individual emitters is not known, undermining their standing for climate liability claims. Uncertainties compound at each step from emissions to global greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, GHG concentrations to global temperature changes, global temperature changes to country-level temperature changes, and country-level temperature changes to economic losses, providing emitters with plausible deniability for damage claims. Here we lift that veil of deniability, combining historical data with climate models of varying complexity in an integrated framework to quantify each nation’s culpability for historical temperature-driven income changes in every other country. We find that the top five emitters (the United States, China, Russia, Brazil, and India) have collectively caused US$6 trillion in income losses from warming since 1990, comparable to 11% of annual global gross domestic product; many other countries are responsible for billions in losses. Yet the distribution of warming impacts from emitters is highly unequal: high-income, high-emitting countries have benefited themselves while harming low-income, low-emitting countries, emphasizing the inequities embedded in the causes and consequences of historical warming. By linking individual emitters to country-level income losses from warming, our results provide critical insight into climate liability and national accountability for climate policy.
more » « less- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10370281
- Publisher / Repository:
- Springer Science + Business Media
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Climatic Change
- Volume:
- 172
- Issue:
- 3-4
- ISSN:
- 0165-0009
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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