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We estimate differences in innovation behavior between foreign versus U.S.-born entrepreneurs in high-tech industries. Our data come from the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, a random sample of firms with detailed information on owner characteristics and innovation activities. We find uniformly higher rates of innovation in immigrant-owned firms for 15 of 16 different innovation measures; the only exception is for copyright/trademark. The immigrant advantage holds for older firms as well as for recent start-ups and for every level of the entrepreneur’s education. The size of the estimated immigrant-native differences in product and process innovation activities rises with detailed controls for demographic and human capital characteristics but falls for R&D and patenting. Controlling for finance, motivations, and industry reduces all coefficients, but for most measures and specifications immigrants are estimated to have a sizable advantage in innovation.
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Black-Owned Firms, Financial Constraints, and the Firm Size Gap
We document the smaller average employment size and lower financial access of Black-owned businesses compared to White-owned businesses. Controlling for other characteristics, we find that observed differences in finance account for 60 percent of the 11.3 percent racial gap in number of employees; differences in returns account for 103 percent. The results imply that if both the levels and returns on finance were equalized across races, then Black-owned firms would be 18.4 percent larger than their actual size. Equalizing financial factors alone would reverse the firm size gap so that Black-owned firms would be larger than White-owned firms by 7.1 percent.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1719201
- PAR ID:
- 10377684
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- AEA Papers and Proceedings
- Volume:
- 112
- ISSN:
- 2574-0768
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 282 to 286
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20221027
