Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions (Conference Paper) | NSF PAGES

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Citation Details

Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions

Award ID(s):: 1942497

NSF-PAR ID:: 10390175

Author(s) / Creator(s):: Essaidi, Meryem; Ferreira, Matheus V.; Weinberg, S. Matthew

Date Published:: 2022-01-01

Journal Name:: Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference

Format(s):: Medium: X

Sponsoring Org:: National Science Foundation

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The DOI is not currently available.