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Title: Building representations of the social world: Children extract patterns from social choices to reason about multi‐group hierarchies
Abstract Research Highlights

Children in our sample extracted patterns from an agent's positive social choices between multiple groups to reason about groups’ relative social standing.

Children used the pattern of an agent's positive social choices to guide their reasoning about which groups were likely to be “leaders” and “helpers” in a fictional town.

The pattern that emerged in an agent's choices of friends shaped children's thinking about groups’ relativesocialbut notphysicalpower.

Children tracked social choices to reason about group‐based hierarchies at the individual level (which groups an agent prefers) and societal level (which groups are privileged).

 
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NSF-PAR ID:
10395695
Author(s) / Creator(s):
 ;  ;  
Publisher / Repository:
Wiley-Blackwell
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Developmental Science
Volume:
26
Issue:
4
ISSN:
1363-755X
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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