Requiem for transit ridership? An examination of who abandoned, who will return, and who will ride more with mobility as a service
- Award ID(s):
- 1847537
- PAR ID:
- 10401530
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Transport Policy
- Volume:
- 134
- Issue:
- C
- ISSN:
- 0967-070X
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 139 to 154
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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