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1. An Impulse-Regime Switching Game Model of Vertical Competition

   https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00381-4  

   Aïd, René ; Campi, Luciano ; Li, Liangchen ; Ludkovski, Mike ( March 2021 , Dynamic Games and Applications)

   null (Ed.)

   Abstract We study a new kind of nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with mixed impulse/switching controls, motivated by strategic competition in commodity markets. A representative upstream firm produces a commodity that is used by a representative downstream firm to produce a final consumption good. Both firms can influence the price of the commodity. By shutting down or increasing generation capacities, the upstream firm influences the price with impulses. By switching (or not) to a substitute, the downstream firm influences the drift of the commodity price process. We study the resulting impulse-regime switching game between the two firms, focusing on explicit threshold-type equilibria. Remarkably, this class of games naturally gives rise to multiple potential Nash equilibria, which we obtain thanks to a verification-based approach. We exhibit three candidate types of equilibria depending on the ultimate number of switches by the downstream firm (zero, one or an infinite number of switches). We illustrate the diversification effect provided by vertical integration in the specific case of the crude oil market. Our analysis shows that the diversification gains strongly depend on the pass-through from the crude price to the gasoline price. 

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2. The Darwinian Returns to Scale

   https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad061  

   Baqaee, David Rezza ; Farhi, Emmanuel ; Sangani, Kunal ( June 2023 , Review of Economic Studies)

   How does an increase in market size, say due to globalization, affect welfare? We study this question using a model with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous markups, and fixed costs. We characterize changes in welfare and decompose changes in allocative efficiency into three different effects: (1) reallocations across firms with heterogeneous price elasticities due to intensifying competition, (2) reallocations due to the exit of marginally profitable firms, and (3) reallocations due to changes in firms’ markups. Whereas the second and third effects have ambiguous implications for welfare, the first effect, which we call the Darwinian effect, always increases welfare regardless of the shape of demand curves. We nonparametrically calibrate demand curves with data from Belgian manufacturing firms and quantify our results. We find that mild increasing returns at the microlevel can catalyze large increasing returns at the macrolevel. Between 70 and 90% of increasing returns to scale come from improvements in how a larger market allocates resources. The lion’s share of these gains are due to the Darwinian effect, which increases the aggregate markup and concentrates sales and employment in high-markup firms. This has implications for policy: an entry subsidy, which harnesses Darwinian reallocations, can improve welfare even when there is more entry than in the first best.

    

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3. Distribution-level markets under high renewable energy penetration

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3538637.3538846  

   Ju, Peizhong ; Lin, Xiaojun ; Huang, Jianwei ( June 2022 , Thirteenth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems (ACM e-Energy 2022))

   We study the market structure for emerging distribution-level energy markets with high renewable energy penetration. Renewable generation is known to be uncertain and has a close-to-zero marginal cost. In this paper, we use solar energy as an example of such zero-marginal-cost resources for our focused study. We first show that, under high penetration of solar generation, the classical real-time market mechanism can either exhibit significant price-volatility (when each firm is not allowed to vary the supply quantity), or induce price-fixing (when each firm is allowed to vary the supply quantity), the latter of which leads to extreme unfairness of surplus division. To overcome these issues, we propose a new rental-market mechanism that trades the usage-right of solar panels instead of real-time solar energy. We show that the rental market produces a stable and unique price (therefore eliminating price-volatility), maintains positive surplus for both consumers and firms (therefore eliminating price-fixing), and achieves the same social welfare as the traditional real-time market. A key insight is that rental markets turn uncertainty of renewable generation from a detrimental factor (that leads to price-volatility in real-time markets) to a beneficial factor (that increases demand elasticity and contributes to the desirable rental-market outcomes). 

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4. Do Managers Do Good with Other People’s Money?

   https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfad008  

   Cheng, Ing-Haw ; Hong, Harrison ; Shue, Kelly ; Ellul, ed., Andrew ( April 2023 , The Review of Corporate Finance Studies)

   There is mixed evidence on whether the marginal dollar spent on corporate social responsibility is due to agency problems. We propose an approach by modeling how the 2003 dividend tax cut, which increased after-tax insider ownership and better aligned managerial and shareholder interests, affected the marginal dollar spent on firm responsibility. We confirm key predictions of our agency model: following the tax cut, moderate insider-ownership firms experience larger declines in their responsibility ratings and increases in their valuations relative to other firms. We also confirm another implication regarding managerial misalignment using a regression-discontinuity design of close votes on shareholder-governance proposals. (JEL G30, G31, G35)

   Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

    

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5. Spectrum Measurement Markets for Tiered Spectrum Access

   https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC.2018.8422512  

   Ghosh, Arnob ; Berry, Randall ; Aggarwal, Vaneet ( May 2018 , 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC))

   The recent framework for tiered spectrum sharing in the 3.5 GHz band establishes rules in which multiple firms called Environment Sensing Capability operators (ESCs) may measure spectrum occupancy and sell these measurements to other firms to help facilitate spectrum access. Motived by this we consider a scenario in which two spectrum access firms (SAs) seeks to access a shared band of spectrum and must in turn purchase spectrum measurements from one of two ESCs. Given the measurements they purchase, the SA firms then compete on price to serve customers in a shared band of spectrum. We study how differences in the quality and price of the spectrum measurements impact the resulting market equilibrium between the SAs and find that having different qualities of measurements available to different SAs can lead to better economic welfare. 

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