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Title: New Pricing Models, Same Old Phillips Curves?
Abstract We show that in a broad class of menu cost models, the first-order dynamics of aggregate inflation in response to arbitrary shocks to aggregate costs are nearly the same as in Calvo models with suitably chosen Calvo adjustment frequencies. We first prove that the canonical menu cost model is first-order equivalent to a mixture of two time-dependent models, which reflect the extensive and intensive margins of price adjustment. We then show numerically that in any plausible parameterization, this mixture is well approximated by a single Calvo model. This close numerical fit carries over to other standard specifications of menu cost models. Thus, for shocks that are not too large, the Phillips curve for a menu cost model looks like the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but with a higher slope.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2042691 1851717
PAR ID:
10484844
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
Oxford University Press
Date Published:
Journal Name:
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Volume:
139
Issue:
1
ISSN:
0033-5533
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: p. 121-186
Size(s):
p. 121-186
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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