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Title: Value transparency and promoting warranted trust in science communication
Abstract If contextual values can play necessary and beneficial roles in scientific research, to what extent should science communicators be transparent about such values? This question is particularly pressing in contexts where there appears to be significant resistance among some non-experts to accept certain scientific claims or adopt science-based policies or recommendations. This paper examines whether value transparency can help promote non-experts’ warranted epistemic trust of experts. I argue that there is a prima facie case in favor of transparency because it can promote four conditions that are thought to be required for epistemic trustworthiness. I then consider three main arguments that transparency about values is likely to be ineffective in promoting such trust (and may undermine it). This analysis shows that while these arguments show that value transparency is not sufficient for promoting epistemic trust, they fail to show that rejecting value transparency as a norm for science communicators is more likely to promote warranted epistemic trust than a qualified norm of value transparency (along with other strategies). Finally, I endorse a tempered understanding of value transparency and consider what this might require in practice.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2223756
PAR ID:
10487086
Author(s) / Creator(s):
Publisher / Repository:
Springer Science + Business Media
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Synthese
Volume:
203
Issue:
2
ISSN:
1573-0964
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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