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MIMO processing enables jammer mitigation through spatial filtering, provided that the receiver knows the spatial signature of the jammer interference. Estimating this signature is easy for barrage jammers that transmit continuously and with static signature, but difficult for more sophisticated jammers: Smart jammers may deliberately suspend transmission when the receiver tries to estimate their spatial signature, they may use time-varying beamforming to continuously change their spatial signature, or they may stay mostly silent and jam only specific instants (e.g., transmission of control signals). To deal with such smart jammers, we propose MASH, the first method that indiscriminately mitigates all types of jammers: Assume that the transmitter and receiver share a common secret. Based on this secret, the transmitter embeds (with a linear time-domain transform) its signal in a secret subspace of a higher-dimensional space. The receiver applies a reciprocal linear transform to the receive signal, which (i) raises the legitimate transmit signal from its secret subspace and (ii) provably transforms any jammer into a barrage jammer, which makes estimation and mitigation via MIMO processing straightforward. We show the efficacy of MASH for data transmission in the massive multi-user MIMO uplink.
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Joint Jammer Mitigation and Data Detection for Smart, Distributed, and Multi-Antenna Jammers
Multi-antenna (MIMO) processing is a promising solution to the problem of jammer mitigation. Existing methods mitigate the jammer based on an estimate of its subspace (or receive statistics) acquired through a dedicated training phase. This strategy has two main drawbacks: (i) it reduces the communication rate since no data can be transmitted during the training phase and (ii) it can be evaded by smart or multi-antenna jammers that are quiet during the training phase or that dynamically change their subspace through time-varying beamforming. To address these drawbacks, we propose joint jammer mitigation and data detection (JMD), a novel paradigm for MIMO jammer mitigation. The core idea is to estimate and remove the jammer interference subspace jointly with detecting the transmit data over multiple time slots. Doing so removes the need for a dedicated rate-reducing training period while enabling the mitigation of smart and dynamic multi-antenna jammers. We instantiate our paradigm with SANDMAN, a simple and practical algorithm for multi-user MIMO uplink JMD. Extensive simulations demonstrate the efficacy of JMD, and of SANDMAN in particular, for jammer mitigation.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1717559
- PAR ID:
- 10490328
- Publisher / Repository:
- IEEE
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- IEEE International Conference on Communications
- ISSN:
- 1938-1883
- ISBN:
- 978-1-5386-7462-8
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1364 to 1369
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Rome, Italy
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1109/ICC45041.2023.10278647
