Adults often respond negatively toward children with incarcerated parents. Yet, the developmental foundations for such negativity remain unclear. Two studies (
This content will become publicly available on March 27, 2025
Although children exhibit curiosity regarding science, questions remain regarding how children evaluate others' curiosity and whether evaluations differ across domains that prioritize faith (e.g., religion) versus those that value questioning (e.g., science). In Study 1 (
- Award ID(s):
- 2044360
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10497258
- Publisher / Repository:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Child Development
- ISSN:
- 0009-3920
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Abstract N = 331 U.S. residents; plurality White; plurality male; data collected between Winter 2019 and Spring 2021) addressed this topic. Study 1 probed 5‐ to 6‐year‐olds' and 7‐ to 8‐year‐olds' inferences about peers with and without incarcerated parents. Children reported less certainty that peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents possess moral beliefs. Study 2 showed that among older children, inferences about parental absence did not fully account for this pattern of results. Across studies, children behaved less generously toward peers with, versus without, incarcerated parents. These studies illuminate how early socio‐moral judgment may contribute to negativity toward children with incarcerated parents. -
Two experiments investigated how evaluations of intergroup curiosity differed depending on whether people placed responsibility for their learning on themselves or on outgroup members. In Study 1, participants ( n = 340; 51% White-American, 49% Black-American) evaluated White actors who were curious about Black culture and placed responsibility on outgroup members to teach versus on themselves to learn. Both Black and White participants rated the latter actors as more moral, and perceptions of effort mediated this effect. A follow-up preregistered study ( n = 513; 75% White-American) asked whether perceptions of greater effort cause greater perceptions of moral goodness. Replicating Study 1, participants rated actors as more moral when they placed responsibility on themselves versus others. Participants also rated actors as more moral when they exerted high versus low effort. These results clarify when and why participants view curiosity as morally good and help to strengthen bridges between work on curiosity, moral cognition, and intergroup relations.
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Abstract In response to some resource inequalities, children give priority to moral concerns. Yet, in others, children show ingroup preferences in their evaluations and resource allocations. The present study built upon this knowledge by investigating children's and young adults’ (
N = 144; 5–6‐year‐olds,M age = 5.83,SD age= .97; 9–11‐year‐olds,M age = 10.74,SD age= .68; and young adults,M age = 19.92,SD age = 1.10) evaluations and allocation decisions in a science inequality context. Participants viewed vignettes in which male and female groups received unequal amounts of science supplies, then evaluated the acceptability of the resource inequalities, allocated new boxes of science supplies between the groups, and provided justifications for their choices. Results revealed both children and young adults evaluated inequalities of science resources less negatively when girls were disadvantaged than when boys were disadvantaged. Further, 5‐ to 6‐year‐old participants and male participants rectified science resource inequalities to a greater extent when the inequality disadvantaged boys compared to when it disadvantaged girls. Generally, participants who used moral reasoning to justify their responses negatively evaluated and rectified the resource inequalities, whereas participants who used group‐focused reasoning positively evaluated and perpetuated the inequalities, though some age and participant gender findings emerged. Together, these findings reveal subtle gender biases that may contribute to perpetuating gender‐based science inequalities both in childhood and adulthood. -
Abstract Children are on a quest for knowledge. To achieve it, children must integrate separate but related episodes of learning. The theoretical model of memory integration posits that the process is supported by component cognitive abilities. In turn, memory integration predicts accumulation of a knowledge base. We tested this model in two studies (data collected in 2016–2018) with second (8‐year‐olds;
n = 391; 196 female; 36% Black, 27% Hispanic/Latinx, 29% White, and 8% multiracial) and third (9‐year‐olds;n = 282; 148 female; 36% Black, 31% Hispanic/Latinx, 27% White, and 5% multiracial) graders. The results support the theoretical model and the role of verbal comprehension in learning new information, and also indicate that verbal comprehension alone is not sufficient to build knowledge. -
ABSTRACT Moral decisions often involve dilemmas: cases of conflict between competing obligations. In two studies (
N = 204), we ask whether children appreciate that reasoning through dilemmas involves acknowledging that there is no single, simple solution. In Study 1, 5‐ to 8‐year‐old US children were randomly assigned to a Moral Dilemma condition, in which story characters face dilemmas between two prosocial actions, or a Personal Cost control, in which story characters face decisions between a matched prosocial action and a self‐interested action. Children were then presented with two reasoners who made the same judgment, but one confidently endorsed one moral action, and the other hesitantly acknowledged both actions. As they aged, children became more likely to prefer the uncertain reasoner's “way of thinking” in the Moral Dilemma compared to the Personal Cost condition. They also inferred that the uncertain reasoner was nicer and more trustworthy than the confident one. In Study 2, when both reasoners acknowledged the dilemma and differed only in their level of uncertainty, 5‐year‐olds preferred the acknowledgment to be accompanied by a confident decision, 6‐ and 7‐year‐olds preferred it be accompanied by uncertainty, and 8‐year‐olds showed no preference. These results show that, before the age at which children can resolve dilemmas successfully on their own, they recognize and value others who approach dilemmas with appropriate humility.