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1. Causal Constraints in the Life and Social Sciences

   https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.165  

   Ross, Lauren N. (December 2023, Philosophy of Science)

   Abstract This paper examines constraints and their role in scientific explanation. Common views in the philosophical literature suggest that constraints are non-causal and that they provide non-causal explanations. While much of this work focuses on examples from physics, this paper explores constraints from other fields, including neuroscience, physiology, and the social sciences. I argue that these cases involve constraints that are causal and that provide a unique type of causal explanation. This paper clarifies what it means for a factor to be a constraint, when such constraints are causal, and how they figure in scientific explanation. 

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2. What is social structural explanation? A causal account

   https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12446  

   Ross, Lauren_N (January 2023, Noûs)

   Abstract Social scientists appeal to various “structures” in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that social structure can be explanatory in virtue of operating as a causal constraint, which is a causal factor with unique characteristics. A novel causal framework is provided for understanding these explanations–this framework addresses puzzles regarding the mysterious causal influence of social structure, how to understand its relation to individual choice, and what makes it the main explanatory (and causally responsible) factor for various outcomes. 

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3. Causes with material continuity

   https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-021-09826-x  

   Ross, Lauren_N (November 2021, Biology & Philosophy)

   Abstract Recent philosophical work on causation has focused on distinctions across types of causal relationships. This paper argues for another distinction that has yet to receive attention in this work. This distinction has to do with whether causal relationships have “material continuity,” which refers to the reliable movement of material from cause to effect. This paper provides an analysis of material continuity and argues that causal relationships with this feature (1) are associated with a unique explanatory perspective, (2) are studied with distinct causal investigative methods, and (3) provide different types of causal control over their effects. 

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4. Cascade versus Mechanism: The Diversity of Causal Structure in Science

   https://doi.org/10.1086/723623  

   Ross, Lauren N. (May 2023, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science)

   According to mainstream philosophical views causal explanation in biology and neuroscience is mechanistic. As the term ‘mechanism’ gets regular use in these fields it is unsurprising that philosophers considerit important to scientific explanation. What is surprisingis that they consider it the only causal term of importance. This paper provides an analysis of a new causal concept—it examines the cascade concept in science and the causal structure it refers to. I argue that this conceptis importantly different from the notion of mechanism and that this difference matters for our understanding of causation and explanation in science. 

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5. Causal Approaches to Explanation

   Ross, Lauren N. (March 2023, Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy)

   Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (Ed.)

   This entry discusses some accounts of causal explanation developed after approximately 1990. Our focus in this entry is on the following three accounts – Section 1 those that focus on mechanisms and mechanistic explanations, Section 2 the kairetic account of explanation, and Section 3 interventionist accounts of causal explanation. All of these have as their target explanations of why or perhaps how some phenomenon occurs (in contrast to, say, explanations of what something is, which is generally taken to be non-causal) and they attempt to capture causal explanations that aim at such explananda. Section 4 then takes up some recent proposals having to do with how causal explanations may differ in explanatory depth or goodness. Section 5 discusses some issues having to do with what is distinctive about causal (as opposed to non-causal) explanations. 

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