The critical role played by email has led to a range of extension protocols (e.g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC) designed to protect against the spoofing of email sender domains. These protocols are complex as is, but are further complicated by automated email forwarding — used by individual users to manage multiple accounts and by mailing lists to redistribute messages. In this paper, we explore how such email forwarding and its implementations can break the implicit assumptions in widely deployed anti-spoofing protocols. Using large-scale empirical measurements of 20 email forwarding services (16 leading email providers and four popular mailing list services), we identify a range of security issues rooted in forwarding behavior and show how they can be combined to reliably evade existing anti-spoofing controls. We further show how these issues allow attackers to not only deliver spoofed email messages to prominent email providers (e.g., Gmail, Microsoft Outlook, and Zoho), but also reliably spoof email on behalf of tens of thousands of popular domains including sensitive domains used by organizations in government (e.g., state.gov), finance (e.g., transunion.com), law (e.g., perkinscoie.com) and news (e.g., washingtonpost.com) among others. 
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                            Understanding the Viability of Gmail's Origin Indicator for Identifying the Sender
                        
                    
    
            The current design of email authentication mechanisms has made it challenging for email providers to establish the authenticity of email messages with complicated provenance, such as in the case of forwarding or third-party sending services, where the purported sender of an email is different from the actual originator. Email service providers such as Gmail have tried to address this issue by deploying sender identity indicators (SIIs), which seek to raise users' awareness about where a message originated and encourage safe behavior from users. However, the success of such indicators depends heavily on user interpretation and behavior, and there exists no work that empirically investigates these aspects. In this work, we conducted an interactive survey (n=180) that examined user comprehension of and behavior changes prompted by Gmail's passive SII, the 'via' indicator. Our quantitative analysis shows that although most participants (89%) noticed the indicator, it did not have a significant impact on whether users would adopt safe behaviors. Additionally, our qualitative analysis suggests that once prompted to consider why 'via' is presented, the domain name displayed after 'via' heavily influenced participants' interpretation of the message 'via' is communicating. Our work highlights the limitations of using passive indicators to assist users in making decisions about email messages with complicated provenance. 
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                            - Award ID(s):
- 2152644
- PAR ID:
- 10505033
- Publisher / Repository:
- USENIX Association
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the Nineteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security
- ISBN:
- 978-1-939133-36-6
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 77 to 95
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Location:
- Anaheim, CA, USA
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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