- Award ID(s):
- 2212745
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10511528
- Editor(s):
- Guruswami, Venkatesan
- Publisher / Repository:
- Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
- Date Published:
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Posted-Price Mechanisms Asset Exchange Market Making Automated Market Makers (AMMs) Blockchains Decentralized Finance Incentive Compatibility Optimization Theory of computation → Algorithmic game theory Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design Theory of computation → Computational pricing and auctions
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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