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Title: Producing Moral Palatability in the Mexican Surrogacy Market
Scholars have long debated the relationship between morality and the market. Some argue that morality tempers market interests, while others argue that the market has its own moral order. Meanwhile, feminist scholars have argued that a false binary between altruism, family, and intimacy on the one hand, and the cold calculus of the market on the other, is based in gender ideologies. Norms around motherhood, in particular, emphasize self-sacrifice, love, and altruism in opposition to self-interested market logics. Commercial surrogacy blurs the line between family and commerce and is therefore an ideal setting for studying tensions between altruism and profit. Drawing on ethnographic research and interviews with 114 actors in the Mexican surrogacy industry, I demonstrate that treating altruism and commercialism as dichotomous can further market interests by preserving the moral palatability and profitability of the industry while perpetuating power asymmetries rooted in gender, race, class, and nationality between surrogate mothers and intended parents.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1656229
PAR ID:
10523324
Author(s) / Creator(s):
 
Publisher / Repository:
SAGE Publications
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Gender & Society
Volume:
33
Issue:
2
ISSN:
0891-2432
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: p. 273-295
Size(s):
p. 273-295
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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