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This content will become publicly available on February 1, 2026

Title: The Impact of Provider Payments on Health Care Utilization of Low-Income Individuals: Evidence from Medicare and Medicaid
Provider payments are the key determinant of insurance generosity within many health insurance programs covering low-income populations. This paper analyzes a large, federally mandated provider payment increase for primary care services provided to low-income elderly and disabled individuals. Using comprehensive administrative data, we leverage variation across beneficiaries and providers in the policy-induced payment increase in difference-in-differences and triple differences research designs. We find the payment increase led to a 6 percent increase in the targeted services for eligible beneficiaries, implying a payment elasticity of 1.2, and decreased the fraction of low-income beneficiaries with no primary care visit in a year by 9 percent. (JEL G22, I11, I13, I18, I38)  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1845190
PAR ID:
10578786
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Publisher / Repository:
American Economic Association
Date Published:
Journal Name:
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Volume:
17
Issue:
1
ISSN:
1945-7731
Page Range / eLocation ID:
106 to 143
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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