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Simple Fluctuations in Simple Glass Formers
- Award ID(s):
- 2154241
- PAR ID:
- 10581765
- Publisher / Repository:
- American Chemical Society
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- The Journal of Physical Chemistry B
- Volume:
- 128
- Issue:
- 49
- ISSN:
- 1520-6106
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 12237 to 12249
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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