Abstract: Reasoning patterns found in Galileo’s treatise on machines, On Mechanics, are compared with patterns identified in case studies of scientifically trained experts thinking aloud, and many similarities are found. At one level the primary patterns identified are ordered analogy sequences and special diagrammatic techniques to support them. At a deeper level I develop constructs to describe patterns that can support embodied, imagistic, mental simulations as a central underlying process. Additionally, a larger hypothesized pattern of ‘progressive imagistic generalization’—Galileo’s development of a model or mechanism that becomes more and more general with each machine while still being imagistically projectable into many machines—provides a way to think about his progress toward a modern explanatory model of torque. By unpacking his arguments, we gain an appreciation of his skillful ability to foster imagistic processes underlying scientific thinking.
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Reasoning Patterns in Galileo’s Analysis of Machines and in Expert Protocols: Roles for Analogy, Imagery, and Mental Simulation
Abstract Reasoning patterns found in Galileo’s treatise on machines, On Mechanics, are compared with patterns identified in case studies of scientifically trained experts thinking aloud, and many similarities are found. At one level the primary patterns identified are ordered analogy sequences and special diagrammatic techniques to support them. At a deeper level I develop constructs to describe patterns that can support embodied, imagistic, mental simulations as a central underlying process. Additionally, a larger hypothesized pattern of ‘progressive imagistic generalization’—Galileo’s development of a model or mechanism that becomes more and more general with each machine while still being imagistically projectable into many machines—provides a way to think about his progress toward a modern explanatory model of torque. By unpacking his arguments, we gain an appreciation of his skillful ability to foster imagistic processes underlying scientific thinking.
more »
« less
- Award ID(s):
- 1503456
- PAR ID:
- 10585746
- Publisher / Repository:
- Springer Nature
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Topoi
- Volume:
- 39
- Issue:
- 4
- ISSN:
- 0167-7411
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 973 to 985
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Galileo Imagery Analogy Mental simulation Mechanisms Visual argument
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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