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Over the past few years, the two dominant app platforms made major improvements to their policies surrounding child-directed apps. While prior work repeatedly demonstrated that privacy issues were prevalent in child-directed apps, it is unclear whether platform policies can lead child-directed apps to comply with privacy requirements, when laws alone have not. To understand the effect of recent changes in platform policies (e.g., whether they result in greater levels of compliance with applicable privacy laws), we conducted a large-scale measurement study of the privacy behaviors of 7,377 child-directed Android apps, as well as a follow-up survey with some of their developers. We observed a drastic decrease in the number of apps that transmitted personal data without verifiable parental consent and an increase in the number of apps that encrypted their transmissions using TLS. However, improper use of third-party SDKs still led to privacy issues (e.g., inaccurate disclosures in apps’ privacy labels). Our analysis of apps’ privacy practices over a period of a few months in 2023 and a comparison of our results with those observed a few years ago demonstrate gradual improvements in apps’ privacy practices over time. We discuss how app platforms can further improve their policies and emphasize the role of enforcement in making such policies effective.
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This content will become publicly available on April 1, 2026
Privacy Settings of Third-Party Libraries in Android Apps: A Study of Facebook SDKs
Previous studies have demonstrated that privacy issues in mobile apps often stem from the integration of third-party libraries (TPLs). To shed light on factors that contribute to these issues, we investigate the privacy-related configuration choices available to and made by Android app developers who incorporate the Facebook Android SDK and Facebook Audience Network SDK in their apps. We compile these Facebook SDKs' privacy-related settings and their defaults. Employing a multi-method approach that integrates static and dynamic analysis, we analyze more than 6,000 popular apps to determine whether the apps incorporate Facebook SDKs and, if so, whether and how developers modify settings. Finally, we assess how these settings align with the privacy practices that developers disclose in the apps’ privacy labels and policies. We observe widespread inconsistencies between practices and disclosures in popular apps. These inconsistencies often stem from privacy settings, including a substantial number of cases in which apps retain default settings over alternatives that offer greater privacy. We observe fewer possible compliance issues in potentially child-directed apps, but issues persist even in these apps. We discuss remediation strategies that SDK and TPL providers could employ to help developers, particularly developers with fewer resources who rely heavily on SDKs. Our recommendations include aligning default privacy settings with data minimization principles and other conservative practices and making privacy-related SDK information both easier to find and harder to miss.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1914486
- PAR ID:
- 10596981
- Publisher / Repository:
- Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Volume:
- 2025
- Issue:
- 2
- ISSN:
- 2299-0984
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 173 to 187
- Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
- Third-party libraries, software development kits, privacy settings, Facebook SDK, Android applications, dynamic analysis, default settings, compliance analysis, privacy labels, privacy policies
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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