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This content will become publicly available on June 30, 2026

Title: Research Directions in Software Supply Chain Security
Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-partydependencies/components/containers; by infiltrating thebuild infrastructureduring the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at thehumansinvolved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2207008
PAR ID:
10610449
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
ACM
Date Published:
Journal Name:
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Volume:
34
Issue:
5
ISSN:
1049-331X
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 38
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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