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Abstract Robust designs protect system utility in the presence of uncertainty in technical and operational outcomes. Systems-of-systems, which lack centralized managerial control, are vulnerable to strategic uncertainty from coordination failures between partially or completely independent system actors. This work assesses the suitability of a game-theoretic equilibrium selection criterion to measure system robustness to strategic uncertainty and investigates the effect of strategically robust designs on collaborative behavior. The work models interactions between agents in a thematic representation of a mobile computing technology transition using an evolutionary game theory framework. Strategic robustness and collaborative solutions are assessed over a range of conditions by varying agent payoffs. Models are constructed on small world, preferential attachment and random graph topologies and executed in batch simulations. Results demonstrate that systems designed to reduce the impacts of coordination failure stemming from strategic uncertainty also increase the stability of the collaborative strategy by increasing the probability of collaboration by partners; a form of robustness by environment shaping that has not been previously investigated in design literature. The work also demonstrates that strategy selection follows the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion and that changes in robustness to coordination failure can be measured with this criterion.
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This content will become publicly available on July 1, 2026
Strategic Engineering Design in Water Infrastructure: A Game-Theoretic Approach and Network Topology for Flood Irrigation Systems
Collaborative infrastructure systems are vital for managing scarce resources, particularly where user behaviors influence system sustainability. This study examines the relationship between design of constructed water infrastructure and strategic behaviors, focusing on flood irrigation systems as an example of collaborative infrastructure. The objectives are to investigate 1) whether shared water infrastructure can be effectively modeled using the stag hunt game framework and 2) how network topology impacts the strategic stability of user cooperation. Flood irrigation relies on collective action, where users balance risks of collaboration failure against benefits of successful cooperation. This situation closely aligns with stag hunt dynamics, in which users choose between a higher-value but riskier collaborative strategy or a lower-value, safer independent option. A key challenge arises when users opt out, increasing the burden on remaining collaborators. We apply a game-theoretic model using risk dominance criteria to analyze stability across four distinct infrastructure topologies: linear, tree, bus, and star. Results identify star and bus topologies as Pareto efficient, where a bus topology offers greater economic efficiency through reduced infrastructure costs and a star topology enhances stability due to equitable distribution of influence and reduced dependencies. An agent-based simulation validates analytical findings by dynamically captures user interactions under uncertainty and showing a strong correlation with game-theoretic results. Consequently, this study confirms the applicability of stag hunt frameworks for analyzing collaborative water infrastructure and provides practical insights into how topology design can influence cooperative resilience. These findings enhance knowledge for sustainable improvement of collaborative infrastructure.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2422337
- PAR ID:
- 10613287
- Publisher / Repository:
- Springer
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Water Resources Management
- ISSN:
- 0920-4741
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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