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Title: Thinking Fast and Slow: Data-Driven Adaptive DeFi Borrow-Lending Protocol
Decentralized finance (DeFi) borrowing and lending platforms are crucial to the decentralized economy, involving two main participants: lenders who provide assets for interest and borrowers who offer collateral exceeding their debt and pay interest. Collateral volatility necessitates over-collateralization to protect lenders and ensure competitive returns. Traditional DeFi platforms use a fixed interest rate curve based on the utilization rate (the fraction of available assets borrowed) and determine over-collateralization offline through simulations to manage risk. This method doesn't adapt well to dynamic market changes, such as price fluctuations and evolving user needs, often resulting in losses for lenders or borrowers. In this paper, we introduce an adaptive, data-driven protocol for DeFi borrowing and lending. Our approach includes a high-frequency controller that dynamically adjusts interest rates to maintain market stability and competitiveness with external markets. Unlike traditional protocols, which rely on user reactions and often adjust slowly, our controller uses a learning-based algorithm to quickly find optimal interest rates, reducing the opportunity cost for users during periods of misalignment with external rates. Additionally, we use a low-frequency planner that analyzes user behavior to set an optimal over-collateralization ratio, balancing risk reduction with profit maximization over the long term. This dual approach is essential for adaptive markets: the short-term component maintains market stability, preventing exploitation, while the long-term planner optimizes market parameters to enhance profitability and reduce risks. We provide theoretical guarantees on the convergence rates and adversarial robustness of the short-term component and the long-term effectiveness of our protocol. Empirical validation confirms our protocol’s theoretical benefits.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2325477
PAR ID:
10618771
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Editor(s):
Böhme, Rainer; Kiffer, Lucianna
Publisher / Repository:
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Date Published:
Volume:
316
ISSN:
1868-8969
ISBN:
978-3-95977-345-4
Page Range / eLocation ID:
27:1-27:23
Subject(s) / Keyword(s):
Defi borrow-lending adaptive market design decentralized finance Theory of computation → Market equilibria
Format(s):
Medium: X Size: 23 pages; 1394303 bytes Other: application/pdf
Size(s):
23 pages 1394303 bytes
Right(s):
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license; info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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