skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.


This content will become publicly available on May 12, 2026

Title: Alleviating the Fear of Losing Alignment in LLM Fine-tuning
Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated revolutionary capabilities in understanding complex contexts and performing a wide range of tasks. However, LLMs can also answer questions that are unethical or harmful, raising concerns about their applications. To regulate LLMs' responses to such questions, a training strategy called alignment can help. Yet, alignment can be unexpectedly compromised when fine-tuning an LLM for downstream tasks. This paper focuses on recovering the alignment lost during fine-tuning. We observe that there are two distinct directions inherent in an aligned LLM: the aligned direction and the harmful direction. An LLM is inclined to answer questions in the aligned direction while refusing queries in the harmful direction. Therefore, we propose to recover the harmful direction of the fine-tuned model that has been compromised. Specifically, we restore a small subset of the fine-tuned model's weight parameters from the original aligned model using gradient descent. We also introduce a rollback mechanism to avoid aggressive recovery and maintain downstream task performance. Our evaluation on 125 fine-tuned LLMs demonstrates that our method can reduce their harmful rate (percentage of answering harmful questions) from 33.25% to 1.74%, without sacrificing task performance much. In contrast, the existing methods either only reduce the harmful rate to a limited extent or significantly impact the normal functionality. Our code is available at https://github.com/kangyangWHU/LLMAlignment  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2319880 2029038
PAR ID:
10630534
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Publisher / Repository:
IEEE
Date Published:
ISBN:
979-8-3315-2236-0
Page Range / eLocation ID:
2152 to 2170
Format(s):
Medium: X
Location:
San Francisco, CA, USA
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks (Qi et al., 2023)– a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs’s safety alignment. While several defenses have been proposed, our evaluation shows that existing defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen – a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks. 
    more » « less
  2. Harmful fine-tuning attack poses serious safety concerns for large language models’ fine-tuning-as-a-service. While existing defenses have been proposed to mitigate the issue, their performances are still far away from satisfactory, and the root cause of the problem has not been fully recovered. To this end, we in this paper show that harmful perturbation over the model weights could be a probable cause of alignment-broken. In order to attenuate the negative impact of harmful perturbation, we propose an alignment-stage solution, dubbed Booster. Technically, along with the original alignment loss, we append a loss regularizer in the alignment stage’s optimization. The regularizer ensures that the model’s harmful loss reduction after the simulated harmful perturbation is attenuated, thereby mitigating the subsequent fine-tuning risk. Empirical results show that Booster can effectively reduce the harmful score of the fine-tuned models while maintaining the performance of downstream tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Booster. 
    more » « less
  3. Large language models (LLMs) with billions of parameters and pretrained on massive amounts of data are now capable of near or better than state-of-the-art performance in a variety of downstream natural language processing tasks. Neural machine translation (NMT) is one such task that LLMs have been applied to with great success. However, little research has focused on applying LLMs to the more difficult subset of NMT called simultaneous translation (SimulMT), where translation begins before the entire source context is available to the model. In this paper, we address key challenges facing LLMs fine-tuned for SimulMT, validate classical SimulMT concepts and practices in the context of LLMs, explore adapting LLMs that are fine-tuned for NMT to the task of SimulMT, and introduce Simul-LLM, the first open-source fine-tuning and evaluation pipeline development framework for LLMs focused on SimulMT. 
    more » « less
  4. Large language models (LLMs) are becoming a popular tool as they have significantly advanced in their capability to tackle a wide range of language-based tasks. However, LLMs applications are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which poses a critical problem. These attacks target LLMs applications through using carefully designed input prompts to divert the model from adhering to original instruction, thereby it could execute unintended actions. These manipulations pose serious security threats which potentially results in data leaks, biased outputs, or harmful responses. This project explores the security vulnerabilities in relation to prompt injection attacks. To detect whether a prompt is vulnerable or not, we follows two approaches: 1) a pre-trained LLM, and 2) a fine-tuned LLM. Then, we conduct a thorough analysis and comparison of the classification performance. Firstly, we use pre-trained XLMRoBERTa model to detect prompt injections using test dataset without any fine-tuning and evaluate it by zero-shot classification. Then, this proposed work will apply supervised fine-tuning to this pre-trained LLM using a task-specific labeled dataset from deep set in huggingface, and this fine-tuned model achieves impressive results with 99.13% accuracy, 100% precision, 98.33% recall and 99.15% F1-score thorough rigorous experimentation and evaluation. We observe that our approach is highly efficient in detecting prompt injection attacks. 
    more » « less
  5. Multiple choice questions are traditionally expensive to produce. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have led to fine-tuned LLMs that generate questions competitive with human-authored questions. However, the relative capabilities of ChatGPT-family models have not yet been established for this task. We present a carefully-controlled human evaluation of three conditions: a fine-tuned, augmented version of Macaw, instruction-tuned Bing Chat with zero-shot prompting, and humanauthored questions from a college science textbook. Our results indicate that on six of seven measures tested, both LLM’s performance was not significantly different from human performance. Analysis of LLM errors further suggests that Macaw and Bing Chat have different failure modes for this task: Macaw tends to repeat answer options whereas Bing Chat tends to not include the specified answer in the answer options. For Macaw, removing error items from analysis results in performance on par with humans for all metrics; for Bing Chat, removing error items improves performance but does not reach human-level performance. 
    more » « less