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Title: “Oh! Um. . . Sure”: Children and adults use other’s linguistic surprisal to reason about expectations and learn stereotypes
While people may be reluctant to explicitly state social stereotypes, their underlying beliefs may nonetheless leak out in subtler conversational cues, such as surprisal reactions that convey information about expectations. Across 3 experiments with adults and children (ages 4-9), we compare permissive responses ("Sure, you can have that one") that vary the presence of surprisal cues (interjections "oh!" and disfluencies "um"). In Experiment 1 (n = 120), children by 6-to-7 use surprisal reactions to infer that a boy more likely made a counter-stereotypical choice. In Experiment 2, we demonstrate that these cues are sufficient for children (n = 120) and adults (n = 80) to learn a novel expectation about a group of aliens. In Experiment 3, adults (n = 150) use the distribution of surprisal information to infer whether a novel behavior is gender-stereotyped. Across these experiments, we see emerging evidence that conversational feedback may provide a crucial and unappreciated avenue for the transmission of social beliefs.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
2317559
PAR ID:
10632438
Author(s) / Creator(s):
;
Publisher / Repository:
Cognitive Science Society
Date Published:
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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