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1. Delegation in Veto Bargaining

   https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201817  

   Kartik, Navin; Kleiner, Andreas; Van Weelden, Richard (December 2021, American Economic Review)

   A proposer requires a veto player’s approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer’s preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including “full delegation”: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer’s ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned. (JEL D72, D82) 

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2. Parallelizable Delegation from LWE

   https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22365-5_22  

   Cody Freitag, Rafael Pass (January 2022, TCC'22)
3. Multi-agent goal delegation

   Gogineni, Venkatsampath R.; Kondrakunta, Sravya; Cox, Michael T. (November 2021, Proceedings of the 9th Goal Reasoning Workshop)

   Autonomous agents in a multi-agent system work with each other to achieve their goals. However, In a partially observable world, current multi-agent systems are often less effective in achieving their goals. This limitation is due to the agents’ lack of reasoning about other agents and their mental states. Another factor is the agents’ inability to share required knowledge with other agents. This paper addresses the limitations by presenting a general approach for autonomous agents to work together in a multi-agent system. In this approach, an agent applies two main concepts: goal reasoning- to determine what goals to pursue and share; Theory of mind-to select an agent(s) for sharing goals and knowledge. We evaluate the performance of our multi-agent system in a Marine Life Survey Domain and compare it to another multi-agent system that randomly selects agent(s) to delegates its goals. 

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4. Non-Interactive Publicly-Verifiable Delegation of Committed Programs

   https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_20  

   Ghosal, Riddhi; Sahai, Amit; Waters, Brent (January 2023, PKC 2023)
5. Delegation and strategic collusion under antitrust policies: An experiment;

   https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2025.102361  

   Kim, Jeong_Yeol (April 2025, China Economic Review)

   Ackert, Lucy; Wei, Lijia; QI, Li (Ed.)

   When firm owners delegate decision-making to managers, such as corporate executives who operate firms directly, a firm’s behavior can vary depending on how the owner determines the incentives of the managers. This study employs a lab experiment to investigate the impact of delegation on collusive behavior of firms in a situation where antitrust policies exist. The experiment highlights the following two key findings: (i) Firms form cartels strategically, alternating their collusive and competitive output to evade antitrust regulations, rather than consistently producing collusive output to maximize joint profits; and (ii) Delegation does not necessarily increase the overall number of cartels, but it may change how cartels are formed. 

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